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Abstract 
 
 
This study endeavours to investigate the philosophical and poetological 
dimensions, the philological origins, and significant philosophical-literary 
representations of the Same. It also assesses sameness as a philosophical and 
poetological modus operandi; that is to say, it analyzes the ways in which the 
Same operates in different types of discourses both as an object of investigation 
and as an agent of (poetic) thought. The concept of the Same or the operation of 
sameness as the philosophical question par excellence will be considered in the 
development of Continental philosophy and philosophical poetics from classical 
antiquity to Postmodernism, and its transposition into poetry.  
The elaboration of the issue of sameness encompasses any philosophical 
inquiry which seeks to establish the essence of Being and make it susceptible to a 
general, unifying principle: as a search for an underlying element; for a 
metaphysical unity or universal, preceding division or difference and amounting 
to the harmony in the Universe; or for a transcendental absolute totality. 
Postulations of the pure conceptual difference are likewise examined as part of the 
elaboration of sameness, and will be viewed as indispensable for revealing the 
genuine plenitude of sameness. 
Part One traces the inception of sameness as a concept of pure identity, 
amounting to the harmony of the Universe by virtue of the operations of 
belonging (Presocratics), participation (Plato), and emanation (Plotinus), anchored 
in the relationships between the One and the many, between the Whole and its 
parts, between the Original and the copy. Part Two inquires into the limits of 
postulating sameness in terms of pure identity and points to two possible solutions 
to this problem: a philosophical-aesthetic digression from sameness (Kant and 
related aesthetic theories of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries) and the 
return to sameness as an absolute totality in Part Three (Schelling and Hegel). 
Part Four investigates the re-postulation of sameness as pure Difference 
(Nietzsche, Heidegger, Derrida), hence the entire re-organization of thought in 
terms of the other. Part Five analyzes the transposition of sameness from 
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philosophy into the poetic language of repetition, using Rilke’s Sonnets to 
Orpheus as its prime poetic example. 
It will be argued that the philosophical displacement of the Same from a 
concept of identity into that of difference does not amount to an abandonment of 
its plenitude, but rather points to the need for a precarious balance between 
sameness and difference, the simultaneous quest for unity and the absolute 
singularity of the other. This balance, it will be argued, must be sought for in 
every genuine creation.  
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Introduction 
 
‘What has to be declared is that the one, which is not, 
solely exists as operation’.1 
 
This thesis attempts an investigation of the philosophical and poetological 
dimensions of the Same. It explores the philological origins as well as significant 
philosophical and literary representations of the Same as the fundamental 
underlying principle of cognition and of Being (idem, το αΰτό … the same). In so 
doing it assesses the Same and sameness as a philosophical and poetological 
modus operandi, too; that is to say, it analyzes the ways in which the Same 
operates in different types of discourses both as an object of investigation and as 
an agent of (poetic) thought. The concept of the Same or the operation of 
sameness as the philosophical question par excellence will be considered in the 
development of Continental philosophy and philosophical poetics. 
Since sameness belongs to the most universal concepts which resist any 
attempt at definition, or, to formulate it in philosophical terms, since an enigma 
lies a priori in any attempt at its conceptualization, sameness will be elaborated 
here with regard to its most prominent postulations throughout the history of 
Continental philosophy and its transposition into poetry. The elaboration of the 
issue of sameness carried out here will therefore encompass any philosophical 
inquiry which seeks to achieve knowledge of the same world that all humans 
share and that is presupposed by the very notion of universality. It will also 
encompass the human quest for the discovery that there is something that is 
identically the same for humanity, comprising the quest for knowing or 
establishing the essence of Being and making it susceptible to a general, unifying 
principle. The assessment of the same world, the one in which we all live, is 
primarily linked to the human dream for plenitude, unity, totality, and harmony, 
preceding difference, otherness, and contradiction. 
                                                 
1 Alain Badiou, Being and Event, trans by Oliver Feltham (USA: Continuum, 2007), p. 24. 
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The philosophical concept of the Same or the operation of sameness is as 
old as the discourse of philosophy itself. Yet, once the philosophy of sameness is 
considered, the Same occurs as a problem rather than as a doctrine. For these 
reasons, far from providing answers or supervening structures in all of these cases, 
sameness rather provokes and entices us into philosophical questioning. The 
philosophical questioning of the issue of sameness allows us to distinguish 
between its three essential stages: 1) the postulations of sameness with regard to 
pure identity (from Presocratics to Kant); 2) the postulation of sameness with 
regard to identity and difference where difference is subordinated to identity 
(German Idealism); 3) the postulation of pure difference or the absolutely singular 
differential (from Nietzsche to Postmodernism). 
The aim of this inquiry is not only to reveal the significance of the 
operation of sameness, but also to stress the absolute indispensability of all three 
stages in its genuine understanding. The significance of the first stage, as that of 
the inception of the philosophical postulations of the Same or the operation of 
sameness lies primarily in enabling human thought to transcend earthly 
phenomena toward the intellectually intelligible realm through the search for an 
underlying principle of unity or a metaphysical universal amounting to the 
harmony and plenitude within the Universe. Yet, we have also to acknowledge the 
limits of these postulations (starting from Plato) which reduce sameness to pure 
identity by disregarding the factor of difference circulating at the very heart of 
sameness. The second stage should be credited as the period, starting with which 
onward, it becomes impossible to think of sameness beyond the mediation of 
difference which, far from standing for the conception of pure difference, is still a 
conceptual category dominated by identity and included in the Absolute. The 
impact of the third stage is invaluable for the assessment of the issue of sameness 
in its plenitude, i.e. from the aspect of searching for the right balance between 
identity and difference where identity is being experienced in the otherness and 
différance (a Derridean term) of the repetition of the absolutely singular 
differential. This stage re-establishes the thought of sameness that welcomes 
difference which has always already been inscribed within it.  
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The juxtaposition of these three relevant stages within the history of 
sameness, we suggest, provides an understanding of the necessity of the right 
balance between identity and difference in artistic creation. This understanding, 
we believe, will open vistas for establishing new frameworks in artistic creations, 
liberated not only from the dominance of metaphysical representation and 
necessity, i.e. from the dominance of pure identity, but also from the dominance 
of the so called hyperreality and transaesthetics (Baudrillardian metaphors), i.e. 
from the dominance of pure difference detached from the wisdom of sameness. 
The aforementioned fundamental traits of the operation of sameness, 
developing from a concept of pure identity into the postulation of pure conceptual 
difference, along with its transposition into the realm of poetry are discussed in 
detail in the five parts of this study. 
Sameness gains systematic significance in Western thought as early as the 
Presocratics. Part One, Thinking of Identity, accordingly attempts to demonstrate 
the inception of sameness in Ancient Greek philosophy by virtue of the operations 
of belonging (pre-Socratics), participation (Plato) and emanation (Plotinus), 
anchored in the relationships between Whole and parts, Original and copy, One 
and many. The focus is made upon the significance of the paradigmatic treatment 
of sameness in Plato and its delineation in the form of the eidé, thereby 
differentiating between the supreme realm of the intelligible and its worldly 
representations (shadows).  The opposition between the eidé and their shadows — 
that is, between the intelligible and the material or sensuous — is inscribed 
decisively into philosophy by Plato. Its relevance with regard to poetics becomes 
manifest in Plato’s claims concerning the mimetic nature of art, particularly 
poetry, whereby their function is reduced to that of the representation of nothing 
but the Same, in the form of the eidé. Yet, we can also speak of Plato’s 
questioning of sameness alongside his conceptualization of it; a questioning which 
appears in various assertions, beliefs, metaphors, and sometimes ironies expressed 
throughout his dialogues.  
   The characteristic trait of the first stage of the philosophical postulation 
of sameness is that it focuses merely upon one of its aspects: that of pure identity. 
A mere outline of this stage which extends up to Kant, focuses upon its 
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representation of the unity of identity as pure unmediated sameness in its 
plenitude, by either disregarding the absolutely singular differential or 
subordinating it to the dominating idea of identity. Far from providing a 
comprehensive analysis, this outline sketches the development of Western 
thinking on identity by virtue of analogy throughout the Middle Ages, the 
Renaissance, and the early Enlightenment, focusing in particular upon the 
philosophical systems of Spinoza and Leibniz, and aiming to demonstrate the 
continuity of a tradition which is based in the representation of the unity of 
identity as mere sameness. 
The limits of the postulation of sameness in terms of pure identity are 
regarded as a vantage point, vis-à-vis of which, Parts Two and Three are 
constructed.  
Part Two, Digression from Sameness, points to one of the possible 
solutions to these acknowledged limits: a philosophical-aesthetic digression from 
sameness, typical of Kant and the aesthetics of seventeenth-eighteenth centuries 
when philosophy abstains from posing the issue of sameness at all, thereby 
questioning the status of this philosophical principle par excellence. In so doing, 
this part traces the digression from sameness which, it will be argued, amounts to 
an entire reorganization of thought with regard to which the origin of philosophy 
and of philosophical poetics are being rethought outside the realm of the 
representation of the Same.  
As a characteristic trait of digression, Part Two examines the philosophical 
system of Kant, since it is Kant who posits understanding or intellect as a 
substitute for the metaphysical signified of the Same. It also inquires into the 
aesthetics theories of the seventeenth-eighteenth centuries, the function of which 
is to validate art in non-cognitive terms with regard to its practical functions, 
according to taste, pleasure, naturalness and truth. As a result, philosophy is 
anthropologized, rethought as a reflection on subjectivity and reduced to the realm 
of judgements derived from experience or empirical observations and their a 
priori conditions. Here, the subjective assessment of experience, sharply 
distinguishing between thinking and being, substitutes for the objective 
assessment of the Same with its posited continuity of thinking and being. 
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In order to discuss the new standards for validating art  —  standards 
which are derived from the suspension of the issue of sameness  —  and to 
examine whether they reveal the hitherto concealed mystery of the art-work or 
represent merely a limited conception, irreconcilable with its genuine essence, this 
part inquires into the prevailing aesthetic theories of the given period. In so doing, 
it traces the digression from sameness through the aesthetic validations of the 
phenomenal appearance of art-works with regard to the categories of the beautiful 
and the sublime. The newly formed discipline of aesthetics is examined in terms 
of the transposition of its inquiry from the cognition of the Same (as its object of 
cognition) into the realization of the ego’s subjectivity in respect of the opposed 
objectivity. This inquiry into late eighteenth and early nineteenth century aesthetic 
theory will endeavour to demonstrate that according to this paradigm, art is being 
validated in respect of fortuitous principles and faculties via the analysis of its 
generic peculiarities, kinds, disposition of qualities, and principles of definition. 
The process of digression is also examined in the development of empirical, 
emotional, psychological, and pragmatic interpretations of art, in which the focus 
on fortuitous principles (the emotions of the reader) substitutes for the prime 
principle of sameness.  
The brief outline of the aesthetic legacy preceding and following Kant 
provided in Part Two aims at demonstrating not only the limits of digression, but 
also the conceptual limits of pure identity of sameness and, hence, the need for its 
re-postulation. These limits condition the search for a re-establishment of 
sameness as the fundamental question of philosophy. 
Part Three, The Return to Sameness, offers a discussion of the second 
approach vis-à-vis the vantage point of the impossibility of representing sameness 
in terms of pure identity. This approach amounts to the re-establishment of 
sameness as the central issue of philosophy upon a new speculative level by the 
philosophy of German Idealism, notably through the systems of Schelling and 
Hegel. This re-establishment of sameness is accomplished by postulating it upon 
the level of an absolute totality which encompasses both identity and difference, 
as opposed to its prior postulation as pure identity in the period of classical 
metaphysics. This brings about a transposition of the issue of sameness from the 
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dimension of pure identity into that of a unity of identity and difference. As the 
inquiry into the texts by Schelling and Hegel demonstrates, in their conceptions of 
the Absolute (despite the differences in these conceptions) difference has an equal 
standing with identity and is a means through which the totality manifests itself. 
This philosophical-poetic retreat from the period of digression, considered 
as a quest to re-cohere the dissected and differentiated spheres of cognizance 
under the aegis of sameness is also examined in view of the validation of art no 
longer according to the principles of taste, pleasure, and naturalness, but vis-à-vis 
its relation to sameness. 
This part stresses the significance of the return to sameness in several 
aspects: in that it points to the limits of the philosophical digression from 
sameness; it considers the re-coherence and re-integration of the formerly 
dichotomized spheres of cognition; it provides a comprehensive theory of the 
identity of sameness as the totality of the Absolute; and it postulates the 
philosophical conception of difference.  
The subsequent postulation of pure difference that focuses upon the 
absolute otherness of the singular (dealt with in Part Four) only becomes possible 
upon this very ground of the comprehensive theory of the identity of sameness. 
Solely in the precarious balance between identity and difference, it will be argued, 
does the plenitude of sameness as the experience of the other scintillate in its full 
splendour.  
Part Four, Difference, has been developed upon the assessment of the 
limits of both prior approaches: the digression and the return. Its significance lies 
namely in the postulation of pure difference within sameness, thereby reasserting 
sameness among the fundamental issues of philosophy and opening up the space 
of freedom and creativity in experiencing the infinite potentiality of its otherness 
and différance. The conception of difference here is no longer conceived as the 
ground for the circulation of the identical as totality and is not subordinated to the 
principle of identity, but it is rather identity that is being experienced in the 
otherness of repetition. Difference has no other aim than its own repetition and 
reproduction via decentring and divergence. 
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This part also examines the metamorphoses of the issue of sameness due to 
the limits of its postulations as a transcendental signified of identity and totality 
and its reestablishment in respect of otherness and difference. What is at stake is 
the demonstration of the destruction of the Same and the infinite potentiality of an 
already emancipated sameness opened up by virtue of the destabilization of its 
integrity. The contrivances of the new postulation of sameness are investigated 
through their manifestations in philosophical texts by Nietzsche, Heidegger, and 
Derrida, all of whom, despite their very individual attitudes, are viewed as 
transgressing the coherence of representation and transposing the issue of 
sameness into an experience: by virtue of the heterogeneity of the singular, the 
originary postulation of Being, or the overlapping of deconstructive 
infrastructures. The space of creative freedom, opened up as a result of the 
liberation from signification is traced in the immediacy of experience, the 
otherness of the multiple, and the iterability of language and play. The movement 
of becoming in this context is not directed towards the return of the Same, but is 
one that creates, destroys, and grounds repetition upon the death of God and the 
dissolution of the self. This new space of creative freedom is a dynamical one, 
open up to the endless metamorphoses of the extreme after being pushed to its 
limits; a culture rightly described as the veritable theatrical world of 
metamorphoses. It is to the very examination of this incredible space of 
difference, credited as founding of the theatrum philosophicum that Part Four is 
dedicated. 
In Part Five, entitled The Transposition of Sameness from Philosophy into 
the Poetic Language of Repetition, the transposition of the issue of sameness from 
the domain of philosophy into that of the poetic language is examined. The 
preconditions for this transposition lie in the acknowledgement of the impuissance 
of the philosophical discourse to provide an adequate conceptualization of 
sameness and the quest to recreate the issue of sameness through the mediation of 
language. These acknowledgements condition the quest for the pure language 
empowered to express the experience of sameness in the poetic language of 
repetition, no longer a repetition of the Same, but of itself as pure signifier, 
signifying nothing but itself. 
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The phenomenon of this transposition — starting with Nietzsche, 
Heidegger, and Derrida, and delineated in Part Four — is investigated here 
through poetic texts by Rainer Maria Rilke, in particular Die Sonette an Orpheus 
(Sonnets to Orpheus, 1922). The textual analyses of the poems aim at 
demonstrating Rilke’s coinage of a new poetic language of repetition. The concept 
of repetition is discussed not only in the ideal organization of pure language in the 
bare repetition of the singular form of the poem, but is also unfolded in terms of 
key threads of twentieth century thought, especially several found in 
postmodernism which challenge and deconstruct the operation of sameness in 
order to unfold the repetition of the Other. The postmodernist understanding of 
repetition is elaborated through texts by Gilles Deleuze, Jacques Derrida, Michel 
Foucault, Roland Barthes, Jean Baudrillard, and others.  
It is essential to note that it is not within the scope of this study to 
provide either an investigation of Rilke’s poetic legacy, or to cover the field of 
secondary sources concerned with Rilke, rather an attempt is made to demonstrate 
the transposition of the issue of sameness from philosophy into the pure poetic 
language of repetition. This very attempt conditions greatly the choice of certain 
sonnets from the entire cycle, and also the reason for granting more space to some 
sonnets rather than to others. 
 The proceeding discussions of vastly different philosophical systems do 
not aim at representing the discourse of sameness as an homogeneous meta-
discourse; rather they endeavour to stress its significance for Western 
philosophical and poetic thought. Moreover, all these postulations of sameness in 
respect of both, identity or difference are likewise inquired into as part of the 
elaboration of the issue of sameness, and will be viewed as indispensable for 
revealing its genuine plenitude. Hence, even the controversial stages of 
Continental philosophy (those of identity, digression, and difference) will be 
viewed generally as an expression of the need to re-think sameness in an adequate 
manner. 
To sum up, the considerations provided in this account aim primarily at 
provoking a recognition of the irrefutable role the operation of sameness has 
always already played in the philosophical and poetic tradition.  
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Part One: Thinking of Identity 
 
 
That which is identical, in Latin idem, is in Greek το αΰτό … the same.1 
 
 
        ... Listening not to me but to the Logos  
 It is wise to agree (homo-log-ein) that  
 All things are one.  
                                    Heraclitus.2 
                            
 
The present part traces the inception of the philosophical postulations of the Same 
or the operation of sameness as the search for an underlying principle of unity and 
identity amounting to the harmony and plenitude within the Universe. It will both 
stress the significance of the postulation of sameness, enabling human thought to 
transcend earthly phenomena toward the intellectually intelligible realm, and the 
limits of these postulations, which reduce sameness to pure identity.  
We will attempt to establish the characteristic traits of the first stage of the 
philosophical postulation of the Same — extending from the Presocratics to Kant 
— in so far as it focuses upon one of its aspects only: that of identity. At this 
stage, generalized in this study under the heading Thinking of Identity, the unity of 
identity is represented as pure unmediated sameness in its plenitude. According to 
Heidegger, the earliest and most authentic representation of the Same — with 
Parmenides — is with regard to pure identity. Here, the Same is represented in 
virtue of ‘the claim of identity’ that ‘speaks from the Being of beings’ or by the 
speaking of the Same itself, described as the speaking of ‘το αΰτό, that which is 
identical, in a way that is almost too powerful’.3 
                                                           
1 Martin Heidegger, Identity and Difference, trans., and with an intr. by Joan Stambaugh  
   (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1969), p. 23. 
2 Heraclitus, The Cosmic Fragments, ed. by Geoffrey Stephen Kirk (Cambridge: Cambridge  
  University Press, 1954), p. 65. 
3 Heidegger, Identity and Difference, p. 27. 
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As has been observed, the Ancient Greek philosophical thought most often 
associated with the postulation of sameness as identity, locates the Same in the 
metaphysical-transcendental dimension. The concept of the Same (idem, το αΰτό 
… the same) is postulated here as a unity of identity, homogeneity and plenitude, 
the ineffable One above all enumeration and the immanent cause of all 
phenomena. Sameness is traced and marked prominently as far back as the 
Presocratics, where it is imaged in the philosophical operation of belonging, 
which is either the seeking of ultimate elements and fundamental underlying 
principles accounting for the earthly phenomena, or the ascent from particulars 
toward the realm of the universals. The Greek operation of sameness comprises 
thus either a reduction of all appearances to the prime principle or the ascent 
toward an intelligible principle. 
The present part traces the various postulations of sameness in the Ancient 
Greek philosophy by virtue of the operations of belonging (the Presocratics), 
participation (Plato) and emanation (Plotinus), anchored in the relationships 
between Whole and parts, One and many, Original and image. It also presents the 
perspectives of the development of an identical thinking in terms of analogy 
throughout the Middle Ages, Renaissance, as well as relevant aspects of the 
philosophical systems of Spinoza and Leibniz, aiming to demonstrate the 
continuity of the tradition, rooted in the representation of the unity of identity as 
mere sameness, disregarding the factor of the absolutely singular differential. 
The focus is made here upon the significance of the paradigmatic 
treatment of sameness in Plato and his postulation of the Same in the realm of the 
eidé, thereby bringing about a strict distinction between the supreme realm of the 
intelligible and its worldly representations (shadows). The opposition between 
eidé and its shadows, sensible and intelligible inscribed decisively into philosophy 
by Plato is deeply installed into Western philosophical thought. Its relevance with 
regard to poetics becomes manifested in Plato’s claim of the mimetic nature of art, 
particularly poetry, whereby their function is reduced to that of the representation 
of the Same. The mimetic theory of art will be examined in a variety of aspects 
characteristic of the dialogues: deciphering the mystery of poetry as the reflection 
of the pure vision of the Same, claiming the impersonality of artistic vision by 
making metaphysical provision for linking the eidé in the individual mind to the 
universal and unchanging eidé of the world pattern, or elevating poetry to an 
eminence over all human pursuits, in close connection to the eidé. 
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Yet, what must ultimately be accounted for with reference to the 
intelligible principle of the Same is that it has never been clearly defined or 
conceptualized in philosophical thought in view of the resistance it shows against 
the limitations characteristic of the human cognitive powers of sense-perception 
and discursive reason. Or, probably, this resistance is due to the primal intactness 
— inscribed in the operation of sameness — of name and thing that rejects any 
finality of explanation, giving preference to the untellable with respect to the told, 
the unformed with respect to the formed. Perhaps for this reason, Plato rather 
questions than conceptualizes the Same, alluding to it through metaphors or 
investigating it in still another layer of its inexpressibility, or with regard to its 
non-being. This shift from the being to the non-being of the Same opens vistas for 
the subsequent analyses of the Multiple, thereby maintaining sameness as an 
operation. It also marks a possibility for liberating art from the domain of 
representation and viewing it with respect to the repetition of the other. 
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1. The inception of the Same in Ancient Greece 
 
 
The conception of sameness in its subtle contrivances has been unceasingly 
haunting philosophical thought since its inception in Greece. In line with Indian 
metaphysics and Chinese Taoism, the Greek philosophical traditions, combining 
diverse influences, forge a philosophy of the ineffable One beyond all 
differentiation, anchored in the concept of the identity and unity of the Cosmos as 
a harmonious prime totality. The ontology of the One implies a theory of the 
univocal Being as the immanent cause of all genera of beings which corresponds 
to the eminence of Oneness. The Multiple is present in this very One, and the 
latter is itself present in the Multiple and explicates itself through it. The 
relationship between the One and the Multiple encompasses thus all the aspects of 
the operation of sameness or identity: belonging, participation, emanation, and 
immanence. In the Ancient Greek philosophical tradition the operation of 
sameness is designated sometimes as the search for the prime irreducible element 
of things and sometimes as the search for the whole which is more than the sum of 
its parts. In respect of Greek Cosmology with its inconceivability of Nothingness 
and its focus on the conception of Being as Cosmic Harmony, the Universe is not 
created out of nothing, ex nihilo, but is moulded from existing material. The 
operation of belonging is correspondingly the search for the primary material out 
of which the Greek Cosmos was moulded.  Belonging as the elementary form of 
sameness is historically formed within the philosophical traditions of the 
Presocratics who, departing from analyzing the fortuitous or derivative attributes 
of objects, seek the origin or the first principle that unifies all matter. In so doing, 
they infinitely divide matter in search of ultimate natural elements which possess 
a given property and account for the oneness of beings, serving as the foundation 
of the conceptual oneness of the Universe. 
The ontological scheme of belonging is thus a descent towards ultimate 
constituents or a reduction of beings to fundamental elements, such as water, fire, 
air or the infinite being. According to Thales of Miletus, (c. 624 BC – c. 546 BC), 
water is the fundamental or primary thing, the primary substance of which all 
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other things are mere transient forms,4 while Heraclitus of Ephesus (c. 535 BC – 
c. 475 BC) reduces the ontological problems of creation, cosmic order and naming 
to fire as the prime constituent, forming the world: ‘This [world-] order did none 
of gods or men make, but it always was and is and shall be: an ever-living fire, 
kindling in measures and going out in measures.’5 Yet, his conception of logos 
(λόγου),6 according to which all things occur, contains elements of participation, 
which is later fully developed by Plato. The Heraclitean operation of participation 
grounds between the unity and the multiple an identity of essence implying a 
concentration of the multiple within the unity, which is itself the cause of the 
multiple: ‘Things taken together are whole and not whole, something which is 
being brought together and brought apart, which is in tune and out of tune: out of 
all things can be made a unity, and out of a unity, all things.’7  
The most scientific among the operations of belonging is the reduction of 
all matter to ultimate indivisible, immutable particles, atoms, by the Greek 
atomists Leucippus of Miletus (first half of the 5th century BC) and Democritus (c. 
460 – c. 370 BC). The primary theme of their ontology is the void, while atoms 
are the second principle of being, after the void. Fragment 47 of Democritus8 
asserts that the material cause of all things that exist is the coming together of 
atoms and void. Atoms are eternal, have many different shapes, and can cluster 
together to create things that are perceivable. Differences in the shape, 
arrangement, and position of atoms produce different things. The atomist 
conception of the Universe is a homogeneous infinite vacuum full of infinite 
number of atoms which, through various formations give birth to the distinctive 
properties of matter. 
Anaximander of Miletos9 (c. 610 BC – c. 546 BC) is the first to have  
introduced the term Infinite as the material cause and first element of things, 
substituting it for the material cause. He claims that the ultimate constituent has to 
                                                           
4 Thales: Fragments, trans. by John Burnet, (1908), <http://philoctetes.free.fr/thaleseng.htm>,  
   [accessed 20 August 2010]. 
5 Heraclitus, The Cosmic Fragments, p. 307. 
6 Ibid, p. 65. 
7 Heraclitus, The Cosmic Fragments, p. 184.  
8 Geoffrey Stephen Kirk, The Presocratic Philosophers (Cambridge: Cambridge   
   University Press, 1962).  
9 Anaximander: Fragments, trans. by John Burnet, (1908),  
   <http://philoctetes.free.fr/anaximander.htm>, [accessed 20 August 2010].  
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be a substance different from the elements of water, air or fire which is the 
infinite, from which arise all the heavens and the worlds within them. 
The Greek dream of plenitude and harmony with its inconceivability of 
nonbeing is represented at large by Parmenides (c. 515 BC – c. 445 BC), who 
inextricably links the operation of sameness to the ontology of being and 
introduces the idea of truth as unconcealment, Aletheia. He offers thinking unified 
with being by viewing nature as the reflection of one and the Same being: ‘The 
thing that can be thought and that for which the thought exists is the same.’10 The 
operation of sameness is revealed through the substantive concept of the Same, 
which is defined as ‘the same’, which ‘rests in the self-same place’,11 contrary to 
the nonbeing, which can neither be known, nor uttered:  ‘thou canst not know 
what is not — that is impossible — nor utter it’ (4,5).12 
Parmenides represents an operation of emanation involving a system of the 
Supreme Monistic Principle of the One, which will become the dominating 
principle of Neoplatonism. The nature of the One is designated in the poem by 
virtue of the motions of emanation and reconciliation through which, to use 
Martin Henn’s words, ‘the microcosm of thought recapitulates the macrocosm of 
Being, by becoming one with nature’.13 
Parmenides is the first in Greek thought not only to postulate the Same as a 
transcendental objective defining it as the ‘continuous one’,14 but also substantiate 
it as a concept of plenitude and cohesion, by representing the entire range of its 
characteristic features: ‘uncreated and indestructible, […] complete, immovable, 
and without end’, indivisible, ‘all alike, […] wholly continuous […], without 
beginning and without end.’15 Parmenides’s being coincides with the Greek idea 
of an identical, homogeneous Cosmos excluding any temporality: ‘nor was it ever, 
nor will it be, for now it is all alike.’16 
                                                           
10 Parmenides, ‘On Nature’, in Early Greek Philosophy, ed. by John Burnet  
    (London: A&C Black, 1920), fragment (8), pp. 174 -176. 
11 Parmenides, ‘On Nature’, pp. 174 -176. 
12 Ibid, p. 173.  
13 Martin J. Henn, Parmenides of Elea: A Verse Translation with Interpretative  
   Essays and Commentary to the Text (London: Praeger Publishers, 2003), p. 53. 
14 Parmenides, ‘On Nature’, pp. 174-176.  
15 Ibid, pp. 174-176. 
16 Ibid, pp. 174-176. 
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The operation of emanation, harboured in the Oneness and harmony of the 
Cosmos (Pythagoras is the first to apply the term kosmos, literally meaning world-
order and ornament to indicate a beautifully ordered universe) is reduced to 
numbers by Pythagoras of Samos (c. 570 BC – c. 495 BC), in respect of whom, 
numbers, apart from denoting the relationships between things, possess intrinsic 
meanings. Pythagoras’s philosophy reflects the concept of sameness by virtue of a 
unique science of numbers which, due to the sacred metaphysical dimensions 
intrinsic in them, lie at the heart of his idea of an identical Cosmos. Through the 
symbolic usage of numbers, Pythagoras offers the archetypal paradigm of creation 
as One - Multiple (Two) - Unity (Three), where the number stops being a sign 
whose function is to denote a specific quantity and is transformed into a 
qualitative entity. The Pythagoreans thus believe that Oneness, the Monad or the 
Unity is the principle or the root, from which all things as manifestations of 
diversity in a unified continuum spring forth. The definition of Theon of Smyrna 
serves as a characteristic for the Pythagorean operation of emanation, in respect of 
which the unity emanated into multiplicities remains unchangeable: ‘Unity is the 
principle of all things and the most dominant of all that is: all things emanate from 
it and it emanates from nothing. It is indivisible and […] immutable and never 
departs from its own nature through multiplication.’17 
The Pythagorean scheme implies a preconceived One, Two or the Dyad as 
the beginning of strife or the division between subject and object and Three or the 
triad as a reunification of the divided. We read: ‘The first […] change from unity 
is made by the doubling of unity which becomes 2, in which are seen matter and 
all this is perceptible, the generation of motion, multiplication and addition, 
composition and the relationship of one thing to another.’18 The function of the 
triad is not only to bind together One and Two in a ‘Relation or Harmonia’, but 
also to reflect ‘the nature of the One in a microcosmic and balanced fashion’.19 
This general formula of creation underlying the cosmogonies of the Greek 
myth and also those of the early Ionian scientific tradition is succinctly summed 
up by Cornford: ‘1) There is an undifferentiated unity. 2) From this unity two 
                                                           
17 Kenneth Sylvan Guthrie, The Pythagorean Sourcebook and Library, compiled and trans.  
    by Kenneth Sylvan Guthrie (Grand Rapids: Phanes Press, 1987), p. 21. 
18 Kenneth Sylvan Guthrie, The Pythagorean Sourcebook and Library  p. 21. 
19 Ibid, p. 22. 
  
23 
 
opposite powers are separated out to form the world order. 3) The two opposites 
unite again to generate life.’20 
The inquiry into the legacy of the Ancient philosophers testifies to the 
ontological priority of the operation of sameness, which since its inception in 
Greece has been uninterruptedly reigning over Western philosophical discourse 
under multiple guises or names, posed with regard to the issues of Being and 
nothingness, plenitude and void. The dream for plenitude, eventually acquiring the 
status of a philosophical concept par excellence, is substantiated here as a concept 
of unity, identity and harmony, posed through an intermingling of the elementary 
forms of the operations of belonging, emanation and participation. 
In the next chapter, we will discuss the Platonic insight into the 
transcendental objective of the Same which is mostly realized by virtue of an 
operation of participation and in some way or other has been dominating the entire 
Western philosophical discourse conditioning the postulation of poetry as that of 
mimesis or a representation of the Same.  
 
                                                           
20 Kenneth Sylvan Guthrie, The Pythagorean Sourcebook and Library, p. 22. 
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2. The Same: A Metaphysical Universal or an 
Operation of Participation in Plato? 
 
2.1 Plato’s Questioning of Sameness: Philosophical Hypotheses or  
      Poetic Metaphors?  
  
 
We will inquire into Plato’s questioning of sameness through his endeavour to 
claim for metaphysical inquiry where the target is on seeking the essence of 
Being. The essence of Being in general is, according to Plato, susceptible to a 
general, unifying principle. The Platonic operation of sameness is greatly 
determined through the Presocratic conceptions of principles as the fundamental 
underlying elements accounting for earthly phenomena, in which both the Eleatic 
and the Pythagorean traditions are combined. It comprises the two controversial 
modes of thought of belonging and participation, persisting separately in 
Presocratic thought: the reduction of all existence into ultimate principles and the 
generalization ascending from particulars toward the realm of universals or Ideas 
of identity and harmony. As a combination of the operations of participation and 
belonging, it offers us, to use Verity Harte’s definition, a choice of ones either as 
‘unified wholes or mereological atoms’.21 
In respect of the Platonic operation of sameness, the Same is thus 
conceived from one side as prior to genera or the cause of the ultimate principles, 
from another it is derived from them. Plato (c. 428/427 BC – c. 348/347 BC) not 
only combines these varying modes of thought but also applies a dialectical 
approach in attempting to give an account of the ultimate grounding in the 
unconditioned unity of the conception of sameness. Questioning the unitary 
conception of sameness, he inquires into the ultimate causes, principles and 
elements through which reality should be explicated. He also elaborates the 
fundamental ontological operation of sameness mainly through the theory of unity 
and the good, as the principle of being that produces order in the Cosmos. In so 
doing Plato offers a theological-philosophical understanding of sameness in which 
                                                           
21 Verity Harte, Plato on Parts and Wholes: The Metaphysics of Structure  
    (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), p. 130. 
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the philosophical dialogue is at times combined with the revelation of the ultimate 
vision of the plenitude of the Same inundated with divine light (Phaedrus 250c).22 
The Same therefore incorporates the human dream for plenitude and 
harmony, emerging as a transcendental objective or a metaphysical universal par 
excellence which enables human thought to transcend beyond earthly phenomena. 
Yet, despite the fact that the Same scintillates in its full splendour through Plato’s 
dialogues, its interpretation is by no means unequivocal; we can rather speak of 
Plato’s questioning of sameness throughout his dialogues and with the application 
of various techniques, than his postulation of it. The insight into the various 
philosophical manifestations of the Same23 demonstrates that the limit of the 
Platonic postulation lies in the fact of its covering merely one of the fundamental 
aspects of sameness, that of identity: comprising timelessness, abstraction, and 
non-being. Disregarding the absolute singularity of the differential, the 
significance of which is coeval to that of the whole, Plato distorts the precarious 
balance between the plenitude of the Same and the absolute singularity of the 
differential. 
The failure to postulate the plenitude of the Same as an operation of 
recurrence of the simultaneously co-existing absolutely unique singularities 
results in representing the Same as a dominating concept of identity. Conceived as 
such by virtue of Plato’s dialectical method, the Same as the primary cause and 
ground of all contrariety eventually gains prevalence over the diverse singularities 
and subordinates them to the predominating idea of a preconceived identity. 
Furthermore, it is by virtue of the predominance of the identity of the Same over 
the manifold, by disregarding the singularity of the multiplicity that the operation 
of sameness becomes reduced to the simple, unitary signified of the Same. 
The reduction of the operation of sameness to the transcendental signified 
of the Same — which is the characteristic feature of the Platonic dialogues —
conditions its transposition into a hierarchical concept of identity dominating over 
the singular differentials. 
                                                           
22 All Plato reference, if not otherwise stated, from Plato: The Complete Dialogues, ed.  
    by John M. Cooper, (Indianapolis, Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997).  
23 While generalizing Plato’s conception of the Same, we refer to the dialogues by him that will  
    be discussed below, exluding the Parmenides and the Sophist which question this conception.  
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Yet, despite the fact that Plato struggles to get a consistent grip on the 
operation of sameness and is generally regarded by the analytic approach24 as the first 
philosopher to pose it (in the form of universals) as a problem, to pursue its formal 
analysis and to posit its solution, he rather questions sameness than offers an 
explanation of it. The fact of his giving preference to the Socratic dialogue over the 
philosophical treatise, testifies to Plato’s conviction that philosophy is not 
fundamentally an assertive but an interrogative activity. He thus rather poses the 
conception of sameness as a fundamental philosophical question throughout his 
dialogues, by questioning its essential traits than proposes a definite answer to it. 
Whether his choice of the dialogical form is conditioned by the influence of the 
esoteric tradition rooted in the tendency of concealing the sacred wisdom of the 
Same, thereby protecting it from misinterpretation or whether it presents a 
transposition of the philosophical issue of sameness into a poetic form remains open. 
The transposition of the philosophical issue of sameness into poetic form 
due to the impossibility of defining it by virtue of clearly stated philosophical 
propositions is a characteristic trait of the early twentieth century and is 
expounded at length by Heidegger. Yet, Heidegger points to the persistence of 
allegory already in the discourse of Plato, remarking that there is an inner 
necessity to the fact that when Plato says something fundamental in philosophy, 
he always speaks in an allegory.25 The reason for this is not that Plato ‘is unsure 
about what he is speaking of’, but that ‘he is quite sure that it cannot be described 
or proved’.26 Aristotle likewise points to this very tendency of Plato who uses 
nothing, but ‘empty words and poetic metaphors’27 (991a21) to explain how the 
eidos (είδος) is related to its sensible counterparts. Contemporary scholars of Plato 
                                                           
24 Among the main texts belonging to the analytic approach are Reginald E. Allen, Studies in 
Plato’s    
Metaphysics (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965); Gregory Vlastos, Plato: A Collection of 
Critical Essays, 1: Metaphysics and Epistemology ([S.I.]: Doubleday and Company, 1971), Gail 
Fine, Plato on Knowledge and Forms (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003). 
25 Drew A. Hyland, Questioning Platonism: Continental Interpretations of Plato (Albany N.Y.: 
State University of New York Press, 2004), pp. 57 – 64 for a criticism of Heidegger’s 
misinterpretation of Plato.  
26 Martin Heidegger, The Essence of Truth, trans. by Ted Stadler  
    (New York: Continuum Books, 2002), p. 13. 
27 Aristotle, ‘Metaphysics’, in The Works of Aristotle trans. into English, general ed. W.D. Ross  
   (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
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also speak of the ‘poetic language’ of Plato, for example, Julius Moravcsik 
ascribes ‘the poetic language of the similes of light in Books 6 and 7 of the 
Republic’ to the excitement Plato feels with regard to the ontological discovery, 
which can be reached ‘only by intellectual efforts that are very remote from 
ordinary experience’.28 
Even though the resistance of the Same against any conceptualization or 
the difficulty of rendering the sacred vision of the Same, manifested in the form of 
revelation through verbal means, Plato nonetheless poses sameness merely in the 
form of hypotheses or poetic metaphors. It thus seems impossible to come to an 
ultimate definition of sameness, based upon Plato’s various discussions of it in 
different dialogues, but merely to postulate it in terms of its pure intelligibility or 
visibility/intelligibility distinction. Yet, despite the fact that the conception of 
sameness - which becomes more or less tangible through the ideas of the eidé, the 
One and the Good — is nowhere systematically conceptualized or defined, its 
existence is maintained throughout the dialogues, which we will now address. 
For this reason, and since we are not proposing an interpretation of Plato’s 
dialogues, but an examination of Plato’s treatment of the operation of sameness 
and its influence upon his understanding of poetics, we will next address those 
works by Plato in which there is actual theorizing of his conception of sameness. 
The focus here is upon the textual evidence of the maintenance by Plato of the 
existence of sameness throughout his dialogues. 
 
 
2.2 The Reduction of the Operation of Sameness to the  
Metaphysical Universal of the Same: The Eidé and the Good 
 
2.2.1 The Eidé: Two Modes of Manifestation of the Metaphysical  
Universal of the Same 
   
To begin with, we will inquire into the discussion of sameness through the 
doctrine of the eidé, which occupies the entire central part of the Republic and is 
crucial in determining Plato’s understanding of sameness. The hypothesis of the 
eidé, having an eternal, pure unqualified nature and belonging to the realm of the 
                                                           
28 Julius Moravcsik, Plato and Platonism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), p. 85. 
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intelligible reflected through the visible are primarily what needs to be examined 
if we are to grasp the operation of sameness in Plato. Furthermore, it is with 
Plato’s introduction of the theory of eidé, constructed upon the very opposition 
between the intelligible and the visible, reality and appearance that the originary 
Same eventually gains prevalence over the multiple, reducing their function to 
that of the mere representation of nothing but the Same. 
Plato expresses the translatability of the oneness of the originary Same 
through the multiple, by virtue of the doctrine of eidé. The eidé belong to the most 
fundamental layer of reality and can be grasped through intellectual abstraction 
from appearances, by transcending from earthly phenomena toward the entities of 
eidé. The entire operation of sameness is rooted in the opposition between the 
eidos as the unchanging unity, identical in itself, and the sensible particulars as the 
contingently existing and ambiguous multiplicity. All the individual eidé are thus 
characterized as unities, modes of oneness in the multiplicity and incorporate the 
basic concept of sameness. They are determined as identical, consistent and 
similar, and each of them is ‘in itself single’, even though ‘they seem to be a 
multiplicity because they appear everywhere in combination with actions and 
material bodies’ (Republic 476a).29 
The translatability of the eidé through the multiple can be traced in a 
passage from the Republic, where the eidé are described as ‘beauty in itself or any 
eternally unchanging form of beauty’ manifested through the sensible particulars. 
The sensible particulars, contrary to the eidé, have shifting appearances and are 
viewed as a source of duplicity and deception: ‘Is there any of these many 
beautiful objects of yours that may not also seem ugly? Or of your just and 
righteous acts that may not appear unjust and unrighteous?’ (Republic 479 a). 
The abovementioned rhetorical question testifies to the fundamental distinction 
between the eidé and the multiple, anchored in the scission between the intelligible and 
the visible, essence and appearance, between ‘what is’ and ‘what appears’. 
The translatability of the intelligible Same by virtue of visible images 
rooted in the etymological explanation of eidé as ‘to see’,30 or that which is seen, 
                                                           
29 All reference to the Republic from Plato: The Republic, trans. by Desmond Lee  
   (Penguin Books, 2003). 
30 See: John Sallis, Being and Logos: Reading the Platonic Dialogues  
   (Bloomington, Ind: Indiana University Press, 1996), p. 383 for the accurate translation  
    of eide versus its mistranslations as form, idea or concept. 
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the seen, that which presents itself to a seeing, makes itself manifest or shows 
itself to showing. The hypothesis of the eidé thus brings forth the fundamental 
distinction between the original which is identical with its being the same as such, 
and the images through which it shines forth. The two modes of showing of the 
eidé as the one and the same as it is in itself and as the many as it is not itself, 
introduces the distortion of the precarious balance between the plenitude of the 
Same and the singularity of the multiple. The showing of the eidos as many or in 
disguise is the showing of nothing but the Same, disregarding the absolute 
uniqueness of the singular and reducing its function to that of the mere 
representation of the Same. Sameness is thereby traced through an operation of 
participation, in which the Same participates in the multiple and relates to the 
multiple as the original to its image, the whole to its parts, the ‘beauty-in-itself’ or 
the ‘goodness-in-itself’ to the particular things or the many (Republic 507 b). It is 
thereby demonstrated through an operation of concealing and revealing, where the 
function of the multiple is reduced to the mere revelation of the concealed Same. 
The eidos which shows itself as the one identical or as it is in itself; and 
the eidos which shows itself as it is not or as the multiple, is the very same eidos. 
What shows itself in any case is the original Same, i.e. the multiple is the 
representation of but the Same or is the image of the Same. The image-original 
correlation is harboured in the preconceived identity between them: the original 
requires the image to manifest itself or to shine forth through it. Yet, it is 
simultaneously rooted in the difference between them that can be understood in 
terms of the dual meaning of showing. Showing itself in the original, means 
showing itself as it is in itself, whereas showing itself in an image also implies a 
showing of itself as it is not. The showing of itself of the original as it is not thus 
implies the appearance of the different or the shadow which, in Plato, are however 
subordinated to the original. The subordination of the singular differentials to the 
original Same emphasizes the predominance of the transcendental signified of the 
Same, as, what the absolutely singular differentials let be manifest is not their own 
singularity, but merely the identity of the Same. 
Given that the eidé have not been clearly defined by Plato, they give rise to 
often controversial argumentations and are interpreted as abstract universals and 
paradigms, ideas and concepts existing in our minds or are even described 
realistically as ‘concrete standards whose figures and proportions philosophers 
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must discern in order to properly measure the truth, the beauty and the goodness 
[…] not only in the sensible world, but also in ourselves’.31 
Yet, what we have attempted to demonstrate is that even lacking a clear 
philosophical definition, the eidé incorporate Plato’s realization of the dream for 
the plenitude and harmony of the Same. 
 
 
2.2.2 The Ontological Discovery of the Good as Monoeidés of the Beyond 
 
Plato’s dream for plenitude is not, however, limited solely by the postulation of 
the eidé, but is rooted in a gradual ascent: from the visible phenomena toward the 
intelligible realm of the eidé, ascending in their turn toward the abstracted unity of 
the basic principle of the Good, conceived as a totality of the meta-eidé, or the 
beyond. As a concept of unity and measure, opposed by a contrary principle of 
multiplicity, the Good is a synthesis of the Presocratic One or the Eleatic doctrine 
of Being. Yet, as is the case with the eidé, the Good is not clearly defined and its 
concealed unitary essence can solely be derived from juxtaposing the various parts 
of the Republic. 
The Good is posed not only as the source of the intelligibility of the 
objects of knowledge, but also of their ‘being and reality’, yet without being that 
reality itself (Republic 509 b). The fact of its being positioned ‘beyond […] and 
superior’ (Republic 509 b) to that reality differentiates it from all the other eidé as 
a pure unity, from which the meta-eidé receive their being. Due to its indivisibility 
and immutability, this original unity is posed in identity, essence and permanence 
as the cause and essence of everything that exists, the fundamental element and 
measure of multiplicity. As a transcendental concept of unity, the Good is 
simultaneously the limitation of the multiplicity and their unification and shows 
itself through the multiple by virtue of an operation of participation. 
This reading of the Republic demonstrates that the position of the Good is 
ranked as the highest and that it is postulated as a meta-unity of subject-object (or 
a unity of the beyond) in the cognitive act, giving ‘the objects of knowledge their 
truth and the knower’s mind the power of knowing’ (Republic 508 e). The 
                                                           
31 Francis A. Grabowski, Plato, Metaphysics and the Forms, Studies in Ancient Philosophy 
    (London: Continuum, 2008), p. 106. 
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accomplishments of the Good are also designated through a coincidence of being 
with the knowable, where ‘what fully is fully knowable’ (477a). 
Identified as such, the Good appears as the foundation of knowledge and 
truth, surpassing them in being itself the source of knowledge and truth (Republic 
508 e). It incorporates both the search for a prime principle as the cause of 
everything and the urge for transcendence toward the realm of ‘fixed and 
immutable realities […] where there is no injustice done or suffered, but all is 
reason and order […]’ (Republic 500 c). The tendency is to show the thing itself 
which is the illustration of the wholeness and oneness of the Same, prior to the 
distinction between revealing and concealing or essence and existence (511 b). 
The Good is always the Same which, through an operation of participation is 
manifested through visible things. As opposed to the eidé which show themselves 
as multiple, it aspires to showing itself as One by being illuminated and conferring 
truth and being. 
The insight into the hypotheses of the Good demonstrates that it can serve 
as an early model for the transcendental objective of the Same, dominating over 
philosophical discourse as the ideal immutable model for imitation (Republic 500 
c). In respect of these hypotheses, the visible objects are viewed merely as images 
or imitations of this ultimate model, while the uniqueness of each is being 
disregarded. This brings forth a fundamental opposition between showing and 
being, essence and existence that lies at the heart of the primal determinacy with 
which things first come forth from the arché-form. 
The distinction between the visible/intelligible is stressed through 
introducing a man who sees the eidé by themselves and the one who distinguishes 
between both the forms and their instances. It also conditions the definition of the 
philosopher directed to the whole or capable of revealing the Same wholly, rather 
than as divided up into the multiple.32 In this context, the prime consideration for 
the philosopher is to imitate the supreme model or even become assimilated to it 
(Republic 500 c). The same distinction lies in the hypothesis of the third kind of 
man, capable of distinguishing between image and original, whole and part, the 
beautiful itself and beautiful things (Cratylus 476 c – d, 479 e – 480 a). 
The characteristic feature of the operation of sameness in Plato is that it 
represents different degrees of sameness through an ascending movement: from 
the grasping of images toward the contemplation of the intelligibility of the 
                                                           
32 John Sallis, Being and Logos: Reading the Platonic Dialogues, p. 395.    
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original Same or from a mode of showing, which is revealing and concealing 
(through the eidé) toward the shining forth of the original Same in itself. This 
gradual ascent becomes tangible by virtue of the simile of the divided line 
corresponding to the distinction between intelligible and visible, outlined in the 
Seventh Book of the Republic. While the simile of the divided line develops 
Plato’s basic differentiation between the two orders of reality, it nonetheless views 
these two orders from the angle of the states of mind. Accordingly, the four 
sections of the line correspond to the four states of mind: ‘to the top section 
intelligence, to the second reason, to the third belief, and to the last illusion’ 
(Republic 511 e).  These four states of mind are also arranged in a scale, based 
upon the assumption that they have degrees of clarity corresponding to the degree 
of truth possessed by their subject-matter (Republic 511 e).  The entire procedure 
is thus a repeated dialectical ascent from assumptions toward the first principle of 
everything which ‘involves nothing in the sensible world, but moves solely 
through forms to forms, and finishes with forms’ (Republic 511 c). 
John Sallis explicates the entire divided line of Plato with regard to the 
more or less perfect, more or less original showings of the same thing.33 
Representing the divided line as a continuum running from less true to truer 
modes of showing, he explicates it in respect of a distinction between the 
intelligible and the visible, original and image. What reveals itself through images 
is thus always the same original. 
The moving from shadows to seeing the fire or the sun, as the source of 
light by which things themselves are seen, is expounded in the cave analogy 
(Republic 516 b). Here the sun stands for the Good, posed as the cause of 
everything: of light, vision and objects. The prisoner who has left the cave can 
only look at the shadows, then at the reflection and then finally at the objects 
themselves. 
This is the development of the idea of making the visibility of the hidden 
things possible through the idea of the Good. The concealing/revealing analogy in 
relation to the cave allegory linked to the originary sense of aletheia, as 
unhiddenness, forms another significant point in the paradigm of the Same within 
the framework of truth as unconcealment. Together with the distinction between 
image and original, whole and part, the beautiful itself and beautiful things, One 
and multiple, the opposition between the hidden and unconcealment, anchored in 
                                                           
33 John Sallis, Being and Logos: Reading the Platonic Dialogues, pp. 420 – 421. 
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the conception of aletheia as truth forms the characteristic trait of the operation of 
sameness. 
The search for the ultimate Same which is delineated through the Good as 
‘the final thing to be perceived in the intelligible region’ (Republic 517 b) by 
virtue of multiple images results in subordinating the image to the original by 
depriving one of the capability of seeing the image as image. The image then is 
the mere representation of the Good which is the source of light, being and truth. 
Posed as the hypothetical Same par excellence comprised in the operation of 
sameness, the Good transposes light into the visible region and, being in the 
intelligible region itself, emerges as the ultimate cause of virtue and of justice, 
temperance and rationality (Republic 517 c). The Good then can merely be 
grasped through concepts of order combined with those of wisdom and 
knowledge by those who can take account of the essential nature of the Good, 
distinguishing it clearly from everything else (Republic 534 b c). 
The representation of the transcendental objective of the Same in one form 
as a preconceived identity and the cause of everything, positioned in the place 
beyond heaven and revealing itself as the pure ultimate vision shining in Lux 
resplendes can be traced in most of the dialogues which, along with the Republic 
belong to the so-called middle period of Plato. 
In the Phaedrus the pure oneness of this vision is revealed through the 
metaphor of the light (Phaedrus 250 c), while it is described as being prior to any 
differentiation of shape or colour and lacking any distinct characteristics. We 
read: ‘What is in this place is without colour and without shape and without 
solidity, a being that really is what it is, the subject of all true knowledge, visible 
only to intelligence’ (Phaedrus 247 d). The Phaedrus maintains the opposition 
between essence and appearance (Phaedrus 259 e) and distinguishes the beautiful, 
shining in full splendour as a result of a recollection provoked by ‘earthly’ images 
of the beautiful logos as opposed to justice, moderation, etc. which do not shine 
through their images with sufficient splendour (Phaedrus 250 b). 
The conception of unity and identity as a limitation of multiplicity 
postulated by virtue of the Good, of which the beautiful is one aspect, is also 
unfolded in the Symposium. Here, the experience of pure divine beauty itself in 
one eidos (monoeidos) (Symposium 211 b), with no image and nothing earthly is 
considered as the highest experience. Posed in the pure oneness, it is the cause out 
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of which the mundane emerges forth and is built upon the opposition to the 
earthly phenomena which are mixed and shifting, ever bound to the images. 
Beauty itself (auto to kalon) is postulated as unconditionally in the present, 
irrespective of time and place, of the viewer and the angle of viewing and is not 
differentiated into kinds or species (Symposium 211 a - b). It is conceived through 
an operation of participation by virtue of which the multiple share the immutable 
oneness of the preconceived identity of always but one form (monoeidos), which 
is ‘but itself by itself with itself’ (211b). Here, the operation of sameness may be 
traced through an ascent which is delineated as a dialectical movement starting 
from grasping beautiful things toward catching sight of ‘something wonderfully 
beautiful in its nature’ (211 a). Plato describes this ascent as an infinitely upward 
movement for the sake of Beauty, starting out from the gradual rising from 
beautiful things and bodies to beautiful customs and arriving in the end at the 
knowing of the very Beauty or the knowing just what it is to be beautiful’ 
(Symposium 211 c - d). The knowing of the intelligible is already beautiful, as 
wisdom is described as being ‘extremely beautiful’ (Symposium 204 b). 
 
 
2. 3. Questioning the Monoeidetism of the Same 
 
 
The operation of sameness introduced through the participation of the eidé in the 
multiple in the middle period is maintained likewise in the late dialogues of Plato. 
In the Timaeus it is represented through the entity of the Living Thing, 
comprehending within itself all intelligible living things and participating in all 
other living things, which constitute its parts, both individually and by kinds 
(Timaeus 30 c – 31). The Living Thing is posed in respect of the good which is 
beautiful and thereby well-proportioned (Timaeus 87 c). Here, the 
visibility/intelligibility distinction expounded at large in the Republic is 
transposed into an opposition between ‘that which always is and has no 
becoming’ and ‘that which becomes but never is’ (Timaeus 28). These two 
contrarieties are, however, combined through a third one which accomplishes the 
bond by proportion (Timaeus 31 c – 32). The classical paradigm of sameness, 
anchored in the intelligible and changeless model of the transcendental objective 
of the Same (under the guises of the eidé or the Good) and its imitation by 
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something visible that possesses becoming is now replaced by adding the third 
kind as ‘a receptacle of all becoming’ to it (Timaeus 49).   
The fundamental opposition is placed between the Intelligible, residing 
within being as the first founding eidos of the Cosmos and the anti-eidos of the 
receptacle functioning as the condition for the possibility of the presence and 
absence of causes and forms. As opposed to the unifying conception of the Same, 
appearing as a unification of instances under one eidos (i.e. the eidos of beauty), 
the anti-eidos of the wandering cause separates things from being and the Cosmos, 
allowing them to show themselves in the play of images in both their gathering 
and dispersion. The receptacle, through which things come into being and the 
Cosmos coming forth as an image, is thus posed as the wandering cause, 
dispersion and differentiation itself. 
We can trace here Plato’s tendency prevailing particularly in the late 
dialogues to question the monoeidetism of the Same through the replacing of the 
pure vision of the undifferentiated Same by the juxtaposition of the heterogeneous 
elements. In the Timaeus this tendency is manifested from the assumption that 
everything is made just from the blend of ‘the Same, the Different and the Being’ 
and is in eternal movement of the Same, ‘which revolves in the same place 
without variation’ and the Different, divided ‘six times, to make seven unequal 
circles’ (Timaeus 36 b, d). The entire Cosmos is ruled according to the 
juxtaposition of the opposing forces from which ‘the first was rotation, an 
unvarying movement in the same place, by which the god would always think the 
same thoughts about the same things’, while the second ‘was revolution, a 
forward motion under the dominance of the circular [...] movement of the Same 
and uniform’ (Timaeus 40, 40 b). 
The entire operation of sameness is maintained, however, with a shift from 
conceiving the pure undifferentiated One into its representation through 
heterogeneous elements, subordinated to the identity of the One. Bernard 
Freydberg remarks that despite the fact that the intelligible form is ‘a likely 
candidate for oneness […] located in the eternal paradigm […] beyond the 
cosmos, in the realm of being’,34 it is now included within the flow of becoming. 
In contrast to the earlier dialogues, where the Same is represented through the 
pure vision of the form of the clear One, it is no more conceived as 
                                                           
34 Bernard Freydberg, Provocative Form in Plato, Kant, Nietzsche (and others), ed. by Peter Haller   
    (New York: Peter Lang, 2000), vol. 21, p. 60. 
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unambiguously One. Freydberg explicates this by the fact that ‘there are no clear 
‘one’s anywhere in the cosmos […]’, instead, the entire cosmos is sewn together 
from images which are not wholes in themselves, but are sewn together from 
heterogeneous elements.35 
Yet, the heterogeneous elements are not postulated in respect of their 
absolute uniqueness, but are subordinated to the identity of the Same. What counts 
is, once again, the homogeneity of the mixture or its self-sameness: ‘And he took 
the three mixtures and mixed them together to make a uniform mixture, forcing 
the Different, which was hard to mix, into conformity with the Same’ (Timaeus 
35). While the supreme aim is to reconcile the heterogeneous elements within the 
Same or ‘stabilize the straying revolutions within ourselves by imitating the 
completely unstraying revolutions of the god’ (Timaeus, 47 c).  
In the Timaeus the operation of sameness is primarily examined in the 
cosmological dimension and posed as the foundation of the world which is viewed 
in its completeness and self-sufficiency in the form of the sphere (Timaeus 33 – 
33 d). Postulated as a homogeneous mixture of the heterogeneous elements, the 
Cosmos is the formal constellation of beautiful images which issue from the 
interplay of the Same and the receptacle, and the characteristic features of which 
are proportion and measure. Plato’s account of ‘this world of ours’ is thus rooted 
in the concept of the Oneness of the Universe, in respect of which it presents the 
image of the intelligible Living Thing, participating in it (Timaeus 92c). 
 
 
2. 4. The Non-Being of the Same 
 
 
The later dialogue Parmenides questions all the earlier postulations of the Same as 
a transcendental objective appearing under the guises of the eidé or the Good. It 
deconstructs any account of the conception of the oneness of the Same, by 
questioning all the essential characteristic features of the One, as well as its 
substantiality. Despite the fact that it remains unclear whether the One refers to 
the Eleatic One or the Platonic eidos of the One, all the significant features 
                                                           
35 Bernard Freydberg, Provocative Form in Plato, Kant, Nietzsche (and others), p. 60. 
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applied to it as to a metaphysical universal of unity and identity are being 
questioned throughout the entire dialogue.   
All the arguments forming the main part of the Parmenides are arranged in 
a way as to contradict each other and demonstrate rather the illusoriness of the 
transcendental objective of the One posed as the unitary cause of all being. The 
One is proved to be both unique and yet in some sense many; unlimited and 
without form and yet having parts (Parmenides 137 c, d).36 All the controversial 
arguments — claiming that the One is neither the same as something, nor different 
from something (Parmenides 138 b), capable of neither motion, nor rest 
(Parmenides 138 c, 139 a), neither like nor unlike either other or itself, neither 
equal nor unequal to itself (Parmenides 140 b) — rather question than define the 
intelligibility of the One. Furthermore, the impossibility of characterizing the One 
gives rise to doubts about its existing as such at all and conditions its postulation 
as non-being. 
The assertions that the One is outside time, has nothing to do with time 
and does not exist in time (Parmenides 141 d) amount to the conclusion that the 
One is not at all and is not the One. It has no part in Being at all, therefore is not at 
all (Parmenides 141 e). The non-being of the One conditions the fact that it cannot 
be named, described, thought of, known or perceived (Parmenides 142 a). 
The dialogue as a whole asserts the necessary existence of oneness, yet not 
the logical proof of the One, suggesting that oneness should be discussed beyond its 
reduction to the identity of the One (Parmenides 142 b). It points to the limits of the 
earlier discussions of oneness by virtue of the dominating concept of the One or the 
Same and seeks ways for overcoming it through postulating the One in respect of its 
infinity in number (Parmenides 143 e) and its dividedness (Parmenides 144 b) into 
the many or the multitude of existences (Parmenides 144 a). 
The Parmenides deconstructs the model of the dominating objective of the 
Same asserted in the earlier dialogues and maintains sameness merely as an 
operation of participation. The operation of participation is asserted through the 
relationship of the One and the multiple which is grounded upon the difference and 
otherness between the being and the One (Parmenides 143 b). Yet even the non-
being of the One implies the operation of participation, and the One thus split up by 
existence is viewed as many (Parmenides 144 e).  
                                                           
36 All reference to Plato’s Parmenides from Plato in Twelve Volumes, trans. by Harold N. Fowler 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, London : William Heinemann Ltd), vol. 9.  
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The fulcrum of the operation of sameness is thereby transposed from the 
One into the participation of the many or of those which are other than the One 
(Parmenides 157 b) in the One (Parmenides 157 c). The One is then viewed in 
respect of each of its parts, participating in the One, and yet being other than the 
One. Here, the word ‘each’ implies the singularity of each of the parts as a part, 
separated from the rest, and existing by itself but necessarily participating in the 
One (Parmenides 158 a). The designation of the relationship between the One and 
its parts conditions the postulation of the many as multitudes (Parmenides 158 c) 
in which the One is not, but exists solely as an operation of participation in 
relation both to itself and to all others (Parmenides 160 b). 
What is questioned thus is not oneness as such, the knowledge of which is 
maintained throughout the entire dialogue and the existence of which is often 
straightforwardly claimed (Parmenides 160 d, 161 e, 162 a, etc.), but its reduction 
to the metaphysical universal of the One. Oneness as an operation of participation 
is instead grounded upon the difference of the One from other things, implying the 
conception of a preconceived difference in the One and as belonging to the One, 
coextensive to the knowledge of the One (Parmenides 160 d e). Difference 
governs the entire relationship of participation between the non-existent One and 
the multitude and is made tangible through the application of the shifters ‘that’, 
‘some’, ‘this’, ‘relation to this’ and ‘these’ (Parmenides 161 a). These shifters also 
imply relations of unlikeness between the One and the multiple, rooted in their 
being different in kinds (Parmenides 161 b). 
The further discussions of the non-existence of the One also testify to the 
fact that it is not oneness which is being questioned, but the dominating objective 
of the One and that oneness is maintained, though in the form of participation. 
The non-existence of the One implies the existence of not-being as a bond, so that 
being is viewed as needing the non-existence of the One in order to attain 
perfection in the partaking (Parmenides 162 a). The One which does not exist 
participates in the multitude in order to attain non-existence (Parmenides 162 b). 
Furthermore, it is the very non-existence of the One that allows the multiplicity to 
exist as others of each other or in difference from each other (Parmenides 164 bc).  
The dialogue concludes in stressing the significance of oneness through 
demonstrating the absurdity of the existence of the many if the many exist and the 
One does not (Parmenides 165 e). This final stage, based upon the previous 
deconstruction of the transcendental objective of the One and, hence, the 
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designation of a relationship of participation between the One and the many aims 
to stress that the deconstructed One does not imply a deconstruction of oneness. 
The same method applied earlier in the same dialogue to demonstrate the 
absurdity of the existence of the One is now applied to demonstrate the absurdity 
of the inexistence of oneness. It stresses the impossibility to distinguish between 
the many and the One, like or unlike, the same and the different, being and 
appearing without admitting the preconceived oneness which should be contained 
in the others (Parmenides 166 b). In the very end, the Parmenides proceeds from 
postulating the non-being of the One toward the posing of pure nothingness 
(Parmenides 166 c). 
To summarize, the significance of the Parmenides lies in the fact that it 
points to the limits of reducing sameness to the transcendental objective of the 
Same, be it under the guises of the eidé or the Good. It instead designates 
sameness as an operation of participation, rooted in the non-being of the One and 
hence in the being of oneness by virtue of the difference between the multiple 
themselves and the multiples and the One. Despite the fact that the Parmenides 
does not offer a philosophical conceptualization of the multitude or the difference 
between them, it still opens up a wider perspective for sameness beyond its 
limitation by a dominating universal of identity and with regard to the multitude. 
The Sophist maintains the non-being of the metaphysical universal of the 
One established by the Parmenides in that it does not engage in any discussion of 
its unitary essence, but instead examines the modes of being of the multiple. The 
modes of being of the multiple are viewed in respect of the operation of 
participation between the infinitely divisible other in the One, delineating a 
differentiation between the concept of unity in itself, the totality of the other and 
the individual part.  
The absolute identity of the Eleatic One is now replaced by a conception 
of unity in relation to multiplicity participating in both identity and difference. 
The discussions of the Eleatic conception of the Oneness of the multiple, as well 
as the Heraclitean assertion of its being a combination of the One and many 
(Sophist 242 d – 243 a) 37 are aimed at transposing sameness from its association 
to the metaphysical universal of the One to the questioning of its non-being. What 
is radically questioned is the being of the One through questioning the Oneness of 
                                                           
37 References from The Sophist are from Plato in Twelve Volumes, trans. by Harold N. Fowler  
   (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, London : William Heinemann Ltd), vol. 12. 
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the Being and its having parts, in order to finally replace it by its participation in 
the unlimited multiplicity. The operation of participation is regarded not only in 
respect of being, movement and rest, but also of the same and difference (Sophist 
255 c – 256 c) substituting for the identity of the One. 
 
 
2. 5. Poetry as the Mimesis of the Same 
 
 
Plato’s conceiving of sameness by virtue of an operation of participation conditions his 
evaluation of art, particularly poetry. The fundamental distinction between intelligible 
and visible — by virtue of which the revealed is nothing but the Same — dominating 
over the Platonic understanding of sameness throughout the Parmenides, conditions his 
postulation of the ideal of art as the endless representation of the Same. It is stemming 
from his conception of the ideal art that Plato condemns those kinds of art which lead 
away from the eidé and therefore from the Same in Republic book X. According to the 
conception of the ideal model of art, the multiple is not the absolutely unique 
singularity, but a multiple mode of showing solely the Same.  
In the main dialogues of the early and middle periods, where sameness is being 
postulated primarily with regard to the being of the transcendental objectives of the eidé 
or the Good, poetry is described as both imitative and causing imitations in the souls of 
its hearers (Republic Books II and III). Its function is reduced to that of the 
representation of always but these same dominating concepts of identity. According to 
Plato, harmony and proportion as the characteristic features of the operation of 
sameness have to be aesthetically discerned. 
Plato positions poetry at the lower end of the visible region due to its being 
an imitation and remaining trapped within the realm of sensation. Yet on the 
whole, the Republic is not against poetry but against its misunderstanding, 
whereby poetry remains under the realm of senses and becomes a mere 
representation of appearances ‘at third remove from the throne of truth’ (Republic 
597 e).38 Most probably, Plato’s criticism of poetry is conditioned by his 
                                                           
38 Kevin Corrigan and Elena Glazov-Corrigan in Plato's Dialectic at Play: Argument, Structure, 
and Myth in the Symposium (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State Press, University Park, 2004) 
argue that Plato’s strongest defense of poetry is not myth, but the dialogue form, and the 
Symposium above all, p. 223. 
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dissatisfaction with pleasure and entertainment value substituting for truth and 
symmetry that prevail in some of the works of his time.39   
In contrast to this view, the main function of poetry according to Plato is to 
call forth a vision of the intelligible realm of the eidé and the idea of the Good, 
empowering the human soul to transcend toward them. This can be demonstrated 
through the final book of the Republic, where the paradigm of eidé serves as the 
model for the carpenter who aims to create something similar to the real (Republic 
597 a). The distinction is between three ‘types of bed’ (Republic 596 b – 598 b): 
the eidos of the bed, the bed fashioned by the carpenter (the copy) and the bed 
drawn by the painter (the copy of a copy). The allegory of the bed demonstrates 
that the oneness of the eidé is what is being endlessly represented by art and 
testifies to Plato’s understanding of the mimetic nature of poetry. Here again, the 
conception of the ideal model of poetry as a mimesis of the Same is opposed to 
those kinds of poetry which fail doing this and are therefore considered inferior to 
philosophy. Given that the nature of poetry is to reveal the concealed essence of 
the hypothetical Same, it is also described as being a kind of fascination and, 
thereby having a kind of hypnotic power (Republic 607 d). The divine nature of 
poetry and the divinely possessed personality of the poet are being referred to 
throughout most of the dialogues.    
The dialogues Ion, Phaedrus, and Timaeus engage the reader in a 
multilayered encounter with the creative process as such, postulating it as the 
representation of the metaphysical universal of the Same (in the form of the eidé 
or the Good). This assumption conditions their attempt to decipher the mystery of 
poetry with respect to the poet’s personality as the mediator through whom the 
divine word is being created. This tendency first becomes expressed in the early 
dialogue Ion, where the poet is described as being inspired, or divinely possessed 
throughout the creation process (Ion 533 e, 534). The process of creation is thus 
described as a prophetic act through which the concealed wisdom of the Same 
becomes revealed by the divinely possessed poet (Ion 534 b, c). The sublime 
power of this prophetic art becomes tangible by the metaphor of the Heraclean 
stone [the magnet] with its power to draw one iron ring to itself, and through it 
                                                           
39 See: John Gibson Warry, Greek Aesthetic Theory (London: Methuen & Co, 1962), pp. 52 – 67 
for an account of Plato’s evaluation of art and poetry and Schuhl, Pierre-Maxime Platon et L’Art 
de son temps (Paris: Alcan, 1933) for a detailed account of Plato’s relation to the art of his time.   
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others (Ion 533 d - 534). It stands at the heart of Plato’s description of the 
relations between Gods, poets, and rhapsodes. 
The general doctrine of inspiration delineated in the Ion becomes 
distinguished between the divine gift of inspiration and the pathological affliction 
of madness in the Phaedrus (265 a). Here, the kinship between poets and prophets 
acting in divine possession is unfolded in an absorbing way, embracing even 
larger aspects of mystics and Love (Phaedrus 265 b). The Socrates of the 
Phaedrus goes even further in stressing the ontological significance of madness as 
the ‘gift of the god’ from which ‘the best things we have come’ (Phaedrus 244) 
and connecting its genealogy to the word manic used for ‘the finest experts of all 
— the ones who tell the future — thereby weaving insanity into prophecy’ 
(Phaedrus 244 b, c). The description of the poetic process as a ‘mania’ implies the 
interweaving of insanity, prophecy, and poetry by virtue of which the wisdom of 
the Same is transmitted from the transcendental into the mundane realm. Here the 
process of transmittance is realized by the help of the Muses which belong to the 
so called species of daemons, persisting in various forms in most of the 
dialogues.40 The dubious role of Muses is stressed in this process: ‘if anyone 
comes to the gates of poetry and expects to become an adequate poet by acquiring 
expert knowledge of the subject without the Muses’ madness, he will fail […]’ 
(Phaedrus 245).  
The commentary on writing invented by Theuth with regard to memory 
acquires the active kynesis of recollection and is revived in the Aristotelian 
anamnesis or the Husserlian noesis. In the Phaedrus it conveys the recollection of 
the feelings that the absent has evoked: ‘the recollection of the things our soul saw 
when it was travelling with god’ (Phaedrus 249 c). Writing is thus reduced to the 
recollection of the wisdom of the metaphysical universal of the Same by those 
who already know it (Phaedrus 275 d). It comprises the allusion to a hypothetical 
universal other than itself or the feelings evoked by this other.  The dual position 
of writing concerns its viewing as ‘a potion for memory and for wisdom’ or the 
introducer of ‘forgetfulness into the soul of those who learn it’ (Phaedrus 275).   
                                                           
40 See a thorough account of the concept of the daemonic and its connection to poetic inspiration in 
Plato in Angus Nicholls, Goethe’s Concept of the Daemonic (Columbia S.C.: Camden House, 
2006), pp. 53 – 56. 
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The concept of writing evoking the dual meaning of the Platonic 
pharmakon (Phaedrus) as a healing means or as poison for memory is further 
investigated by Derrida:  
 
Writing, a mnemotechnic means, supplanting good memory, 
spontaneous memory, signifies forgetfulness. It is exactly what Plato said in 
the Phaedrus, comparing writing to speech [...] Forgetfulness because it is a 
mediation and the departure of the logos from itself.41 
 
The Symposium also makes a shift into aesthetics, focusing upon the 
capacity of seeing the divine beauty itself in one form (monoeidos). The vision of 
the Beautiful itself (Symposium 211 e) conditions his validation of poetry as 
‘beautiful and immortal’ (Symposium 209 d). The poetic process is as well 
regarded as a creation out of nothing (Symposium 205 c), whereas being a poet 
figures eminently, even amongst the virtues of the god, who is described as ‘so 
skilled a poet that he can make others into poets’ (Symposium 196 e).  
In the Timaeus the reduction of the function of art to that of the 
representation of the transcendental objective of the Same is demonstrated by 
virtue of the analogies between divine and artistic creation or the deification of 
man and the humanization of god. The paradigm of creation comprises the 
creation of Kosmos (order) out of Chaos (disorder) or the moulding of the 
beautiful and harmonious out of the formless: ‘he [the god] took over all that was 
visible — not at rest but in discordant and disorderly motion - and brought it from 
a state of disorder to one of order’ (Timaeus 30).  
The god, the Demiurge or the craftsman brings order by virtue of the eidé 
as patterns which are imposed onto receptacles underlying physical things. An 
artistic creation, analogous to divine creation, is the forming of the formless in 
resemblance to a higher reality. It is posed as the representation of some 
immutable metaphysical universal or ‘modelled after that which is changeless’ 
(Timaeus 29). The process of creation per se is described as the mimesis of the 
perfect and intelligible model which is always changeless as opposed to its 
deceitful images and reflections (Timaeus, 49), while the aim of artistic creation, 
                                                           
41 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. by G.Ch. Spivak (Baltimore; London: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1997), p. 37. 
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and of speech is to ‘bring order to any orbit in our souls that has become 
unharmonized, and make concordant with itself’ (Timaeus 47 d). 
This reading of the dialogues by Plato demonstrates that although Plato 
does not offer a consistent philosophical theory of art,42 he stresses its significance 
with regard to the issue of the metaphysical universal of the Same. The function of 
the ideal model of art should respectively be the mimesis or representation of 
solely the Same, the hypothetical universal par excellence. This view of art as the 
revealing of the concealed wisdom of the Same or the quest for the eternal eidé 
has an indisputable influence over Neoplatonism, the Middle Ages, and the 
Renaissance, while Romanticism borrows from the Platonic focus upon the divine 
power of the artist from which the work of art issues. 
 
 
 
2. 6. The Limits of Mimesis 
 
 
The questioning of the mimetic nature of art is manifested in the discussion of 
image-making crafts in the Sophist, where it is claimed that the ‘bold assumption’ 
of the not-being of the One postulated in the Parmenides is what conditions the 
existence of phantasmata (Sophist 236 a – 237 a). Here, sophistry postulated as 
the attempt to utter, say or think of the inconceivable, inexpressible, unspeakable 
and irrational non-being is opposed to the rationality of the logos (Sophist 238 c). 
It is noteworthy that this shift still informed one of the most influential discourses 
on the question of representation of reality in literature and ‘pure’, that is to say 
authentic, production of poetic reality, namely Erich Auerbach’s study Mimesis 
(1946).43 
The assumption of the non-being of the One thus gives rise to the 
fundamental differentiation between the making of images and the making of 
originals that conditions the further division of the making of images into the 
                                                           
42 See: Christopher Janaway, Images of Excellence: Plato’s Critique of the Arts (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1995), p. 7, arguing that Plato does not offer a theory of aesthetic value or 
aesthetic experience, as he does not regard aesthetic value as sufficient to justify the arts. 
43 Erich Auerbach, Mimesis. Dargestellte Wirklichkeit in der abendländischen Kultur, 10th ed. (A. 
Francke Verlag Tübingen und Basel, 1946), cf. his afterword, pp. 515-518. 
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making of likenesses (eikones) and the making of appearances (phantasmata) 
(Sophist 235 e – 236 c). The likeness of the image to the original implies the 
manifestation of the original through the fact of the image’s not-being of the 
original, while the appearance implies the radical lack, the distortion of the 
original. The Sophist thus juxtaposes two controversial views of art: the mimetic 
art, which represents nothing but the original Same and a different kind of art, 
which substitutes the appearing fine of the art-work itself for the genuine likeness 
to the original (Sophist 236 a – b). This new art of phantasma does not aspire to 
make a likeness of the metaphysical universal of the original One, as the point of 
departure is the very non-being of the One, but focuses upon the appearance of the 
copy itself. 
The Sophist thus presents two controversial approaches to poetry: in the 
light of mimesis and simulacrum. Despite the fact that the ideal model of poetry is 
mimesis, and that sophistry is outlined in a negative implication, the significance 
of this dialogue lies in that it displays the possibility of questioning the mimetic 
nature of poetry by offering a controversial approach to it. This juxtapostion is 
based upon the questioning of the being of the Same in the Parmenides and its 
discussion in the light of its non-being. The questioning of the Parmenidian 
prohibition of non-being in its establishment of the being of non-being and the 
non-being of being (241d) represents various discussions of the metaphysical 
universal of the Same in the dimension of non-being, thereby representing 
controversial approaches to art.  
To sum up, the influence of Plato’s questioning of sameness upon the 
history of Western thought — starting from Plotinus and extending into Christian 
thought by way of Augustine, Thomas Aquinas and into various Platonist and 
Neoplatonist movements of the Renaissance — has been indisputably profound. 
Its significance lies primarily in the ascent toward the essence of Being in general 
which is susceptible to the general, unifying principle of sameness.  
The role of Plato is, however, by no means unequivocal: he is both, the 
first Western philosopher to incorporate the human dream of harmony and 
plenitude by offering if not a fully conceptualized, still a multi-dimensional 
postulation of sameness and at the same time, the first to reduce sameness to the 
metaphysical universal of the Same (under the guises of the eidé, the Good or the 
One). The limits of the postulation of the Same as a hypothetical universal par 
excellence, conditions its further development into a dominating concept of 
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identity suppressing any singularity and restricting the function of art to that of the 
representation of nothing but the Same.44 Yet, it is again Plato who offers a way 
out of the dominating identity of the Same by postulating its non-being in the 
Parmenides and presenting sameness as an operation of participation, thereby 
opening perspectives for the possibility of liberating art from representation 
through discussing it in terms of simulacrum or phantasma. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
44 See: Gerard Genette, The Architext : An Introduction, trans. by Jane E. Lewin (Berkeley, Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1992), pp. 8 – 10 for a discussion of Plato’s view on the 
representational character of poetry and p. 23, claiming of the Platonic-Aristotelian restriction of 
poetics to the representative weighing heavily on the theory of genres for several centuries.  
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3. Plotinus: Emanation as a Mode of Conceiving 
Sameness 
 
 
3. 1. The Postulation of the Self-Sufficiency of the One   
 
 
In the Ancient Greek philosophy, the last major mode of thinking of the pure 
unmediated identity of the Same — along with those of belonging and 
participation — is that of emanation. Emanative operation is the characteristic 
mode of the Neoplatonics, particularly Plotinus (204/5 – 270 C.E.) for 
representing sameness which nonetheless remains obscure in Plato.  
Yet, not even Plotinus offers a full conceptualization of sameness in the 
Enneads, but merely delineates it in virtue of the postulation of the first principle 
of the One and its emanation. The One occupies a twofold position between a 
metaphysical principle and the result of the mystical experience of Plotinus,45 
according to which a mystical union with the hypernoetic One is suggested.46 Due 
to its enigmatic nature, this Supreme principle is characterized as ineffable and 
may be revealed neither by knowing nor by the Intellection, but through a 
presence transcending all knowledge (VI.9.4).47 It is thus valid to demonstrate 
merely the presence, but not the distinct features of the One which is apparently 
beyond conceivability.  
Plotinus however questions even the existence of mere Oneness, stating that 
any predication of it would turn the first principle of One into two and therefore a 
plurality (VI.9.4). The solution to the controversial issue of the presence of the 
One and the questioning of its having essence at all may be found in the 
                                                           
45 See: John N. Deck, Nature, Contemplation, and the One: A Study in the Philosophy of Plotinus 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967), on the mythical experience of Plotinus based on the 
texts of Plotinus and Porphyry in p. 8. 
46 Gerald J. P. O'Daly, Plotinus's Philosophy of the Self  (Shannon: Irish University Press, 1974), 
pp. 164 -165. 
47 All reference to the Enneads from Plotinus, The Enneads, trans. by St. MacKenna (London: 
Faber & Faber Limited, 1962). 
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assumption that what Plotinus aims to postulate is a primal conception of 
sameness, beyond any mediation. This primal sameness is characterized by unity 
and an unprecedented identity of what Lloyd Gerson calls the identity between 
essence and existence.48 
The idea of the pure identity of essence and existence is expressed through 
the hypothesis of the first principle of the One and its emanation into the 
multitude. The authentically One is thus postulated a priori as both intelligence 
and intelligible in unqualified simplicity, pure identity, unity and immutability as 
the incorporation of the desiderata concept of the Same (V.4.1). It stands for the 
ontological cause of the number and of multitude (III.8.9) which is posterior to the 
One. The significance of sameness is stressed through characterizing the essential 
nature of the manifold by the very need for that unity (VI.9.6), in virtue of which 
only ‘beings are beings’ (VI.9.1).  
The Plotinian understanding of sameness thus expresses the general quest 
of Antiquity for unity and identity and is at the same time indisputably influenced 
by Plato’s postulates of the metaphysical universals of the eidé, the Good and, 
particularly, the One of the Parmenides. On the whole, Plotinus maintains the 
basic scheme of sameness in virtue of complication which implies the inherence 
of the multiple in the One and vice versa, anchored in the intelligible/visible 
distinction and thereby, the possibility of revealing the One through the multiple. 
He himself admits that the distinction of the Platonic Parmenides between the 
primal unity of the One, the One-Many and the One-and-Many is in accordance 
with his thesis of the Three Kinds (V.1.8). Yet, Plotinus transforms Platonism in a 
way as to open the issue of sameness up to quite new lines of development and 
view it not as an operation of participation, but as that of emanation.49  
The basic difference between Platonism and Neoplatonism, i.e. 
participation and emanation with regard to sameness, lies in the transposition of 
the focus of examination from the multiple into the One. The trajectory of 
transposition is traced from the multiple, as the active agent of representing the 
Same, incapable of otherwise manifesting itself in Plato into the self-sufficient 
One, creating the other than itself as a result of overflowing or superabundance in 
Plotinus (V.2.1). The One which is perfect and, thereby lacks nothing, becomes 
                                                           
48 Lloyd P. Gerson, Plotinus (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 6. 
49 For a controversial view arguing against the emanative theory see: Lloyd P. Gerson, Plotinus 
(London: Routledge, 1994), p. 27. 
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the active generative and creative agent in an operation of sameness, where 
emanation substitutes for imitation and, to use Gilles Deleuze’s description, ‘the 
idea of a gift’ substitutes for ‘that of violence’.50  
The Plotinian One is thus postulated primarily with regard to its capacity 
to make gifts, but is simultaneously beyond this capacity and remains unchanged 
in itself. Plotinus emphasizes the position of the beyond of the highest principle of 
identity, stating that the One is ‘great beyond anything’ (VI.9.6) and not only is 
above the act of giving, but is also described as ‘transcending Being’ (V.4.1) and 
transcending ‘all of the intellectual nature’ (III.8.9). The tracing of the emanation 
of the Plotinian One reveals the ‘self-sufficing essence’ and perfection of the One 
that, together with its attribute of being ‘great in power’, make it the supreme 
hierarchical principal of sameness (VI.9.6). As a concept of pure identity par 
excellence, the One is also described as being ‘supremely adequate, autonomous, 
all-transcending’ (VI.9.6).  
The fact that the One and the Good have analogical features allows 
concluding that these two concepts are interchangeable in Plotinus. The Good, 
similar to the One, is characterized as self-sufficient and posed as the centre and 
cause of every act (III.8.11). Emilson explicates the fact that the One is also the 
Good by its being a totally self-sufficient completeness other things aspire to.51 
The One or the Good are thus postulated primarily in respect of their emanative 
activity which is manifested through the act of giving or the producing out of 
perfection, whereby the One is qualified as the always perfect, everlasting 
producer, producing the less than itself (V.1.6 - 7). 
 
 
 
                                                           
50 Gilles Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, trans. by Martin Joughin (New York: 
Zone Books, 2005), p. 170. 
51 Eyjólfur Kjavat Emilsson, Plotinus on Intellect (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007), p. 72. 
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3. 2. Distinguishing Between the Same and the Lack 
        of the Same 
 
  
The primal quest for sameness in Plotinus may be traced primarily in virtue of a 
differentiation between the perfection of the One, identical in itself and in need of 
nothing and the manifold, in need of the unity, identity and perfection of the One. 
The significance of sameness, of an underlying identity and unity is stressed 
through need which, to use Eyjόlfur Emilsson’s words, ‘is a relational stance 
implying a difference between what is in need and that which it needs’.52  
The difference between the self-sufficient One and the manifold which is 
not self-sufficient and, thereby needs the higher principle of the Good to be able to 
act and know it, conditions the creation of the less perfect principles of the 
Intellect and the Soul. The need for the perfect identity of the One guides the 
aspiring of these inferior principles to the identity of the One. 
Despite the fact that this study is not engaged in the investigation of the 
hypostases of the Intellect and the Soul, it inquires into them in respect of the 
issue of sameness. As such, the significance of tracing the hierarchical structure of 
the Soul, the Intellect and the One comprised in the Plotinian system, lies in 
tracing the emanation of the higher principle of identity, out of perfection, into the 
lower principles which are in need of identity and perfection. Within this 
framework, another movement of the lower principles in pursuit of the simple and 
the irreducible prime principle encompassing all the Ideas or immutable models of 
things may be traced. 
This emanative scheme implies that the highest absolute prime identity of 
the One, as an infinite potentiality beyond time, creates the eternal actuality of the 
Intellectual-Principle — circumscribing the Nature of the Authentic Existents — 
which correspondingly creates the Soul, existing in time, containing Ideal-
Principles and on the model of Ideas, giving birth to matter in its diversity (V.1.4). 
The Intellect, contrary to the pure identity of the One, rooted in the identity of 
subject/object, is grounded upon their distinction and is characterized by the 
longing for that identity.  
                                                           
52 Eyjólfur Kjavat Emilsson, Plotinus on Intellect, p. 84. 
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These distinctions condition the postulates of the Intellectual-Principle, 
Existence, Difference, and Identity as the first categories in Plotinus (V.1.4). 
Motion and Rest are also included, providing for the intellectual act and 
preserving identity above any differentiation. Plotinus posits the problem of 
identity and difference as the source for creativity: the different (from the All) in 
Matter is the generative power that gives rise to myriad forms, which are, 
however, subordinated to the absolute prime identity (II.4.13).  
Identity is the absolute prime principle par excellence, the ontological 
cause and reason for difference which is always governed by the need for identity 
and aspires to it. Difference is thus viewed not in its conceptuality, but as the lack 
of identity, just as evil is explicated by the lack of goodness giving rise to a 
negative theology equating absence with the negation of quality (II.4.13). 
Difference thus always has a merely negative value and is defined by the lack of 
identity which is always positive and dominating.     
As we can see, the Plotinian conception of sameness implies the absolute 
identity of the first principle of the One as an encompassing totality, a unity prior 
to duality, the source of all oppositions and its emanation into lower degrees of 
reality which are nothing but images of the One. 
 
 
3. 3. Images of the Same 
 
  
The principle of the absolute prime identity of the Same conditions the neo-
Platonic conception of art as the quest for this identity, in virtue of creating 
images of it. What lies at the heart of Plotinus’s understanding of art, is thus its 
being positioned in respect of the intelligible reality and in subordination to that 
reality. The function of art, in line with the Platonic theory of mimesis, is thereby 
reduced to the representation of the higher reality of the intelligible One.  
Plotinus, however, modifies it, by offering the heuristic theory, anchored 
in the differentiation between god’s creation and man’s invention. The genuine 
function of art is thus to help us invent the eternal immutable Same, as the 
intelligible model or that which is represented through every art-work. The 
operation of emanation becomes perceptible in art-theory, in respect of which the 
first principle of the Same becomes less perfect and less concentrated in unity, 
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while evolving outwards (V.8.1). The images of the higher reality represented in 
the art-work are then less perfect than the reality itself, as correspondingly is the 
object of art with respect to the idea of art. 
The significance of the neo-Platonic understanding of art lies also in its 
introspective nature, in respect of which the outside vision of the first principle is 
transposed within. The artist-creator ‘possessed by Apollo or by one of the 
Muses’ has to no longer look outside for the vision of the Same, but find the 
strength to see it within (V.8. 10). The conceiving of sameness here is transposed 
into the pure identification with it, as to be most truly in beauty is to become one 
with it (V.8.11). 
Here we come upon what Pierre Hadot describes as Plotinus’s central 
intuition, in respect of which the human self is not irrevocably separated from its 
eternal model which is within ourselves.53 This introspective motion brings about 
a new understanding of the conception of sameness encompassing the 
identification of the inner self with the divine principle. Artistic creation is then 
equated to the mystic unification of the self with the Spirit.54 It can be realized by 
lovers of the pure authentic beauty, having clear vision of the splendour above and 
creating images of it due to the pain for the lack of it (V.9. 1 & V.9.2).  
The pure identity of essence and existence of the ontological One implies 
the idea of primal silence and the presupposition that all is made silently and 
without toil, ‘with the partaking of solely Being and Idea’ (V.8.7). The 
implication of silence brings about the conception of the perfect unity of things 
and words preceding any discourse of signification and rejecting any finality of 
expression. This conception of the pure identity of the One conditions both, the 
mimetic nature of art and the limits of mimesis. From one side, the function of art 
is the representation of the One, from another it is the acknowledgement of the 
impossibility of representing its pure identity which is beyond any mediation of 
signification.  
The hypothesis, concerning the formlessness of the One and the limits of 
giving any definition to it, conditions the transposition of the issue of the Same 
into the dimension of a pure intactness of name and thing in the truth of silence 
transcending the sense-realm (V.5.6). This implies the attempt of liberating art 
                                                           
53 Pierre Hadot, Plotinus or the Simplicity of Vision, trans. by Michael Chase (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1993), p. 27.  
54 See: Pierre Hadot, pp. 32 – 33 for an account of the mystic experience of the self. 
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from the domain of representation and postulating it in terms of the pure 
contemplation of the Same.  
As a result, the metaphysical universal of the Same is postulated as the 
indefinable principle of pure identity which cannot be conveyed by any sound or 
hearing, yet only through images to some extent (V.5.6 & V.8).  In this context, 
the naming of the Same is postulated in terms of an impossibility of naming or 
talking of the untellable, in which case art may be defined with regard to the 
‘agony of true creation’ (V.5.6) or to its quest for silence, for the yet unreleased 
energetic intensity preceding creation.  
Any discourse of representation is thus posed as the quest to represent the 
primal vision of the identical One in virtue of the transformation of breath or 
pneuma into speech (V.5.5) through vibrant air, disseminated via sound waves. 
Yet, it is simultaneously posed in terms of an impossibility to represent the pure 
identity of the Same, constituting a mere preliminary affirmation of its absolute 
simplicity and remaining inadequate to express its nature (V.5.6).   
Together with the philosophical operations of belonging and participation, 
the Plotinian theory of emanation constitutes a major mode within Antiquity for 
representing the predominating concept of the identity of the metaphysical 
universal of the Same or the operation of sameness. The neo-Platonic conception 
of sameness manifested in virtue of the self-sufficient One and its emanation into 
the inferior hypostases, made a great impact on theological-philosophical thought 
throughout the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, including Meister Eckhart, 
Nicolas of Cusa, Giordano Bruno, and up to Spinoza and Leibniz.  
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4. An Outline of the Perspectives of the Development of 
Sameness 
 
4. 1. Conceiving of Sameness through Christian Monotheism 
 
 
The notion of sameness in its subtle contrivances anchored in the unity and 
identity of the Universe and manifesting itself in virtue of the predominance of the 
metaphysical universal of the Same, that is, as the ontological cause and reason of 
being, remains significant throughout the Christian Middle Ages and the 
Renaissance.  
The medieval thinkers adopt the Greek paradigm of representation of the 
intelligible realm in virtue of the visible world, though introducing ways of 
making it compatible with the divinely created theory of the Universe. Among 
others, this tendency prevails in the works of the highly influential Christian 
philosopher St Augustine (354 – 430) who delineates the right order between this 
world and the higher ‘supreme, unchangeable, eternal’ and immutable realm of 
equality as that of ‘imitation of eternity’, where ‘earthly things are subject to 
heavenly things’, associating ‘the cycles of their own duration in rhythmic 
succession with the song of the great whole’ (Book VI, x. 29).55 The cause of the 
supreme identity of the immutable and eternal rhythm is the Christian God, 
therefore the way toward its conceiving, lies through the inward movement to God 
(Augustine, De Musica, Book VI, xii. 36). 
Conceiving of the supreme identity of the Same, medieval thought 
attempts to combine the Platonic doctrine of the eidé and the Plotinian theory of 
emanation with their relocation from the outside into the inside of God’s mind, 
offering a theory of the sovereign freedom of God as the single cause of all 
existence.56 The Greek paradigm of creation, implying the postulate of the 
ontological Same and its manifestation in virtue of the contingent manifold is 
maintained, yet with a reorganization in the direction of Christian monotheism, 
                                                           
55 All reference to St. Augustine in St. Augustine’s De Musica, trans. by William Francis Jackson 
Knight (London: The Orthological Institute, 1949). 
56 See: Joseph Koterski, An Introduction to Medieval Philosophy (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 
2009), pp. 61 – 82, for a detailed account of this combination.  
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whereby the classical paradigm is rephrased as that of transubstantiation. 
Analogously, in the medieval conception of sameness as the explanation of Being, 
a named, anthropologized, localized and temporized Logos substitutes for the 
metaphysical universal of the Same. The biographical, ethical, and existential 
latitudes of the Christian Logos gratifying human needs for the interesting and the 
spectacle distort the enigma of the Ancient Same and pose the polarized 
microcosm of the human being, saturated with the existential feelings of 
love/hatred, belief/despair, good/evil, fear/bravery at the centre of that story.  
From now on, the revelation of the transubstantiation and incarnation of 
the Same is to be sought solely in the Scripture which is the embodiment of the 
Divine word. Medieval postulations of sameness are thereby reduced to the 
decipherment and endless interpretations of the Divine word which is presupposed 
to exist hidden beneath the visible marks of the Scripture. The characteristic traits 
of the medieval conception of the Scripture as that which allows us to recognize 
eternal truths can be found in the Italian philosopher and theologian St. 
Bonaventure (ca. 1217 - 1274). He describes the Scripture as the highest light, 
illuminating the mind for the understanding of the supreme identity of the One 
which is beyond reason and cannot be acquired by human research, but comes 
down by inspiration from God. The conception of identity is delineated through a 
combination of the Classical understanding of the truth of oneness in its spiritual 
and mystical sense and the Christian representation of its threefoldness: ‘the 
eternal generation and Incarnation of Christ, the pattern of human life, and the 
union of the soul with God’ (On the Reduction of Arts to Theology, section 5).57 
The divine light which ‘was in the beginning’, is primarily viewed as the 
incorporation of the concept of ontological identity in the intactness of words and 
things, saying and being.58 It is traced in respect of its identity, the distortion of 
the identity ever since the Adamic naming, even before the myth of Babel and its 
actualization in language aspiring to re-establish the lost adequacy of words and 
things.  
The concept of identity, prevailing in Ancient Greece, is now being 
represented in respect of the loss of identity by man — as ‘man became ugly by 
his own wish. He lost the whole which in obedience to God’s laws, he once 
                                                           
57 St. Bonaventure, De reductione artium ad theologiam, trans. by Sister Emma Therese Healey, 
St. Bonaventure (New York: The Franciscan Institute, St. Bonaventure College, 1955). 
58 Genesis 1.3.  
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possessed’ — and his eternal quest for it (Augustine, De Musica, Book VI, xi.30). 
The concept of sameness is thereby viewed as a redemption narrative in respect of 
which ever since Adamic naming, God and man perpetually become One in the 
act of creation, while language represents the infinite potentiality of the unformed 
through the actuality of formed matter. 
Against a background of the philosophical-theological postulations of the 
intelligibility of the Same, the medieval discourse constitutes thus merely an 
interpretation of interpretation: an interpretation of the images or icons of the 
Same and the signs and traces of its oneness manifested in the Scriptures. 
Medieval philosophical and aesthetic discourses are theologized and reduced to 
the exegesis and interpretation of the perpetually repeated subjects of the Bible, 
thereby eventually asserting the predominance of the metaphysical universal of 
the Same. As an endless interpretation of the Same, the medieval discourse 
applies the techniques of hermeneutics and semiotics to decipher the meaning of 
its signs and define the laws that link them. 
The medieval artist or philosopher is no longer the mytho-poetic creator in 
analogy with God in the freedom of the pure act of creation, but a craftsman 
making the already existing shine through shaped matter. The art of interpretation 
is viewed as a craft, ars is techne: in order to interpret, the artist is in need of 
special hermeneutic techniques, the application of which makes the artist a 
craftsman and art a craft. 
The medieval conception of art as an essentially impersonal, or non-
subjective representation of the transcendent realm, is derived from the triad of 
terms given in the Book of Wisdom: number, weight and measure, and is 
conditioned by the pancalistic vision of the cosmos (based upon the supremacy of 
beauty).59 This vision is anchored in the Platonic idea, viewing the beauty of the 
world as the image of the Ideal Beauty, combined with the Biblical claim of the 
harmonious creation of the world. The significance of the idea of beauty in 
medieval cosmology, and hence in aesthetic vision may be illustrated through 
Bonaventure’s definition of beauty as ‘the splendour of all the transcendentals 
together’, comprising those of one, true, good and beautiful.60 Medieval aesthetics 
as the representation of the intelligible realm of the beautiful may rightly be 
                                                           
59 Umberto Eco and Hugh Bredin, Art and Beauty in the Middle Ages, trans. by Hugh Bredin 
(London: Yale University Press, 2002), pp. 17 – 19.     
60 Umberto Eco and Hugh Bredin, Art and Beauty in the Middle Ages, p. 24. 
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defined as that of harmony and proportion.61 In Thomas Aquinas (1225 - 1274), it 
is anchored in the criteria of integrity, proportion and clarity.62 
 
 
4. 2. Analogy as a Way of Conceiving of Identity 
 
 
In the Middle Ages and throughout the Renaissance the ontological postulation of 
sameness is transmuted into doctrines of God as the first cause of contingent 
things, requiring the presence of God who himself exists with no need of a cause. 
Thomas Aquinas aims to prove rationally (within the framework of fides quaerens 
intellectum, faith seeking understanding) the existence of God as the ultimate 
principle which does not need a casual explanation (Summa of Theology 1.11.3).63 
He offers a new understanding of sameness, in respect of which the supreme 
identity is in God, whereby ideas are also viewed as totally identical with God.64 
The plurality of ideas, arising from the difference in the nature of things is not 
viewed as a unity of pure intelligible essences in their self-sufficiency, but is 
subordinated to the absolute identity of the self-existent and uncreated God.65 
The idea of the absolute identity within God brings about significant 
modifications in conceiving of sameness in virtue of analogy, substituting for that 
of participation and eventually taking on greater significance in the philosophies 
of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance.66 According to it, the plenitude of the 
Same is present in the multiple not as part of their essence or an accident, but in 
all things innermostly (Summa of Theology 1.8.1.c). The relationship between the 
identity of the Same and the multiple is designated in accordance with analogy or 
congruence, in respect of which the qualities persisting in the multiple are present 
in God in a higher modality and intensity. 
                                                           
61 See: Umberto Eco and Hugh Bredin, Art and Beauty in the Middle Ages, pp. 28 – 42 on the 
aesthetics of proportion. 
62 Ibid, p. 76. 
63 Thomas Aquinas, Summa of Theology in Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas, ed. by Anton 
C. Pegis, 2 vols. (New York: Random House, 1945). 
64 Thomas Aquinas, Truth, trans. by Robert W. Mulligan (New York: Preserving Christian 
Publications, 1993), I, pp. 139 – 141. 
65 Thomas Aquinas, Truth, p. 147. 
66 Gilles Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, p. 175. 
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Analogy is viewed as a higher form for conceiving of identity, as compared 
with those already familiar to Greek science and medieval thought, in that it treats 
not the visible or substantial similitude, but the subtle resemblances of relations 
drawing together all the figures in the whole universe.67  
The identity between God and the multiple is thus delineated through what 
Deleuze describes as the co-presence of two correlative movements of complicare 
and explicare substituting for a series of successive subordinate emanations.68 
Conceived in virtue of analogy, God remains implicitly in himself in complicating 
the multiple, while the multiple remains inherently in God in explicating and 
implicating him. The theory of the correlative movements of complication and 
explication as a way of conceiving the predominating idea of identity, offers the 
replacement of participating or emanative operations by that of immanence. The 
operation of immanence implies thus the substitution of an equality of being —
anchored in the presence of the multiple to the Same and the presence of the Same 
in the multiple — for the hierarchy of hypostases dominating throughout the 
Classical Antiquity. 
The idea of a complicative God, explicating himself through the multiple, 
remains persistent in the philosophy of Nicholas Cusanus (1401 - 1464). He 
conceives of the idea of identity by virtue of the two postulations of God: as the 
‘universal complication’, in which everything is and as the ‘universal explication, 
in the sense that he is in everything’.69 
The replacement of the participation of the One in the multiple by the 
operation of analogy gives rise to the metaphysical objective of the Absolute 
Maximum which encompasses the multiple and is explicated through it. Cusanus 
postulates this encompassing Absolute in the following passage: ‘In God we must 
not conceive of distinction and indistinction […] as two contradictories, but we 
must conceive of them as antecedently existing in their own most simple 
beginning, where distinction is not other than indistinction.’70 The Maximus is 
thus described according to the principle of immanence as the absolute unity 
                                                           
67 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things, a translation of Les Mots et les choses (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1994), pp. 21 – 22. 
68 Gilles Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, p. 175. 
69 Nicholas of Cusa, ‘On Learned Ignorance’, II.3.g in Deleuze, Gilles, Expressionism in 
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explicated or expressed in virtue of the multiple which, correspondingly is the 
expression or explication of the Maximum: ‘Absolute maximum is the unity 
which is all; it enfolds all [...] and as nothing is opposed to it, the minimum as 
well coincides with it’(Chapter 2).71 The conceiveing of God as the coincidence of 
opposites or of contradictories is however beyond reason: the mind has to move 
beyond reason and intellect to see that God is both maximum and minimum, both 
everwhere and nowhere.72 
The actuality of the manifold in Cusanus’s philosophy is thereby reduced 
to that of the mere representation of the predominating idea of identity or the 
unfolding of the potentiality of the Absolute, just as ‘number is the unfolding of 
unity, motion of rest, time of eternity, composition of simplicity, time of the 
present, magnitude of the point, inequality of equality, diversity of identity’.73 
Analogously, finite art is the representation or the image of the infinite 
divine art, ‘more the perfecting than the copying of created figures’.74 It is the 
dissolution of any differentiation within the absolute identity: ‘absolute creative 
art, subsisting in itself to such a degree that the art is the artist, and its mastery is 
the master.’75 The principle of analogy, anchored in complication and explication 
serves as the key concept for explicating not only the creation of the Universe, but 
artistic invention as well. Willing and performing coincide in the omnipotence of 
the artist, in whose breath (spiritus) ‘exists word or conception as well as 
power’.76 Similarly, God in whom wisdom and omnipotence exist in the most 
perfect will creates by means of the spirit in which ‘the wisdom of the Son and the 
omnipotence of the Father dwell’.77 
The operation of the immediate and adequate expression of the Absolute 
through the multiple, described by Deleuze as that of expressive immanence, 
comprehending the aspects of complication, explication, inherence, and 
implication, embraces the expression of God in the world which is ‘carried into 
                                                           
71 Nicholas of Cusa, The Layman On Wisdom and the Mind, trans. with an intr. by M.L. Fuhrer 
(Canada: Dovehouse Editions, 1989), p. 58. 
72 Edward F. Cranz, Nicholas of Cusa and the Renaissance, ed. by Thomas M. Izbicki and Gerald 
Christianson (Aldershot, Brookfield USA: Ashgate Variorum, 2000), p. 23. 
73 Nicholas of Cusa, The Layman On Wisdom and the Mind, p. 65. 
74 Ibid, p. 60. 
75 Ibid, p. 99. 
76 Ibid, p. 99. 
77 Ibid, p. 99. 
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God in such a way that it loses its limits or finitude, and participates directly in 
divine infinity’.78 From this viewpoint, the relationship between God and the 
world may be explicated by Giordano Bruno’s (1548 - 1600) metaphor of infinity, 
the centre of which ‘is everywhere and the circumference is nowhere [...]’ or the 
circumference of which ‘is everywhere, but the centre is not to be found’.79 
Bruno extends the conception of analogy, viewing the absolute identity of 
the multiple in the infinite which cannot be subject to change nor can it be altered 
by these contrary things, since ‘in it everything is concordant [...] it is one and the 
same, [...] infinite, immobile’ (Fifth Dialogue).80 He offers the idea of an 
immutable identity complicating within itself the multiple which is merely ‘a 
diverse and different face of the same substance’.81 The crux of his conception of 
sameness is thus an unalterable substance which always remains the Same and is 
explicated or expressed in virtue of the multiplicity, described as ‘modes and 
multiformity of being’.82 The diversity of the multiple is subordinated to the 
predominance of the identity of the Same and is viewed as merely the 
representation of this identity.  
The conception of expressive immanence governs the entire relationship 
between the identity of the Same and the multiple in Bruno, implying the 
assumption of the simultaneous co-existence of a complicative Same and an 
explicative multitude. Everything is thus in perpetual transmutation, moving from 
possibility to actuality and  aspiring to the absolute potency and act of the One 
and the Same. The trajectory of this movement may be traced in virtue of the 
ascent ‘going up from physical universality [...] to the height of the archetype [...] 
until [...] a single original and universal substance identical for all’.83 
Far from offering an overall analysis, the outline of the development of 
sameness and the application of new forms for conceiving it in virtue of Christian 
Monotheism and the Renaissance thought grounded upon a few thinkers, aims to 
demonstrate the persistence of the thinking of pure unmediated identity in a 
variety of guises throughout these lengthy periods.  
                                                           
78 Gilles Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, p. 176. 
79 Giordano Bruno, Five Dialogues by G. Bruno, Cause, Principle, and Unity (Westport, 
Connecticut: Greenwood Press Publishers, 1976), p. 137. 
80 Giordano Bruno, Five Dialogues by G. Bruno, Cause, Principle, and Unity, p. 135. 
81 Ibid, p. 53. 
82 Ibid, p. 138. 
83 Giordano Bruno, Five Dialogues by G. Bruno, Cause, Principle, and Unity, p. 140. 
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4. 3. Finalizing Thinking in Identical Terms   
 
 
The last stage in philosophy when it is still valid to think of the plenitude of the 
Same in respect of the pure unmediated identity is represented by the 
philosophical systems of Baruch Spinoza (1632 - 1677) and Gottfried Leibniz 
(1646 - 1716). Far from representing comprehensive analyses of their systems, we 
will attempt to demonstrate that what still remains at the heart of their thought is 
the thinking of sameness as pure identity. 
As we have attempted to show throughout the present part, the thinking of 
the identity of the Same has been conceived by virtue of the operations of 
belonging, participation, and emanation. At a particular moment in its 
development, in medieval and Renaissance thought, the issue of the Same is 
tackled by way of analogy which brings about the perspective of viewing it in still 
another dimension of immanence. Sameness thus is conceived in terms of the 
Deleuzian formulation of expressive immanence, implying the correlate 
movements of the complication of the multiple in the Same and its explication by 
the multiple. 
The thinking of the identity of the Same in virtue of an expressive 
immanence is what links the two philosophers of the seventeenth century, Spinoza 
and Leibniz who introduce it through the theories of the modes of the invariant 
substance or through monadology, correspondingly. 
What is essential in Spinoza’s philosophy is the absolute governance of 
univocity which enables the forming and grasping of an absolutely adequate idea. 
The univocity implies univocity of attributes, univocity of causation, and univocity 
of ideas.84 The univocity of causation implies that God is the cause of the 
multiple: ‘Whatsoever is, is in God, and without God nothing can be, or 
conceived’ (Ethics, part I, Prop. XV).85  
The first and second Corollaries to the XIV Proposition suggest a 
univocity of attributes, in respect of which attributes are in the same form as the 
substance which complicates all modes and accidents: ‘God is one, that is only 
one substance can be granted in the universe, and that substance is absolutely 
                                                           
84 Gilles Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, pp. 330 - 333. 
85 Benedictus de Spinoza, The Chief Works, trans. and intr. by R.H.M. Elwes (London: G. Bell and 
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infinite [...] extension and thought are either attributes of God or [...] accidents [...] 
of the attributes of God.’86 
The univocity of attributes governs also the postulation of the finite as the 
modification of the infinite or as accident or attribute through which, in virtue of 
its adequacy to the infinite, the essence of the infinite is perceived. God is 
accordingly defined as a ‘substance, consisting of infinite attributes, of which each 
expresses eternal and infinite essentiality’ (Ethics, part I, Prop. XI).87  
The two modes of univocity imply the third one, the univocity of ideas, 
implying that the infinite, indivisible substance and the finite share common 
notions: ‘In God there is necessarily the idea not only of his essence, but also of 
all things which necessarily follow from his essence’ (The Ethics, part II, Prop. 
III).88 The univocity of idea unites God and the multiple in their absolute oneness: 
‘The idea of God, from which an infinite number of things follow in infinite ways, 
can only be one’ (The Ethics, part II, Prop. IV).89 
In Spinoza, univocity as a way of conceiving of sameness conditions his 
pantheistic worldview, anchored in the adequacy between the depersonalized 
immanence of God, as the only self-creating cause or natura naturans, ‘a being 
that we conceive clearly and distinctly through itself’90 and the multiple as natura 
naturata or the working out of a creative endeavour of the one true substance. The 
adequacy between the One and the multiple implies the univocity of God and the 
world, in respect of which God is identical with the world and not beyond: ‘God is 
the indwelling and not the transient cause of all things’ (The Ethics, part I, Prop. 
XVIII).91  
Spinoza’s deification of nature, interpreted as an essentially poetic 
approach to nature and his quest for an adequate knowledge of Deus sive Natura 
(God or Nature) in the created world is what attracts Goethe, Novalis, Lessing, 
                                                           
86 Benedictus de Spinoza, The Chief Works, p. 55. 
87 Benedictus de Spinoza, The Chief Works, p. 51. 
88 Ibid, p. 84. 
89 Ibid, p. 85. 
90 Benedictus de Spinoza, Short Treatise On God, Man and His Well-being, trans. and ed. by A. 
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Herder, Hölderlin, and Jacobi, who interpret his monistic philosophy not only 
scientifically but also theologically and aesthetically.92 
To sum up, Spinoza construes sameness in virtue of the principle of 
univocity which is a principle of identity par excellence and is rooted in the 
common cause, form, and notion persisting in the relationship between the One 
and the multiple: ‘there is but One, which exists through itself, and is a support to 
all other attributes.’93 The Same in Spinoza, appearing under the guise of one 
substance as now God, now nature; now mind, now matter, is imbued with a 
pantheistic sense and is inseparable from the created world. The aesthetic 
implications of this is that poetry comes to express an indwelling, pantheistic 
nature; an implication, which will be crucial for Schelling, et al.   
 The monadological philosophy of Leibniz combines the materialistic-
empiricist, naturalistic and pantheistic systems coexisting in the 17th-18th centuries 
in order to ground the true unity of the Same in relation to multiplicity. Sameness 
is tackled from two fundamentally different positions: from a quasi-atomistic 
worldview, attempting to reduce the Same to a prime indivisible constituent and 
from a theological one, viewing sameness in virtue of the analogy between the 
One and the multiple. In both cases, the principles of unity, analogy, and harmony 
govern the relationship between the One and the multiple.  
 The monadistic approach to the problem of the Same, reducing all things 
to one indivisible, incessantly active constituent recalls the similar operation of 
belonging in the Presocratic atomists. Yet, it differs from them by the spiritualistic 
approach to the monad which is not merely an atomistic, but also a metaphysical 
concept. The monads are postulated as simple substances or ultimate units of 
nature, indivisible (3) and having no parts (1), whose energy impels them to 
ceaseless activity in accordance with their nature.94  
 Leibniz introduces the monad in its function of representing the universe 
as a principle of unity, identity, and harmony. In virtue of its original inner power, 
independent of that of every other monad and as a ‘perpetual living mirror of the 
universe’ (56), each of the monads reflects the universe in different degrees of 
                                                           
92 On Spinoza’s reception by German thought around 1800 see Margarethe Wegenast, Hölderlin’s 
Spinoza-Rezeption (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1990).  
93 Benedictus de Spinoza, Short Treatise On God, Man and His Well-being, p. 33. 
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clarity and perfection. Yet, the reflected is always but the same universe in its 
unity and infinity, the identity of which dominates upon the different perceptions 
of the monads. 
 The introduction of the monad demonstrates that sameness remains at the 
heart of Leibniz’s philosophical system which aims to represent it in terms of pure 
identity. Sameness is postulated here in virtue of representation: the representation 
of the intelligible through psychological or purely intellectual elements by the 
cognitive function, giving rise to a complete reproduction (Abbildung) of the 
universe which is complemented by the subjective variations of the individual 
approach.95 Sameness is also represented in virtue of expression: of the expression 
of the pre-established unity, identity and harmony of the macrocosm through the 
individual substance of the microcosm of the monad. 
 The conceiving of sameness by Spinoza and Leibniz constitutes the last 
phase in the thinking of its pure identity. In the next part, we will inquire into the 
philosophical digression from the Same throughout the 17th and 18th centuries and 
the consequences it brings about in the philosophical and poetic thought.  
  
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
                                                           
95 Anna Tereza Tymieniecka, Leibniz’ Cosmological Synthesis  
   (Assen: Royal VanGorcum Ltd., 1964), p. 98. 
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Part Two: Digression from Sameness 
 
‘Aesthetics […] is unable to think of art according to its proper statute, and so long as man is 
prisoner of an aesthetic perspective; the essence of art remains closed to him’.1 
 
 
Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the limits of philosophical 
postulations of sameness in respect of pure identity — in the long philosophical 
tradition extending from the Presocratics to Leibniz and Spinoza — become 
tangible. The metaphysical signified of the Same eventually becomes profane 
from being perpetually circulated as a dominant concept of unity and identity. 
Philosophy faces a dilemma of either re-postulating sameness by maintaining the 
classical hypothesis of its being or, by questioning the entire tradition, to suspend 
the postulation of the Same as the fundamental issue of philosophy. Leaving the 
examination of the re-postulation of sameness to the third and fourth parts of the 
present study, the digression from the Same will inquire into the second path 
where philosophy abstains from posing the issue of sameness at all. In so doing, 
this part will trace the digression from the Same amounting to an entire 
reorganization of thought, with regard to which the origin of philosophy and 
philosophical poetics are being re-thought outside the realm of representation.  
 What are the fundamental directions and consequences of this reorganization 
in philosophical and poetic thought? Does this reorganization point to the limits of 
sameness and question the validity of this entire tradition dedicated to the 
revelation of its enigma, or is it itself a limited conception of philosophy and 
poetics detached from the issue of sameness? Is the suspension of the issue of 
sameness the only way out of the limitations of representation? And do the new 
standards of validation derived from this suspension reveal the hitherto concealed 
mystery of the art work, or do they represent merely a limited conception 
irreconcilable with its genuine essence? 
                                                           
1 Giorgio Agamben, The Man Without Content, trans. by Georgia Albert (Stanford CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1999), p. 102. 
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 These and other similar issues will be addressed in this part of the thesis 
through inquiring into the philosophical system of Kant and the philosophical 
discipline of aesthetics, the function of which is to validate art in non-cognitive 
terms with regard to its practical functions according to taste, pleasure, 
naturalness, and truth. 
 The essential traits of digression become substantial in Kant who offers 
understanding or intellect — defined by Hegel as ‘the absolute immovable, 
insuperable finitude of human Reason’2 — as a substitute for the metaphysical 
signified of the Same. He suggests that the divided, dichotomized, and 
differentiated spheres of knowledge should substitute for the wisdom of the 
identity, plenitude, and harmony of the unified Cosmos. 
 By conducting his inquiry in the direction of the a priori synthesis of 
subjective experience and the conditions of possibility of experience itself, Kant 
abstains from the very postulation of sameness. It is, therefore, not the origins, 
foundation or even limits of the Same that are being reviewed, but the origin of 
philosophy which, with Kant, digresses from the issue of sameness toward the 
examination of the conditions of the existence of philosophical knowledge. As a 
result, philosophy is anthropologized and reconsidered as a reflection on 
subjectivity and reduced to the realm of judgements derived from experience or 
empirical observations and their a priori conditions. The subjective assessment of 
experience, sharply distinguishing between thinking and being, substitutes for the 
objective assessment of the Same with its adequacy of thinking and being.  
The digression from the sameness will also be traced through the aesthetic 
postulations of art during this period when the thinking of identity gives way to 
the analyses of the phenomenal appearance of art-works with regard to the 
categories of the beautiful and the sublime. The newly formed discipline of 
aesthetics transposes its inquiry from the cognition of the Same (as its object of 
cognition) into the realization of the ego’s subjectivity in respect of the opposed 
objectivity.  
 The transitory reign of pleasure comes to substitute for the outworn concept 
of the Same and becomes the subject of debate, reflection, and imaginative 
                                                           
2 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Faith and Knowledge, trans. by Walter Cerf and H. S. Harris 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1977), p. 77. 
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representation. Jean Starobinski argues that the eighteenth century is primarily 
famous for questioning the criteria of pleasure, discovering all the problems 
inherent in pleasure, and actually inventing pleasure.3 Sensibility is accompanied 
by a paradigm of rationality based upon the dissection of art into innumerable 
genera and species via clearly stated definitions and categories, and failing to re-
cohere it on the ground of an underlying identity. With regard to this paradigm, art 
is being validated in respect of fortuitous principles and faculties via the analysis 
of its generic peculiarities, kinds, disposition of qualities, and principles of 
definition. 
 The impact of Kant’s divide between the fixed and unalterable oppositions 
of sensibility and understanding will also be traced in the development of 
empirical, emotional, psychological, and pragmatic interpretations of art. A brief 
outline of the aesthetic legacy of the aforementioned period will not only 
demonstrate the digression from sameness but also point to the limits of thinking 
of the pure identity of sameness. 
                                                           
3 Jean Starobinski, The Invention of Liberty, trans. by Bernard C. Swift (New York: Rizzoli 
International Publications, Inc.,1987), p. 53. 
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1. Aesthetic Theories as a Transposition into Subjectivity 
 
 
1. 1 Shifting from the Poetics of Sameness to a Subject-Centred     
       Aesthetics of Reception 
 
 
Starting from the seventeenth and throughout the eighteenth centuries, the 
metaphysical concept of the Same which dominated philosophical thought from 
Antiquity to the Renaissance, eventually becomes obsolete. Philosophy stops 
being concerned with the issue of sameness and the problem of its identical 
representation via art. The Same eludes the horizon of thought, as we will see, not 
for good but merely for about two centuries to return afterwards in its full 
splendour as absolute totality in its plenitude (in Schelling and Hegel) and in the 
de-forming difference of the Other (in Nietzsche, Heidegger, Derrida, and others). 
 Meanwhile, acknowledging the exhaustion of the issue of sameness as a 
result of its repeated postulation as a metaphysical signified of pure identity and 
unity, philosophy throughout the seventeenth and the first half of the eighteenth 
century, rather than re-postulating sameness, chooses to digress from it. The 
philosophical digression from the Same has its direct influence upon the 
formation of the discipline of aesthetics, the fulcrum of which becomes David 
Hume’s Of the Standard of Taste (1757), as a substitute for the metaphysical 
discourses on the Same. A brief outline of the prevailing aesthetic theories will, 
thus, be provided aiming to portray this period as a mere fragment of digression 
on the general canvas of the philosophy of sameness. This inquiry into aesthetic 
theory points to the limits of the digression from sameness and the urge for its 
different postulation. Far from attaining the genuine essence of the art-work, these 
theories focus upon its derivative functions, thereby allowing us to conclude that a 
digression from sameness amounts to the digression from art. As Giorgio 
Agamben rightly argues: ‘When the work of art is […] offered for aesthetic 
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enjoyment […] this still remains far from attaining the essential structure of the 
work of art, that is, the origin that gives itself in the work of art and remains 
reserved in it.’4 The contrasting analysis conducted here aims at emphasizing the 
significance of the issue of sameness as opposed to the deficiency and 
temporariness of the newly coined aesthetic categories in their attempt to 
substitute for it. 
 The aesthetic theories of this period should be examined from the aspect of 
the unprecedented unity of rationality and sensibility, order and variety appealing 
both to judgment and sensibility, as described by Starobinski: ‘With certain 
aspects of the work of art (symmetry, clarity, etc.), the judgment is given priority. 
With other aspects (ornamentation, charming oddities), pleasure results from an 
immediate startling impact.’5 
 This unity of rationality and sensibility is conditioned by historical 
circumstances. On the one hand, it is conditioned by the rise of the natural 
sciences which provide a model of rationality (after the work of Galileo and 
Descartes), striving to explain the laws governing various phenomena by means of 
experiments, observations, or calculations. This initiates a tendency to attempt 
distinctions between the arts and the sciences (this distinction is not really fully 
achieved until the second half of the nineteenth century, especially after 1860, i.e., 
after Darwin), and the application of the rationalistic method for the analysis of 
the arts based upon the dissection of art based on particular genera and structural 
definitions of stylistic or compositional means. With regard to the paradigm of 
rationality, art is not validated in the light of the prime principle of sameness, but 
according to fortuitous principles and faculties via the analysis of its generic 
peculiarities, kinds, disposition of qualities, and principles of definition. 
 From another angle, the second half of the eighteenth century gains its 
fundamental importance from the coinage of the term aesthetics (Baumgarten is 
the first to mention this term in a formal way in the middle of the eighteenth 
century) and the invention of its subject matter with such dominating concepts as 
taste, sentiment, genius, originality, and creative imagination in their modern 
                                                           
4 Giorgio Agamben, The Man Without Content, p. 102. 
5 Jean Starobinski, The Invention of Liberty, p. 53. 
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meaning.6 In respect of the aesthetic paradigm, art is validated according to taste, 
pleasure, naturalness and truth, in which the practical and teleological functions of 
art take precedence over the onto-theological and epistemological concerns of 
Classical and Medieval philosophy. Accordingly, art is no longer posed and 
examined in its essence with regard to its relation to the Same but rather in its 
relation to the subject. This brings forth a major transformation in thought that can 
be described as a transposition of philosophical and aesthetic thought from 
objectivity into subjectivity, from the objective assessment of sameness into the 
subjective assessment of experience, from concept to judgement. 
 Yet, as the inquiry into the entire philosophical discourse of the West will 
demonstrate, this reorganization in the form of a paradigmatic shift from the 
poetics of sameness into a subject-centred aesthetics of reception or a general 
psychological aesthetics is merely a temporal digression, a kind of mutation, to 
use Michel Foucault’s term. As his archaeology of thought argues, the subject 
(which takes its beginning from the Cartesian ego) and its reception are neither the 
oldest nor the most constant object of inquiry compared with ‘that profound 
history of the Same’.7 In accordance with Foucault, ‘man is an invention of recent 
date. And one perhaps nearing its end ’and ‘it is not around him and his secrets 
that knowledge prowled for so long in the darkness’.8 Even more so for the 
subjective assessment of experience which, to transform Foucault’s argument, is 
by far not the oldest, nor the most constant object of inquiry of philosophical 
poetics. It is merely from this perspective that we will inquire into the empirical, 
emotional, psychological, and pragmatic interpretations of art, grouping them 
under the common title of a temporary digression from sameness. 
 
 
                                                           
6 See: Paul Oskar Kristeller, ‘The Modern System of Arts’ for a detailed account of aesthetic 
theories in the 17-18 centuries, in Aesthetics : A Comprehensive Anthology, ed. by Steven Cahn 
and Aaron Meskin (London: Blackwell Publishing, 2008), pp. 3-15.  
7 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things, trans. provided by Vintage Books (New York: Random 
House, Inc., 1994), p. 386. 
8 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things, pp. 386 – 387. 
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1. 2 Outline of Aesthetic Theories with Particular Reference to the   
        Digression from Sameness 
 
A brief outline of aesthetic theories of the aforementioned period aims at 
investigating the criteria which substitute for the metaphysical poetic theories, 
anchored in the understanding of poetry as the representation of the Same. A vast 
number of aesthetic theories are developed during the eighteenth century 
attempting to fill the void opened up due to the decline of the Same, yet, as the 
general outlook will demonstrate, all of them are related to the subject. The 
inquiry into the main aesthetic theories of the eighteenth century is an attempt to 
demonstrate the limits of a subject-centred aesthetics and its inability to provide a 
genuine approach to the art work.  
English and German aesthetics developed under the strong influence of the 
French classicist and neo-classicist movements endeavouring to establish and 
regulate art according to good sense, taste and reason. Along with the Aristotelian 
or scholastic inheritance, Horace (his adaptations) and Marco Girolamo Vida are 
among the authorities regulating art. First and foremost, aesthetics wields the 
influence of the neo-classical conception of expression in poetry as revealed in the 
Ars Poetica (1674) by the French poet and critic Nicolas Boileau-Despréaux 
(1636 – 1711). It is essential to underline the characteristic features of the Art of 
Poetry as an imitation of the Ars Poetica of Horace, in so far as it lays down the 
codes and rules for all future French versification in the vein of its Latin 
prototype. Following the legacy of Horace’s Ars Poetica, Boileau focuses on the 
verisimilitude and artful design of the versification aiming to affect the reader: 
 
Jamais au spectateur n’offrez rien d’incroyable: 
Le vrai peut quelquefois n’être pas vraisemblable. 
 (Write not what cannot be with ease conceived: 
Some truths may be too strong to be believed.) (Canto III).9 
 
                                                           
9 Nicolas Boileau, Art of Poetry and Lutrin, trans. by Sir William Soames and John Ozell (London: 
Oneworld Classics, 2008), pp. 30-31. 
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This assessment of poetry shifts from its representational to its practical 
function, aiming to please or affect the reader whose emotions are a prime 
consideration. The poet’s personal emotions and their artful expression serve as a 
means to an end and as an essential tool for evoking similar emotions in the 
reader: 
 
Il faut dans la douleur que vous vous abaissiez. 
Pour me tirer des pleurs, il faut que vous pleuriez. 
(In sorrow, you must softer methods keep, 
And to excite our tears you must weep). 10 
 
The French aesthetic theories which greatly influenced English and German 
theoreticians are those of Jean Baptiste du Bos (1670 - 1742) and Charles Batteux 
(1713 - 1780). They focus upon the concept of art as an imitation (imitation de la 
belle nature) which conditions the unity and congruence of painting and poetry. 
Aristotle’s mimetic theory, Horace's famous Ut pictura poesis and Simonides’s 
saying ‘painting is dumb poetry and poetry is a speaking picture’ serve as sources 
for this. 
 Abbé Du Bos,11 whose Réflexions critiques sur la poésie et la peinture 
(1718) exerts a lasting influence on the aesthetics of the eighteenth century, 
ascribes to art the psychological function of exciting the emotions by evoking an 
instant of high emotion and excitement, of physical or mental stimulation via 
vivid images. He recognizes the absolute domination of passion in poetry and the 
fine arts by asserting that generally men suffer from the absence of passions rather 
than from the anxieties caused by these passions. Du Bos breaks with the 
traditional conventions by suppressing the bonds of dependence between pleasure 
and rational discernment or the edification of the soul, and claims that the decision 
of the sensations precedes reasoning which has merely an auxiliary role in our 
judgement of a poem or a picture. 
                                                           
10 Nicolas Boileau, Art of Poetry and Lutrin, pp. 34 & 35. 
11 See: Marcel Braunschvig, L'Abbé  du Bos, rénovateur de la critique au XVIII siècle (reproduced 
by BiblioBazaar, 2010. 
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Du Bos is also acknowledged as the first aesthetician to remark upon the 
existing differences between poetry and painting and to differentiate between 
them according to the signs or symbols of expression (natural and coexistent in 
painting, conventional and successive in poetry), and the subjects appropriate for 
poetry and painting (phenomena of the soul are out of the range of the painter's art 
unless expressed by visible aspects of the body; an unfamiliar subject may be 
treated by the poet whereas the painter's subject must be known or at least 
recognizable). 
 The influential treatise of Abbé Batteux Les beaux arts réduits à un même 
principe (1746) is the first in its kind to codify the modern system of the fine arts. 
In accordance with it, the general principle common to all the arts is the imitation 
of beautiful nature while those distinguishing between the art forms are pleasure 
and usefulness. 
 Both of these influential treatises which combine in their approach 
rationality and sensibility, exemplify the general disposition of aesthetics in the 
realm of subjectivity. They constitute the general background for the development 
of aesthetic theory in Germany in the eighteenth century. Yet, if the French 
theoreticians, especially Batteux and the Encyclopaedists, are credited with having 
developed a concrete French conception of the fine arts, then German thought, 
represented by Alexander Baumgarten (1714-1762), is famed for utilizing it in the 
philosophical theory of aesthetics and formulating its general scope and 
programme. 
 German aesthetic thought of the eighteenth century should be viewed, 
accordingly, as the philosophical conceptualization of aesthetic theory, in which 
aesthetic pleasure, anchored in the subject’s sensuous relationship with the world, 
substitutes for the role played by metaphysics. The wide range of issues raised by 
the French, especially those concerning the interrelation of rational and sensual 
cognition, are systematized, and aesthetics is posed as a separate discipline which 
focuses on that part of our relationship with the world that is not reducible to 
scientific cognition but accessible only via sensual perception. This could be made 
clear through the juxtaposition of the Cartesian term metaphysics, concerning 
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clear and distinct ideas and aesthetics, dealing with ideas that are less than clear 
and distinct (particularly in Baumgarten). 
 The eminent figures in German thought contributing to the emergence of 
aesthetics as an independent philosophical discipline with the paradigmatic shift 
from the aesthetics of production into the aesthetics of reception and 
psychological aesthetics are, along with Baumgarten, Moses Mendelssohn (1729-
1786) and Johann Georg Hamann (1730-1788). Despite the fact that the age of 
aesthetic paradigms in philosophy is thought to have begun with Kant,12 these 
thinkers merit consideration for opening vistas for the idealists and for influencing 
greatly the subsequent development of German aesthetics. 
 The principal trait of German aesthetic thought is the reduction of the theory 
of art to sensual perception. Within this unifying scope, however, each of the 
aestheticians demonstrates his individual approach. Baumgarten is predominantly 
concerned with the cognitive aspect, Mendelssohn with the emotional, i.e. the 
sense of pleasure derived from the work of art, and Hamann with the advocacy of 
the poetic language as a re-creation of the original creation of God. Claiming 
epistemological relevance for sensual perception as opposed to rationality, they 
reduce aesthetics to ‘a defense of the relevance of sensual perception’ and develop 
it as ‘advocacy of sensibility, not as a theory of art’.13 
 Baumgarten’s Aesthetica (1750, 1758) and Hamann’s Aesthetica in nuce 
(1762) raise the issue of aesthetic pleasure which substitutes for the role played by 
the metaphysical philosophy of the Same. They view the sensuous relationship to 
the world as being part of aesthetic pleasure, thereby raising the question of truth 
as the aesthetic truth of the Wahrscheinliche or that which appears as true. 
Baumgarten’s theory is an attempt to contribute to rational cognition through 
sensual cognition, which is posed as a sine qua non for the former (Aesthetica, 
41).14 The sensual mode of cognition is, thus, analogous to rational procedures, 
whilst aesthetics is the art of thinking analogous to rationality (ars analogi 
rationis). Artistic emotionality and cognitive achievements, aesthetic immediacy 
and abstract cognition, sensuality and rationality are no longer opposed to each 
                                                           
12 Kai Hammermeister, The German Aesthetic Tradition 
    (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 20. 
13 Kai Hammermeister, The German Aesthetic Tradition, p. 4. 
14 The reference to Baumgarten is from Aesthetica (G. Olms Publisher, 1986). 
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other but, instead, reconciled in Baumgarten’s theory of aesthetics which, as an 
individual philosophical discipline, eventually gains independence. 
 Mendelssohn demonstrates the viability of a metaphysical framework 
shaped by Leibniz and Wolff, especially concerning the nature and variety of 
sentiments neglected by that metaphysical tradition and treated with greater 
sensitivity by English and French authors.15 His investigation and classification of 
aesthetic pleasure constitutes an interesting combination of rationality and 
sensibility, typical of the aesthetic theories of this period. Here, aesthetic pleasure 
is classified in accordance with three sources of pleasure: beauty (stemming from 
the unity of the manifold), perfection (stemming from the unanimity of the 
manifold), and sensual pleasure (stemming from the improvement of our 
physique). Actually, what Mendelssohn opts for, is to find novel art forms 
analogous to works of music which contain the combination of all the three 
elements of pleasure. Along with the psychological aspect of art, Mendelssohn is 
preoccupied with its practical application, where art serves as an indispensable 
tool for his theory of perfection. His Letters on Sensations, (Briefe über die 
Empfindungen, 1755) aim to perfect man by giving him an aesthetic education.16 
 Hammermeister underlines the contribution of Mendelssohn’s aesthetics by 
sketching its further development in three major directions.17 First, he stresses the 
fact of Mendelssohn’s being the first German philosopher to devote significant 
attention to the concept of the sublime as the sensual expression of an 
extraordinary perfection that does not incite terror, but inspires admiration, 
thereby associating it with an ultimately positive emotional response. Second, he 
emphasizes the fact that Mendelssohn’s notion of the naїve as the simplistic 
representation of a beautiful and noble soul clearly influenced Schiller’s definition 
of naїve art. Third, he considers Mendelssohn’s attempt to classify the individual 
forms of art according to a semiotic system, by distinguishing the different art 
forms in accordance with the signs they use, as the first attempt at a semiotic 
theory of art in Germany that was later taken up by Lessing and Herder. All these 
                                                           
15 Moses Mendelssohn, Philosophical Writings, ed. by Daniel O. Dahlstorm, Cambridge Texts in   
    the History of Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. ix. 
16 Moses Mendelssohn, Philosophical Writings, pp. 7 – 96 for a detailed account. 
17 Kai Hammermeister, The German Aesthetic Tradition, pp. 13 – 20. 
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issues contribute to establishing aesthetics as an independent discipline in 
philosophy. 
 What distinguishes Hamann’s aesthetics is his metaphysical conception of 
language that focuses upon poetic language as an endless process of the 
translation of a cognition based on sensuality, a translation from a language of 
angels into a language of humans. Consequently, he conceives of language not 
merely as the intelligible language of mathematical reason but primarily as the 
poetic language of passions, senses, and images. The poetic language is 
considered as the native language of mankind, allowing insight into the being of 
God and helping to divulge God’s revelation in nature. 
We also need to refer to the Swiss aesthetic critics Johann Georg Bodmer (1786 - 
1864) and Johann Jakob Breitinger (1701 - 1776) whose influence upon German 
aesthetics is observed in a variety of ways. The essential trait of their theory is the 
emphasis upon the freedom of imagination even while within the framework of 
Wolffian perfectionism.18 They proceed toward an aesthetic theory that 
subsequently gives the play of the mental powers equal importance with the 
sensible representation of truth by treating the aesthetic qualities of representation 
as parallel to their purely cognitive qualities. Bodmer and Breitinger hold that 
novelty is an especially powerful means of making moral truths come alive. In 
respect of their theory, the moralistic aim of poetry can be better achieved by a 
free use of imagination in poetry. In most of their joint works, they regard literary 
exposition as a form of painting on the tabula rasa of the imagination.  
 The critical theories of the Swiss critics tackle the issues inscribed within the 
framework of general aesthetics, especially those concerning the concept of art 
being an imitation of nature, conditioning the unity and congruence of painting 
and poetry. In accordance with their aesthetics, poetry and painting are alike in 
producing similar effects on the mind although through different media.  
                                                           
18 Paul Guyer, ‘18th Century German Aesthetics’ in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
Fall 2008 Edition, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/aesthetics-18th-german/>.  
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 Along with the French and Swiss influence, German aesthetics is 
characterized by the interest in ancient sculpture and architecture stimulated by 
Winckelmann’s studies of classical art. The statue Laocoon (dated approximately 
50 BC, which is presently in the Museum of Vatican) serves as an illustration of 
theoretical considerations concerning aesthetic principles, and even gives rise to 
Winckelmann’s, Lessing's, Herder's, and Goethe's treatises entitled Laokoon (or 
Über Laokoon). The treatises on the Laokoon group expound the qualities of the 
statue corresponding to the aesthetic criteria of their authors. The principles set 
forth in them are developed according to how the statue, as a work of art, 
conforms to these criteria. Most artists and theoreticians of this period, define the 
principal figure in the Laocoon group as a model of ideal beauty through the 
imitation of which the artist corrects the imperfections of Nature. 
 For a period, the Laokoon puts an end to the age-old tradition of the parallel 
between painting and poetry and, thus, frees poetry from the function of 
description. Yet, the relationship between poetry and painting is considered as one 
of the most important elements that precede the formation of the modern 
comprehensive system of fine arts in respect of which Lessing’s Laokoon is 
denounced for its exclusion of music.19 Along with the Ancients and French 
critics, Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729-1781) bears the influences of Edmund 
Burke, the philosophical systems of the Enlightenment, Leibniz, Christian Wolf 
and the aesthetics of Baumgarten. Lessing undertakes to establish aesthetic 
principles through inductive logic, deriding German critics for the application of 
the deductive method (Chapter XXVI, Laocoon)20 in his 1766 influential essay 
Laokoon or on the Limits of Painting and Poetry (Laokoon oder über die Grenzen 
der Malerei und Poesie). He examines the relationship between poetry and 
painting, claiming that the affinity between them is based on the function of 
imitation. 
Lessing’s definition of a work of art accounts for his posing the beautiful as 
the principal object of aesthetic inquiry, in which ‘the name of works of art’ 
should be ‘reserved for those alone […] in which beauty has been his first and last 
                                                           
19 See Paul Oskar Kristeller, ‘The Modern System of Arts’  p. 12. 
20 Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Laocoon, Nathan the Wise, etc. ed. by William A. Steel, J. M. Dent 
& Sons LTD (London: Aldine House, 1949), p. 97. 
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object’.21 The superiority of the poet over the painter is seen in the poet’s capacity 
to show beauty not delineated in its component parts but ‘merely in its effect’.22 
Where Baumgarten’s influence upon Lessing is concerned, it is his notion of 
poetry as a perfectly sensuous language stirring the soul with a multitude of 
perceptions of fear, pleasure, etc., that affects him most.  
The significance of Lessing’s aesthetic theory is the attribution to poetry of a 
dramatic expression independent of all pictorial representation, through his 
opposition to the concept of ut pictura poesis. Another important point is the 
inclusion of the ugly, the ridiculous and the disgusting (Chapters XXIII-XXV)23 
into poetry as opposed to painting which is restricted to the beautiful. 
 Johann Gottfried Herder’s (1744 - 1803) texts belong already to a later, pre-
Romantic period, bearing the influences of the Enlightenment in the person of 
Kant and the opposition of Enlightenment in the person of Hamann. Herder’s 
texts are the result of the combined influence of Kant’s system of reason and 
Hamann’s mystical insight into the unconscious and irrational depths of the soul. 
Herder’s conception of beauty is developed in his later work the Kalligone, where 
he suggests, in opposition to the great emphasis traditionally placed on beauty in 
the philosophy of art that beauty is not in fact nearly as essential to art as it is 
often taken to be. In particular, he argues that art is much more essentially a 
matter of Bildung — cultural formation or education (especially in moral 
respects).24 
Chronologically, the last text on the Laokoon is Johann Wolfgang Goethe’s 
(1749 - 1832) Über Laokoon which views the statue as a masterpiece of Greek 
sculpture. Built on the classical concept of creation as an expression of the ideal, 
Goethe disregards the statue’s reference to the fate of the Trojan priest. Instead, he 
signifies the figures of the group as human types and, the statue itself, as a 
depiction of a scene from human life. Goethe’s concept of art, as ‘supreme 
                                                           
21 Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Laocoon, Nathan the Wise, etc. p. 40. 
22 Ibid., p. 81. 
23 Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Laocoon, Nathan the Wise, pp. 86-97. 
24 Michael Forster, ‘Johann Gottfried von Herder’ in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/herder/>. 
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conceptual unity’ is in congruence with the Greek ideal characterizing art in its 
museworthiness (das Musische).25  
 The English aesthetic theories also wield the strong influence of the French 
aesthetic paradigm. The earliest text in English aesthetics, however, is Sir Philip 
Sidney’s Apology for Poetry, 1595 which views poetry not as an end in itself but 
as having certain instructive and moral purposes. Moreover, it propagates the idea 
of educating the community through poetry by linking poetry to inspirational 
teaching and knowledge. Sidney emphasizes the irrefutable advantages and 
efficacy of a poetry-based education which ‘in the noblest nations and languages 
that are known, hath been the first light-giver to ignorance, and first nurse, whose 
milk by little and little enabled them to feed afterwards of tougher knowledges.’26 
His Apology approaches the central stand in the rhetoric of Horace that reduces 
the function of poetry to pleasing or instructing the reader and claims that ‘the 
poet’s aim is either to profit or to please, or to blend in one the delightful and the 
useful’.27 Even though poetry is superior to history and philosophy thanks to the 
moral effect it achieves moving the readers more forcefully to virtue. Poetry is 
used by Sidney in the meaning of poiesy from the Greek word poiein, to make. In 
accordance with this etymological appeal, the early Greek philosophers are 
considered to be poets, while the beauty of Plato’s writings is believed to depend 
‘most of Poetry’.28 
 The first important treatise in its endeavour to illustrate the likeness of 
poetry and painting in the vein of the French, is John Dryden's Parallel (1695) 
which draws upon the congruence between painting and poetry stemming from 
their common end to please the reader. Dryden is, however, more famous for his 
poetry than aesthetic theory. 
                                                           
25 Walter Benjamin, ‘The Concept of Criticism in German Romanticism’ in Selected Writings, ed. 
by Marcus Bullock and Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 1997), I, p. 179. 
26 Sir Philip Sidney, ‘An Apology for Poetry’ in English Critical Essays, ed. by Edmund P. Jones 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1922), p. 2. 
27 Horace, ‘Ars Poetica’ in Literary Criticism, Plato to Dryden, ed. by A. Gilbert (New York: 
American Book Co, 1940), p. 139. 
28 Sir Philip Sidney, ‘An Apology for Poetry’, p. 6. 
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 Anthony Ashley Cooper, the third Earl of Shaftesbury (1671 - 1713),29 one 
of the most influential thinkers of the period, approaches the views of French 
theoreticians, in particular Dubos’s concept of plaisir pur (pure pleasure) via his 
notion of aesthetic sensation as disinterested love and in respect of the idea about 
the poetic qualities of the highest type in painting. Yet, due to the influence 
exerted on him by Plato, Plotinus, and Cicero, he does not make a clear distinction 
between aesthetics and ethics.  
 The first English aesthetician to depart from the theory of likeness between 
poetry and philosophy towards emphasizing poetry’s greater power to affect the 
reader is Edmund Burke (1730 - 1797). He bases his idea of the difference 
between poetry and painting upon the various degrees of clarity in the use of 
symbols. In the Chapter On Words of his aesthetical treatise entitled A 
Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful 
(1757),30 Burke asserts that words failing to present clear and definite images have 
a greater power to fill the mind with affections about the beautiful and the sublime 
than the clear and distinct images of painting. Painting, thus, reigns in the realm of 
the beautiful whereas the realm of poetry is the sublime. As an example, he cites 
Homer's lines in The Iliad on the fatal beauty of Helen which say nothing of the 
particulars of her beauty in contrast to the descriptions made by Spencer on 
Belphebe. Nonetheless, Burke claims to be much more touched by the way Priam 
and the old men of his council allude to her than by the long and laboured 
descriptions of her beauty handed down by tradition. 
 In the Chapter On Words, Burke consistently departs from the paradigm of 
the congruence between poetry and painting prevailing in English aesthetic 
thought. He maintains a view similar to the one about the Iliad, this time on 
music’s compliance to feeling because of its obscurity in significance. Burke even 
goes so far as to free the sound from its associated idea as the pure and non-
representative expression of the sublime. The tendency to regard music as the 
apex of the pure reflection of the Spirit, as a non-representational form of 
                                                           
29 Third Earl of Shaftsesbury, ‘Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times’, in Aesthetics: 
A Comprehensive Anthology, ed. By Steven M. Cahn and Aaron Meskin (Blackwell Publishing, 
2008), pp. 77 – 86.   
30 Edmund Burke, A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and the 
Beautiful, ed. by Adam Phillips (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 156. 
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articulation for grasping certain non-cognitive aspects of subjectivity, is not 
typical of English aesthetics. Abrams regards it as belonging more to the German 
tendencies, exemplified by Herder, Novalis, and Schlegel.31 
 As this delineation of aesthetic thought of the eighteenth century 
demonstrates, the decline of the Same conditions the urge of poetics to prescribe a 
function different from that of representing the Same to art. Aesthetics, thus, 
digresses from the issue of sameness by viewing art in respect of its cognitive and 
emotional aspects, or in terms of the sense of pleasure derived from the work of 
art. Three main sources of pleasure are thereby distinguished: the beautiful, the 
sublime, and sensual pleasure. Art is also viewed in respect of the psychological 
and moral aspects as a means to affect, cultivate, or instruct the reader.  The 
function of art is, accordingly, defined not in terms of the issue of sameness but in 
respect of the subject. The emotions of the author aiming at evoking high passions 
and excitement in the reader are prime considerations, asserting an aesthetics of 
subjectivity, anchored in the sensuous relationship to the world. Yet, this 
transformation of thought, does not amount to discovering the absolute 
uniqueness of the art-work as an experience of creative freedom — a discovery, 
which is only possible in case of a valid postulation of sameness and difference — 
but merely reduces art to the subject. The limits of this reduction are already 
inherent in the aesthetic theories of the eighteenth centuries, conditioning the 
inevitability of a re-postulation of sameness. 
 In the next chapter, we will trace the philosophical digression from the Same 
in the a priori synthesis of subjective experience and the questioning of the 
conditions of the possibility of experience in Kant’s works. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
31 Meyer H. Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp: Romantic Theory and the Critical Tradition 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 93-94.   
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2. Kant: The Questioning of Sameness 
 
2. 1 Digressing From Identity toward the Transcendental A Priori 
and the Empirical Spheres of Cognition 
 
 
The turning profane of the metaphysical paradigm grounded upon the dominance 
of the transcendental concept of the Same and its identical representation 
conditions not only the formation of aesthetics as traced in the preceding chapter 
but also the urge of philosophy to rethink its own position in respect of this 
situation. The rethinking of philosophy in terms of the limits of the identity of the 
Same is made possible either by rethinking sameness beyond its pure identity, or 
by rethinking philosophy beyond the very issue of sameness which amounts to the 
questioning of sameness as the fundamental question of philosophy. 
 The subsequent development of philosophy will always retrospectively be 
related in this study to this vantage point of the impossibility of thinking of the 
Same in its pure identity. When viewing from this vantage point, accordingly, we 
distinguish between a philosophy of sameness (comprising that of difference), 
rooted in the re-establishing of sameness as the fundamental issue of philosophy 
through its radical rethinking, and a philosophy of digression from sameness that 
delimits its own scope beyond it, thereby questioning the very status of sameness 
in its fundamentality. Leaving the examination of the philosophy of sameness to 
Parts Three (Schelling and Hegel) and Four (Nietzsche, Heidegger and Derrida), 
comprising the major differences of their very individual ways of rethinking the 
foundation, origin, and limits of the Same, we will now investigate the 
philosophical digression from sameness accomplished by Immanuel Kant (1724-
1804).  
 What interests us within the scope of this study, is not the investigation of 
the entire philosophical system of Kant, but rather his questioning of the issue of 
sameness as the fundamental question of philosophy by refusing to raise it at all. 
Kant’s philosophy will thus be viewed as a digression from the issue of sameness, 
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anchored in the identity of thinking and being toward a strict differentiation 
between the thinking subject and the object of thought. With Kant, the dream of 
plenitude and harmony represented by the desiderata concept of the Same or the 
category of sameness in the metaphysical philosophy of identity is replaced by the 
dichotomized polarities of thinking and being, sensibility and understanding, 
theory and praxis which philosophy or art appear unable and/or unwilling to 
overcome. Philosophy digresses from the homogeneous field of identity and 
establishes the transcendental a priori on one side and the differentiated empirical 
spheres of cognition on the other. It digresses from the speculative field of Being 
to the practical field of reason and from the metaphysical universal of the Same to 
the category of the Idea. 
 As is the case with the aesthetic theories outlined in the previous chapter, 
where the validation of art is transposed from the speculative field of sameness 
into that of subjective experience, Kant’s aesthetic judgments consider the 
beautiful and the sublime primarily in terms of their effects upon the subject. To 
use Gilles Deleuze’s words: ‘It is not the existence of the represented object that 
counts, but the simple effect of a representation on me.’32  The issue of sameness 
and its representation in art is, therefore, not among the central concerns of Kant’s 
Critique of Judgment (Kritik der Urteilskraft, 1790), but rather the subjective 
faculties involved in aesthetic judgments which amounts to a subjective approach 
to aesthetics. 
 Kant’s particular concern with aesthetics, meant to guarantee the totality of 
his philosophical system, begins with the Transcendental Aesthetic in the Critique 
of Pure Reason (Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 1781) and is developed more 
extensively in the Third Critique. It is an acknowledged fact that the Critique of 
Judgment is architectonically conceived as an attempt to bridge via the faculty of 
judgment the gaps between understanding and reason opened up by his First and 
Second Critiques. Consequently, despite the unsurpassed impact of Kant’s 
aesthetical theories upon the disciplines of aesthetics and art in general, aesthetics, 
as the interpretation of individual art works, does not constitute a central problem 
                                                           
32 Gilles Deleuze, Kant’s Critical Philosophy: The Doctrine of the Faculties, trans. by Hugh 
Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (London: The Athlone Press, 1984), p. 46. 
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for Kant.33 Instead, Kant is engaged in the scientific exploration and positing of 
aesthetics as merely part of his broader critical enterprise which is meant to 
guarantee the unity of reason. He therefore transforms the function of aesthetics 
from the validation of art as the representation of the Same into a questioning of 
the conditions of possibility of experience. 
 This displacement exhibits the limits of representation, transposing art from 
the realm of the representation of the transcendental objective of the Same into the 
subjective assessment of experience, thereby also transforming aesthetics into the 
formalization of the concrete. In general terms, this process may be described as 
the replacement of the metaphysical investigation of art by the transcendental one 
which inquires into the self-present subject of intuition and universal experience 
and poses subjective experience as a universal ground for art. Transcendental 
aesthetics, thus, studies the perceptions and physiological conditions of the 
subject. The aesthetic judgment, defined as the expression of the pleasurable 
subjective state of the free play of imagination and understanding, substitutes for 
inquiries into art in the light of its being a representation of the Same. 
 The strict differentiation between the sensible and the intelligible starts with 
the Critique of Pure Reason which grounds the difference between these terms not 
merely in logical but also in transcendental terms. The transcendental character of 
that difference is explicated by the fact that it affects not only the form but also 
the origin and contents of the difference. The structure and schematic organization 
of the Critique of Pure Reason is built upon the very opposition between 
sensibility and thought, expressed through the divide between the principles of 
sensibility a priori, discussed in the Transcendental Aesthetic, in opposition to the 
Transcendental Logic which treats of the principles of pure thought. In 
accordance with Kant’s divide of pure knowledge, autonomous fields are 
sovereign and not brought into synthesis. We can trace how ideas, forming the 
basis of Reason, are not available to intuition and how aesthetics, by contrast, is 
designed to provide intuitions for the Understanding. The introduction of the term 
intuition (Anschauung) into the process of cognition serves as the very ground for 
further differentiation between appearances (or objects as given to us), and things 
                                                           
33 See: Mark A.Cheetham, Kant, Art and Art History: Moments of Discipline (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001) for a detailed account of Kant’s relation to art and artists.  
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in themselves. In accordance with the scheme of the Transcendental Aesthetics, 
the subject is empowered to attain self-cognizance through speculative reflections 
of itself as another via representations (Vorstellungen), according to sensibility 
(Sinnlichkeit) which affects us through objects, and which alone supplies us with 
intuitions (Anschauungen). The speculative reflections of the subject are thereby 
characterised by a vast variety of empirical facts on the one hand, and a system of 
a priori conditions of knowledge on the other, the latter of which substitute for the 
metaphysical inquiries into the concept of the Same and its representation. As a 
way to overcome the aforementioned divide, Kant introduces the concept of 
critique along with the concept of a transcendental scheme in response to the 
necessity for a third term that could reconcile understanding with sensibility by 
partaking of both the intelligible and sensible spheres.34 
 Kant’s subsequent philosophy of aesthetic judgments is a move ‘much 
closer to Baumgarten’, as Andrew Bowie argues,35 as compared with the Critique 
of Pure Reason, where Kant claims that Baumgarten’s attempt to bring judgments 
on beauty into philosophy were futile because such judgments were always based 
on empirical rules that could not have the binding force of the a priori rules of 
science. 
 
 
2. 2 Reducing Art to the Subject’s Faculties of Thought 
 
 
In the Critique of Judgment, Kant introduces the term aesthetic ideas which, as 
opposed to the Critique of Pure Reason, makes ideas available to intuition, 
thereby transposing aesthetics towards the realm of ideas. It is already a 
compromise for Kant to admit that besides rational ideas there should also be 
aesthetic ideas originating in a sensible faculty meant to enliven the faculty of 
thinking. The faculty for the presentation of aesthetic ideas that animates the 
                                                           
34 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. by Kemp Smith (Garden City, N.Y.: 
Doubleday, 1966), pp. 121-127. 
35 Andrew Bowie, Aesthetics and Subjectivity from Kant to Nietzsche (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1990), p. 17. 
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works of art is the spirit which, in Kant’s formulation, is the power of ideas 
through which sensibility overcomes its own nature. Again, what is an issue of 
concern for Kant in validating an art work, is the faculty engaged in its creation or 
the creation of aesthetic ideas. According to Kant, reason, as the faculty of 
determined ideas, is not engaged in the creation of art or aesthetic ideas, but only 
imagination and understanding.  
What is at stake in the Critique of Judgment is Kant’s introduction of the 
power of judgment which, by constituting an intermediary between the faculties of 
the understanding and of reason, between the principles of pure reason and of 
practical reason, between theory and practice, and between freedom and nature, is 
designated to bridge the gap between them. The aforementioned reconciliation is 
thought to be realized through a reference to the supersensible by virtue of 
judgment and beauty. The Third Critique, correspondingly, appears to be an 
attempt to link the empirical judgment of pleasure to the universal validity of this 
pleasure via the harmony between imagination and understanding in cognitive 
judgments. Kant’s system should, however, rather be examined in its power of 
positing the autonomous spheres of knowledge and conceptualizing the difference 
between them, rather than as an attempt at reconciliation. An account of Kant’s 
separating rather than reconciling power can be traced in J. M. Bernstein’s The 
Fate of Art which refers to Kant’s treatise as Memorial Aesthetics. He argues that 
what issues from Kant’s reference to the supersensible, is not the recognition of a 
possible reconciliation but rather a recognition of the separation of the realms of 
freedom and nature and even a ‘sepulchre to stand over their lost unity’.36 
 The aesthetic concepts of the beautiful and the sublime are analyzed by Kant 
primarily in that they are the objects of inquiry of reflective aesthetic judgments. 
As such, they are viewed as causing a feeling of pleasure, which is the result of 
the agreement between the faculty of imagination and the faculty of the 
understanding or reason. This agreement of faculties is demonstrated through the 
function of presentation (exhibitio), i.e. that of ‘placing a corresponding intuition 
                                                           
36 J.M. Bernstein, The Fate of Art: Aesthetic Alienation from Kant to Derrida and Adorno (Oxford: 
Polity Press, 1997), p. 18. 
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beside the concept […] through […] imagination’ (5: 193).37 Deleuze describes it 
as an agreement of ‘imagination, in its pure freedom [...] with the understanding in 
its non-specified legality’.38 Aesthetic common sense, however, is not represented 
as an objective accord of faculties, but once again in terms of subjectivity, as a 
‘pure subjective harmony where imagination and understanding are exercised 
spontaneously, each on its own account’.39 
 Aesthetic pleasure should also be disinterested, namely a ‘kind of 
representation through a satisfaction or dissatisfaction without any interest’ 
(5:211), which means it should be independent both of speculative and practical 
interest. The beautiful is, thus, related to the subject laying claim to universal 
delight, in other words, in whether it ‘pleases universally without a concept’ 
(5:219). This means that the imperative of beauty in terms of aesthetic 
disinterestedness is a pure judgment, independent from knowledge and morality, 
as well as from the mere subjective pleasure present in the empirical one. The 
complex relationship between the beautiful and the true is also drawn in the light 
of the category of disinterestedness.40 
 In Kant, the aesthetic category of the beautiful is reduced to pleasure which 
arises from the beautiful form in the judgment of taste. Kant differentiates 
between natural or mechanical beauty and the fine arts, stemming from the fact 
that the latter gives rise to representations which are not merely of the order of 
senses, but rather modes of cognition. The judgment of the beautiful work of art 
needs to be stripped of its determining character and become the mere act of 
judging suited to beautiful objects. As Rodolphe Gasché remarks: ‘Where the 
concepts guiding their production have undergone such an operation of 
denudement [...] the products of art have the look of objects of nature.’41 The 
indeterminateness of the concept is, thus, the requirement for the production, as 
well as for the judgment of the beautiful work of art. In a further extrapolation, it 
                                                           
37 Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgement, ed. by Paul Guyer, trans. by Paul Guyer & 
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39 Ibid, p. 49. 
40 See: Paul Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Taste (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 
1979), pp. 351-357 for an account of the relationship between beauty and morality. 
41 Rodolphe Gasché, The Idea of Form: Rethinking Kant’s Aesthetics (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
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becomes clear that the characteristic of a genius is defined in respect of his task of 
denuding of the arts, or, as Gasché puts it: ‘the genius is the paradoxical entity in 
which nature passes into freedom.’42 The definition of genius is grounded upon 
the very differentiation between nature and science and described as ‘the inborn 
predisposition of the mind (ingenium) through which nature gives the rule to art’ 
(Critique of Judgment, 5:307).  
This causes another problem between freedom (the free will of the I 
belonging to the realm of the super-sensuous) as a central issue in Kant’s 
philosophy and the recurrence of the term spontaneity (characteristic of the 
genius) which goes beyond sensuousness in describing the existence of our self-
consciousness. Freedom is defined as an essential factor for art as ‘only 
production through freedom, i.e. through a capacity for choice that grounds its 
actions in reason, should be called art’ (Critique of Judgment, 5:303). 
Denuded of any aesthetic norms, the beautiful work of art is judged as such 
stemming from a ‘specific arrangement of faculties that is beneficial to cognition 
in general’.43 What counts in the beautiful arts, is the accord of imagination and 
understanding brought to life by the genius. The genius expresses the suprasensual 
unity of all faculties, thereby providing a possibility for extending the rules of the 
beautiful in nature to the beautiful in art. The interests of the beautiful and of the 
genius are the main constituent of the so-called Kantian material meta-aesthetics, 
which according to Deleuze, ‘bears witness to a Kantian romanticism.’44     
 As we can see, the beautiful has its origin in the subject, namely in the 
relationship between the subject’s cognitive faculties, while to judge a work of art 
means to become attuned to the play of faculties of its creator. The fulcrum here is 
transposed from the object to the subject or to the concept of the thing as its 
beautiful representation, while aesthetic ideas are indeterminate concepts the 
presentation of which is what defines a work of genius. In Kant, the characteristic 
trait of a work of genius is its having spirit (Geist), which again has a subjective 
sense in its capacity to present aesthetic ideas and thereby stimulate the mind to 
cognition and representation. We have to distinguish here between the feeling of 
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spirit (Geistesgefühl) from its metaphysical analogue in that the idea of totality as 
spirit, expressed in Kant’s category of the sublime as a name given to what is 
absolutely great, refers not to an object of thought but to the subjective ideas of 
reason.  The very definition of the sublime (‘That is sublime which even to be 
able to think of demonstrates a faculty of the mind that surpasses every measure 
of the senses’ (Critique of Judgment, 5:250)) which accounts for an impossibility 
to grasp the sublime via imagination, provides evidence that sublimity is not a 
quality of the object but a state of subjectivity. 
 The possibility of the sublime is rooted in the concept of formlessness which 
allows thinking to add the ideas of the whole, the infinite, and the totality 
characteristic for a feeling of spirit. It is useful to cite Gasché on this point: ‘if 
Kant’s strict terminology did not prohibit it, one would be inclined to say that 
boundless formlessness must have the form of a whole, in order for it to be 
sublime.’45 Yet, it is essential to bear in mind the philosophical position of 
digression occupied by Kant, in respect of which art works are no longer 
formative for the experience of sameness and no longer represent constitutively 
the concept of the Same but, instead, make Reason sensuously available only in a 
limited way as a response of the subject rather than as a quality of the object. The 
sublime, then, as opposed to the limitations of sensuous presentation in the realm 
of art, is an act of cognition or a mental accomplishment related to the 
limitlessness or unfathomable in nature or, rather, to the subject’s ability to think 
the infinite by transcending experience via a supersensible faculty of the mind. 
Kant asserts the necessity of a super-sensuous faculty of the mind for judging the 
sublime through an estimation of magnitude via imagination and understanding, 
claiming that ‘even being able to think of it as a whole’ or ‘to be able to think the 
given infinite without contradiction’ (Critique of judgment, 5:254) require a 
super-sensible faculty in the human mind. He relates this supersensible faculty for 
judging the sublime to reason in order to approximate the subjective (the 
disposition of the mind judging the sublime) with its ideas, just as he relates the 
imagination in its free play in judging the beautiful to the understanding, in order 
to agree with its concepts. Moreover, it is precisely with the term sublime that 
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Kant makes aesthetic judgement purposive for reason (presented as the source of 
ideas) through ‘the necessary enlargement of the imagination to the point of 
adequacy to that which is unlimited in our faculty of reason, namely the idea of 
the absolute whole’ (Critique of Judgment, 5:260). The boundless formlessness in 
the sublime, thus, does not amount to the whole but merely to the mind’s 
possessing a supersensible faculty for thinking the whole, which means it is not a 
thinking of nature but of the subject’s attitude toward it. As Deleuze argues, the 
experience of the immensity of the sublime ‘cannot be attributed to the natural 
object, but to the operation of reason which unites immensity of the sensible 
world into the whole of Idea’.46 Drawing on the results from the exposition of the 
sublime as the supersensible use of the sensible representation of nature and as 
that which pleases immediately through its resistance to the interest of senses, 
Kant describes the sublime as ‘an object (of nature) the representation of which 
determines the mind to think of the unattainability of nature as a presentation of 
ideas’ (Critique of Judgment, 5:268). 
Given the fact that the sublime has arisen from a feeling of spirit 
(Geistesgefühl), Kant relates the aesthetic judgement not only to the beautiful as a 
judgement of taste, but also to the sublime. He grounds the sublime in the position 
between imagination and thought, providing an example of what Deleuze 
describes as discordant harmony, defined as a relation in which ‘each 
communicates to the other only the violence which confronts it with its own 
difference and its divergence from the others’.47 
 The categories of the sublime and the beautiful in Kant are juxtaposed on the 
common ground of the aesthetic judgement coeval to the juxtaposition of the 
sensuous and the super-sensible. In the aesthetic judgment of objects in relation to 
the sublime, Kant proceeds in accordance with the same principles that were used 
in the analysis of the judgements of taste. However, the division into the 
mathematically and dynamically sublime in the judgment of an object contravenes 
the calm contemplation in the reflection of the beautiful. Kant explains this 
difference by the sublime’s bringing with it as its characteristic sign ‘a movement 
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in the mind connected with the judging of the object, whereas the taste for the 
beautiful presupposes and preserves the mind in calm contemplation’ (Critique of 
Judgment 5:247). 
 Here again we deal with a completely different order of thought which is 
concerned with the judgment of the beautiful and sublime not in terms of the 
adequacy of a representation of the Same, but in respect of the faculties of thought 
engaged in the judgment, as well as with the relationship between them. In 
contrast to the minimal harmony between the powers of cognition present in the 
representation of a beautiful object, the boundless formlessness of nature 
encountered in the sublime causes discordance between the imagination and the 
understanding. The category of the sublime is, accordingly, viewed as confronting 
us with a direct subjective relationship between imagination and reason. As 
Deleuze argues, this is a relationship of a discordant accord when the imagination, 
confronted with its own limit, experiences a violence which stretches it to the 
extremity of its power and makes it lose its freedom. Yet, at the bottom of this 
dissension an accord emerges, according to Deleuze, between imagination and 
reason which allows us to conclude that the feeling of the sublime is rather pain 
than pleasure.48    
 Kant sustains the boundary of the sensuous and intelligible in the beautiful 
and the sublime via the cohering function of imagination (Einbildungskraft). The 
central position in the problems relating to this boundary is occupied by the I, the 
subject, who describes itself as object but remains divided in itself and fails to 
attain a full synthesis in self-cognizance. This very opposition and the attempt to 
overcome it are discussed at length in contemporary aesthetic theory and are 
characterized as having a great impact on post-Kantian philosophical-aesthetic 
thought. For one, Bowie describes it as having ‘a major effect on German 
Idealism and early Romanticism, and thus upon aesthetic theory’.49 
Hammermeister also points to the problematic of the Kantian opposition between 
beauty resting on the basis of sensory experience and sublimity aiming at 
abandoning the sensory and moving toward reason.50 He points to Schiller’s, 
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Schelling’s, and Hegel’s attempts to overcome this opposition toward a 
unification of beauty and sublimity, without which the self would remain divided 
between sensibility and morality. 
 The achievement of imagination is primarily its capacity to unify the 
faculties of mind by traversing all the empirical manifestations toward the unity in 
self-consciousness which is the knowledge of the essence of man. It is again 
important to distinguish the synthesizing function of the Kantian imagination, 
designated to unify the dissected faculties of sensibility, understanding, and 
reason from its representative or mimetic function directed at the representation of 
the Same. As Deleuze defines it, the imagination does not take ‘a legislative 
function [...] but frees itself, so that all the faculties together enter into a free 
accord’.51 This productive power of imagination is best exposed in the analysis of 
poetry’s capacity to unify in a harmonious accord the cognitive faculties of 
sensibility and understanding. The power of poetry is also inherent in its 
autonomy due to its being/as a product of the genius: ‘one cannot learn to write 
inspired poetry, however exhaustive all the rules for the art of poetry and however 
excellent the models for it may be’ (Critique of Judgment, 5:309).  
 The enigma of the unnameable, as a combination of spirit and letter in 
poetry, does not allude, however, to the impossibility of representing the 
metaphysical universal of the Same, but to a subjective experience, empowered to 
vivify the cognitive faculties. Here is how Kant defines the unnameable, as ‘the 
feeling of which animates the cognitive faculties and combines spirit with the 
mere letter of language’ (Critique of Judgment, 5:316). The power of poetry is, 
therefore, the production of an indeterminate intuition of the supersensible that 
animates the mind by the harmonious accord of faculties. Kant’s understanding of 
poetry is, thus, rooted in poetry’s ability to reveal aesthetic ideas in full measure: 
 
The poet ventures to make sensible rational ideas of invisible beings […] as 
well as to make that of which there are examples in experience […] sensible 
beyond experience […] by means of an imagination that emulates the 
precedent of reason in attaining to a maximum’ (Critique of Judgment, 
5:314).  
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The difference between the two arts of speech, of rhetoric and poetry, lies 
precisely in different applications of the faculties of understanding and 
imagination, Rhetoric is defined as ‘the art of conducting a business of the 
understanding as a free play of the imagination’; poetry, the other way round, as 
‘that of carrying out a free play of the imagination as a business of the 
understanding’ (Critique of Judgment, 5:321). Poetry is, accordingly, examined in 
its capacity to strengthen the mind in the supersensible judgment of nature and as 
a play of illusion which can, nevertheless, be purposively employed as an aim by 
understanding and is opposed to rhetoric which is described as the art of deceiving 
via illusion and of robbing one’s freedom before one can judge. The priority of 
poetry over rhetoric, thus, lies in its purity, in having no other aim than pure 
illusion, in contrast to rhetoric’s aim to persuade and convince via illusion. It is 
interesting to note Kant’s personal remarks on this point:  
 
I must confess that a beautiful poem has always given me a pure enjoyment, 
whereas reading the best speech of a Roman popular speaker or a 
contemporary speaker in parliament or the pulpit has always been mixed with 
the disagreeable feeling of disapproval of a deceitful art, which understands 
how to move people, like machines, to a judgment in important matters […] 
Eloquence and well-spokenness (together, rhetoric) belong to beautiful art; 
but the art of the orator (ars oratoria), as the art of using the weakness of 
people for one’s own purposes […] is not worthy of any respect at all 
(Critique of Judgment, 5:327, 5:328).  
 
 
Kant qualifies the poetic presentation as an unprecedented fullness of 
thought, capable of raising itself to the level of ideas. Poetry is, thus, elevated to 
the level of idea, and the fullness of its representation lies beyond the limitations 
of particular faculties: 
 
It [the art of poetry] expands the mind by setting the imagination free and 
presenting, within the limits of a given concept and among the unbounded 
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manifold of forms possibly agreeing with it, the one that connects its 
presentation with a fullness of thought to which no linguistic expression is 
fully adequate, and thus elevates itself aesthetically to the level of ideas 
(5:326). 
 
As we have seen, Kant’s philosophical system digresses from sameness as 
the fundamental issue of philosophy in order to focus upon the subject by 
inquiring into the interrelation of its mental faculties. The limits of Kant’s 
digression from sameness as the fundamental issue of philosophy may be 
illustrated by juxtaposing it with subsequent philosophical thought which re-
establishes sameness by way of its radical re-postulation in terms of the difference 
within it. This juxtaposition permits us to conclude that the refutation of the 
metaphysical universal of the Same is not analogous to that of sameness per se, 
but to the refutation of the dominance of the identity of the Same and its 
monotonous representation in art. It permits us to trace philosophy as an 
impossible postulation of sameness in the entire context of often contradictory 
aspects of identity, difference, and repetition.  
 
 
2. 3 Hegel versus Kant 
 
 
We can trace the fundamental difference between Kant’s digression from 
sameness and the philosophical urge for the re-consideration of its lost plenitude 
through Hegel’s essay Faith and Knowledge (1800). The critique of Kant’s 
philosophical system by Hegel has dual importance. First, it offers the outline of 
his encompassing theory (The Phenomenology of Spirit, 1807) which is his 
original rethinking of sameness in terms of its totality. Second, it conceptualizes 
the differences between the two opposing paths —  that is, his own and Kant’s, 
viewed from the vantage point of the decline of the Same, the philosophy of 
sameness and that of digression. 
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 The re-consideration of the Same as a totality of Spirit in Hegel contravenes 
Kant’s prime concern about guaranteeing the unity of reason. In what follows, we 
will see how Hegel criticises Kant’s philosophical system for its failure to raise 
the issue of sameness. Moreover, we will see the difficulties that arise when 
analyzing a philosophy of digression in terms of sameness, inasmuch as it simply 
abstains from it. Such an analysis is doomed to failure from the very start due to 
the difference in the points of departure. 
 Hegel’s criticism of Kant is based upon the lack of a preconceived unity, the 
hypothetical Same, despite the fact that the very concept of preconceived unity is 
alien to Kant. It is the characteristic trait of Hegel’s own philosophical system, 
rather than that of Kant’s to re-postulate the issue of sameness in terms of 
plenitude. As we have seen, Kant is not the least concerned with the rethinking of 
the grounds, origin or even the limits of the Same, but in establishing a 
philosophical system beyond sameness. This philosophical system is based, 
instead, upon the differentiating power of reason, anchored in mediations and the 
sharp distinction, in the process of understanding itself, between subject and 
object, thinking and being, sensibility and understanding. From a pure Hegelian 
perspective, this system cannot become effective due to the lack of a preconceived 
plenitude. Hegel criticises the dissolving power of the understanding in Kant’s 
philosophy of reflection, in which the differentiating and dissecting powers 
remain meaningless as long as they are not applied with respect to a totality or an 
original unity.52 
 Inquiring into Kant’s synthetic a priori judgments in terms of a 
preconceived unity of the transcendental ego, Hegel sketches his own theory of re-
grounding the Same as the original, absolute totality of the heterogeneous. In the 
course of the analysis, he views the dissecting form of judgment vis-à-vis a 
hypothetical preconceived identity and ends up with the futile assertion of its 
apparent lack. What Hegel fails to observe, is that the very notion of a 
hypothetical identity which ‘sunders itself, and appears as separated into the form 
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of a judgment, as subject and predicate, or particular and universal’53 is genuinely 
Hegelian and apparently alien to Kant’s system. Equally ineffective is the 
exposition of Kant’s system from the perspective of the reconciliation between the 
particular and the universal through transcending thought from the contingency of 
the particular toward an archetypal (urbildich) intellect analogous to the 
transcendental imagination, for which ‘the possibility of the parts […] as to their 
character and integration is dependent on the whole’.54 To explicate the character 
of the parts in their dependency on the whole and trace the conditions of their 
integration in the totality, is to remain bound within the frames of the philosophy 
of sameness, which is a typically Hegelian approach as opposed to Kant which is 
straightforwardly engaged in posing the particular as such, devoid of any 
synthesis within the whole. Furthermore, Kant fails to reconcile the thinking 
subject with the objects of thought within a unity, and, therefore, knowledge 
remains subject to a gap between mere empirical knowledge of objects on the one 
hand and the understanding of knowledge of the other. We can, therefore, 
conclude that to pose Kant’s philosophical system with respect to the idea of a 
preconceived unity is ineffective, as it will end up either with the assertion of its 
lack or the dominance of the empirical knowledge of experience over the absolute 
truth of totality. 
 Hegel further inquires into Kant’s idea of transcendental imagination, of a 
pure apperception in the Critique of Pure Reason and his notion of an archetypal 
intellect in the Critique of Judgement as an attempt to unify the hitherto 
dichotomized spheres of intuition and understanding. Viewed from the 
perspective of unification, Kant’s notions of the transcendental imagination or the 
archetypal intellect account for the transposition of the locus of reconciliation 
from the metaphysical beyond of the Same into the self-reflection of the thinking 
subject. Yet, is Kant preoccupied with the idea of a preconceived unity at all or 
does he instead refuse to pose the issue of sameness? 
 The inquiry into Kant’s philosophical system testifies to the fact that the 
very idea of a preconceived identical unity as the primary cause of all 
differentiation is alien to it. Moreover, the juxtaposition of Kant and Hegel on the 
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premises of the philosophy of the sameness accounts for the fundamental 
differences between a philosophy of sameness and that of digression. 
 Hegel sees Kant’s attempt at unification via the transcendental imagination 
or the archetypal intellect as being a failure due to the intermediary position of the 
faculty of imagination in opposition to the Hegelian requirement that it should be 
posed as an a priori synthetic unity in its In-itselfness: 
 
We must not take the faculty of imagination as the middle term that gets 
inserted between an existing absolute subject and an absolute existing world. 
The productive imagination must rather be recognized as what is primary and 
original, as that out of which subjective Ego and objective world first sunder 
themselves into the necessarily bipartite appearance and product, and as the 
sole In-itself. 55  
 
Hegel critiques the Kantian hypothetical category of mind, namely the 
intellectual intuition, for its inability to unify the dichotomized spheres of intuition 
and understanding. This critique demonstrates the controversial approaches of 
Hegel and Kant toward the issue of sameness. For Hegel, it is revivable by virtue 
of the act of sublation of all dialectical oppositions which, in this particular case, 
is the sublation of empirical experience and thought in the reflecting-back of the 
empirical experience into the common prior ground of the absolute, an act totally 
incompatible with Kant’s entire system of multiple autonomous principles. 
 In what follows (in the chapter on Hegel, Part Three), we will trace the 
development of these sketches by Hegel into a philosophy of his own, namely in 
his re-establishment of sameness in the form of an absolute preconceived totality 
of thinking and being. In the Phenomenology of Spirit, he re-grounds the 
reflective oppositions of Kant’s empirical experience by defining them as 
bifurcations of an original synthetic unity which encompasses both the opposition 
of that unity and that which it reunites in a preconceived totality.56 
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3. Post-Kantian Aesthetic Theories 
 
 
As the next parts of this study will demonstrate, the philosophical-aesthetic 
digression is a transitory position with regard to sameness, rather than a radical 
solution to the problem caused by the decline of the metaphysical universal of the 
Same. This brief inquiry into post-Kantian aesthetics or poetics aims to stress the 
limits of these perspectives and the urge for a new re-postulation of sameness, 
hence, a re-thinking of art beyond these limitations. It is within these frames that 
we will present a brief outline of the post-Kantian aesthetic and poetic theories 
which attempt to provide a valid theory of art either from the perspective of 
rationality or a subjective assessment of art.  
 English aesthetic theories which originated from the subjective assessment 
of art are expressive theories, focusing on the sincere expression of the author’s 
intense feelings and their transportation to the reader. The most eminent 
representatives are William Wordsworth (1770 - 1850) and William Hazlitt (1778 
- 1830) who display Longinus’s influence (1 – 3 c. A.D.) and transform Thomas 
Hobbes’s (1588 - 1679) principle which regards the power-drive as the prime 
human motive. Remaining bound to neo-classical theories of sensibility these 
aesthetic theories merely displace the aesthetic paradigm from imitation into 
expression or, as Abrams describes: ‘from the mirror to the fountain, the lamp, 
and related analogues.’57 The alignment from the emotions of the reader to the 
emotions of the poet in their spontaneity as the characteristic trait of the romantic 
period does not bring about any significant change, but remains trapped within the 
subjective assessment of art with its focus upon sensibility. 
 Included among the aesthetic theories which contrast subjective assessment 
to the scientific worldview is the one claiming the absolute sovereignty of the 
unconscious in poetic creation. The cornerstone of the aesthetics of the romantic 
poets John Keats (1795 - 1821) and William Blake (1757 - 1827), the main 
representatives of this movement, is the poetic imagination as the organ of 
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intuition beyond experience: infinity is intuited through the finite appearance of 
the poetic intuition. Abrams considers Keats’s axiom on poetry’s coming ‘as 
naturally as the leaves to a tree’ and Blake’s claim for poetic automatism (Blake 
writes of his Milton: ‘I have written this Poem from immediate Dictation […] 
without Premeditation and even against my will’) as prime examples of 
unconscious invention in English criticism.58 
Aesthetic theories, anchored in the scientific interpretation of poetic 
invention (connected with Isaac Newton’s science of mechanics and David 
Hume’s associative principles of the mind), in contrast, denounce expressive 
poetic theories and consider poetry as useless in the age of science. Undoubtedly, 
this approach is incapable of providing any valid theory of art, but rather deepens 
the dichotomy between art and nature, science and poetry or philosophy and 
poetry. The dichotomy between them may be observed in the polemics between 
Thomas Peacock’s (1785 - 1866) Four Ages of Poetry (1820) and Percy Bysshe 
Shelly’s (1792 - 1822) Defence of Poetry (1821). Thomas Peacock’s criticism of 
expressive poetic theories in general and Wordsworth’s poetic tenets of naturalism 
in particular are an attempt to prove their uselessness from a scientific standpoint, 
while Shelley’s essay is an attempt to overcome this dichotomy. In his defence of 
poetry, Shelley attempts to reconcile poetry, philosophy and science by 
resurrecting the metaphysical paradigm of sameness. Poetry is, accordingly, 
reduced to its function of representing the metaphysical universal of the Same 
through the metaphors of the mirror (‘a mirror which makes beautiful that which 
is distorted’59) and the sacred silence of the primordial word commensurate with 
the Spirit or the Same, designated to translate the plenitude of the Spirit for 
mortals and ‘temper this planetary music for mortal ears’.60 The limit of Shelley’s 
approach to sameness is, however, linked to the limits of classical metaphysics 
and representation. As we have attempted to demonstrate, the decline of the 
metaphysical universal of the Same points to the impossibility of reducing the 
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function of poetry to that of the representation of the Same and conditions the 
urge of philosophy not only to re-ground it, but also rethink the origin of poetry. 
 Among other influential theories is the organic theory of imagination by 
Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772 - 1834) who views the creative process as 
reflected in the primary imagination by which all individual minds develop out 
into their perception of this universe echoed, again, in the secondary or re-creative 
imagination which is possessed only by the poet of genius.61 The primary 
imagination in Coleridge is primary by virtue of being a repetition, as Paul 
Hamilton argues, ‘a repetition in the finite mind of the infinite I AM’, which, can 
define what is absolute for us because it ‘repeats an originally divine 
contraction’.62 The poet, possessing the secondary or re-creative imagination is 
frequently referred to as not only the mediator but also the mythical personage 
endowed with the power of imagination to reconcile or diffuse discordant qualities 
‘of sameness, with difference; of the general with the concrete; the idea with the 
image’.63 Coleridge’s belief in the poetic power of relating the finite to the infinite 
or representing the ‘translucence of the eternal through and in the Temporal’64 
does not provide a new theory for art, but explains his being influenced by Kant 
and Schelling. 
 In German post-Kantian thought, among the first philosophers attempting to 
overcome Kant’s subjective and ahistorical attitude towards aesthetics via a theory 
of art that offers objective criteria for its definition is Friedrich Schiller (1759 - 
1805). Schiller’s aesthetic views are expressed in the essay On the Aesthetic 
Education of Man [Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen in einer Reihe 
von Briefen, 1795] whose primary aim is to arrive at freedom through beauty as 
the only possible expression of freedom in appearance, thus marking a distinct 
break with Kant’s subjective beauty.65 Dieter Henrich inquires into Schiller’s 
conception of beauty and freedom further taken up by Schelling and Hegel as one 
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of the several ways to overcome the subject/object division in Kant’s works.66 The 
introduction of the concept of Spieltrieb — the play drive that bridges the gap 
between Stofftrieb, the material drive and Formtrieb, the form drive — is of 
utmost importance as the conception of humanity that has the ability to unify 
materiality with form, contingency with necessity, suffering with freedom (AL, 
letter 15). It stands for the aesthetic principle, referring to the contemplation of the 
beautiful in play, in which the true nature of the man, no longer divided into 
sensuality and morality, is revealed. The beautiful serves as the mediator between 
these drives through Schiller’s conception of love and is neither purely empirical 
nor purely transcendental.    
 In his 1796 essay On Naїve and Sentimental Poetry [Über naive und 
sentimentalische Dichtung], Schiller designates the model of a historical 
development based upon the paradigm of the Greek culture that anchors in the 
perfection of the man brought about by the perfection of art and bridges the gap 
between beautiful form and moral energy. 67 
 The subjective moment in Kant’s system is precisely what stimulates the 
philosophy of German Idealism and early Romanticism to seek ways of moving 
beyond the limitations of subjectivity toward a new representation of the infinite 
via the finite. Kant’s distinction of the beautiful and the sublime becomes the 
basis of the philosophical tension between the desire for a new mythology (Oldest 
System-Programme of German Idealism and F. Schlegel’s Rede über die 
Mythologie) and the idea of the autonomy of the aesthetic work.68 A new 
mythology would integrate science and art in the sensuous representation of 
Reason, whereas the autonomy of the aesthetic work would preserve independent 
ways of articulating the world that are beyond instrumental purposes.  
 We will briefly stop only at the early Romantic attempt to solve the problem 
of the Kantian divide, since the reunification of the separated spheres of 
knowledge within a preconceived totality attempted by German Idealism will be 
considered in individual chapters on Schelling and Hegel in Part Three. 
                                                           
66 Dieter Henrich, ‘Beauty and Freedom: Schiller’s Struggle with Kant’s Aesthetics’ in Essays in 
Kant’s Aesthetics, ed. by Ted Cohen and Paul Guyer (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1982), 
pp. 237 – 257. 
67 Kai Hammermeister, The German Aesthetic Tradition, pp. 44 – 58. 
68  Andrew Bowie, Aesthetics and Subjectivity from Kant to Nietzsche, p. 40. 
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 The urge and impossibility to represent and invoke the infinite via the finite 
is at the heart of Romantic art and is one of the major concerns of Romantic 
philosophy. Among the principal traits of Romantic criticism is the grasping of 
the infinite via the finite form of art, namely in the assimilation of the art work, at 
the price of its ruin, to the Absolute. The particular art work is viewed in its ascent 
toward the universal medium of art (the idea of art) and, in the next stage, to the 
grasping of the Absolute. Walter Benjamin defines it as ‘the medium in which the 
restriction of the individual work refers methodically to the infinitude of art and 
finally [endlich] is transformed into that infinitude [Unendlichkeit]’.69  
 The central ideas of early German Romanticism are expressed in the 
theoretical writings of Karl Wilhelm Friedrich (later: von) Schlegel (1772 – 1829) 
on the notions of the ability of the individual work capable of transcending toward 
the level of idea, the literary fragment, the Romantic Witz and allegory. The 
significance of the Romantic Witz as the development of the Idea towards ‘Idea’s 
self-knowledge in its manifestation’70 is stressed in the discussion of 
eidaesthetics, namely a separate theory of eidetics, which is always capable of 
shifting into aesthetics by virtue of the expression of the Idea within a work of art 
by Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy. Where the allusive form of the fragment is 
concerned, it is adequate for expressing both the Romantic quest for grasping the 
Absolute and the impossibility to grasp its plenitude via the finiteness of form. In 
accordance with Robert Crawford’s description, there is an analogy between the 
fragment and the lost plenitude of the Same: ‘The fragment […] hints at 
something beyond itself and/or beyond the language in which it is embedded. In 
the past the fragment has gestured towards a lost aboriginal wholeness, and has 
been associated with tragedy or loss.’71  
The conception of the aesthetic autonomy of art, irreducible to ethical, historical 
or any other discourses that would lead to a philosophy of the Absolute, is also 
among the central concerns of Friedrich Schlegel (Fragment 252 from the 
                                                           
69 Walter Benjamin, ‘The Concept of Criticism in German Romanticism, I, p. 152. 
70 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, The Literary Absolute (New York: State 
University of New York Press, 1988), p. 53. 
71 Robert Crawford, The Modern Poet (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 68.    
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Athenaeum Fragments, 1798 - 1800).72 He likewise departs from the common 
aesthetic theories which consider the work of art as the precondition for pleasing 
or instructing the reader. Instead, he employs Kant’s notion of the sublime, 
transcribed as an impossibility to represent the infinite via the Romantic term of 
allegory which parallels the Kantian sublime in its function of referring to 
something beyond itself and incorporating the impossibility of reaching the 
Highest.73 The way of overcoming the disparate disciplines of art, philosophy, 
science, and theology through the formation of a new synthesizing mythology 
formed from the depths of spirit and encompassing all other arts within it, is 
another concern of Schlegel.74  
 The integration of both poetic and philosophical forces is also introduced by 
Novalis’s (1772 - 1801) notion of mythical criticism in which ‘poetic spirit and 
philosophic spirit have interpenetrated in their entire fullness’.75 He focuses upon 
the possibility of educating (Bildung) the community through poetry in unity with 
philosophy as the most intimate communion of the finite and the infinite 
(Logological Fragments I, F 25).76 The central idea of Bildung forms the elevation 
of the self (analogous to the Werden of Schlegel, A 116) towards its genuine 
identity which is, again, realizable via poetry.77  
 What Novalis attempts to achieve is primarily the reconciliation of the 
dichotomized spheres of knowledge within a preconceived metaphysical identity 
(Miscellaneous Observations, F75),78 by disregarding the already accomplished 
decline of the metaphysical universal of the Same and the need for its re-
postulation. He attempts to ground his theory upon the already exhausted 
revelation-redemption-resurrection formula of the metaphysical Same, in 
accordance with which, the manifold is borne from the preconceived identity of 
                                                           
72 Friedrich Schlegel, Kritische Schriften und Fragmente, ed. by Ernst Behler and Hans Eichner 
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the One in order to represent it and return to it after having achieved freedom and 
self-consciousness. This view may be illustrated by Novalis’s argument: ‘Before 
abstraction everything is one — but it is one as chaos is — after abstraction 
everything is again unified — but this unification is a free alliance of independent, 
self determined beings’. (Miscellaneous Observations, F 94).79 From the 
perspective of the idea of a preconceived identity which the Romantics attempt to 
resurrect, art is reduced to the realization of the Same due to its incapacity for 
self-realization: ‘Actually in all true arts — one spirit — is — realized, is 
produced from within — the world of spirits’ (Logological Fragments II, F 19).80 
However, this view returns art to the realm of the representation of the Same, a 
return which proves to be impossible due to the decline of the Same and the need 
for its adequate re-postulation.  
 The inquiry into the post-Kantian aesthetic situation demonstrates the limits 
of the aesthetical and poetic theories which either attempt to validate art in respect 
of subjectivity or the already exhausted metaphysical universal of the Same. In 
order to establish new criteria for validating the singularity of the art work, 
inherent in the uniqueness of its inner organization, philosophical thought faces 
the need for an adequate re-postulation of sameness beyond classical metaphysics. 
Schelling and Hegel distinctly acknowledge the limits of a philosophical-aesthetic 
digression, attempting to return philosophy to the grounds of sameness by 
introducing the term Absolute. Whether or not this is the right path for re-thinking 
philosophy and for adequately judging the proper statute of the work of art, will 
be examined in the next part.   
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Part Three: The Return to Sameness 
 
As we have seen, the limits of the metaphysical postulations of the Same as pure 
identity conditioned the philosophical urge for its re-consideration either in the 
form of questioning of its statute or its re-assertion on a new speculative level. In 
Part Two of the present study, we attempted to demonstrate the inefficiency of the 
first path of questioning the statute of sameness by refusing to pose it at all in the 
period named philosophical digression and alluded to the possibility of a return to 
sameness. It is the very possibility of the philosophical-poetic return from the 
above period of digression to the re-establishment of sameness as the central issue 
of philosophy, and, hence to the validation of art no longer in respect of the 
fortuitous principles of taste, pleasure, naturalness, and truth, but vis-à-vis its 
relation to sameness that this Part will discuss. The philosophical reconsideration 
of sameness as a quest to re-cohere the dissected and differentiated spheres of 
cognizance under the aegis of sameness will be discussed through the philosophy 
of German Idealism, namely the systems of Schelling and Hegel. 
 The re-establishment of sameness by Schelling and Hegel is accomplished 
by postulating it upon the level of an absolute totality which encompasses both 
identity and difference, as opposed to its prior postulation as pure identity in the 
period of classical metaphysics. This brings about a transposition of the issue of 
sameness from the dimension of pure identity into that of a unity of identity and 
difference. This radical transposition is discussed by Heidegger, who argues that:  
 
The philosophy of speculative Idealism, prepared by Leibniz and Kant, through 
Fichte, Schelling and Hegel established an abode for the essence of identity, whereby 
since the era of speculative Idealism, it is no longer possible to represent the unity of 
identity as mere sameness, disregarding the mediation that prevails in unity.1  
 
From this period onward, it becomes impossible to think of sameness 
beyond the mediation of difference which, far from representing the conception of 
                                                           
1 Martin Heidegger, Identity and Difference, trans. and with an introducion by Joan Stambaugh 
(London: Harper & Row Publishers, 1969), p. 25. 
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pure difference, is a conceptual category included in the Absolute. Sameness, 
accordingly, becomes conceived through the concept of the Absolute which 
entails the identity of oppositions, of the positive and negative dissolving within 
the identical. In this context, difference is reduced to negativity extending to the 
point of contradiction and posed as internal to the Absolute, in subordination to 
identity as part of the whole or an element of the Absolute.  
 In Schelling, the category of the Absolute which substantiates sameness is a 
preconceived totality, a synthesis of identity and difference. Its primacy 
conditions Schelling’s introduction of the discipline of the philosophy of art 
which elaborates new criteria for the validation of art, as opposed to the fortuitous 
criteria applied in the period of digression. Moreover, Schelling prioritizes art in 
its power to reveal the concealed enigma of the Absolute which becomes re-
asserted as the fundamental issue of philosophy and art and the ground for their 
potential reconciliation. 
 Hegel’s conception of the Absolute differs from that of Schelling, in that 
despite their common function of representing sameness, the first is conceived as 
a totality of becoming, while the second, as a preconceived totality. We will 
inquire into the subtleties of Hegel’s conception of sameness as the totality of the 
Absolute, guided by the view that it is the most comprehensive postulation of its 
identity or, to use Gilles Deleuze’s words concerning Hegel’s innovation, ‘the 
final and most powerful homage rendered to the old principle’.2 From the aspect 
of re-establishing sameness as the fundamental issue of philosophy, Hegel’s 
philosophy should be credited not only for providing the most comprehensive 
theory of identity but also for postulating difference, though still subordinated to 
identity. As the inquiry into the texts by Hegel will demonstrate, in his conception 
of the Absolute difference has an equal stand with identity and is a means through 
which totality manifests itself. As opposed to the subsequent postulations of pure 
difference (by Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Derrida), the Hegelian difference takes 
the form of the inscription of double negation within totality and, hence, the 
assertion of identity. The dissimilarity between the two postulations of difference 
can be traced through Gilles Deleuze’s opposition of Hegel’s circle to the eternal 
                                                           
2 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. by Paul Patton (London: Continuum, 2008),  
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return of Nietzsche, arguing that the first is ‘only the infinite circulation of the 
identical by means of negativity’.3 In sum, in Hegel’s conception of sameness, the 
principle of identity is radicalized as the dominant principle coextensive with that 
of totality, while difference is still included in the concept of identity and serves as 
the ground for its self-realization.  
 The issue of language is radicalized in this context to the point of 
substantiating the sacred absence of the Same through the presence in the word. 
Its tragic instance constitutes the impossibility of transmuting the formlessness of 
the Same through the formed word, bringing about the oppositions between 
infinite and finite, the language of Angels and the non-being of language, the 
being of the Word, the poverty of words, and silence. 
 The re-establishment of the issue of sameness is significant in that it points 
to the limits of the philosophical digression from sameness, re-coheres the 
dichotomized spheres of cognizance, provides a comprehensive theory of the 
identity of sameness as the totality of the Absolute, and postulates the 
philosophical conception of difference. The philosophical postulation of pure 
difference, focusing upon the absolute otherness of the singular (dealt with in Part 
Four) becomes only possible, we believe, upon the ground of the comprehensive 
theory of the identity of sameness. Solely in the precarious balance between 
identity and difference, we argue, the plenitude of sameness as the experience of 
the other, scintillates in its full splendour. 
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1. Schelling: Re-postulating Sameness as the Absolute 
 
1. 1 Rethinking of Sameness beyond its Pure Identity  
   
To examine the philosophy of Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1775 - 1854) 
with regard to the issue of sameness, we have to relate it to the vantage point of 
the decline of the metaphysical universal of the Same and the end of the period of 
its infinite representation. As we have noted earlier, the impossibility of 
postulating the Same as pure identity urges philosophy to either re-postulate 
sameness or question whether it is the fundamental issue of philosophy. Schelling, 
as opposed to Kant, whose philosophical system digresses from sameness, seeks 
ways for resurrecting it through conceiving the Same as the Absolute transcending 
all differentiations. In so doing, Schelling radically critiques Kant’s philosophical 
approach which, laying claim to reflecting the a priori conditions of knowledge, 
makes a shift into subjectivity and brings forth the divide between the 
sensible/intelligible. Among the principal issues that Schelling pursues since 1797 
when he publishes the Philosophy of Nature (Ideen zu einer Philosophie der 
Natur) is the distinctive character of nature and the Ich. Yet, he sees both 
philosophy of nature and the speculative conception of Ich as two complementary 
sides of one philosophy.  
 Schelling sees the possibility of overcoming the Kantian lacuna and 
transposing philosophy from the ground of self-reflection into that of objectivity 
through his system of identity, (Identitätsphilosophie). Schelling’s system of 
identity proceeds in the direction of objective idealism which is one among the 
three systems of German Idealism attempting to re-cohere the spheres of thinking 
and being, separated by the Kantian philosophy: Fichte’s subjective idealism and 
Hegel’s subjective-objective or absolute idealism, erasing the difference between 
subjective and objective idealism.4 The crucial move of Schelling’s identity 
                                                           
4 See also: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Difference between Fichte’s and Schelling’s 
System of Philosophy, trans. by H.S. Harris and Walter Cerf (New York: State University of New 
York Press, 1977), p. 139. 
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philosophy is his return to the philosophy of sameness through re-postulating it as 
an absolute preconceived identity which precedes the subject/object bifurcation 
and manifests itself as such through it. In so doing, Schelling introduces the 
notion of absolute as a substitute for the metaphysical universal of the Same, as 
the encompassing of the sensuous and intelligible which, to use Andrew Bowie’s 
description, ‘only differ from each other in degree, as part of the same 
continuum’.5 
 In the System of Transcendental Idealism (System des transzendentalen 
Idealismus) of 1800, Schelling develops the idea of sameness into the organ of all 
transcendental thinking as an organ belonging to his system of objective idealism 
that demonstrates the Oneness of nature and human knowledge.6 In the final part, 
Schelling extends the idea of reconciliation, by representing the idea of a new 
mythology encompassing the differentiated spheres of cognizance, ethics, and 
aesthetics. In accordance with it, science and philosophy should return to the 
general ocean of poetry (Poesie), from which they were originally born. In 
general, the new mythology has the function of unifying art as an epistemological 
instrument with practical philosophy, although the transition from the apolitical 
individual work of art to the socially committed new mythology may be 
considered as problematic.7 
In distinction from the classical metaphysics which has been postulating the 
transcendental objective of the Same as an absolute preconceived identity, 
Schelling’s postulation of sameness as absolute identity manifesting itself through 
the multiple, already encompasses the concept of difference. Yet, it is essential to 
note that difference here is still subordinated to the dominating concept of identity 
and is designated as a means for making identity manifest. Schelling’s conception 
of sameness is also distinct from classical metaphysics in that it bears the 
influence of Romanticism, with respect to which it is imbued with the sense of 
loss or impossibility. 
                                                           
5 Andrew Bowie, Aesthetics and Subjectivity from Kant to Nietzsche (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1990), p. 105. 
6 Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism (1800), trans. by 
Peter Heath (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia: 1978), p. 12. 
7 Kai Hammermeister, The German Aesthetic Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002), p. 77. 
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 The significance of Schelling’s (and Hegel’s in a more comprehensive way) 
resurrection of sameness lies in the fact that the transcendental objective of the 
Same is no longer limited to being presented as pure identity, but, instead, is 
designated as a synthesis of opposites juxtaposed with respect to this identity. 
Seeking ways to re-think sameness beyond the terms of pure identity, Schelling 
postulates difference as opposed to identity, nonetheless belonging together with 
it to the encompassing absolute as a means to let it be manifest. It is, therefore, 
with the very postulation of difference, although still a conceptual difference 
within the Same, that Schelling’s philosophy re-postulates sameness as the 
fundamental issue of philosophy. 
 
 
1. 2 The Romantic Idea of Art 
  
 
The return to the issue of sameness via the notion of the Absolute brings forth the 
need to seek new criteria for validating art as distinct from those adopted 
throughout the transitory stage of digression. In contrast to the preceding aesthetic 
theories which have been validating art in respect of the fortuitous criteria rooted 
in the subject, Schelling undertakes its investigation with regard to the prime 
principle of the resurrected sameness. For a short period following the 
philosophical digression from the Same and preceding the philosophy of 
Nietzsche, the function of art is re-postulated in terms of representation, namely, it 
is reduced to the mere signifier of the transcendental signified of the Absolute. 
The validation of art with regard to the Absolute, as well as the re-grounding of 
the relationship between the polarities of identity and difference, the One and the 
Multiple, the ideal and the real, the conscious and the unconscious upon the same 
ground are congruent with the Idealist conception of the primacy of an ultimate 
identity encompassing all differentiation or of a comprehensive poetic knowledge 
encompassing subjective knowledge.8 Consequently, Schelling’s philosophical 
                                                           
8 Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism (1800),  
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system may be considered mainly as part of the body of thought known as 
German Idealism, the core of which is the certitude in art’s capacity to link the 
sensible and intelligible in the representation of the Absolute. Schelling’s 
statement from the System of Transcendental Idealism serves as an account for 
this congruence: ‘Philosophy of art is the true organon of philosophy.’9 
 Yet, under the influence of the early German Romantics (Novalis, Schlegel, 
etc.), Schelling views art from the Romantic perspective, according to which it is 
considered superior to philosophy in its capacity to grasp and reflect the identity 
of the Absolute in non-theoretical terms. This perspective both grants art the 
privilege of reflecting upon the Absolute and poses the Absolute as an entity that 
cannot be fully amenable to conceptual articulation, but may fully be represented 
primarily via art. From the Romantic perspective, art is represented as a unity of 
the conscious and unconscious productivities of the artist that are opposed in the 
artwork with no possibility for reconciliation, while the Absolute is imbued with 
the sense of a lost unity and the longing for it. This perspective conditions the 
conceiving of art in its dual function of representing the Absolute and the 
impossibility of representing it. 
 The Romantic belief in art’s privileged position for reflecting upon the 
Absolute — an operation which is the fundamental concern of Schelling’s 
philosophy — is among the prime factors conditioning the irrefutable influence of 
Hölderlin upon Schelling. Hölderlin’s aesthetic fragments of the latter half of the 
1790s, containing both the idea of the rationally ever-elusive Absolute and that of 
beauty as the means to enable its experiential realization, influence Schelling’s 
conceiving of aesthetics as the via regia to the Absolute that remains unknowable 
by all conceptual means.10 Schelling’s idea of dependency of the world of 
knowledge upon the loss of the Absolute also bears Hölderlin’s influence.11 The 
idea of loss presumably haunts Schelling’s theoretical reflections as deeply as 
those of Hölderlin who, in Blanchot’s opinion, expresses it through both the 
impossibility of limiting the All and its assertion through poetry: the Empedoclean 
impossibility of limiting the Allheit as the all-present Nature (allgegenwärtig) or 
                                                           
9 Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism (1800), p. 14. 
10 Kai Hammermeister, The German Aesthetic Tradition, p. 64. 
11 Andrew Bowie, Schelling and Modern European Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 26. 
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the boundless totality and, simultaneously, the assertion of this Allheit wherever 
poetry asserts itself.12   
 An inquiry into Hölderlin’s epistolary novel Hyperion aims to examine the 
meaning of the Allheit in Aeracletian terms as the one differentiated in itself in 
order to grasp its influence upon Schelling’s philosophy. What presumably 
influences Schelling is the precarious balance between the feeling of the one, the 
loss of the one, and its reconstitution in art. These complex issues, comprising the 
limitlessness of the Allheit and its limiting experience through speech, and yet, the 
giving of being to the Allheit through the finiteness of speech, immensely 
influence Schelling. They imbue his philosophical investigations with the sense of 
impossibility of translating the Absolute in adequate terms.  
 The realization of the impossible is expanded by Hölderlin into the problem 
of naming: it refers to the impossibility of naming and the ambiguous value of 
silence. In the primal silence, described as the peaceful state of ‘a forgetting of all 
existence, a hush of our being’,13 a human being feels he has found the sense of 
the Allheit; in the same state of silence, in the final silence as the retreat of speech 
and being, he feels he has lost the Allheit. Language, then, is the extinguishing of 
silence and the return to silence through the tones of death in the swan song. It is 
posed as the impossible ‘reconciliation of the Sacred with Speech’,14 as a means 
to fill the void and even an expression of overfilling with the oneness of nature. In 
this context, the impossibility of naming is expressed by the metaphor of the 
indifferent echo and is always a post-language: ‘Never now did I say to the 
flower, ‘You are my sister’, and to the springs, ‘We are of one race’. Now, like an 
echo, I faithfully gave each thing its name.’15  
 All that remains after the loss of the Allheit influencing Schelling’s 
conception of the Absolute, is the final return to silence as a retreat of speech and 
representation, a return to oneness without names again: ‘as I am now I have no 
names for things.’16  
                                                           
12 Maurice Blanchot, ‘The ‘Sacred’ Speech of Hölderlin’, in The Work of Fire, trans. by Charlotte 
Mandell (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), p. 114. 
13 Friedrich Hölderlin, Hyperion and Selected Poems, trans. by Williard R. Task, ed. by Eric L. 
Santner (New York: Continuum, 1990), p. 32. 
14 Maurice Blanchot, ‘The ‘Sacred’ Speech of Hölderlin’, p. 131. 
15 Friedrich Hölderlin, Hyperion and Selected Poems, p. 33.  
16 Ibid., p. 126. 
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 The influence of Hölderlin is also tangible in Schelling’s concern with the 
ontological understanding of the subject/object separation and its dissolution into 
the Absolute; a concern represented in his identity philosophy which follows the 
System of Transcendental Philosophy and extends as the key issue throughout his 
entire philosophy. The juxtaposition of Schelling’s idea of the Absolute as a 
synthesis arising via the conflict of multiplicity against the original unity with 
Hölderlin’s conception of the arche-separation (die Ur-Teilung) accounts for this 
influence: 
 
In the highest and strictest sense [judgement] is the original separation of object 
and subject which are the most deeply united in intellectual intuition, that separation 
through which alone object and subject become possible, the arche-separation (die Ur-
Teilung).17 
 
The issues concerning the validation of art with regard to the Absolute are 
displayed in Schelling’s Philosophy of Art (Philosophie der Kunst, 1802-3) in a 
deeper manner. 
 
 
1. 3 Differences between Digression and Sameness 
  
 
The prime concern of Schelling in undertaking a thorough investigation of art is 
both to re-postulate art with regard to the revivified concept of the Absolute and to 
grasp the essence of the Absolute via art in its power to reflect upon it. As we can 
see, this approach radically differs from the ones adopted in the pre-Kantian 
aesthetic theories and in the philosophy of Kant. The difference between them is 
the fundamental demarcation between a philosophy of sameness and that of 
digression, a demarcation patently displayed in Schelling’s criticism of aesthetics.    
 To conceptualize the necessity for founding a new theory of art, Schelling 
expresses his disagreement with the fundamental principles of the pre-Kantian and 
                                                           
17 Friedrich Hölderlin, Essays and Letters on Theory, ed. and trans. by Thomas Pfau (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1988), p. 37. 
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Kantian aesthetic theories, namely those which allowed us to classify them under 
the category of digression. The fundamental categories of the philosophical 
digression from sameness in validating art that are subjected to Schelling’s 
criticism are the categories applied in judging art as a sensual production (‘as 
sensual stimulation, as recreation, as relaxation for a spirit fatigued by more 
serious matters and as a pleasant stimulant’18), the psychological categories 
influenced by the English and the French, and those of philosophical 
empiricism.19 To sum up, Schelling’s criticism is directed against the very lack of 
any universally valid fundamental underlying principle in the aesthetic theories 
and, hence its replacement by fortuitous principles.20 Schelling also criticizes 
Kantian aesthetics for not reflecting the idea of the beautiful as the archetypal 
element revealing itself in the real world, and for its dependency on the moral and 
useful. The Kantians are defined as extremely tasteless, the Kantian philosophy, 
as a complete sterility of spirit. Schelling’s witty description of various aesthetic 
theories is worth citing at length: 
   
  One tried to explain beauty using empirical psychology, and in general treated the 
miracles of art the same way one treated ghost stories and other superstitions: by 
enlightening us and explaining them away [...]. Other aesthetics are virtual recipes or 
cookbooks in which the recipe for a tragedy reads approximately as follows: a great deal 
of fright, but not too much; as much sympathy as possible, and tears without end.21 
 
Upon the ground of a clear demarcation from aesthetic theories of 
digression, Schelling targets at re-establishing art in accordance with the first 
principles of philosophy and at an adequate representation of these principles 
through art. Hence, the self-elevation from individual moments or individualized 
beauty to the idea of the whole in validating art is at stake. The entire treatise of 
the Philosophy of Art is constructed upon the application of the prime principles 
which are expressed in the form of general philosophical propositions, to defining 
                                                           
18 Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, The Philosophy of Art, ed., trans. and introduction. by 
Douglas W. Stot (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), p. 4. 
19 Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, The Philosophy of Art, p. 4. 
20 Ibid, p. 12. 
21 Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, The Philosophy of Art, p. 12. 
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the essence of art. In so doing, Schelling applies the key Kantian concept of 
imagination (Einbildungskraft) along with its synthesizing power to reveal the 
Absolute. Imagination synthesizes images of the object world into a cognitive 
discourse, thus making art one of the forms of the disclosure of the Absolute. The 
prime philosophical propositions anchored in the concept of the preconceived 
encompassing Absolute serve as the basis for Schelling’s theory of art which 
construes art as the representation of this Absolute, as ‘a tool of the gods, a 
proclaimer of divine mysteries, the unveiler of ideas’.22 The propositions 
concerning the implicit identity underlying the category of art beyond particular 
works of art are also illustrated through the history of art. Schelling aims to 
conceptualize the category of art by proving the essential and inner unity of all 
artworks through the construction of the forms of art and its history.23 Moreover, 
these propositions serve as the theoretical ground for Schelling’s philosophy of 
art, anchored in the ideal reconciliation of philosophy and art in the idea of the 
Absolute. This reconciliation becomes possible by foregrounding art and 
philosophy upon primary principles, in respect of the ontological concept of truth 
and, in harmony with the implicit order of the universe.24 It also becomes possible 
through an intuition of eternal beauty or the archetypes of the beautiful, 
underscoring the equal access which both, art and philosophy have to the ideas or 
archetypes (the relationship between ideas and archetypes is first introduced by 
Schelling in his study of Giordano Bruno25).         
 The idea of reconciliation contravenes the Kantian demarcation between 
philosophy and art, the reason of which Schelling sees in the very 
misapprehension of art and its validation in respect of the false principle of 
empiricism. The misinterpretation of the essence of art is, therefore, defined as the 
reason which made philosophy distinguish itself from the flaccid sensuality of art, 
by bringing forth the irreconcilability of philosophy and art.26 By contrast, 
Schelling views the reconciliation of art/philosophy possible from the perspective 
                                                           
22 Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, The Philosophy of Art, p. 4. 
23 Ibid., p. 19. 
24 Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, The Philosophy of Art, p. 10. 
25 See: Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, Bruno: Or, On the Natural and Divine Principles 
of Things, trans. by Michael G. Vater (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984). 
26 Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, The Philosophy of Art, p. 204.   
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of the philosophy of sameness, provided that this reconciliation stems from the 
imperative of the Absolute. This implies the transcending of the contradictions of 
the phenomenal appearances of philosophy and art toward the higher perspective 
of the encompassing law of the universe as pure absoluteness. A philosophy of art 
is, accordingly, considered valid, based upon the identity of philosophy and art in 
their teleological affinity to disclose the Absolute. 
To summarize, Schelling’s philosophy of art testifies to the return from a 
philosophy of digression to a philosophy of sameness, in terms of which art 
constitutes the signifier of the metaphysical incommensurable of the Absolute 
which cannot be grasped otherwise than via translatability into scientific terms. 
 
 
 
1. 4 Art as an Ideal Potency of the Same 
 
 
As we have noted earlier, the positive impact of the Philosophy of Art is the 
revivification of the issue of sameness via the concept of the Absolute and, hence, 
the re-grounding of art in the light of its prime principles. Its significance lies 
primarily in re-postulating sameness, conceived as a unity of identity and 
difference, as the fundamental issue of philosophy and in reminding of its 
forgotten enigma through the desiderata concepts of the harmony, oneness, and 
unity of the universe. The return to the Same had a particular significance in the 
period of digression when not only did the genuine value of the art work remain 
concealed, but also when (not needed) a whole bunch of aesthetic theories dictated 
false criteria for art by conditioning the development of art-works designated for 
mere enjoyment. 
 Yet, the limits of the Schellingian Absolute lie in its representing a limited 
conception of sameness, in which the difference is subordinated to the higher 
perspective of identity and is a means for representing it. This approach reduces 
sameness to a dominating metaphysical universal, namely the Absolute, thereby 
postulating art as its representation. It also disregards the absolute singularity of 
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the work of art, making the latter subordinate to the idea of art as the 
representation of the Absolute.27 
 It is from the dual perspectives of an essential return to sameness, 
comprising both the elucidation of its hitherto concealed subtleties and, at the 
same time, the limits of its reduction to the concept of the Absolute that we will 
now inquire into Schelling’s Philosophy of Art.   
 The central idea of Schelling’s philosophy of art is the re-postulation of the 
metaphysical universal of the Same in its unity, identity, and immutability by 
virtue of the indivisible wholeness of the Absolute and the possibility of its 
representation through the particular determination of art. This re-postulation aims 
at the resurrection of the One from Ancient Greek philosophy by providing 
evidence for the existence of actually and basically one essence, one absolute 
reality based upon fundamental philosophical propositions. These propositions 
account for the immutability of this one essence which can neither change into 
other essences, nor undergo any changes due to the process of determination. The 
undivided wholeness of the One as the pure essence that inheres in nature, art, and 
history can be represented solely by determinations which are defined as ideal 
potencies by Schelling. The individual potency of the philosophy of art is 
accordingly defined as ‘the science of the All in the form or potence of art’ which 
considers not the particularity of the work of art, but rather ‘the universe in the 
form of art’.28 The classification of philosophy and art as ideal potencies of the 
Absolute, whereby their function is reduced to that of representation, also serves 
as the ground for conceptualizing the congruence between them with regard to the 
congruence between beauty and truth. Here is Schelling’s argument on this point: 
‘Just as for philosophy in general the absolute is the archetype of truth, so also for 
art is it the archetype of beauty. We must therefore show that truth and beauty are 
merely two different ways of viewing the absolute’29 To make his identification 
intellectually valid, Schelling refers to the following philosophical proposition 
alluding to the metaphysical philosophy of the Same: ‘The universe is formed in 
God as an absolute work of art and in eternal beauty’; and its annotation: ‘It 
                                                           
27 Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, The Philosophy of Art, p. 7. 
28 Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, The Philosophy of Art, p. 16. 
29 Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, The Philosophy of Art, p. 17. 
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follows [...] that all things [...] are formed in absolute beauty, and that the 
archetypes of all things, just as they are absolutely true, are absolutely beautiful.’30 
 As further reading of the Philosophy of Art makes clear, Schelling grounds 
his theory of art upon the onto-theological primacy of the preconceived identity of 
the Absolute as the cause, possibility, and source of all things, thereby prescribing 
the function of representing the Absolute to art. We read: ‘The immediate cause of 
all art is God, for God is by means of his absolute identity the source of all mutual 
informing [...] of the real and the ideal upon which all art rests’; or: ‘God is the 
source of the ideas. The ideas originate only in God. Art, however, is the 
representation of the archetypes, hence God himself is the immediate cause and 
the final possibility of all art.’31 
 Schelling introduces the conception of the pure oneness of substance and 
form in the pre-existing Absolute, and therefore, in the principle of art. The 
transition from substance into form is viewed as the precondition for the 
manifestation of the Absolute which would otherwise remain a ‘self-enclosed 
subjectivity without being discerned or distinguished’.32 The preconceived 
oneness of substance and form in the Absolute and the abovementioned transition 
condition the re-postulation of art as the translatability of the Absolute or, to use 
Schelling’s definition, as: ‘the form of the informing of the infinite into the finite 
as particular form’.33 The essence of art is, accordingly, defined with regard to the 
Absolute which is posed in its creative and generative capacity. The corroboration 
of the creativity of the Absolute as the combined creation of itself within an 
infinite potentiality beyond time and of its creation of something other than itself 
is a form of return to the Neoplatonic concept of emanation in the sense of 
overflowing as a result of its fullness: ‘Seeking nothing, possessing nothing, 
lacking nothing, the One is perfect and, in our metaphor, has overflowed, and its 
exuberance has produced the new.’34   
                                                           
30 Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, The Philosophy of Art, p. 31. 
31 Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, The Philosophy of Art, p. 32. 
32 Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, The Philosophy of Art, p. 119. 
33 Ibid., p. 99. 
34 Plotinus, The Enneads, trans. by Stephen Mackenna (London: Faber & Faber Limited, 1962), p. 
380. 
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 Schelling differentiates between a variety of arts, in respect of an 
interrelation of form and matter, in which the latter is the lowest, shaped and 
differentiated kind, as opposed to the shapeless, undifferentiated and 
undetermined purity of the Absolute. From this Neoplatonic perspective,35 music 
is classified as a privileged art in so far as in music the pure form appears 
liberated from matter: 
  
Music, which from the one perspective is the most closed of all arts, the one that 
comprehends forms still within chaos and without differentiation, and that expresses only 
the pure form of these movements separated from corporeality, similarly takes up the 
absolute model or figure only as rhythm, harmony, and melody, that is, for the first 
potence, even though within this sphere it is the most boundless of all arts.36 
 
All the arts are, accordingly, posed as emanations of the Absolute and 
differentiated according to the juxtaposition of the ideal/real: music, as the 
informing of the ideal into the real; painting, as a model of the real portrayal of the 
forms and contours of the ideal; and the plastic arts, as the total transformation of 
the infinite into the finite.37 The classification of painting and plastic arts in 
respect of the juxtaposition of the finite/infinite also derives from several 
borrowed propositions concerning light, as ‘the infinite concept of all finite things, 
insofar as it is contained in the real unity’.38 Schelling revivifies the tropology of 
light, both, in opposition to nonlight (as colour)39 and as absolute light as a way 
for conceiving the idea itself. The Neoplatonic metaphor of absolute light, as ‘the 
light within itself, unmingled, pure, suddenly gleaming’40 is metamorphosed into 
a fundamental Schellingian presupposition regarding light and matter as one in 
pre-established harmony through gravity. It comprises the Neoplatonic sense of 
reabsorbing of the difference within identity appearing as light only as something 
relatively ideal and, therefore, in both opposition and relative unity with 
corporeality. 
                                                           
35 Plotinus, The Enneads, p. 108. 
36 Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, The Philosophy of Art, p. 118. 
37 Ibid., p. 201. 
38 Ibid., p. 119. 
39 Ibid., p. 121. 
40 Plotinus, The Enneads, p. 409.  
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 An essential point in Schelling’s discussion of the arts is the resurrection of 
the Platonic-Neoplatonic ascending dialectics, according to which the real is 
transcended into the ideal: ‘Matter gradually dematerializes into the ideal: in 
painting as far as the relative-ideal, through light; then, in music and even so in 
speech and poesy, into the genuinely ideal, the most complete manifestation of the 
absolute cognitive act’.41 
 The function of the verbal arts, defined as the universal form of poesy, is 
also reduced to the representation of the Absolute or the portrayal of the ideas in 
speech and language. It is corroborated by the juxtaposition of the divine and 
human languages, in terms of which matter is ‘the divine word that has entered 
into the finite; [...] recognizable in sonority through pure differences’.42 Language 
is accordingly conceived through the infinite chain of ascending and descending 
dialectics as the eternal creative activity of the Absolute, by virtue of which it 
eternally objectifies itself through matter and returns to itself. Moreover, language 
is the most appropriate symbol of the absolute or infinite affirmation of God in the 
process of integration, since this affirmation here represents itself through 
something real without ceasing to be ideal (which is precisely the highest 
requirement). This approach is a return to the metaphysical understanding of 
language as the primal unity of thing/name in logos that is transformed into the 
Romantic intensity of loss of unity, the longing for it and the quest for 
resurrection of this lost unity. The quest for the primal intactness of name/thing 
through speech rejecting any finality of explanation refers back to Plotinus’s 
‘agony for a true expression; […] the untellable’, when ‘we name, only to indicate 
for our own use as best we may’.43 Schelling recalls the philosophical-theological 
legacy in his attempt to re-establish the lost adequacy of being and speaking in the 
logos: ‘in most philosophical and religious systems, […] the eternal and absolute 
act of self-affirmation in God — his eternal act of creating — is designated as the 
speaking word of God, the logos, which is simultaneously God himself.’44 
Language is thereby identified in its referential function as the quest to represent 
the Absolute and the impossibility of representing it, thereby establishing the 
                                                           
41 Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, The Philosophy of Art, p. 121. 
42 Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, The Philosophy of Art, p. 204. 
43 Plotinus, The Enneads, p. 408. 
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function of language as the naming of the unnameable or, to use Schelling’s 
words, as poesy’s constructing of its bodies of ideas from the chaos.45 
 The significance of re-establishing language in terms of a separation of 
speech from the totality of language is substantiated in the transposition of poetry 
from the region of aesthetics into that of the philosophy of language by 
subtracting the poetic work from the realm of the sensible to hand it over to truth. 
The separation of speech, named its rhythm (the control and subjugation of time, 
defined as music within music) is due to the internal regularity of the work of art, 
whereby it becomes self-contained and possesses its own internal time as opposed 
to the external free movement. The concept of rhythm is a means to introduce an 
element of difference into the system of identity, albeit the difference of rhythm is 
subordinated to the identity of the cosmic harmony and a means to make the latter 
manifest: ‘it thus includes change, yet an autonomously ordered change 
subordinated to the identity of that in which the change takes place.’46 The poetic 
text is, accordingly, examined from a dual perspective: as a self-enclosed entity, a 
‘whole possessive of its own internal time and momentum, and thereby separated 
from the larger whole of language’47 and as an entity implicitly representing the 
infinity of the Absolute in its adequacy with language. Schelling describes it 
emerging daringly in its heterogeneous rhythm and alien to the common 
regulations of aesthetics, as poesy which ‘never has its purpose outside itself, 
although it does also elicit externally that particular feeling inhering internally 
within it’.48 
 These general observations concerning the philosophical investigation of art, 
namely the verbal art are also demonstrated by Schelling’s approach to particular 
works of art. 
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46 Plotinus, The Enneads, p. 205. 
47 Ibid., p. 206. 
48 Ibid., p. 207. 
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1. 5 Schelling’s Reading of Dante’s Commedia  
 
The investigation of individual genres, authors or particular works of art is for 
Schelling still another way of expounding upon the general observations on the 
essence of art as portrayal of the Absolute. Here, the particularity of form as both 
pure limitation and undivided absoluteness is designated to reveal the 
formlessness of this Absolute. We will view Schelling’s analysis of the Divine 
Comedy (La divina commedia) by Dante as the realization of his theoretical 
assumptions on the essence of art, language, and the issue of the reconciliation of 
philosophy/art.  
 The choice of the Commedia is presumably conditioned by the fact that 
Schelling’s own theory of a possible reconciliation between art and philosophy is 
realized to a greater extent in it. Schelling traces the substantiation of his theory 
through an intertwining of the potencies of philosophy, poetry, theology, and 
science in their common function of representing the Absolute.49 George Steiner 
also observes the overlapping of the three semantic fields in Dante, claiming that 
‘he [Dante] organizes, makes irreducibly vital, the reciprocities of religious, 
metaphysical and aesthetic codes in respect of being and generation’.50 
 Schelling conceives of the interweaving of philosophy, physics, and 
astronomy with the poesy itself only because artwork is given the status of an 
archetype, as an image of the universe and is declared commensurate with a 
universal worldview.51 Referring to Dante’s poetic composition, Schelling 
introduces the concept of universality as the essence of poesy, according to which 
the particularity is regarded not in its absolute singularity, but in the/its infinite 
process of perfection toward the Absolute.52 Schelling’s view of art constituting 
an ideal potency of the Absolute is substantiated in his analysis of the Commedia 
as a paradigm of creation in congruence with God’s creation of the universe, in 
which the pattern of artistic creation is analogous to God’s invention. Steiner 
stresses the pertinence of creation in the Commedia as an act of liberty with 
                                                           
49 Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, The Philosophy of Art, p. 240. 
50 George Steiner, Grammars of Creation (London: Faber and Faber, 2001), p. 64. 
51 George Steiner, Grammars of Creation, p. 243. 
52 Ibid, p. 241. 
123 
 
 
 
ontological implication, according to which God’s ideas could take on 
autonomous identity.53 The profundity of the poetic form of the Commedia is for 
Schelling nothing but a model of the identical universe portraying the identity of 
the universe created by God and its congruity as a whole. Accordingly, the inner 
construction of each of the three parts and the spiritual rhythm through which they 
are juxtaposed to one another are disclosed with regard to the cosmic order of the 
universe. The exposition of the unique artistic invention of form, colour, and tone 
of each part of the Commedia in its intactness is designated to represent the 
harmony of the universe and the preconceived identity of the Absolute: 
  
The Inferno, just as it contains the most terrible of objects, is also the strongest in 
expression, the most austere in diction, and verbally the darkest and most dreadful. In [...] 
Purgatorio a deep stillness resides, since the laments of the lower world go silent; on the 
heights, the antecourts of heaven, everything becomes color. The Paradiso is a true music 
of the spheres.54 
 
Schelling demonstrates the individuality of each part: the musicality and 
lyricism of Paradiso expressed through the frequent use of Latin words from 
church hymns; the pure inventiveness of the metamorphosis in the Inferno capable 
of revealing the sublime and beautiful even through the dreadful and base; and the 
picturesque designation of the Purgatorio in its graphical and light effects. This 
original insight is not aimed at displaying the otherness of each part, but solely the 
reintegration of the otherness into a coherent whole which serves as a model of 
the implicit identity of the universe encompassing all differentiations. The insight 
into the admirable statute of the poetic creation of the Commedia is thus a means 
for Schelling to reinforce his view of the fusion of all artistic genres: ‘neither 
plastic, picturesque, nor musical, but rather all this at once and in consonant 
harmony’.55 
 What the philosophical inquiry into The Divine Comedy aims to 
demonstrate, is the validity of the philosophy of art in examining art as a 
representation of the transcendental objective of the Absolute, as opposed to the 
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54 Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, The Philosophy of Art, p. 245. 
55 Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, The Philosophy of Art, p. 247. 
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prevailing aesthetic theories. Schelling believes that this investigation is not 
inimical to the very nature of art, but has the capacity for generating ever new 
significances. By virtue of the designation of The Comedy as the portrayal of an 
elevation toward the Spirit, toward the pure sphere of the absolute light, where 
vision resolves itself, and poesy becomes music, not only does Schelling 
demonstrate the validity of his theoretical premises on art or the possibility of 
philosophy/art reconciliation, but also reminds the reader of the ancient wisdom of 
sameness. The elucidation of Dante’s tropes of the One as boundless totality, 
absolute light or eternal love manifesting itself through a multiplicity of 
reflections, though remaining itself unalterable, not only displays the congruence 
between Schelling and Dante, philosophy and art, but also alludes to the 
metaphysical philosophy of the Same and re-establishes its lost plenitude. A 
passage from Dante’s text may serve as an illustration to this:    
 
The Primal Light that irradiates them all is received by them in as many ways as 
are the splendors to which it joins itself. Wherefore since the affection follows upon the 
act of conceiving, the sweetness of love glows variously in them, more and less. Behold 
now the height and breadth of the Eternal Goodness, since it has made itself so many 
mirrors wherein it is reflected, remaining in itself One as before.56 
 
The readings of Dante’s and Schelling’s texts, as well as Schelling’s 
interpretation of Dante account for a philosophy of sameness, anchored in the 
preconceived identity of the metaphysical universal of the Same, of which 
philosophy and art are mere representations. The re-postulation of sameness 
through the Absolute is, thus, Schelling’s own way to reconcile the dichotomized 
spheres of the sensible/intelligible and to emancipate art from being 
misinterpreted by aesthetical theories of digression. What he primarily aims to 
achieve, is the establishment of the pure formlessness of the Absolute by means of 
the distinctive forms of poetry and philosophy. The poet and the philosopher are, 
accordingly, united in their ascent toward the sphere of the divine substance (per 
aspera ad astra): through the metamorphoses of darkness - colour (as the unity of 
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light and matter) toward the purity of the absolute light. Schelling’s reading of 
Dante serves as an illustration of this: 
 
The poet has penetrated through the heart of the earth itself to light. In the darkness 
of the underworld only form itself could be distinguished. In the Purgatorio, light 
emerges still wedded to earthly matter and becomes color. In the Paradiso, only the pure 
music of light remains; the reflex ceases, and the poet elevates himself in stages to the 
vision of the colorless, pure substance of the deity itself.57  
 
To summarize, Schelling’s philosophy is an attempt to resurrect the 
metaphysical philosophy of sameness after the transitory realm of digression by 
postulating the preconceived identity of the Absolute and posing art, as its ideal 
potency designated to represent the Absolute. Despite the fact that the limits of 
this re-postulation imply disregarding the pure otherness of the absolutely singular 
and the viewing of only one aspect of sameness, namely its identity, its positive 
impact is indisputable. The positive impact of Schelling’s philosophy includes his 
resurrection of the concept of sameness in its plenitude, by reminding the reader 
of the lost harmony of the universe and the re-postulation of art in respect of this 
plenitude in its power to allude to the unnameable. Schelling should also be 
credited for the philosophical postulation of the conceptual difference which, 
though still subject to dissolution in the Absolute and a mere means for 
representing its unity, opens vistas for its further corroboration in terms of pure 
otherness from Nietzsche and on.58  
 The next chapter will inquire into Hegel’s postulation of sameness as a 
totality of becoming which, along with conceptual differences from Schelling’s 
system (Hegel’s objective-subjective idealism versus Schelling’s objective 
idealism) is nonetheless congruent with it in its attempt to resurrect sameness as 
the fundamental issue of philosophy. 
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58 See also on Schelling’s influence on Theodor W. Adorno: Kai Hammermeister, The German 
Aesthetic Tradition, p. 211 
126 
 
 
 
2. Hegel: The Same as the Totality of Becoming 
 
2. 1 Sketches of the Concept of Totality   
 
 
In around 1800, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770 - 1831), together with 
Schelling, promulgates objective idealism as a way to surmount the antinomies 
manifest in Kant’s philosophy of subjectivity and to re-establish sameness as the 
fundamental issue of philosophy. To bridge the Kantian divide in its refusal to 
meet the fundamental philosophical requirement of unity, he initially offers the 
preconceived unity of the transcendental objective of the Absolute.  
 Hegel’s first attempts to bring forth a unity capable of surmounting the 
Kantian dichotomy — still with the contribution of Schelling and Hölderlin — are 
reflected in the Oldest System Program of German Idealism of 1796 (Das älteste 
Systemprogramm des deutschen Idealismus),59 the aim of which is to stress the 
urge for a new mythology. The power for unification is designated as a mythology 
of reason integrating the diversity of the sensuous and intelligible in the manner 
that myths used to integrate the diversity between nature, art, and society. It would 
be introduced as a new religion through making ideas aesthetic (i.e. 
mythological), and mythology reasonable: ‘mythology must become philosophical 
and the people reasonable, and philosophy must become mythological in order to 
make the philosophers sensuous.’60  
 To reconcile the dichotomized spheres of the sensuous and intelligible 
through the aesthetic power, the System Program poses the Idea of beauty in the 
higher Platonic sense as an aesthetic act, the highest act of reason encompassing 
all Ideas, thereby posing the philosophy of spirit as aesthetic philosophy. The 
equal development of every human faculty is considered possible through the 
sensibility of a poetically founded religion as an ethical totality which is described 
                                                           
59 See on the disputes of its authorship in: Christoph Jamme und Helmut Schneider ‘Der Streitum 
die Verfasser Schaft’, in Mythologie der Vernunft: Hegels ältestes Systemprogramm des deutschen 
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60 Andrew Bowie ‘The Oldest System Programme of German Idealism’, in Aesthetics and 
Subjectivity from Kant to Nietzsche (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990), Appendix, 
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by Jürgen Habermas as mythopoetry.61 As a result, for a limited period poetry 
regains its priority over the sciences and arts by functioning as the teacher of 
humanity and constituting the form of the new mythology up to the point where it 
is replaced with the idea of speculative reason. Hegel henceforth presupposes the 
Absolute as the power of unification, the totality encompassing identity and non-
identity, the finite and the infinite. The Absolute totality is asserted by virtue of 
the continual processing and self-negation of the non-identical within the totality.  
It is with the various meanings of the identical concept of the Absolute that 
Hegel’s subjective-objective idealism diverges from the objective idealism of 
Schelling. Despite the fact that both Schellingian and Hegelian conceptions of the 
Absolute are meant to return philosophy from digression toward sameness, they 
differ in that Hegel postulates it as a totality of becoming, while Schelling poses it 
in its preconceived identity. Starting his discourse on modernity with Hegel, 
Habermas, whose conception of communication derives from Hegel’s logology, 
contrasts the Hegelian Absolute which unfolds itself only in the process of the 
relationship between the finite and infinite with Hölderlin’s and Schelling’s 
Absolute, preceding the world process either as being or as intellectual intuition: 
‘The absolute [in Hegel] comes to be neither as substance nor as subject; it is 
apprehended only as the mediating process of a relation-to-self that produces itself 
free from conditions.’62  
 The difference between Hegel’s and Schelling’s postulations of the Absolute 
can also be derived from Hegel’s treatise The Difference between Fichte’s and 
Schelling’s System of Philosophy (1801), in which Hegel evokes the concept of a 
totality encompassing the difference as well as the identity of the opposites. In the 
Hegelian totality, this opposition is not nullified, but each of the opposites within 
it has a separate standing.63 This contravenes Schelling’s concept of the Absolute, 
posed as a preconceived synthesis in which the opposition of difference and 
identity of subject and object is dissolved.  
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 Hegel’s principal objection to objective idealism is its incapability of self-
reflection, hence the failure to pose the Same upon the ground of an absolute 
totality through the dialectics of an absolute subject-object identity. This serves as 
a point of departure for the development of Hegel’s speculative discourse engaged 
in the conceptualization of the total identity of subject and object; an identity, in 
which neither subjective, nor objective synthesis prevails, but all opposition is 
overcome under the aegis of the Absolute.64 To achieve this absolute totality at the 
price of a suspension of all opposition, Hegel (even if he finds fault with Kant’s 
explanation) takes up Kant’s hypothesis of a ternary structure of the proposition 
and develops it into the syllogism.65 This serves as a basis for the development of 
the Hegelian dialectics, first described by Heinrich Moritz Chalybäus (1796–
1862) as comprising three dialectical stages of development: thesis, antithesis, 
synthesis. The dialectical method means that the Absolute must always pass 
through the phase of the Negative, the overcoming of which becomes possible 
through the Hegelian Aufhebung or sublation.   
 From the perspective of a philosophical conceiving/conception of sameness, 
Hegel’s discourse is unprecedented in so far as it adds the layer of self-cognition 
to the cognitive discourse of the Same, thereby transmuting a philosophical 
representation into an all-encompassing speculative discourse, anchored in the 
identity of self-cognition and the cognition of the Same. Rodolphe Gasché rightly 
describes the speculative discourse of Hegel as ‘the full exposition of all the 
logically possible moments of the logos, a process that is completed as soon as the 
logos is folded back into itself’.66 It aims at re-postulating sameness which has 
been perpetually postulated since the inception of Western philosophy in Greece, 
as a totality encompassing all opposition. Moreover, in distinction from preceding 
theories which merely presuppose this totality, Hegel builds an entire 
philosophical edifice and elaborates upon it in a comprehensive, speculative 
discourse. Gasché rightly remarks that Hegel cannot be satisfied with the mystic 
rapture that the all-devouring Absolute invites, but must ‘expound the intrinsic 
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links between the Absolute and its content’ and ‘try to posit this manifold as 
internally connected to the Absolute’.67   
 Expounding the concept of totality, Hegel, in distinction from classical 
metaphysics, poses identity as only one of its aspects, since, in order for a totality 
to be complete, it must also admit the negative moment or the claims of 
separation. The Hegelian Absolute is thereby posed as ‘the identity of identity 
and non-identity’, in which ‘being opposed and being one are both together’.68 
This postulation of sameness as absolute totality, encompassing both identity and 
difference is well depicted as different from both classical metaphysics and the so 
called philosophical thought of difference (from Nietzsche onwards). As we have 
stated earlier, Hegel’s postulation of sameness is distinguished from classical 
metaphysics and from Schelling’s system in that the first covers merely the 
identity of sameness, while the latter postulates it as a preconceived identity, 
where difference is a means to represent the totality. The divergence from the 
philosophy of difference constitutes in the fact that the latter is concerned with the 
very postulation of pure difference, manifesting not the totality of the Absolute, 
but only itself as such.  
 This intermediary position of Hegel in respect of sameness is stressed in 
Gasché’s analysis which describes the Hegelian totality as based upon the 
continuity of identity and difference or the ‘unity of itself and of the disunion that 
such a unity must presuppose’.69 It is also from this angle that he defines the 
totality in Hegel as ‘the result of a self-construction in which identity turns into 
totality by maintaining the identical poles’ nonidentity’.70 Difference or non-
identity comprised in the concept of totality in Hegel differs from its analogues 
discussed in the philosophy of difference in that its function still remains in the 
representation of a totality free of contradictions and oppositions. The Hegelian 
conception of difference is subordinated to that of identity in the dynamics or 
becoming of diversities, a becoming which is still the becoming of totality as 
opposed to the recurrence of the other. From the perspective of its subordination 
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to identity, Hegel’s becoming which is created through the mediation of the 
negative is opposed to the free movement of diversities postulated by the 
philosophy of difference. From this angle, as opposed to the free movement of 
diversities, Hegel’s becoming is qualified as a false movement by Gilles 
Deleuze.71 As we can see, the Hegelian becoming still belongs to the realm of 
representation and is posed as a mediation having only a single centre and a 
unique and receding perspective. It resurrects the infinite representation of the 
Same, ensuring the identity of all moments as belonging to the Same and posing 
the difference and otherness between the moments constituting the Same.  
 In what follows, we will inquire into Hegel’s philosophical works not only 
as a way to surpass the philosophical-aesthetic digression from sameness, but as 
the most encompassing postulation of sameness, comprising the wisdom of its 
harmony, yet opening new vistas for the postulation of the absolute singularity of 
the other. As such, the Hegelian dialectics is viewed as the postulation of the 
totality as a becoming of identity and non-identity, in combination with self-
reflection or the surmounting of the dichotomy between being and thinking 
through focusing upon the very process of thinking. As a result, art is detached 
from the realm of digression and rendered to truth, thereby functioning as the 
sensuous representation of the Absolute itself. From the same perspective, 
language is no longer regarded as a mere tool of representation but rethought in 
relation to the intactness of thought/utterance and the issue of the impossible 
expression of the totality of being and thinking.  
 These and other issues will be discussed through the Phenomenology of 
Spirit (Phänomenologie des Geistes, 1807), with the appearance of which in its 
opposition of spirit to nature, the break of Hegel with Schelling becomes final.  
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2. 2 The Totality as Geist  
          
 
The Hegelian postulation of sameness in terms of the conception of the Absolute 
as a transition from being into becoming, from pure identity into totality, in which 
otherness insinuates itself under the guise of the idea of Geist as das Negative 
substantiates in the Phenomenology of Spirit. Hegel poses identity in its 
interrelation with non-identity within totality to reveal Being not as a static given-
Being (Sein), but as Becoming (Werden). In so doing, he brings forth the 
possibility of a redemption or recreation of itself by virtue of the otherness or 
negation of itself as given. The Spirit is therefore defined as the totality of 
becoming by virtue of the opposing poles of identity and difference, as at once 
‘the essence and the actuality of the whole, which sunders itself into a substance 
which endures, and a substance which sacrifices itself, and which at the same time 
also takes them back into its unity ’.72 
 Alexandre Kojève juxtaposes the ontological categories of identity and 
negativity to stress the factor of negativity in its ability to withdraw being from its 
static state, where it was always nothing but the same being, eternally identical to 
itself, but different from the others. In the transposition of the static being into a 
dynamical becoming, he stresses the role of Negativity, by virtue of which ‘an 
identical being can negate or overcome its identity with itself and become other 
than it is, even its own opposite’.73 As a result, the negating being becomes 
capable of leaving ‘the place that was assigned to it in the Cosmos’ and ends up 
with ‘not being what it is and being what it is not’ (das nicht zu sein, was es ist, 
und das zu sein, was es nicht ist).74 Accordingly, the role assigned to the negative, 
as to the pole opposed to the identical and having a similar standing within the 
totality of the Absolute, is merely a means to assert the superior form of totality. 
What is at stake, thus, is not pure negativity, but negativity as the extreme limit of 
difference. In its subordination to identity, negativity is imbued with the function 
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of distorting the equilibrium of the Absolute, by setting it into motion and 
affirming its identity and totality only by expiation. It is therefore not the 
postulation of negativity, but the processing of negativity into identity within the 
totality of the dialectical circle that Hegel opts for. As we can see, the conception 
of difference, posed as negativity, is subordinated to the totality of Being and 
dialectically overcome in and by this totality. To summarize, Hegel resurrects the 
philosophy of sameness by virtue of a conception of totality, within which identity 
and negativity do not exist in an isolated state, but ‘are only complementary 
aspects of one and the same real being’.75 
As the most comprehensive postulation of sameness, the Hegelian 
Phenomenology represents all the complementary stages of the redemption of the 
Same, comprising the self-alienation and the Return through which the Spirit as a 
purified self-identity is manifest. The Return of the Spirit to its Sameness, i.e. its 
assertion as a being-in-and-for-itself is realized through Natural Religion and the 
Religion of Art, in the form of consciousness and self-consciousness, 
correspondingly. Judged from this angle, art is no longer validated according to 
the fortuitous criteria of the period of digression, but re-postulated in the form of 
self-consciousness as the representation of the metaphysical universal of the Same 
(under the guise of the Spirit). It is returned to the realm of representation, 
whereby its function is reduced to the unfolding of the Spirit by virtue of the 
immediacy of the self-consciousness or the ‘shape of shapelessnesss’.76 This re-
postulation concerns not only art, but also  the wider context of creation which is 
re-established as a movement of externalization of the Spirit by virtue of its 
otherness, defined as ‘torrents of light, [...] the genesis of its being-for-self and the 
return [...],  streams of fire destructive of [all] structured form’.77 Creation — 
enfolding the creation of the self, as well as creation in the form of art — is the 
moment of the otherness or difference; yet difference or otherness is not 
postulated as such, but is sublated within totality.  
 This brings forth a re-establishment of the philosophy of sameness and 
hence, the re-definition of the process of creation, comprising the otherness of art 
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as the substantiation of the infinite formlessness of Spirit or the naming of the 
‘many-named One [...] clothed with the manifold powers of existence and with the 
shapes of reality ’.78 Analogous to the classical paradigm of translatability, the 
manifold shapes of art that lack a message of their own are reduced to being the 
messengers of the One, ‘messengers of its might, visions of its glory, voices in its 
praise’.79 This process, however, is no longer limited by the Spirit’s being in need 
of substantiation in art in order to manifest itself, but is reciprocated by art’s being 
in need of the Spirit’s sacrifice of its primal wholeness in order to come to 
existence. In sum, the redemption narrative substitutes for the translatability 
paradigm and, accordingly, art is re-defined as the redemption of the sacrificed 
wholeness or the lost world of the Spirit in the epoch when the Spirit ‘mourns 
over the loss of its world, and now out of the purity of self creates its own 
essence, which is raised above the real world’.80 With regard to the redemption 
narrative — comprising the whole, the sacrifice of the whole and its redemption 
through the manifold — the simple inner is blended with the multiform outer,81 
whilst art is transcended from being a mere representation of the Spirit toward 
becoming one with it in absolute sameness, so that ‘the Notion and the work of art 
produced know each other as one and the same’.82 The redemption narrative is 
further substantiated with the classical topology of light: ‘Pure Light disperses its 
unitary nature into an infinity of forms, and offers up itself as a sacrifice to being-
for-self, so that from its substance the individual may take an enduring existence 
for itself.’83  
 The re-establishing of the process of creation as redemption narrative 
conditions also the re-postulation of the artist in terms of an absolute identity of 
the Spirit, the artist, and the work of art. By virtue of the same sacrificial act of 
creation, in/as a result of which the Spirit loses its unitary nature to give birth to 
the manifold, it is identified with the artist: ‘Spirit is Artist’.84 Similarly, the artist 
depersonalizes himself and rises to the abstraction of pure action in order to create 
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a work of art, which will become one with the artist and the Spirit. The work of art 
thereby forms a whole merely as referred to the genesis of its own creation and to 
the genesis of creation per se. 85 
 From the perspective of the redemption narrative, not only art but also 
religion and philosophy are considered in the ascent toward the absolute 
revelation of the Spirit, as their fundamental aim. In Hegel’s formulation: ‘the 
hopes and expectations of the world up till now had pressed forward solely to this 
revelation, to behold what absolute Being is, and in it to find itself.’86 This 
revelation is realized in the phase of absolute religion as the highest one, in which 
Spirit, conscious of its own externalization, retains its self-identity in its otherness 
and realizes itself as essentially a self-conscious Being.87 The differentiations in 
the forms of art, science, or religion are all reconciled in the redemption narrative, 
in respect of which they have come to existence due to the sacrificial act of the 
Spirit in order for the latter to redeem itself in the ‘form of simple oneness’.88 In 
other words, they all have come to existence solely due to the negation or 
otherness of the pure unitary essence of the Spirit when it sacrificed its wholeness 
to enter into actual or immediate existence, other to itself. Moreover, the actually 
existing world is nothing but the sacrifice of the wholeness of the Spirit, since it is 
by virtue of this very sacrificial act that the Spirit ‘creates a world’.89  
 To summarize, what Hegel aims at is the re-establishment of the philosophy 
of sameness as Absolute totality and the subordination of all creative processes to 
its absolute Oneness, stemming from the fundamental proposition that ‘what is 
differentiated is itself just as much only one thing’.90 Identity and difference are 
likewise posed in terms of the becoming of the totality of the Absolute and hence, 
subordinated to the hierarchy of the Same: ‘simple sameness is an abstraction and 
hence absolute difference, but this, as difference in itself, is distinguished from 
itself and is therefore selfsameness.’91 As a result, a new hitherto unsurpassed 
postulation of sameness as a totality of selfsameness is accomplished, in respect 
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of which ‘the world is indeed implicitly reconciled with the divine being’ and the 
alienated is reunited with the One in order to be ‘identical with it in its love’.92 
 In this context, an essential role is prescribed to language, by virtue of which 
solely, the pure being which would otherwise remain a non-existent potentiality, a 
non-being, an other which is not there, not this is actualized. The sacrifice of the 
whole or its self-alienation in the world of culture is thus realized by language 
functioning as the existence (Dasein) of Spirit, the real existence of the pure being 
for itself qua independent separate individuality existing for others. The entire 
process of creation becomes in its essence the nocturnal creation of language as 
another mode of coming forth of the god, in which, ‘out of his creative night’, he 
is immediately present in his universality.93 Moreover, language as the retaining 
within itself the immediacy of its individuality, yet presenting itself as universality 
is identified with the single unity of Spirit. The unity of the universal self-
consciousness of Spirit is, according to Hegel, by virtue of its pure inwardness, no 
less than the being-for-others and the being-for-self of the individuals.94 While the 
unity of language as pure thought is due to its inwardness and outer existence.95  
 The issue of language is also discussed in terms of the shaping of the 
unshaped or the forming of the formless through finite forms. Its trajectory is 
sketched starting from the first form of the god’s utterance through its 
objectification in the pure pathos of substance, developing further into the form of 
contingent existence and finally into the return to the lucidity of the univocal word 
in which ‘the universal truth [...] was revealed by the divine Light’.96 The function 
of language is likewise the revelation of reality which in Hegel is always a 
revealed reality. In respect of Kojève’s reading of the Phenomenology this is 
equal to the reality plus the revelation of the reality through discourse. The 
revelation of the reality becomes possible through the difference present in human 
discourse between the real and the discourse which reveals it. As Kojève 
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formulates it: ‘Without Man, Being would be mute: it would be there (Dasein), 
but it would not be true (das Wahre).’97 
 Another fundamental dimension of language is that of the interrelation 
between thought/utterance, in terms of which the knowledge of being is revealed 
by speech as sense certainty (sinnliche Gewissheit). By means of difference and 
negation, speech transforms Being and, by transforming it, transforms itself in the 
ascent from the elementary form of Consciousness towards Self-Consciousness. 
In this process of transformation, Being emerges into real existence from ‘the 
darkness of thought’ through the potentiality of nothingness, which precedes 
negation. It only becomes substantiated by virtue of language, through the ‘clarity 
of utterance’, from which in its realization as the pure Absolute, it further 
withdraws itself dissociating itself from its imperfect existence.98 
 Hegel prefigures the conception of a truthful language that questions the 
sense-certainty of the This (das Diese) and the Now, and in this questioning 
always already encompasses the negativity of an entity (Seiendes) proving itself to 
be simultaneously a non-entity (Nichtseiendes). He signifies language as the 
naming of the unnameable, of that which remains unnamed in every naming 
through the grasping of the negativity of the name. Language thus asserts the 
universal (Allgemeines) as the true content of sense-certainty, as ‘a simple thing 
[…] which is through negation, which is neither This nor That’.99 The significance 
of this conception is that for the first time in the history of philosophy, Hegel 
posits the negativity of nothing within the temporality of language, between the 
immediacy of sense-certainty and the universal: ‘The this is, therefore, established 
as not This, or as something superseded (aufgehoben); and hence not as Nothing, 
but as a determinate Nothing, the Nothing of a content, viz. of the This.’100  
 The return to sameness for Hegel is also the return to the primordial Word 
(das ur-sprüngliche Wort), conceived as a unity of name/thing designated through 
a unity of voice, letters, and silence. In this context, nothing is postulated in its 
potential transmutation into being, while human word — in its quest for the 
primordial Word. Giorgio Agamben inquires into the Hegelian unification of the 
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metaphysically inseparable categories of language and death: ‘death and voice 
have the same negative structure and […] are metaphysically inseparable’.101 He 
discusses the negativity in language in its difference with respect to the entity and 
links the path leading to the disclosure of being to the experiencing of the taking 
place of language not as a givenness, but as an absence, the Voice of Death. In so 
doing, he defines the Voice in Hegel as ‘a silent and unspeakable voice […] the 
supreme shifter, which permits thought to experience the taking place of language 
and to ground, with it, the dimension of being in its difference with respect to the 
entity’.102 Moreover, the significance of language as the silent and unspeakable 
Voice of Death in Hegel is viewed as constituting the model according to which 
Western culture construes the relation and passage between nature and culture, 
phusis and logos. Agamben not only defines Voice as ‘the original mythogeme of 
metaphysics’,103 but poses its discussion as the science of the removed voice 104 at 
the heart of ontology. 
 
 
 
2. 3 Reconsidering Aesthetics 
 
 
The point of departure for Hegel’s Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics 
(Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik, published posthumously) is the need to establish 
new criteria for the validation of art as opposed to those acknowledged in the period 
of digression. In so doing, Hegel transposes the issue of art from the philosophy of 
digression into that of sameness and postulates it in its relatedness to the Absolute. 
The essence of art is therefore defined by its reciprocal relation vis-à-vis the 
Absolute, according to which it comes into existence through the sacrificial loss of 
the pure being of the Absolute and belongs to the three moments in which the 
truth of the Absolute Spirit is revealed. Art is, accordingly, the sublation 
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[Aufhebung] of the materialization of the idea along with religion and philosophy. 
In this context, religion is posed as the combination of image and idea in the 
representation [Vorstellung] of the Absolute, while philosophy is viewed as 
conceptual knowledge on which truth depends. Philosophy, religion, and art are 
all postulated in their relatedness vis-à-vis the Absolute, as three modes of 
consciousness of the Idea. Upon the ground of this postulation, the function of art 
is not the representation of Idea, as Charles Taylor argues, but its mode of 
consciousness.105  
 Despite the difference in forms, art, philosophy, and religion are all placed 
in a subordinate position vis-à-vis the prime principle of the Absolute and are 
thereby conceived as similar modes of consciousness of the Spirit. Art reveals the 
Spirit intuitively as the unity of externalization and redemption, while religion or 
philosophy represent and conceive of the Absolute cognitively. What 
distinguishes this view from classical metaphysics is that art, philosophy, and 
religion are not viewed as static forms, but in their perpetual transformation into 
something other, in their transcendence toward a sphere where they are re-
transformed into Idea. Hegel analyzes them dialectically in their ascent toward the 
Absolute as the gradual unfolding of the Spirit.  
 A significant point for Hegel’s speculation on theology and aesthetics is the 
accord between the Absolute as portrayed in a given period and the stages of 
development attained by the human spirit in that same period. This accord can be 
reached by the essential combination of synchronic and diachronic approaches in 
rendering the Absolute. From this perspective art is defined as both historical in 
its origin and its function.106 Hegel applies this approach in differentiating 
between symbolic, classical, and romantic stages of art by grounding his 
differentiation on a view that links the development of art to the elimination of the 
significance of the sensuous. Hegel believes this elimination makes the human 
being creative and capable of disinterested contemplation of the world as it is in 
itself. From this perspective, the early theological ideas, such as those prevalent 
among the Egyptians, Persians, and Indians could be expressed to a certain degree 
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of adequacy only in art and not yet in philosophical thought. Art at the stage of 
these ancient oriental cultures is described as belonging to the symbolic stage of 
artistic manifestation, as pre-art [Vorkunst] in which the vague idea is manifest in 
inadequate forms. The age of Greek sculpture is the representation of the Spirit in 
its ideal sensual form and is defined as the classical stage of art in which there is 
no distinction between the manifestation of truth in religion and in art. In its final 
stage, the romantic art subsumes the works of art created under the concept of 
Christianity. To summarize: art, if viewed from this angle, plays the function of a 
manifestation of truth merely within the historical frames of one historical period, 
namely, that of the art-religion [Kunstreligion] of the Greek civilization, whereas 
starting with Christianity, the role of manifestation of truth is transposed into the 
images of the New Testament. 
 These considerations concerning the historical origin of art and its ability 
(together with philosophy and religion) to undergo transformations serve as a 
ground for Hegel to develop his problematic thesis concerning the end of art. He 
predicts that art will move beyond itself in its highest stage, at the ‘age of prose’, 
and that everything timely and consequential in art will eventually be taken up 
into philosophical knowledge. The perspectives of the gradual sublimation of art 
into religion, and religion into philosophy are delineated.107  
 In defining the essence of art, Hegel reduces the function of the artist to the 
representation of the Absolute, whereby he encounters the idea of the Absolute 
and attempts to represent it through symbols and forms of sensual expressions. 
The self-manifestation of the united totality of the Absolute by virtue of art is 
realizable through the unity of content and its appropriate mode of 
manifestation.108 It is accomplished by a juxtaposition of the particular and the 
universal, since the abstract universal needs the concreteness of art for its 
phenomenal manifestation.109 To demonstrate these assertions, Hegel claims that 
the enunciation of God, as simply the One, is merely a lifeless abstraction of the 
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irrational understanding which can provide no material for art unless apprehended 
in concrete truth (in the Division of the Subject, Chapter V). As an example, he 
presents the idea of the Christian God, conceived in his divine truth as both the 
One and the Trinity, and therefore, in Himself thoroughly concrete: ‘Here One is 
essentiality, universality, and particularity, together with their reconciled unity; 
and it is only such unity that constitutes the concrete.’110 The subsequent 
speculations of Hegel gesture toward the character of concreteness as sensuous 
concreteness, capable of representing the Spirit and belonging both to the content 
and to the representation, as the point where both may coincide and correspond to 
one another. These considerations introduce the concrete content in itself, 
involving the element of external, actual, and sensible manifestation.   
 Hegel’s dialectical method, introduced in the previous chapter of this study, 
is applied likewise to the analysis of individual works in their gradual ascent 
toward particular art-types, then toward the idea of Art and finally toward the 
Spirit. The differentiated art-types (objective and subjective; symbolic, classical 
and romantic), constituting the self-unfolding Idea of beauty escalate next towards 
Art per se which is the self-unfolding Idea of the Spirit. The central concern of 
Hegel in analyzing the artworks is to demonstrate the power of art, as the self-
unfolding Idea of Spirit, to transcend and finally dissolve into the Spirit:  
 
What the particular arts realize in individual works of art are according to their 
abstract conception simply the universal types which constitute the self-unfolding Idea of 
beauty. It is as the external realization of this Idea that the wide Pantheon of art is being 
erected, whose architect and builder is the spirit of beauty as it awakens to self-
knowledge, and to complete which the history of the world will need its evolution of 
ages.111 
 
In speculating on the conception of beauty, anchored in the idea of totality, 
Hegel who is not ready to admit that art can in fact be ugly, disregards ugliness as 
merely the flow of variations.112 The classification of particular art-types, 
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analogous to archetypes is thus made with regard to the Idea of beauty as an 
ultimate and fundamental law, a higher principle to which the derivative attributes 
should be subordinated. Here, the Idea of beauty per se substitutes for the 
conception of the beautiful anchored in the sensuous mode or the purely abstract 
attributes of space and time. Classifying between the symbolic, classical, and 
romantic art-types, Hegel, accordingly, views them as the universal stages or 
elements of the Idea of beauty. In so doing, he describes the Classical art as the 
completion of the realm of beautiful, (nothing is or can become more beautiful), 
while the Romantic art as the one where beauty is no longer the ultimate aim.  
 As we have stated before, at the heart of Hegel’s differentiation between art-
types, lies the principle of the absolute totality manifesting itself through art. 
According to it, symbolic art which starts with the particular and is therefore not 
adequate for representing the universal truth of Spirit, attains its most adequate 
reality and most complete application in architecture; classical art as a unity of 
meaning and corporeality, finds adequate realization in sculpture; while romantic 
art, as an expression of the idea of transubstantiation, takes possession of painting, 
music, and poetic representation. Romantic art is therefore the reflective 
presentation of the Absolute combined with the symbolic. Hegel concentrates in 
particular upon the romantic art type which realizes itself in painting, music, and 
poetry, by regarding them not as isolated aesthetic modes in themselves, but in 
their mutual transitions and their dissolution into the Absolute Spirit. As we can 
see, the unifying idea for these aesthetic modes, distinct in their mediums of 
representation, is the higher principle of the absolute totality which they come to 
represent and of which they form particular manifestations or simply different 
gradations. Henceforth, painting, as the first art in this escalation, is viewed in its 
development into the second art-type, namely music. As a medium for its content 
and for the plastic embodiment of the content, painting employs visibility 
specialized in its own nature, i.e. as developed into colour. The quality of 
visibility in painting — the visibility and the rendering visible — is already 
distinct from the one employed in architecture and sculpture, since it is of more 
ideal form for its being based on colour (simple light, differentiating itself by 
virtue of its contrast with darkness). According to Hegel, they [the visibility and 
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the rendering visible] ‘liberate art from the sensuous completeness in space which 
attaches to material things, by restricting themselves to a plane surface’.113  By 
contrast, music, with its still sensuous medium ‘treats the sensuous as ideal, and 
does so by negating and idealizing into the individual isolation of a single point, 
the indifferent externality of space, whose complete semblance is accepted and 
imitated by painting’.114  
 The classification of art-types clearly accounts for the fact that they are 
viewed particularly in their development toward the partial representation of the 
Absolute. The single point of transition in music — surpassing the abstract spatial 
sensuousness, such as painting, employs and approaching the abstract spirituality 
of poetry — is the temporal ideality of sound. Music is thereby positioned 
between painting and poetry, forming ‘the center of the romantic arts, just as 
sculpture represents the central point between architecture and the arts of romantic 
subjectivity’.115  
 By converting the abstract visibility of painting into the audibility of sound, 
Hegel demonstrates the feasibility of the idea of an absolute totality asserting 
itself through the becoming of the multiplicity, in which the ideal content is 
liberated from its immersion in matter. From the perspective of the fundamental 
Hegelian argument concerning the need for Spirit to overcome the sensuous in 
order to achieve its highest conceptuality, music, with its still sensuous medium is 
posed as inferior to language. As an expression of the sensuous, it is distinctly 
differentiated from verbal language, posed as the medium of truth. The higher 
form of truth, derived from Hegel’s conception of language as the self-recognition 
of Spirit in the other, is only found via the articulation of conceptual ideas, leading 
to the belief in language’s capacity to name the unnameable. This belief lies at the 
heart of Hegel’s definition of poetry as the third and most spiritual mode of 
representation of the romantic art-type, possessing the power of liberating art from 
the sensuous element. In poetry, sound, as the point of intersection or transition of 
music into poetry is no longer the feeling of the sonorous itself, but is the sign, 
void of import, the sign of the idea that is concrete in itself. Hegel develops the 
                                                           
113 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics, p. 94. 
114 Ibid, p. 94. 
115 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics, p. 95. 
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temporality of sound into language: the sensuous element with inward feeling in 
music is separated from the content of consciousness in poetry, and music 
develops into poetry.116 This content of consciousness consolidates gradually into 
the shape of ideas in poetry which treats sound solely as a symbol with no value 
or import. Thus considered, sound reduced by Hegel to a mere letter, becomes a 
mere indication of mind for the audible just as for the visible. These 
considerations allow him to conceive the proper medium of a poetical 
representation as the poetical imagination and intellectual portrayal itself. 
Moreover, they allow viewing poetry as an extended or synthetic type of art that 
extends over and runs through all art-types. The main reason for this is that 
poetry’s proper medium is the artistic imagination which is considered essential to 
every product that belongs to the beautiful and is independently developed in 
each. Quoting Hegel: ‘Poetry is the universal art of mind which has become free 
in its own nature, and which is not tied to find its realization in external sensuous 
matter, but expatiates exclusively in the inner space and inner time of the ideas 
and feelings.’117  
 Yet, even poetry as the highest phase of art is for Hegel merely a reflection 
of the absolute totality, the very point where the absolute spirit, on its way to 
complete self-knowledge transcends its artistic manifestation transforming into 
philosophical thought. We read: ‘Yet just in this its highest phase art ends by 
transcending itself, inasmuch as it abandons the medium of a harmonious 
embodiment of mind in sensuous form, and passes from the poetry of imagination 
into the prose of thought.’118 
 As we can see, Hegel’s postulation of the Absolute as a totality of becoming 
through absolute reflection is not only a way for surmounting the Kantian 
bifurcations excluding any idea of wholeness, but also the last and most complete 
representation of the identity of sameness which has been haunting philosophical 
thought since its very inception. Yet, as a general rule, a thing, reaching its highest 
point, begins to transform itself into its own Other or, to use Hegel’s own words: 
‘The highest maturity, the highest stage, which anything can attain is that in which 
                                                           
116 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics, p. 95. 
117 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics, p. 96. 
118 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics, p. 96 
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its downfall begins.’119 To apply Hegel’s own words to the philosophy of 
sameness, we can conclude that having reached its highest maturity with Hegel, 
philosophical thinking ceases postulating the identity and totality of the Same, 
and, thus, ceases postulating art as its representation. Instead, philosophy faces the 
urge of passing over into another mode of thought in conceiving of the plenitude 
of sameness. It therefore substitutes the postulation of the Other for the 
postulation of the Same, the postulation of Difference for that of Identity, thereby 
withdrawing art from the realm of representation. After Hegel, predominantly 
from Nietzsche onwards, philosophical thought becomes preoccupied with the 
postulation of pure Difference, hence the postulation of the artwork as a pure 
signifier in its absolutely singular otherness. 
   
 
 
                                                           
119 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Science of Logic, trans. by Arnold Vincent Miller (New York: 
Humanities Press, 1969), p. 611. 
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Part Four: Difference 
 
 
This part investigates the third path for the development of the issue of sameness 
viewed from the vantage point delineated in Part two when, due to the 
acknowledged limits of its philosophical postulations as pure identity, 
Continental philosophy from Kant onwards faces the dilemma of either re-
postulating sameness or suspending its postulation as the fundamental issue of 
philosophy. In Parts Two and Three we have examined the legacy of two 
controversial approaches to this dilemma: the digression from the Same (by Kant 
(Kritik der Urteilskraft and the aesthetic theories of the end of seventeenth and 
beginning of eighteenth centuries) and the return to sameness (by Hegel and 
Schelling). This third path, namely the postulation of the pure difference within 
the Same, is being developed upon the assessment of the limits of both 
approaches. Its significance lies in the reassertion of sameness among the 
fundamental issues of philosophy and the opening up of the space of freedom 
and creativity in experiencing the infinite potentiality of its otherness and 
différance (a Derridean term). The conception of difference (from the Nitzschean 
difference to the Derridean différance) here is no longer viewed as the ground 
for the circulation of the identical as totality, neither is it subordinated to the 
principle of identity. It is rather identity that is being experienced in the 
otherness of repetition. Difference has no other aim than its own repetition and 
reproduction via decentring and divergence. It can be illustrated as the Eternal 
Return under the symbol of a circle, of which ‘Difference is at the centre and the 
Same is only on the periphery: it is a constantly decentred, continually tortuous 
circle which revolves only around the unequal’.1 
 Here we will trace the metamorphoses of the issue of sameness due to the 
limits of its postulations as a transcendental signified of pure identity and totality 
and its reestablishment in respect of otherness and difference. What is at stake is 
the demonstration of the destruction of the Same and the infinite potentiality of 
                                                          
1 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. by Paul Patton (London: Continuum, 2008),  
   p. 67. 
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an already de-sedimented sameness opened up via the destabilization of its 
integrity. We will follow the contrivances of the new postulation of sameness in 
Nietzsche, Heidegger and Derrida who, despite their very individual attitudes, 
display a rigour as transgressing the coherence of representation and as 
transposing the issue of sameness into an experience by virtue of the 
heterogeneity of the singular, the originary postulation of Being or the 
overlapping of deconstructive infrastructures.  
 The conception of sameness in respect of difference conditions a different 
development of literature and literary criticism, distinguished by an impossibility 
to reduce a text to meaning, content, and theme or rather by the resistance of 
writing to such a reduction. The liberation from signification accomplished by 
the thought of difference brings about a space of creative freedom anchored in 
the immediacy of experience, the otherness of the multiple, the iterability of 
language and play. The movement of becoming in this context is not directed 
towards the return of the Same, but rather creates, destroys, and grounds 
repetition upon the death of God and the dissolution of the self. This new space 
of creative freedom is a dynamic one, opened up to the endless metamorphoses 
of the extreme after being pushed to its limits; a culture rightly described as the 
veritable theatrical world of metamorphoses.  
With regard to Gilles Deleuze’s definition, what is at stake in this space 
is the question of ‘making movement itself a work […], of substituting direct 
signs for mediate representations; of inventing vibrations, rotations, whirlings, 
gravitations, dances or leaps which directly touch the mind’.2  
We will subsequently inquire into this incredible space of difference, 
credited for the founding of the theatrum philosophicum: ‘an incredible 
equivalent of theatre within philosophy, thereby founding simultaneously this 
theatre of the future and a new philosophy.’3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 9. 
3 Ibid, p. 9 
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1. Nietzsche: The Affirmation of the Same as Non-Same 
 
 
1. 1. Surmounting the Same: God is Dead 
 
To distinguish Friedrich Nietzsche’s (1844 - 1900) position with respect to 
sameness, we need to refer back to the conceptual point delineated in Part two 
when, due to the limits of the philosophical postulations of sameness as pure 
identity, philosophy faces the dilemma of either re-postulating sameness or 
suspending its postulation as the fundamental issue of philosophy. Nietzsche’s 
philosophical position is developed in response to the legacy of two 
controversial approaches to this dilemma: the digression from sameness (either 
by Kant or aesthetic theories, examined in Part two of this thesis) and the return 
to the Same (by Hegel and Schelling, examined in Part three). Furthermore, it is 
being developed upon the assessment of the limits of both approaches: the 
impossibility of suspending sameness and reducing it to fortuitous principles of 
subjectivity; and the limits of re-postulating sameness as a pre-existing totality 
on a new speculative level.  
Due to the limits of both approaches, Nietzsche’s position will be 
regarded from the perspective of the philosophy of sameness as a third path 
which re-postulates sameness as the recurrence of the absolutely singular 
differential. As the one ‘whose duty is wakefulness itself’ (Preface to Beyond 
Good and Evil, 1886)4 in a period when the thinking of the pure identity of the 
Same has been surmounted, Nietzsche poses the philosophical conception of the 
pure conceptual difference, anchored in the recurrence of the absolute singularity 
of the differential. What we will attempt to demonstrate, is not only the 
irrefutable significance of Nietzsche’s position with regard to sameness for both 
philosophy and art, but its being the only right solution to the abovementioned 
dilemma of the Same. Anchored in the ideal balance between the plenitude of 
the Same and the uniqueness of the differential, Nietzsche’s philosophy liberates 
human thought both from the endless chain of representation and from the trap 
                                                          
4 Friedrich Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, Beyond Good and Evil, trans. by Helen Zimmern 
and Paul V. Cohn (Ware: Wordsworth Editions, 2008). 
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of subjectivity, exposing it to freedom, to the infinite resources of a new 
language of pureness, and a dazzling experience. It is in this intermediate region 
of madness and pure language, to use Michel Foucault’s definition, that we find 
Nietzsche.5 
The point of departure for Nietzsche is his contestation of metaphysics 
which serves his claim for the death of God, thereby implying the refutation of 
the domination of the unitary signified of the Same under whatever guises it may 
have appeared: as ‘Plato’s invention of Pure Spirit and the Good in Itself’; as 
Christianity or ‘Platonism for the people’; as the ‘superfluous teleological 
principles’ of Spinoza; or as the false synthetic judgements of Kant (Beyond 
Good and Evil, Preface & Chapter 1, sections 13, 11 correspondingly). 
However, more than anything else, the surmounting of metaphysics for 
Nietzsche is the disenchantment from the seductive powers of the Eleatic error 
of Being and the getting rid of God through getting rid of grammar or ‘reason in 
language’ (Twilight of the Idols, 1889, Reason in Philosophy, section 5).6 
Finally, Nietzsche objects the Hegelian idea of dialectics for its unfounded 
philosophical optimism, opposing to Hegel’s divinized reason, the unreason and 
chance in logic itself and suggesting that we should understand the evolution of 
the human being through the greatest unreason.7 All these rejected metaphysical 
concepts implying the metaphysical universal of the Same — that of Being, of 
the Absolute, of Goodness, of Truth, and of Perfection — are generalized as 
causa sui and described as attaining to ‘their stupendous concept God’ which is 
‘the last, most attenuated and emptiest thing (Twilight of the Idols, Reason in 
Philosophy, section 4). Pointing to the limits of the metaphysical postulations of 
the Same, Nietzsche defines the causa sui as the best self-contradiction that has 
so far been conceived, a sort of logical violation and unnaturalness (Beyond 
Good and Evil, Chapter 1, section 21).  
The surmounting of the metaphysical universal of the Same under the 
guise of the death of God is repeatedly expressed in various writings by 
Nietzsche. In Zarathustra it appears in the form of an impossibility to disregard 
this fact: ‘Could this be possible! This old holy man in his forest has heard 
                                                          
5 Michel Foucault, ‘Nietzsche, Freud, Marx’, in Michel Foucault, Aesthetics, Essential works of 
Foucault 1954-1984, ed. by James D. Faubion, trans. by Robert Hurley and others (London: 
Penguin Books, 2000), II, p. 278. 
6 Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols with the Antichrist and Ecce Homo, trans. by Antony 
M. Ludovici (Ware : Wordsworth Editions, 2007).  
7 Friedrich Nietzsche, Sämtliche Werke:Kritische Studienausgabe, ed. by Giorgio Colli and 
Mazzino Montinari, 15 vols (Berlin/New York, 1988), XI, p. 253.  
 149
nothing of this yet, that God is dead!’ (Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Part 1, section 
2).8 In the Gay Science it is asserted through the laughter of ‘the many [...] who did 
not believe in God’ when they encounter the madman who seeks God (The Gay 
Science, 1882, section 125),9 while in the Twilight of the Idols it takes the form of a 
denial of God, and hence the denial of the responsibility of God for the sake of 
saving the world (Twilight of the Idols, The Four Great Errors section 8).  
The significance of Nietzsche’s postulation of sameness or, as Derrida 
argues, his exceeding of metaphysics and Platonism is rightly described by 
Heidegger as the transformation of the very value of hierarchy itself or as the 
transformation of the hierarchical structure itself.10 
 
 
1. 2. Dispelling the Chimeras of Truth 
 
Nietzsche’s refutation of the metaphysical universal of the Same in all its 
contrivances points to the erroneousness of any postulation of ‘unity, identity, 
permanence, substance, cause, materiality and being’ (Twilight of the Idols, 
Reason in Philosophy, section 5). It implies also the impugning of the traditional 
concept of truth, as the revealing of the concealed, its illumination or unveiling 
and hence the recognition of untruth as a condition of life (Beyond Good and 
Evil, Chapter 1, section 4). As a result, the metaphysical concept of truth is cast, 
to use Jacques Derrida’s definition, ‘into its bottomless abyss as non-truth, 
veiling and dissimulation’.11 
In Derrida’s reading of Nietzsche, the self-presentation of truth in the 
idea is traced through the process of the becoming female of the idea:12 from the 
Platonic eidé, implying the identification of truth with the philosopher to the 
severing of the philosopher from truth as a result of his exile, or the exile of the 
idea. The philosopher is transformed then into the follower of the trace of truth 
which has become transcendental, inaccessible and seductive. Yet, in 
Nietzsche’s texts ‘there is no such thing as a woman, as a truth in itself of 
                                                          
8 Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, trans. by Graham Parkes, Oxford World’s 
Classics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).  
9 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. by Walter Kaufman (New York: Vintage Books, 
1974). 
10 Jacques Derrida, Spurs: Nietzsche’s Syles, trans. by Barbara Harlow (Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press, 1979) p. 81. 
11 Jacques Derrida, Spurs: Nietzsche’s Syles,  p. 119 
12 Ibid, pp. 87 – 89. 
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woman in itself’, but only multiple, variegated, contradictory ‘not-truths’, a 
surfeit of truth in the plural.13 The refutation of truth leads to the suspension of 
the decidable oppositions of true/untrue, veiled/unveiled, whereby reading is 
freed from the hermeneutic horizon of the meaning or truth of being, and the 
spurring operation becomes more powerful than any content, thesis or 
meaning.14 
The surmounting of truth amounts to the overcoming of the primordial 
truth of the Same, anchored in the revelation of always but the identical via 
multiplicity. It is the challenge of the pursuit of origin [Ursprung] as an attempt 
to capture the exact essence of things and their genuine identities, daring the 
metaphysical assumption of the existence of intelligible forms that precede the 
external world of accident.  
Foucault traces this challenge in Nietzsche’s replacement of the word 
Ursprung, as the search for the truth of the identical, by Enstehung und 
Herkunft, designating emergence, the moment of arising in recording the true 
object of genealogy, seeking to re-establish the ‘hazardous play of 
dominations’.15 Rather than the value of truth Nietzsche suggests that the 
genealogist should instead listen to history to dispel the chimeras of origin, to 
find that the very secret of things lies in their having no essence, or, to use 
Foucault’s words, ‘their essence was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from 
alien forms’ and should examine the history of reason to learn that it was born 
from chance.16  The challenge of the metaphysical concept of truth that 
necessitates the removal of every mask for the sake of the ultimate disclosure of 
the original identity is hereby replaced by the discovery of non-truth at the 
exteriority of accidents, the emergence of masks of the other, the 
fragmenting/fragmentation of the unified whole and the demonstration of its 
heterogeneity. 
The dispelling of the domination of the metaphysical concept of truth is 
significant for the re-postulation of sameness by means of making the difference 
and discontinuities of the multiple visible. The re-postulation then becomes the 
task of the genealogist who inquires into history to reveal the very heterogeneity 
of the multiple rather than the ontology of the identity of the Same as the 
                                                          
13 Jacques Derrida, Spurs: Nietzsche’s Syles, p. 103. 
14 Ibid, p. 107. 
15 Michel Foucault, ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’, in Michel Foucault, Aesthetics, Method, 
and Epistemology, II, pp. 369 – 389; these references p. 373 & p. 376.  
16 Michel Foucault, ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’, II, p. 371. 
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synthesis of multiplicity. This task of re-postulation is realized in Nietzsche by 
dissipating and segmenting the preconceived identity of the Same which is no 
more represented by the successive configurations of multiples amounting to the 
identical meaning of always but the Same, but rather the disclosure of the 
differences and dispersions of the singular randomness of the multiples 
themselves.        
The recognition of untruth as a condition of life, with the concomitant 
removal of the opposition in the visible/intelligible and the illusion of the moral 
judgement beneath them (Twilight of the Idols, The ‘Improvers’ of Mankind, 
section 1) is Nietzsche’s demand upon philosophers who, venturing to do so, 
place themselves beyond good and evil (Beyond Good and Evil, Chapter 1, 
section 4). Upon the ground of this recognition, a new order of philosophers is 
appearing, designated by Nietzsche as ‘tempters’ (Beyond Good and Evil, 
Chapter 2, section 42), and a new philosophy of theatre, the theatrum 
philosophicum,17 is substituting for the philosophies of identity and digression. 
The theatrum philosophicum, as the theatre of mime with multiple, fugitive and 
instantaneous scenes, is the inquiry into the non-place of truth, hence the 
decentred and asymmetrical place of the interplay of the chance, difference, and 
heterogeneity of the multiple rooted in the intensity of inner experience and the 
infinite repetition in language. 
 
 
1. 3. The Space of Freedom   
 
Nietzsche designates the space liberated from the domination of the 
metaphysical universal of the Same, be it in the guise of God or truth, as a 
decentred, asymmetrical space of interplay of heterogeneity, difference, abyss, 
and hiatus. It is, however, not a dispelling of the Same, as even the most extreme 
statement ‘God is dead’, implies the presumed knowledge of God’s being or, to 
use Maurice Blanchot’s words, that God is complicit with his sacrificial act and 
that it is accomplished by his consent.18 It is instead the attainment of the Same 
as non-Same by revealing the very mediation that prevails in the identity of the 
                                                          
17 Michel Foucault, ‘Theatrum Philosophicum’, in Michel Foucault, Aesthetics, Method, and 
Epistemology, II, pp. 343 – 368. 
18 Maurice Blanchot, ‘On Nietzsche’s Side’, in The Work of Fire, trans. by Charlotte Mandell 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), pp. 292 – 293. 
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Same rather than the absolute identity of the Same above any differentiation. In 
virtue of this act, Nietzsche liberates the Same from the obsession of 
transcendence, the monotony of being represented as an irrefutable metaphysical 
concept of identity by opening up infinite perspectives for the possibility of 
discovering it anew for innumerable times in the endless diversity of the 
singular, its absolute uniqueness, and, hence its difference from others. 
Furthermore, it opens perspectives for a new conception of sameness outside 
representation in the absolute adequacy of the Same and the singular. 
This act of Nietzsche’s should thus be regarded as a positive act of 
liberation, of the freedom to revolt against the givenness of the Same and of the 
affirmation of the positivity of the Same as non-Same, as the Other. The 
affirmation of non-Same is the affirmation of God as non-God, his double, 
Death of God as Dionysus and the Crucified One.19 Blanchot describes this very 
negation of God in Nietzsche as affirmation, and asserts that the negation of God 
is linked to the restless negativity of man, his power to deny God endlessly, his 
passionate questioning, limitless dissatisfaction and will to sacrifice.20 This is a 
negation for the sake of affirmation of freedom: affirming man as infinite power 
of negation in his ability to be always equal to what surpasses him, what is other 
than he is, what is different from himself. It is the affirmation of freedom upon 
the ground of pure nothing contrary to the nothingness of God conceived as the 
rejection of the absolute: ‘The infinite collapse of God allows freedom to 
become aware of the nothing that is its foundation, without making an absolute 
of this nothing.’21 
Nietzsche’s approach to sameness appears to be the only way to return to 
the Same, to resurrect the Same by means of a departure from the Same and in 
the death of the Same. Subjecting the Same to danger, risking and gambling it, 
Nietzsche awakens man by offering him the rigour of creating and destroying an 
infinite number of ever different combinations in order finally to confess with 
Foucault, that: 
 
To awaken us from the confused sleep of dialectics and of anthropology, we 
required the Nietzschean figures of tragedy, of Dionysus, of the death of God, 
                                                          
19 Maurice Blanchot, ‘On Nietzsche’s Side’, p. 297. 
20 Ibid, p. 294. 
21 Michel Foucault, ‘Nietsche, Genealogy, History’, p. 296. 
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of the philosopher’s hammer, of the Superman approaching with the steps of a 
dove, of the Return.22 
 
Now the space opened up by the death of God is to be filled with the Overhuman 
which is the overcoming of the human (Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Fourth and Last 
Part, section 13,2 & 13,3). This overcoming becomes possible by overcoming 
the transcendence ‘behind the stars’, going under and sacrificing the human to 
the earth (Thus Spoke Zarathustra, First Part, section 4). It becomes possible 
through overcoming anthropology by viewing the human as a bridge going over 
and going under toward the Overman who is the lightning and the madness 
(Thus Spoke Zarathustra, First Part, sections 3, 4). 
This overcoming of the transcendence of the Same is realized through 
what Georges Bataille describes as the inner experience or the ecstatic 
experience of the meaning of nonmeaning which again becomes the nonmeaning 
of meaning with no possible outcome.23 It is overcome by laughter which, in 
Bataille’s explication, is the laughing at oneself (at the tasks one undertook in 
the manner of Zarathustra) due to the intoxication with nothingness, experienced 
as the free and empty foundation of the world’s nonmeaning.24 To annihilate the 
heaviness of the world and the ‘inhuman term’ of the absolute, one thus needs a 
sudden impulse and an irrepressible need.25  
The space of Nietzschean freedom is to be filled therefore with 
intoxicated and impulsive individuals chosen by chance to surpass the unified 
universe and relate the love for the identity and transcendence of the Same to an 
earthly love, echoing to infinity.26 Here, the Other is posited as the Same, the 
Overman beyond the human-all-too-human, and ‘playing and dancing’ are 
opposed to ‘betting and leaping’.27 In this space of freedom, chance stands 
higher than necessity; the fragment, higher than the whole, the time of Aeon 
higher than Chronos, and the Return is not the return of the perfect circle, but the 
Recurrence of difference.28 
 
                                                          
22 Michel Foucault, ‘A Preface to Transgression’, in Michel Foucault, Aesthetics, Method, and 
Epistemology, II, p. 76.  
23 Georges Bataille, On Nietzsche, trans. by Bruce Boone (London: Continuum, 2008), p. 135. 
24 Georges Bataille, On Nietzsche, pp. 55 – 61 & 84. 
25 Ibid, pp. 61 & 69. 
26 Ibid, pp. 70 & 72. 
27 Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. by Hugh Tomlinson (London: Continuum, 
2006), p. 34.   
28 Michel Foucault, ‘Theatrum Philosophicum’, II, pp. 364 – 365. 
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1.4 Eternal Ring of Recurrence 
 
Oh how should I not lust after Eternity and after the nuptial ring of all rings – 
the ring of recurrence! (Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Third Part, section 16) 
 
The metamorphoses marking the beginning of a period of absence, hiatus and 
distancing in philosophy, conditioned by the death of God as the guarantor of the 
identity of the self, can be traced through the substitution of the Circulus vitiosus 
deus for the image of the perfect circle prevailing in Western thought throughout 
the long period of identity. In Nietzsche, the Eternal Recurrence29 refers not to 
the return of the Same through the multiple expressed in the form of a well-
centered circle but to the recurrence, freed from the curvature of the circle.30 It 
relates not to the hierarchical world of the well-centered Same, but to ‘a world of 
differences implicated one in the other, to a complicated, properly chaotic world 
without identity”.31 
Nietzsche sees the means of enduring the thought of the Eternal 
Recurrence in the transvaluation of all values: pleasure is no longer to be found 
in certainty, but in uncertainty, it is no longer the will to self-preservation, but 
rather to power (The Will to Power, 1059).32 
Nietzsche’s thought of the Eternal Recurrence is itself the result of an 
ecstatic experience of a sudden unveiling in the midst of a ‘Stimmung, a certain 
tonality of the soul’.33 Emerging as a lived experience, the Eternal Recurrence is 
no longer the representation of the Same, unable to manifest itself, but a 
combination of anamnesis and forgetting. The function of forgetting in this 
revelation is the indispensable condition for the actualization of all possible 
identities of the subject through the forgetting of its present identity. The 
fulcrum is transposed from the revelation of the Same through the consciousness 
of an identical self into that of innumerable selves as a result of the loss of the 
identity of this particular self. The self thus liberates itself from a prior identity 
with the Same and emerges as the representation of itself as such, susceptible to 
                                                          
29 See: Rüdiger Görner, ‘From Liederkreis to the Eternal Recurrence of the Same’, in 
KulturPoetik (Journal for Cultural Poetics, Bd. 7,2, 2007), pp. 159 -163 for a detailed account of 
Nietzsche’s conception of the Eternal Recurrence in relation to Wagner.  
30 Michel Foucault, ‘Theatrum Philosophicum’, II, p. 366. 
31 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 69. 
32 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. by Anthony M. Ludovici (Obscure Press, 2008), 
all further reference from this edition. 
33 Pierre Klossowski, Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle, trans. by Daniel W. Smith (London: 
Athlone, 1997), p. 56. 
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becoming all possible selves. The circular movement of the Recurrence is 
merged with the unconscious of the self who, having experienced all its possible 
selves re-wills itself, as Pierre Klossowski explicates, ‘as a fortuitous moment 
whose very fortuity implies the necessity of the integral return of the whole 
series’.34  
The theory of recurrence is developed through the renunciation of the 
possibility for the self’s being a fortuitous moment once and for all and the 
assertion of its being ‘nothing except this capacity to receive this revelation at all 
the other moments of the circular movement: nowhere in particular […], but 
always in the movement as a whole’.35 It is presented as the manifestation of the 
recurrence of the heterogeneity of the multiple with respect to the homogeneity 
of the whole.  
The designation of the Eternal recurrence as a lived experience through a 
Stimmung, namely through a fluctuation of intensity is Nietzsche’s solution to 
the problem of signification in which the latter is nothing but intensity. The 
fluctuations of intensity are merely designations and do not imply any 
signification ‘other than that of being an intensity’.36 From this perspective, 
Klossowski assigns the sign of the Circulus vitiosus deus to the movement of 
flux and reflux of the intensity of Nietzsche’s Stimmungen, a sign marking not 
only the trace of a fluctuation but also the absence of intensity. Signification thus 
existing only through affluxes ‘can never absolutely disengage itself from the 
moving chasms it masks’, remaining ‘a function of Chaos, out of which meaning 
is generated’.37 
The earth is then described as a Gods’ table which trembles with creative 
new-words and Gods’ dice-throws in the play of dice with Gods, so that the 
earth quaked and broke open and pushed up floods of fire (Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra, Third Part, section 16,3). The recurrence of the fortuitous moment 
in its relation to all given moments is demonstrated in virtue of the single dice-
throw in its relation to all the possible dice-throws and their opposition to the 
whole: ‘Each roll of the dice is isolated from every other one. Nothing brings 
them together as a whole. The whole is necessity. The dice are free’.38  
                                                          
34 Pierre Klossowski, Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle, p. 58. 
35 Pierre Klossowski, Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle, pp. 59-60. 
36 Pierre Klossowski, Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle, p. 61. 
37 Pierre Klossowski, Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle, p. 62. 
38 Georges Bataille, On Nietzsche, p. 129. 
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The Eternal Recurrence is identified as a synthesis of forces with ‘the 
reproduction of diversity at the heart of synthesis’, anchored in ‘the differential 
and genetic element of forces which directly confront one another’.39 It is the 
affirmation of multiple forms reproducing themselves as such, all of which are 
possible without a single one being assigned.  It is the actualization of one point 
at the expanse of multiple others remaining as passive possibilities. This single 
point is identified by Deleuze as a ‘single dicethrow’ which, coming to 
reproduce itself as such, is opposed to ‘several dicethrows, which, because of 
their number, finally reproduce the same combination.40 
 
 
1.5 The Eternal Lust of Becoming in Art 
 
The postulation of the Same as non-Same in all its contrivances brings about a 
radical transformation in the understanding of the Same from a transcendental 
signified into a correlation of differences, from a supreme total consciousness 
(God, the One, Spirit, etc.) into its reduction to the tension of the incoherent 
moments in the unconscious.  The decentring of philosophy from the paradigm 
of the identity of the Same, hence the liberation from the domination of truth, 
opens up an unprecedented space of freedom and intense experience that not 
only greatly influences the major transformations in the philosophy of art, but 
also conditions the transposition of the issue of sameness from philosophy into 
art, and even, into the domain of pure language. Furthermore, it enables us to 
grasp, together with Nietzsche, the universe as ‘a dance of the gods: the universe 
being nothing but a perpetual flight from itself, and a perpetual re-finding of 
itself in multiple gods ’.41 
The world itself is regarded by Nietzsche as ‘self-generating work of art’ 
(The Will to Power, 796). This transition is well traced by Klossowski who defines 
it as a matter of generating the conditions of a new freedom, a creative freedom of 
‘retranslating the conscious semiotic into the semiotic of impulses’.42 It inevitably 
brings about a transformation in the function of art, shifting from that of the 
representation of the identity and totality of the Same into the manifestation of itself, 
                                                          
39 Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 48. 
40 Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 24. 
41 Pierre Klossowski, Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle, p. 65. 
42 Ibid, p. 50. 
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described as ‘the stimulant of the will to power, something that excites willing’, 
‘magnifies the world as error, […] sanctifies the lie’.43  
Art is no longer anchored in the representation of a higher totality but in 
play, uselessness and ‘the childishness of God’ (The Will to Power, 797). 
Creation then transmits into the breaking of the gregariousness of the mediocrity 
or an act of violence directed against the totality of the Same; from now on, ‘to 
create is to do violence to what exists, and thus to the integrity of beings’.44 
The tendency of the radicalization of art persists in The Birth of Tragedy 
(1872) which regards art as the precondition for a highly cultural society, a 
means to remedy the affliction of modern society and ‘the highest task and true 
metaphysical activity of this life’.45 Furthermore, moral and ontological 
dimensions are reduced to aesthetics which is radicalized as the sole justification 
of existence empowered to discharge the absurdity of existence: ‘only as an 
aesthetic phenomenon is existence and the world eternally justified’.46 The 
paradigm for a highly cultured society is the artistic culture of archaic Greece in 
the period from Homer to the middle of the fifth century, the return to which is 
thought in the form of repetition. Klossowski explicates the return to the Attic 
tragedy in the form of the Circulus vitiosus deus which takes on ‘a divine 
physiognomy under the aspect of Dionysus ’.47  
The Birth of Tragedy should not be read as a reflection on Ancient 
culture, but more as the foundation of a Deleuzian theatre within philosophy, a 
theatre of the future and a new philosophy. What matters for Nietzsche in this 
theatrum philosophicum, is the illustration of the form of the absolute difference 
in the eternal recurrence by filling of the ‘inner emptiness of the mask within a 
theatrical space: by multiplying the superimposed masks and inscribing the 
omnipresence of Dionysus in that superimposition’.48 
The dispersion of the totality of sameness makes possible its presentation 
as the becoming of the multiple and affirmation of diversities in art which 
becomes the release of the Same or that through which the becoming of its unity 
emerges as the tension of semblance and difference, dream and intoxication. 
From the The Birth of Tragedy through to The Will to Power, Nietzsche remains 
                                                          
43 Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, pp. 95-96. 
44 Pierre Klossowski, Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle, p. 129. 
45 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings, ed. by Raymond Geuss and 
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46 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings, p. 33. 
47 Pierre Klossowski, Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle, p. 66. 
48 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 11. 
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concerned with these principal conditions in which art manifests itself as a 
constraint to visionary states (the Apollonian) or an orgiastic impulse (the 
Dionysiac) and the tension or enormous opposition between them. He 
establishes the synthesis of these contrasting forces as the Eternal Recurrence, 
thereby posing the reproduction of diversity at the heart of synthesis.49 The 
highest form of art thus emerges as the synthesis of the confrontation of the 
Apolline image-world of dream that embodies the drive toward distinction and 
individuality, moderation and self-control, the making of boundaries and limits 
as ‘the magnificent divine image (Götterbild) of the principum individuationis, 
whose gesture and gaze speak to us of all the intense pleasure, wisdom and 
beauty of semblance’ and the Dionysiac world of intoxication, as the drive 
towards the excess, transgression of limits, the dissolution of boundaries, the 
destruction of individuality and the ‘breakdown of the principum individuationis 
’50 by imparting a mystical sense of oneness.  
Nietzsche praises equally the Apolline and Dionysiac drives as those of 
semblance and ecstatic vision, through which the veil of maya is destroyed, and 
the primordial One shines forth. The Eternal Recurrence should, accordingly, be 
understood not as a return to the identity of the Same through the alliance of 
Dionysus and Apollo, but as the return of Dionysus and Apollo as diversities.  
The Attic tragedy, with its fragile synthesis of the Apolline and 
Dionysian, is endangered by Socratic rationalism (‘In order to be beautiful 
everything must be reasonable’51) with its abstract theoretical generalizations 
and by morality which, for Deleuze, constitutes the first, Euripidean death of 
tragedy along with its second death at the hands of Christianity and the third 
death under the combined blows of the modern dialectic and Wagner himself.52 
The restlessly advancing spirit of science destroys myth and poetry as the spirit 
of art par excellence and, in Nietzsche’s description, drives poetry from its 
natural, ideal soil, so that it becomes homeless from that point onwards.53  
                                                          
49 See: Paul de Man, ‘Rhetoric of Tropes’, in Allegories of Reading: Figural Language in 
Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke, and Proust (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1979), 
pp. 119 – 131 for a different view about the contradiction inherent in the authoritative claims and 
the statements provided by the text, arguing that the Dionysian vocabulary is used only to make 
the Apollonian mode that destructs it more intelligible.  
50 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings, p. 17. 
51 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings, p. 62. 
52 Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 10. 
53 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings, p. 82. 
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Nietzsche’s point here is the impossibility of creating a cultured society 
based entirely upon non-Dionysiac foundations, i.e. upon mere cognition, 
positivism, and optimistic knowledge, in which ‘the lovely madness of artistic 
enthusiasm never glowed’ and which ‘was debarred from ever looking with 
pleasure into the abysses of the Dionysiac’.54 
Readdressing the issues of the Birth of Tragedy in the Twilight of the 
Idols, Nietzsche reasserts the eternal lust of Becoming which also involves the 
lust of destruction found in Dionysus as the manifestation of excessive energy 
(Twilight of the Idols, Things I Owe to the Ancients, 4 & 5). The idea concerning 
the experience of the primal pain by the Dionysiac artist who is described as the 
echo of this pain,55 remains persistent in the later texts by Nietzsche. The 
Dionysiac state is thus primarily the eternal recurrence of life and the triumphant 
Yea to life despite death and change through eternal pain which acts as a 
stimulus within the scope of the psychology of orgiasm, conceived as the feeling 
of a superabundance of vitality and strength (Twilight of the Idols, Things I Owe 
to the Ancients, 4 & 5). These views condition the shift from the Classical 
understanding of the artist as the divinely possessed prophet into the final 
requirement which claims that ‘Artists should not see things as they are, they 
should see them fuller, simpler, stronger’ (The Will to Power, 800). 
 
 
1. 6. The Pure Language of Becoming 
 
‘Nietzsche says that we have no language to express what is in becoming’.56  
  
The re-postulation of art in respect of the eternal lust of Becoming conditions the 
formation and development of the conception of the pure language of becoming 
outside the realm of representation (examined in Part One and Three) and 
subjective assessments (examined in Part Two), a rigorous language which will 
neither ‘reveal the secret of man’s natural being, nor will it express the serenity 
of anthropological truths, but rather it will say that he exists without God’.57 The 
conception of pure language is thus contemporaneous to the dispelling of the 
                                                          
54 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings, pp. 67-68. 
55 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings, p. 30. 
56 Pierre Klossowski, Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle, p. 49. 
57 Michel Foucault, Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology, II, p. 70. 
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transcendental signified of the Same: ‘the death of God profoundly influenced 
our language.’58 As a result of the acknowledgement of the death of God, the 
function of language shifts from the signification of the transcendental signified 
of the Same into that of pure repetition. Sameness becomes transposed into the 
repetition of the absolutely singular differential at the threshold of language 
which endlessly mirrors nothing but itself in virtue of the mask, the double, the 
simulacrum. Instead of representing the totality of the Same, language questions 
its limit through replacing the act of representation by that of transgression and 
the act of the Return by that of the Eternal Recurrence of the different. Arriving 
at its limits, language eventually becomes transformed into a poetic language par 
excellence, whereupon sameness becomes transposed to the threshold of 
language.  
From his early works on, Nietzsche forges a philosophy grounded upon 
the diffusion of the concept of the Same (as das Ur-Eine) into the non-Same or 
into a negativity or nothingness he ventures to name. The quest for naming the 
non-Same conditions the need for a different language of becoming, which 
would substitute for the dialectical discourse of philosophy. This would be the 
pure language transgressing the function of successive fixation of systematic 
thought towards a discontinuity analogous to the unconscious state of mind. It is 
the lack of this pure language of becoming that the late Nietzsche stresses while 
criticizing certain aspects of the Birth of Tragedy in the new introduction to the 
second edition (An Attempt at Self - Criticism, in 1886). The late Nietzsche does 
not repudiate the central stand of his work which he himself calls a work of 
Romantic mythology (it develops the early Romantic approach towards myth: 
the same idea of the identification of Dionysus, the Greek wine-god with Christ 
was earlier taken up by Hölderlin, Novalis, and Schlegel),59 but the form in 
which it is expressed. Criticizing his own language, Nietzsche feels the 
incompatibility between the novel postulation of the conception of the Same as 
Non-Same and the classical philosophical discourse through which it is 
postulated. He feels deeply the lack of a different language, that of becoming, 
asserting itself as the affirmation of negativity, the void of the absented God or 
the trace He has left behind. This lack is expressed in the regret Nietzsche feels 
about the time of writing The Birth of Tragedy, a time during which he did not 
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yet have the courage or immodesty to permit himself a language of his very own, 
instead of the new evaluations in Schopenhauerian and Kantian formulations. 
The urge for a pure poetic language is expressed in his confession that he ought 
to have expressed himself by singing rather than philosophizing: ‘It ought to 
have sung, this new soul, and not talked! What a pity it is that I did not dare to 
say what I had to say at that time as a poet; perhaps I could have done it!’!60  
The quest for a different language accompanies Nietzsche throughout 
different stages of his life. In The Genealogy of Morals it appears as a quest for 
the language of active philology transgressing the function of sealing things with 
names. Nietzsche stresses the need for conceiving the origin of language looking 
to discover who it is that speaks and names: ‘Who uses a particular word, what 
does he apply it to first of all; himself, someone else who listens, […] and with 
what intention? What does he will by uttering a particular word?’ (Genealogy of 
Morals, I 4, 5, 10, 11).61 Throughout most of his writings language is postulated 
as a language of freedom contingent with that of psychology, the signs of which 
are dependent upon the excitation of the unconscious through the re-excitation of 
the ‘already-existing signifying traces […] by a more or less variable afflux’.62 
All these various functions of language are, however, cohered under a common 
quest for a pure language of becoming that transgresses the realm of 
representation toward the free manifestation of itself as repetition. 
Jürgen Habermas’s The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity is relevant 
in validating Nietzsche’s philosophy with regard to its great impact upon 
modernity and for tracing its subsequent development in two directions:  
 
The skeptic scholar who wants to unmask the perversion of the will to 
power, the revolt of reactionary forces, and the emergence of a subject-
centered reason by using anthropological, psychological, and historical 
methods has successors in Bataille, Lacan, and Foucault; the initiate-critic 
of metaphysics who pretends to a unique kind of knowledge and pursues 
the rise of the philosophy of the subject back to its pre-Socratic beginnings 
has successors in Heidegger and Derrida.63 
 
                                                          
60 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings, p. 10 and p. 6. 
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While the critical texts by Bataille and Foucault have been traced throughout this 
study in respect of their assessment of various issues related to the conception of 
sameness, the philosophies of Heidegger and Derrida will be subject to a more 
thorough scrutiny in respect of their unique postulations of the conception of 
pure difference, to which this part is dedicated. 
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2. Heidegger: The emerging-abiding sway of Being as 
Alētheia 
 
2. 1. Sameness manifested as Being in its relatedness to Dasein 
 
 
Martin Heidegger’s (1889 - 1976) philosophy is significant within the scope of 
this study primarily because of his raising anew the issue of sameness as Being 
in its originary (ur-sprüngliche, in the Heideggerian sense of primordial) 
plenitude in the unique belonging-together of the primal Same and the absolutely 
singular event through a conceptualization of difference and Nothing. The issue 
is to demonstrate that Heidegger’s capturing of the enigma of the unspoken in 
sameness in view of a conceiving of Nothing in poetic language is the most 
adequate postulation of sameness. Not only does this approach reassert sameness 
as the fundamental issue of philosophy, but it also grants poetic language the 
exclusive power of grasping sameness, thereby establishing poetry as the 
discipline par excellence. The absolutely unique repetition of the poem is placed 
on the verge of naming and impossibility to name. Its unsurpassed gesture of 
unconcealing the plenitude of Being as an unmediated gift of a letting-be of 
presence as aletheia makes it the most originary manifestation of sameness.          
Heidegger’s concern with sameness can be traced from Being and Time 
(Sein und Zeit, 1927) where it is delineated in terms of the question of Being 
(Das Sein) as that of an event, in which all beings are understandable as such 
and the issue of Dasein as the being for whom Being is at issue. This 
reformulation of sameness brings forth the possibility of analyzing the 
relationship between its universality and absolute singularity. The issue of 
sameness manifested in terms of the general question of Being is thus examined 
in its relatedness to the absolute singularity of Dasein or the very own existence 
of the being who has an understanding of the issue of Being and is capable of 
raising it. 
What becomes clear just from the Introduction to Being and Time, is 
Heidegger’s quest for the primordial plenitude of Being which has been haunting 
human thought since its very inception. For this reason, not only does Heidegger 
raise anew the question of the meaning of Being as the fundamental issue of 
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philosophy, but embraces and intensifies the positive value which persists in the 
long philosophical tradition from the Presocratics to Nietzsche and Husserl. 
Heidegger acknowledges the need for reawakening an understanding for the 
meaning of this question which provided a ‘stimulus for researchers of Plato and 
Aristotle […] as a theme for actual investigation’.64 He has all respect for their 
utmost intellectual efforts, fragmentary and incipient though they were, aiming 
to liberate the question of Being from the subsequent trivialization it underwent. 
Yet, he likewise points to the limits of its metaphysical postulations and the 
blindness of all ontology which has not previously clarified the meaning of 
Being and grasped it as its fundamental task.   
The point of departure for the re-postulation of the question of Being is, 
as Heidegger argues, its liberation from the dogmas rooted in the 
presuppositions of ancient ontology. These misleading presuppositions concern 
the stating of Being as the most universal concept which needs no further 
clarification, the indefinability of Being due to limitations in ancient ontology or 
traditional logic and the fact that Being is a self-evident concept. Heidegger 
argues that these very presuppositions condition the need for an adequate 
reformulation of the question of Being (demanding that we look this question in 
the face) which still remains veiled in darkness.65  
Heidegger first attempts to liberate the question of Being from the 
classical metaphysical interpretation of conceiving the Being of beings as itself a 
being by suggesting that we should avoid determining beings as beings by 
tracing them back in their origins to another being. To reformulate the issue of 
sameness through raising anew the question of Being, it is thus essential to avoid 
reducing it to the ontological universal of the Same, i.e. to Being, posed as the 
origin from which all beings emerge, but rather to conceptualize it in respect of 
Dasein, i.e., the being, perspicuous in his Being. In Heidegger, this 
reformulation avoids the metaphysical circle rooted in the concept of the 
preconceived universal of some metaphysical Being and its deduction, in order 
to lay bare and exhibit its very ground in virtue of its relatedness to Dasein.  
Sameness as a questioning of Being is thus grounded upon the 
destructuring of the history of ontology (a destructuring, which does not wish to 
bury the past in nullity, but has a positive intent) and transposed into the 
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65 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, pp. 22 – 24. 
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interpretation of Dasein in its factual rootedness in the world which is reflected 
back upon the interpretation of Dasein. The essential structures which are 
demonstrated in everydayness, but remain determinative in every mode of being 
of factual Dasein become indispensable for re-postulating the problem of Being. 
These structures are grounded in an interpretation of time, posed as the horizon 
for the understanding of Being in terms of the temporality [Zeitlichkeit] of 
Dasein. The temporality of Dasein is the condition of the possibility of 
historicity:66 it pursues possibilities for the future, bears the weight of its past 
and acts in the present (hence the three constituents of Dasein: existentiality, 
facticity and thrownness).  
The issue of sameness as the underlying differentiated unity of Being is 
hereby posed in its relatedness to the Being of Dasein. Moreover, it is through 
the temporality of Dasein as Being-in-the-world that the primordial constitution 
of the question of Being is to be understood.67 The temporality of Dasein is also 
its extreme possibility for Death, described as the impossibility to be there any 
longer. It is one of the fundamental dimensions, in which the question of Being 
is brought to its very limits and disclosed in its primordial plenitude. 
Heidegger discloses the universality of the question of Being in the 
singular experience of Death, or as Stephen Mulhall formulates it: ‘by 
actualizing its potential for Being-a-whole, Dasein would enact an authentic 
mode of Being-towards death.’68 Dasein can authentically confront the question 
of Being solely in virtue of grasping the full depth of its finitude. Or, to 
formulate otherwise, the plenitude of Being can solely be grasped through the 
loss of this plenitude by the no-longer-Being-there of Dasein. In its very 
thrownness into life,69 Dasein is thrown into the finitude of its Being-there, 
hence into confronting the universal question of Being from the intensity of its 
own finitude. Death is then Dasein’s ownmost possibility for conceiving the 
question of Being; a possibility which is non-relational and which is not to be 
outstripped.70 In sum, the core of Dasein’s possibility for Death lies in the 
possibility of grasping the general question of Being from the ownmost moment 
of one’s finitude.  
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67 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 488.  
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The existentiality of Dasein in Heidegger is inextricably linked to the 
question of Being, hence, what is constitutive for the human being is the 
interpretation of the immediacy of experience through cognition. As Paul de 
Man puts it, the word ‘existential’ in Heidegger means philosophically conscious 
knowledge as opposed to immediate, intuitive, experienced knowledge; it means 
that ‘we are human to the extent that we are able to understand our own 
subjectivity by transforming it into language ’.71 
The disclosing of Dasein is thus possible through its capability of 
interpreting itself through language and of keeping silent: ‘To be able to keep 
silent, Dasein […] must have at its disposal an authentic and rich disclosedness 
of itself.’72 Heidegger’s distinction between the language of Being and the 
discourse, which has lost its primary relationship-of-Being in a way that allowed 
it be appropriated in a primordial manner conditions his subsequent turn to 
poetry as the authentic language of Being. 
The raising of the question of Being is thereby linked to the issue of 
language in its primary relationship-to-Being which is both one of concealment 
and unconcealment. The Word is posed in its difference from words as ‘the 
enunciation of the Word in words’.73 However, this is an impossible enunciation 
of the Word conceived as ‘the soundless Voice of Being,’74 through which man 
experiences Being as difference and nothingness. According to Giorgio 
Agamben, the notion of the Voice in Heidegger is ‘the originary negative 
articulation’, whereby the experience of the taking place of language lies in the 
removal of the voice through the ‘nullifying power […] inherent in […] da ’, 
(Da-sein, as the Being-the-there). 75  
It is thus possible to raise the question of Being only through 
phenomenology, rooted in the self-showing of the phenomenon or the Being of 
beings. The question of Being becomes the object of inquiry of phenomenology 
as the method which expresses the maxim ‘To the things themselves’.76 
Heidegger understands phenomenology in respect of the two semantic elements 
of phenomenon and logos. The basic meaning of logos is discourse as the 
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making manifest of what one is talking about in one’s discourse,77 while the 
term phenomenon signifies that which shows itself in itself, the manifest or the 
totality of what lies in the light of day or can be brought to the light.78 
Phenomenology in Heidegger is thus defined by ‘letting the nonapparent appear 
as nonapparent’.79  
The question of Being is accordingly viewed as a phenomenon in the 
phenomenological sense, as something that does not show itself at all or lies 
hidden, but at the same time belongs to what thus shows itself; and it belongs to 
it so essentially as to constitute its meaning. Yet, that which remains hidden or 
shows itself in disguise is the Being of entities.80 
It is precisely in these dimensions that the answer to the question of 
Being which is re-established, but remains unanswered in Being and Time, 
should be sought. 
 
 
2.2 Reestablishing Being as Nothing  
 
Heidegger suggests in the Preface to Being and Time of 195381 that its reader 
should refer simultaneously to the Introduction to Metaphysics (1935). This is an 
evidence of the fact that his point of departure in the investigation of the 
question of Being remains Being and Time which should be taken as the ground 
for his later works. The latter should, accordingly, be read as an attempt to find 
an answer to the question of Being which remains open in Being and Time. 
The destructuring of the question of Being initiated in Being and Time is 
transformed here into a question of language, whereby the issue of sameness is 
brought back to the primordial intactness of language and things by virtue of the 
naming force of words, in which things first come to be and are.82 The focal 
point, the new centre of gravity between the concealed and unconcealed, the 
presence of the absent and the emphasis of its presence through absence is 
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language.83 As Habermas remarks, in Heidegger’s philosophy ‘the luminous 
force of world-disclosing language is hypostatized’.84 Language is presented 
primarily as the naming of Being within the problem of nothingness as No-thing, 
the crossing over of negativity and difference in order to return towards the 
inconceivable unity of the primordial. No-thing is then linked to Being via the 
equivocal relationship of concealment/unconcealment, saying and silence. 
Here sameness is revealed in its primordial plenitude through the Greek 
questioning of beings as such and as a whole or the Being of beings. It is 
manifested through the initial meaning of the word phusis, or that which 
emerges from itself, the unfolding that opens itself up, the coming-into-
appearance or the emerging-abiding sway.85 Phusis as the emergent self-
upraising, the self-unfolding that abides is also the overwhelming coming-to-
presence of Being as parousia or ousia. Within parousia, that which comes to 
presence from concealment essentially unfolds as beings. This sway, stepping 
forth from concealment (alētheia) struggles forth as a world, through which 
beings first come into being.86 The emerging-abiding sway as phusis is not 
experienced through natural processes but on the basis of a fundamental 
experience of Being in poetry and thought. 
What is at stake here is the impossibility of laying hold of the Being of 
beings directly and, hence the need to investigate it from the point of view of its 
disclosedness or the openedness of what the oblivion of Being closes off and 
conceals.87 The question of Being (‘How does it stand with Being?’) is therefore 
transposed into the extreme limits and the abrupt abysses of Nothing, where it is 
formulated as the fundamental question of philosophy: ‘Why are there beings at 
all instead of Nothing?’ This formulation belongs to Heidegger’s continuing 
questioning of Negativity beginning with Being and Time:  
  
Has anyone ever posed the problem of the ontological source of negativity 
(Nichtheit), or, prior to that, even sought the mere conditions on the basis 
of which the problem of the not and its notness and the possibility of that 
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notness can be raised? And how else are these conditions to be found except 
by the thematic clarification of the meaning of Being in general?88 
 
The subsequent texts repeatedly stress the urge to go expressly up to the limit of 
Nothing in the question about Being and to take Nothing into the question of 
Being.89 Nothing, however, cannot be spoken of directly, but merely indicated. 
The possibility of grappling with the question of Being as that of Nothing 
requires therefore a different spiritual rank characteristic of philosophy, defined 
as the questioning of the extra-ordinary.90 The raising of the issue of sameness 
re-formulated as that of Nothing becomes likewise the privilege of the poet who 
can talk about Nothing ‘because an essential superiority of the spirit holds sway 
in poetry’.91 The postulation of Being as Nothing conditions the reestablishment 
of poetry and philosophy as the ability to present common and familiar things as 
unfamiliar (as demonstrated by Heidegger through the text by Knut Hamsun92) 
and indicate Nothing. The unheard, the hitherto un-said and unthought can be 
projected by the creators (poets, thinkers and statesmen), who throw the 
counterweight of their work against the overwhelming sway and thereby open up 
the world in their work: Beings as such now first come into being.93  
This re-postulation amounts to the transposition of the question of Being 
into the field of endless creation, a radical reestablishing of the question of 
Being in respect of creativity is taking place: ‘Even when an age still makes an 
effort just to uphold the inherited level […] of its Dasein, the level already sinks. 
It can be upheld only insofar as at all times it is creatively transcended’.94 
Moreover, a radical reestablishment of Being in language which is reformulated 
as grammata, the coming to a stand of the spoken, the standing of the world in 
the written image, in the written signs or letters is coming to realization: ‘It is 
thus grammar that represents language as something in being, whereas through 
the flow of talk, language drains away into the impermanent.’95 
Still another mode of the self-showing of Being upon the ground of the 
Greek phusis is unfolded in poetry. Heidegger postulates Being as seeming 
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which is no less powerful than Being as unconcealment.96 He explicates it by 
referring to the etymology of the word phainesthai, in the sense of lighting-up, 
self-showing or appearing. The naming force of this word is clarified through the 
great poetry of Pindar for whom phua (what is original and authentic) is the 
fundamental characteristic of Dasein.97 Here Being means appearing or 
essentially unfolds as appearing or phusis; the unconcealment as alētheia comes 
to a stand in showing itself, whereby ‘standing-in-itself means nothing other 
than standing-in-the-light’.98 
 
 
 
2. 3. Identity and Difference 
 
Another fundamental dimension in which Being can be grasped in its originarity 
is that of the unity of phusis and logos, Being and thinking, where logos has the 
sense of the constant gatheredness of Being or of gathered harmony.99 The 
significance of logos in the question of Being lies in its twofold meaning: on the 
one hand, it is the unifying One in the sense of what is everywhere primal and 
thus most universal, and at the same time it is the unifying One in the sense of 
the All-Highest.100 As the grounding and gatherer of everything into the 
universal, and, simultaneously, the gatherer of everything in terms of the unique, 
the logos thus interpreted opens up the question of sameness to the possibility of 
being, postulated in terms of a unique belonging-together of its originary 
plenitude and the singularity of the Ereignis which is usually translated as event 
or the event of  appropriation (Heidegger himself has said that as a key term, it 
can no more be translated than the Greek logos or the Chinese Tao101).  
Heidegger returns here to the primordial sameness of Being and thinking 
where oneness must be understood in the sense of the belonging-together of that 
which is originally unified. Being and thinking are the same in their belonging-
together in the sense of contending with each other. This originary sameness is 
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designated upon the former postulation of Being as phusis; the standing in the 
light, appearing or stepping into unconcealment of Being. In this holding sway 
of Being, thinking as the apprehension of Being holds sway as belonging to 
Being, it is identical with Being. Apprehension originarily belongs to phusis, the 
sway of phusis shares its sway with apprehension which is defined as ‘the 
receptive bringing-to-a-stand of the constant that shows itself in itself’.102  
In order to demonstrate the originarity of sameness, Heidegger refers to 
Heraclitus and Parmenides in whose poeticized thought Being and Dasein [a 
Dasein belonging to Being] are authentically founded. Heidegger asserts that 
Being opens itself up only to poetic and thoughtful projection and that it is the 
privilege of poets and thinkers to bring their Dasein to stand in the Being of 
beings.103 What Heidegger aims at, is the pursuit of the originary plenitude of the 
Same in the unity of thinking and Being when ‘thinking and Being belong 
together in the Same and by virtue of this Same’.104 It is upon the ground of this 
originary identity that Heidegger defines the Being-here of humanity, its Da-
Sein.105 Man is essentially and only the relationship of responding to Being; Man 
and Being are designated in belonging to each other.106 Heidegger creates a new 
notion of the Ereignis, the event of appropriation in the singulare tantum to 
describe the absolute singularity of the constellation of Being and man in which 
both reach each other and achieve their active nature by losing the qualities 
endowed by metaphysics.107 The origin of language is likewise postulated in 
respect of this originary sameness, on the basis of a fundamental orientation to 
Being in its originarity. The origin of language is delineated in its delicacy 
which makes it the most susceptible vibration holding everything within the 
suspended structure of the appropriation.108  
In order to demonstrate the significance of this originarity for the genuine 
elucidation of the question of Being, Heidegger traces the further development 
of thought in its inability to hold on to the inception in its genuine plenitude.109 
Among the major consequences of the distortion of this plenitude is the 
postulation of the human being as the builder or inventor of language and Being, 
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instead of the originary acknowledgment of the human being as belonging to 
Being by virtue of the violence-doing of poetic saying and thoughtful 
projection.110 The postulation of art as the originary act of violence-doing is its 
defining as technē not because it involves technical skills, but because it brings 
Being to stand in the work as a being, it sets-to-work Being through an act which 
is an opening-up and keeping-open or knowing.111 
Heidegger explains the very possibility of the existence of beings by the 
initial distortion of sameness through the violence-doing-of-creation. Yet, it is 
simultaneously in virtue of the creative act as violence-doing that human being 
dares the setting out into the un-said and the breaking into the un-thought. The 
unconcealment of Being in its originarity becomes thus possible through the 
daring to surmount Being and, hence the risking of the assault of un-being, 
disintegration, un-constancy, unstructure and un-fittingness.112 The raising of the 
question of the plenitude of Being becomes possible by tracing the difference 
within it through the violence-doing-creation which draws the line of opposition 
between beings as a whole as overwhelming and the violence-doing human 
being as the creator.  
The plenitude of Being may be grasped precisely in the difference 
between the excessive violence of the metaphysical universal of the Same and 
the absolutely singular which shatters it by the act of violence. Being thus posed 
breaks in its appearance by virtue of the violence-doing-creation. Moreover, it is 
this breaking in of the uniqueness and suddenness of Dasein that discloses Being 
in its plenitude as phusis. The originary division, whose intensity and originary 
disjunction sustains history, is thus, according to Heidegger, the distinction 
between Being and beings.113 In this way, the plenitude of the Same as Being 
can merely be grasped in its ownmost proper meaning as difference; as a 
univocal Being encompassing the individualities remaining equivocal within it.  
Focusing upon the difference between Being and beings, Heidegger 
provides an adequate answer to the issue of the sameness in terms of a negativity 
that permeates its essence. Deleuze explains the Heideggerian difference in the 
sense of the Fold, (Zweifalt), as constitutive of Being and of the manner in which 
Being constitutes being, in the double movement of clearing and veiling. He 
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links Heidegger’s thinking of the ontological origin (ontologischer Ursprung) of 
the Same in relation to itself to the definition of Being as ‘the differenciator of 
difference’.114 He designates the Heideggerian relationship of difference 
between Being and beings via horizontal and vertical lines. They incorporate the 
commencement of the singularity on the horizontal line forming the moments of 
a bare repetition (of beings) and a recommencement on the vertical line 
condensing singularities and on which the other repetition, that of the Being of 
beings is woven.115   
The revelation of the Same as Being, as being-there, Da-sein, keeps 
abreast with that of difference which intersects and dominates it. The classical 
notion of the Same as the ontological ground of multiplicity is now reestablished 
as a simultaneity of equally original structures which are defined by Heidegger 
as equiprimordial (gleichursprünglich). The oneness of Being is thus defined in 
terms of the equiprimordials or the simultaneously coexisting coeval structures 
of Being-in or Being-in-the-World as a multiplicity of characteristics constitutive 
for it.116 As Heidegger remarks, thinking has needed more than two thousand 
years to understand the relation of mediation within identity.117 
It is upon the ground of Being as phusis that Heidegger poses language as 
logos, gathering or poetry, as the breakaway of humanity into Being where 
Being becomes word.118 Language is thereby posed as the primal poetry, in 
which people poetize Being and through which they step into history. The being 
human in its history-opening essence is thereby hidden in the phenomenon of 
logos, in the sense of revealing or apprehending the Being of beings or the 
difference between them by the act of violence. Language is accordingly the 
primary opening-up of Being in the structure of its gatheredness in which human 
beings are the gatherers, standing and acting in the logos. It is primarily posed in 
its difference from the everyday discourse toward the truth of its gatheredness, in 
the sense of Being. 
Heidegger traces the loss of the originary plenitude of Being in the 
disjoining of essence and existence, Being and appearing, on and 
phainomenon.119 This involves the reduction of the primal sameness to the 
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prototype of the Same eidos, according to which all opening of beings should be 
directed toward resembling or equaling to this dominating prototype. To quote 
Heidegger: ‘The truth of phusis […] now becomes […] mimesis.’120  
The distancing of Being from the originary inception at the age of Greek 
Dasein is delineated by Heidegger through endurance (as Being in 
contradistinction to becoming), perpetual identity or the enduring prototype (in 
contradistinction to seeming), presence-at-hand (Being in contradistinction to 
thinking) and lying at hand (in contradistinction to the ought).121 All of them, 
Heidegger argues, at bottom say the same: constant presence, on as ousia.122 
Heidegger’s juxtaposition of his own postulation of Being with that of 
Hegel is significant as an account for the continuity of the issue of sameness and 
for conceiving the difference in the forms of its postulations: as an absolute 
concept in which difference is a mere manifestation of the preconceived identity 
and totality (in Hegel) and the thinking of the pure difference (in Heidegger). 
Here is Heidegger’s conclusion: 
 
For Hegel, the matter of thinking is: Being with respect to beings […] as 
absolute thinking. For us, the matter of thinking is the Same, and thus Being 
– but Being with respect to its difference from beings. […] for Hegel, the 
matter of thinking is the idea as the absolute concept. For us, […] the matter 
of thinking is the difference as difference.123    
 
This juxtaposition testifies to the significance of the issue of sameness 
throughout the entire philosophical discourse (provided that Hegel’s 
philosophical system is the culmination of thinking of the identity of the Same) 
and the fundamental transformation in philosophy which reestablishes the issue 
of sameness by unfolding it in the unfamiliarity of nothing and difference; the 
difference between Being and beings.  
It is essential here to conceive of difference not as a denial of sameness, 
but as the sole way for reestablishing its originary plenitude and admit with 
Heidegger that ‘we think of Being rigorously only when we think of it in its 
difference with beings, and of beings in their difference with Being’.124 And we 
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have to admit again with Heidegger that the sole way to Being lies in thinking of 
it rigorously, i.e. in venturing to think of the un-thought, un-said and un-being in 
Being; of its pure non-Being or the absolute Nothing. Likewise, this means 
admitting the endless creation as the sole way for upholding the Dasein. 
 
 
 
2.4 The Ursprung of Art as the Originating of the Concealed 
 
 
The difference which appears through the withdrawal of Being or its otherness 
from beings, is manifested in the historicality of art in so far as it is the creative 
preservation of truth in the work.125 In defining the origin of art, Heidegger is 
concerned to demonstrate it as the originating of the concealed by a leap or the 
bringing of the concealed out of its essential source in a founding leap. In so 
doing, he bases his inquiry upon the literal meaning of the word ‘origin’ 
[Ursprung] as primal leap.126 
The origin of the work of art is then the refusal to ground art upon the 
universality of the Same and its transposition instead to the unconcealing gesture 
of the earth127 which lets things appear in their absolutely unique singularity or 
difference. Heidegger’s discussion of the concept of thingness is anchored in the 
notion of the thing as formed matter and its distinction from that which does not 
exist as a thing (including God and man). Aesthetics is thus viewed as a means 
of discovering the thingness of things via the experience of art which is the 
revealing of the concealed and the self-concealment.  
 The essence of art is thereby reduced to the actuality of the work, 
defined by the happening of truth.128 In this context, the (peasant?) shoes in Van 
Gogh’s painting are the suspension of meaning for the unconcealment to happen 
as such in regard to beings as a whole. The essence of unconcelament is 
dominated by a constant concealment in the double form of refusal and 
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dissembling.129 The shoes then should be regarded, as Derrida notes, in the 
originarity of painting as ‘this detachment which loses its footing’, by making a 
picture of the picture and inviting you not to forget the very thing it makes you 
forget: you have painting and not shoes.130 
Derrida stresses the significance of the loosening of the laces of the shoes 
as a determined form of stricture, a logic of detachment permitting us to take 
account of the possibility of the risk or loss of meaning (the shoes are neither 
attached nor detached, neither full nor empty, any stricture is simultaneously 
stricturation and destricturation) which brings forth the structure/stricture of 
indeterminacy and play.131  
Art as the realm of indeterminacy and play is the happening of poetry in 
the triple sense of bestowing, grounding, and beginning.132 Heidegger here 
accords poetry a privileged position because of the fundamental place language 
occupies in it. His belief in the revelation of the sacred, purely unmediated Being 
through language as the house of Being conditions his new positing of 
Ursprungsphilosophie through poetry. The unveiling or disclosure of Being as 
Alētheia in the sense of concealment/unconcealment is traced through poetry as 
the identification of the message of the two-fold’s unconcealment. The essence 
of poetry is thereby transmitted into a completely new dimension: from speaking 
(sprechen) towards saying (reden), from representation towards repetition. 
While the issue of sameness manifested as the question of Being has essentially 
become poetical. In this context, art and particularly poetry is reduced to the 
concept of Truth or to the enunciation of the Word: ‘Art, as the setting-into-work 
of truth, is poetry. Not only the creation of the work is poetic, but equally poetic, 
though in its own way, is the preserving of the word’ or: ‘The nature of art is 
poetry. The nature of poetry, in turn is the founding of truth’.133 
 What matters for Heidegger from Being and Time to his late inquiries 
into language (in the lectures delivered in 1953, 1957, 1958 & 1959 and 
published under the common title On the Way to Language) is the bringing out 
the Being of beings in its originarity, outside the realm of representation as ‘the 
presence of present beings, the two-fold of the two in virtue of their simple 
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oneness’.134 The originary identity between presence and the present beings 
substituting for the unmediated identity of the metaphysical universal of the 
Same is posited in the register of its most radical impossibility. The crux is no 
longer the identity and totality of Being as the Same, but the encompassing of all 
the intensities, diversities, and modalities in the voice of Being. Heidegger poses 
the voice of Being as the voice of difference that ‘determines and tunes’ the 
nature of man walking the ‘boundary of the boundless’.135 
 
 
2. 5 On the Way to Language  
 
 
Due to the inadequacy of the fundamental concepts of Western Metaphysics for 
grasping the originary voice of Being, Heidegger turns to the Eastern technique 
of the hint as the message of the veiling that opens up. He thereby imbues poetry 
with the sense of immediate presence of Being disclosing itself in the pure 
delight of the beckoning stillness. The subtle vibrations of the voice of Being 
can be grasped in the saying of silence of the poetic language as the shining forth 
of the openness or the nothing. A new poetic language is being coined, rooted in 
the purity of language itself outside the realm of representation. 
Heidegger imbues the poetical disclosure of Being with the East Asian 
sense of Iki as the bringing forth of the radiance of the suprasensuous through 
sensuous radiance; the bringing forth of Ku, the emptiness, the open through Iro, 
colour.136 In so doing, he suggests an understanding of poetry as graciousness, in 
the sense of putting into words ‘the breathlike advent of the stillness of 
delight’.137 Solely language as Saying (reden) implied with the Eastern sense of 
showing, letting appear and shine in the manner of hinting, similar to Koto ba, 
the Japanese word for language is valid for the unconcealment of the originary 
Being. Koto ba — in the sense of ‘petals that stem from Koto’,138 where Koto is 
the ‘holding sway over that which needs the shelter of all that flourishes and 
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flowers’139 or in the sense of ‘flower petals that flourish out of the lightening 
message of the graciousness that brings forth’140 — transgresses the 
conventional understanding of language as representation towards the realm of 
imagination. This transgression is itself poetical in the sense of putting into 
language the experience the poet undergoes with language. 
The valid language for Being is sought in the transformation when ‘the 
being of language becomes the language of being’.141 The urge that the language 
of Being be empowered to allude to what remains unspoken in it, after the 
utterance of all names guides Heidegger to refer to Lao Tzu’s Tao, way, in the 
sense of an originary identity in the logos which speaks simultaneously ‘as the 
name for Being and for Saying’.142   
The way to the question of Being lies through the way to language which 
is a completely different attitude toward the being of language. This attitude 
implies the possibility to speak ‘from out of language’s reality and be led to its 
realty’,143 instead of the usual taking up of a position above it or of treating 
language as an object. The originary dialogue appropriated to Saying as the 
veiled relation of message and messenger’s course substitutes for the 
hermeneutic circle.     
The question of Being in Heidegger becomes eventually reduced to a 
reflection on language in the urge to name or rather the impossibility of naming. 
Poetry is then viewed as poiesy, in the sense of the disclosure of the concealed as 
pure and absolute unconcealedness via repetition. The 
unconcealment/concealment correlation is rooted in the interpretation of phusis 
as the emerging and rising in and from itself and all things. The Heideggerian 
substitution of the poetics of presence for that of mimesis may be demonstrated 
via the famous example of the temple, (‘The temple’s firm towering makes 
visible the invisible space of air’144), in which the temple no longer signifies a 
higher signified, but renders visible the full presence of itself and the concealed 
space of air. Here, a work of art functions as a disclosure of truth, a world-
disclosing tool that holds the openness of the world open. 
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To find the valid language for Being, Heidegger inquires into its 
functions as a disclosure of Being for man before and prior to the production of 
works of art.  It is this originary function of language that Heidegger seeks in the 
infinite possibilities of the poet’s entrance into the relation of word to thing. The 
power of the word is thus investigated in respect of its endowing the thing with 
Being or the bethinging of the thing, in virtue of which the sense of Being 
appears like an endowment dedicated to the thing from the word. The 
personality of the poet is subordinated to the lack of the poetic power of the 
word which conditions his becoming a poet.  
The significance of Heidegger’s conception of the originary sameness of 
Being within language in the scope of this study lies primarily in his 
reassessment of the Western understanding of the relationship between being 
and saying, voice and word. This reassessment can be traced in the proximity 
between Logos and Being, in the sense of Saying through the belonging to each 
other of word and thing. It endows the Word with the function of the giver, of 
that which gives Being, simultaneously endowing the function of the thinker 
with that of the seeker of the word as giver.145 
The essential pertinence of nothing and difference to language and Being 
serves as the key concept for Heidegger’s postulation of sameness. It is through 
this articulation of a being-other of language as Saying, namely the showing or 
making appear of the world through lighting and concealing that the genuine 
origin of Being is manifested. The power of Saying as the vibrating, hovering, 
and trembling sound of the Word brings about the ‘lighting-concealing-releasing 
offer of world’.146 The sounding word is the sole way for listening to the ‘ringing 
of stillness’147 in the originary voice of Being, the appropriating event through 
which Being itself comes into its own presence. The question of Being is, 
accordingly, postulated in respect of the radical impossibility to be spoken and 
of that which remains unsaid in the said: ‘what remains unsaid, what is not yet 
shown, what has not yet reached its appearance.’148 
The reestablishing of the question of Being becomes thus possible upon 
the ground of a reassessment of the lack of Being, the attempt of bringing it 
about through the Word and the impossibility of doing so. The question of Being 
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is thereby reassessed as both an attempt to resay what has already been 
manifested as the Same which ‘stays the Same as the message’,149 and the 
impossibility of doing so.   
It is predominantly with the above-mentioned aspects of Being and 
Nothing, the issues of Saying, speaking, and silence that the late Heidegger is 
engaged, attuning the reader to the sacral power of language and poetry. 
 
 
2. 6 A Philosophical Recourse to the Poetic Texts 
 
   
Along with purely theoretical investigations, Heidegger makes a philosophical 
recourse to the poetic texts of Stefan George, Georg Trakl, and Hölderlin to 
inquire into the experience that the poet has undergone with language. In so 
doing, Heidegger is cautious to maintain the vibration, hovering, and ringing of 
the poetic Word in the univocal philosophical discourse which he names ‘the 
rigid groove of a univocal statement’.150 His philosophical inquiry into poetry 
transposes the question of Being into the pure repetition of the poem, by 
endowing thought with pure experience of language in the sense of cutting 
furrows into the soil of Being. Here, Heidegger even refers to Nietzsche’s words, 
stressing the need for the thought to have ‘a vigorous fragrance, like a wheatfield 
on a summer’s night’ (Grossoktav WW XI, 20).151  
Here the privilege of the poem as our innermost possibility of reliving 
within language is stressed and demonstrated through reservations about the 
highest thought and the claims that pure thought can never be a substitute for our 
listening to the inner peace of the poem. 
What is at stake in the interpretation of the poem, is the deciphering of 
the unspeakable experience of Being which manifests itself in each of the 
singular poems and the totality of the poems reduced to a single poetic 
statement. The task of the interpreter is thus to situate the poet’s site in the 
intensity of its gathering and pervading power, by a clarification of individual 
poems. Heidegger applies the term clarification in the ontological sense of 
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bringing forth the ‘purity which shimmers in everything said poetically’ to its 
first appearance.152 
In accordance with the aforementioned theory, Heidegger interprets the 
site of Georg Trakl’s poetic work as that of apartness circling around the 
wandering stranger. It emerges as the song of the wandering soul which is about 
‘to gain the earth by its wandering, the earth that is the stiller home of the 
homecoming generation’.153 This interpretation is the revelation of the ‘rigorous 
unison of the many voiced language’154 of Trakl’s poetry that remains unsaid in 
the multiple ambiguity of the poetic saying.  
The inquiry into the poem Words by Stefan George is an encounter with 
the poetic word as the bringing of the unsaid or pure Nothing into language. 
What is at stake here is the experience (Erlebnis155) of the pure language outside 
the realm of representation, beyond the signification of things by words. 
Language is posed at the brink of naming the unsaid and the radical lack for the 
name. Robert Bernasconi interprets this experience of the lack for the word as 
‘the lack of the word for the word’ which means the lack of the name for the 
Being of language.156    
The poet is the one who seeks for the word of Being and, due to the lack 
of this word, for ‘the treasure’ that ‘never graced’ his land, renounces (‘So I 
renounced and sadly see:/Where word breaks off no thing may be’; from 
Words).157 He is the one, who experiences both, the treasured power of language 
and the impossibility of owning it (‘And straight it vanished from my hand’).158 
The bethinging (die Bedingnis) power of the word conditions the commitment of 
the poet to the mystery of the word in the form of a nondenial of the self that 
says: ‘may there be.’159  
Heidegger interprets renunciation as an unsayable experience, ‘the 
transformation of Saying into the echo of an inexpressible Saying whose sound 
is barely perceptible and songlike’.160 He links it to the may there be that reveals 
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the concealed purity of the is in the sense of thanksgiving that is attuned to joy. 
In this context the mystery of the word is both remote in the sense of mystery 
and near, in the sense of being experienced.  
Heidegger’s interpretation of Hölderlin’s poems stems from the premises 
of his philosophy and serves as a proof of his own thought. The postscript to 
Heidegger’s essay ‘What is Metaphysics?’, which includes the sentences ‘The 
poet names the holy. The thinker says Being’,161 may serve as a clue for this 
interpretation in so far as the poet and the thinker are united in their experience 
of the lack of the holy or of Being. They both experience the lack of the word for 
Being, for an experience of language; the poet through the word holy, the thinker 
through the truth of Being. 
In Heidegger’s reading of Hölderlin, both the poet and the thinker, 
experience the lack of the truth of Being and aspire to reestablish it differently in 
the pure speaking of an originary language. According to Paul De Man, 
Heidegger chooses Hölderlin because he is ‘in need of a witness, of someone of 
whom he can say that he has named the immediate presence of Being’.162 The 
fact of Hölderlin’s being a witness of Being enables Heidegger to realize his 
concern of transposing the question of Being into the pure event of language in 
respect of its radical resistance to being named. Being is transposed into the 
immediacy of the poetic language: in Heidegger it is interpreted as the 
unconcealment of the concealed as unconcealment, whereas in Hölderlin, it is 
the impossibility and strife of unconcealment.   
Heidegger’s essay Remembrance of the Poet on Hölderlin’s poem 
Heimkunft, Homecoming reveals the genuine vocation of the poet as the return 
‘into the proximity of the source’163 after having wandered for a long time in 
search of the homeland which is near and not near. The mystery of the homeland 
is near as an experience and not near, as a mystery. The homecoming of the poet 
is then his getting to know the mystery of the home as the bereft source not ‘by 
unveiling or analyzing it’, but ‘by carefully guarding as mystery’.164 
The return home is designated as commensurate with grasping the High 
One through naming it. The mission of the poet is thus the unconcealment of the 
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concealed Being through the immediacy of the poetic Word, empowered to 
bring Being into existence by naming it. Hölderlin, however, faces the 
impossibility of revealing Being through the mediation of the name.  
Heidegger privileges the poet as the one empowered to name the holy or 
the High One in the time of the failure of god, making it appear in the very 
utterance of the name, in the granting of the initial word.165 The reservations 
concerning the distortion of the unity of word and Being once the word is uttered 
by the poet and achieved by other persons can be overcome by remembrance.166 
It is however the very distortion of the initial identity that enables the existence 
of the multiplicity through finding for each person ‘a homecoming in the manner 
appropriate for him’.167 
In another essay, Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry, Heidegger defines 
the essence of poetry as the ‘most innocent of all occupations and language, as 
the most dangerous of possessions [...] given to man’.168 Here likewise the 
emphatic presence of Being as the purest and most concealed, is unconcealed 
through language. Heidegger stresses the bethinging power of language, 
asserting its function as that of the founder of Being. The gods have acquired 
names, and a world has appeared by virtue of language: ‘the real conversation, 
which we ourselves are’ consists in ‘the naming of the gods, and in the 
transmutation of the world into word.’169 
Heidegger sacralizes the creative power of the word, establishing the 
world in itself through a nomination, and equally sacralizes the poetic being as 
the supreme form of being; with his conviction: ‘Poetically, dwells man on his 
earth’.170 He believes in the re-establishing of the primeval unity of things and 
words via poetry, conceived as ‘the establishing of being by means of the word’ 
and as that ‘which first makes language possible’.171 In the same way, he 
sacralizes the vocation of the poet, as the one ‘through whom the spirit 
speaks’172 who is struck by Apollo and is selected to transpose the truth of this 
supreme vision by words in order to bring it into being.  
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The Heideggerian belief in the world-creating power of the Word 
becomes more distinctly illustrated through his exegeses of poetic texts. For 
Heidegger, the belief in the power of the Word is equally a belief in the supreme 
power of poetry as a manifestation of pure language. It becomes manifested in 
the entirety of a re-unification of words and things and a re-creation of the sacral 
vision by virtue of a pure nomination.  
The Heideggerian belief in the supreme power of the poetic language can 
be viewed as the confession of a philosopher impuissant to recreate the primeval 
lucidity of the sacred vision of Being through a philosophical discourse. Solely 
the pure poetic language of repetition which is beyond any signifying function is 
empowered to become the language of Being. Heidegger’s belief in the poetic 
power of language is the reason for his interpreting Hölderlin via a reversal of 
his poetic site from an impossibility to name into a naming empowered to 
bething. It can be viewed as Heidegger’s unwillingness to face the impuissance 
of the poetic Word of bringing Being into presence and his unwillingness to face 
the poet of the poet in his impuissance of recreating the ultimate vision through 
the ineffable mediation of the Word.  
What speaks in the speech between the poet and the thinker, whether by 
virtue of speech or the impossibility of speech, is, as Derrida argues (referring to 
Heidegger’s Gespräch with Trakl), the very language, which ‘speaks about 
itself, refers to itself in deferring itself’.173  
The significance of Heidegger’s postulation of sameness within the scope 
of this study is primarily the reestablishing of the originary Being within a pure 
speaking of language (Die Sprache spricht). As Derrida argues, the call of Being 
as promise has already taken place wherever language comes: ‘This would also 
be a promise of spirit’.174 It would be a promise of spirit, Geist as flame, in the 
affirmative determination of which the internal possibility of the worst is already 
lodged.175  
In Heidegger the promise of spirit or the promise of language becomes 
possible by virtue of an originarity of Being in the certain thinking of Ereignis as 
the event of a promise which has already taken place. It becomes possible in the 
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relation of spirit to itself as the gathering (Versammlung) of the unique in the 
One (in das Eine). 
To sum up, the issue of sameness is reestablished in Heidegger in its 
originarity by virtue of a pure speaking of language as repetition. It is reflected 
in Heidegger’s assumption that exceptional poetry (by Hölderlin, Trakl, Rilke 
and, up to a point George) can attain purity in speech and speaking. This pure 
repetition is designated by Derrida as a retrait or an advance towards the most 
originary, the pre-archi-originary which thinks more by thinking nothing more 
and opens onto what remains origin-heterogeneous.176  
To rethink what Derrida describes as the most matutinal (the other 
origin-heterogeneous birth) possibility of the same issue of Being, Heidegger 
chooses the path of pure repetition, of the most vertiginous and abyssal 
repetition which crosses the path of the entirely other to re-call the other under 
the Same.  
Jacques Derrida follows the same path.  
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3. Derrida: The Deconstruction of the Same 
 
3. 1 Experiencing the Sameness in the Other 
  
                                                        
As we have attempted to demonstrate, the essential characteristic of Nietzsche’s 
and Heidegger’s positions is the inquiry into the limits of the unity and totality 
of the issue of the Same in order to reveal the origin of the very difference as the 
ultimate foundation of all knowledge. 
Jacques Derrida follows their path of attaining the ‘ultimate 
foundations’177 of knowledge, the rationality of which is, however, to be 
discovered by deconstruction. Deconstruction, as Derrida defines it, does not 
issue from logos, but inaugurates the destruction or de-sedimentation of all the 
significations that have their source in the logos.178 According to his explanation, 
deconstruction should be viewed as ‘broaching the deconstruction of the greatest 
totality — the concept of the episteme and logocentric metaphysics’.179 
Before going into the details of Derrida’s corroboration of difference 
within sameness — which remains the central concern of this chapter — we 
have to mention that Postmodernism in general and Deconstruction in particular, 
arouse heated debates among contemporary critics. We will outline here the 
position contrasting to ours which disparages Postmodernism’s desire for 
disintegration by viewing it as a condition where identity no longer prevails. 
Consequently, the central postmodernist conception of difference is opposed to 
identity and, thereby considered as detached from sameness. Due to this 
position, then, the postmodernist unleashing of a force of pure transgression is 
transformed into a kind of negative capability. Postmodernism is accordingly 
qualified as a complex maneuvering in which knowledge is deemed 
questionable, the human subject is dispossessed, humanism is unmasked as a 
form of covert oppression, and narrative logic as one of the central organizing 
                                                          
177 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore; 
London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997); p. 60; all further reference from this 
edition.   
178 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, p. 10. 
179 Ibid, p. 46. 
 187
principles of western thought, is broken down.180 From this perspective, then, 
deconstruction is not viewed as the de-sedimentation of sameness in order to 
release its hidden energy, but rather a resistance to totality, teleology, or to any 
kind of closures, such as narrative, conceptual, or metaphysical. The 
deconstructive movement against the thinking of the pure identity of sameness 
and its devolving into the desire to convert the singularity of the different into 
sameness is thus misjudged as a resistance to sameness in general with its 
fundamental human values. Moreover, the postmodernist liberation of 
philosophy and art from endless representation, as well as from their 
subordination to the subject is misinterpreted as ‘quite explicitly antihumanist, 
denying human beings the instrumental command of language [...]’,181 while its 
spirit is defined as specifically anti-humanistic.182 The postmodernist remission 
of the power of the artist and the refusal of the integrity of the art work are 
misinterpreted as the disruption of the whole of western traditions which arouse 
ethical issues concerning the neglected responsibility and obligations.183 Yet, our 
central concern is to stress the significance of the postmodern thought of 
sameness based on a more primordial response to the different. We aim to show 
that postmodernism is by no means the denial of sameness, but its assessment 
upon the different and the other which has always already been inscribed within 
sameness. Moreover, we argue that both, the condition in which identity no 
longer prevails and the one in which the different is either subordinated to 
identity or disregarded are bleak and malevolent prospects for humanity. For this 
reason, the investigation of the ways of the genuine encounter of the Same and 
the other are under focus. 
It is precisely from the aspect of de-sedimentation that we will inquire 
into Derrida’s deconstruction of the Same not as a demolition of the Same, but 
as an impossibility to think of its plenitude in a non-contradictory way. Hence, 
deconstruction will be viewed as a unique way which ventures to show the Same 
in its full splendour by questioning its static transcendentality and by making 
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visible the Other to the Same as the limit of its possibility. Moreover, it will be 
viewed as a significant shift from the philosophical conceptualization of the 
Same throughout the history of Western philosophy into the experiencing of the 
Same in its ever different singularity by risking it and pushing it to the limits. 
Deconstruction will thus be traced in its innermost possibility of reviving the 
issue of sameness, no longer by raising, postulating or reestablishing it, but by 
allowing us to experience the Same in its ever same and ever different repetition 
of the Other. As Derrida demonstrates, the Other or the different begins only at 
the limits of the totality of the Same and it can be considered only from the 
assumption that difference was always already inscribed within the Same. We 
will therefore trace the opening up of this dynamic space of difference in its 
subtlest contrivances and endless energetic potential via the interplay of 
overlapping structures and the infinite number of possible combinations, 
condensed in the absolute singularity of every given combination. In tracing this 
open space of deconstruction, it is essential to remember the impossibility of 
further questioning the essence or origin of the Same in whatever form of 
philosophical conceptualization, but rather experience it in every single act of 
freedom.         
The investigation of the major postulations of sameness in Western 
philosophy — starting from its inception in Greece throughout its deconstruction 
by Derrida — allows us to generalize the history of philosophy in terms of the 
urge to rethink sameness in a peculiar manner. As we have attempted to 
demonstrate, philosophy up to Hegel (with the period of digression, delineated in 
Part Two) had been postulating sameness either in terms of pure identity or of a 
totality, in which difference is subordinated to the higher identity or dissolved 
into it. By contrast, Derrida employs the term différance as the ‘limit, the 
interruption, the destruction of the Hegelian relève wherever it operates’184 in 
order to de-sediment the Same by pointing to the otherness inscribed within it. 
This brings forth an asymmetry among the symmetrical philosophical 
oppositions of praxis/theoria, conscious/unconscious and a disorganization of 
these oppositions which are no longer designed to make possible the ultimate 
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sublation (aufheben) of difference according to the process of Hegelian 
negativity.185  
The possibility of existence of this différance which is the abyss itself, 
must be sought, as Irene Harvey argues, within the very structure, the rationality 
housed within all interiority, within the subject (as absence) and within the 
object (as a certain spacing).186 As a result, the Same is no longer represented as 
a transcendental signified in the static plenitude of its meaning, arresting the 
concatenation of writing, but rather functions as a potently meaningful matrix of 
différance that can be experienced in the jouissance, in the dynamical openness 
to new contexts. It is precisely this ‘effect, if not the mission, of liberating 
forbidden jouissance’187 as the possibility of experiencing sameness that 
characterizes deconstruction. 
To liberate, to show up the forbidden jouissance as an experience of 
freedom in an open de-centered system, which has been eventually unfolding 
itself upon the ruins of the metaphysical signified of the Same, is the very aim of 
deconstruction. Deconstruction thus encompasses two interrelated operations: 
the interruption and destruction of the remnants of the metaphysical signified of 
the Same, hence the entire chain of onto-teleolo-theological representations and 
the possibility of experiencing sameness in the jouissance of creating endless 
structural combinations. In both operations, the issue of sameness is transformed 
into an experience: in the first operation the intensity of its experience is coeval 
with the rigour (force) of destruction (which needs to be greater than the force of 
its assertion); in the second one, it is coeval with the liberation of the forbidden 
jouissance as an experience of freedom in the process of creating endless 
structural combinations to unfold the absolutely pure singularity of the Other. 
To reduce the Same to the singularity of the Other, deconstruction 
divides the conceptual generality of meaning. The singularity is thus divided and 
takes its part in the genre, the type, the context, and the meaning. It loses itself to 
offer itself, to belong, and to participate as a trait, a differential trait different 
with itself. Derrida explains the possibility of singularity by its différance, in its 
double meaning of difference and to defer: ‘Singularity differs from itself, it is 
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deferred [se diffère] so as to be what it is and to be repeated in its very 
singularity.’188 
The deconstruction of the Same is realized by the eventual 
deconstruction of the philosophical categories of identity, origin, logocentrism 
and mimesis through staging, transforming, wrenching these concepts out of 
their traditional contexts and showing them to be other than they usually are 
taken to be. To deny the risk of regressing to the system that is being 
deconstructed while leaving the names of old categories in circulation, Derrida 
describes the signifier, in this case the name, as a merely circumstantial or 
conventional occurrence of the concept or as ‘a concession without any specific 
effect’.189 The traditional system of general textuality anchored in the sensible or 
intelligible presence of the referent in its manifold modes as meaning, essence, 
existence or form, appearance, content, substance is thereby disorganized. A 
new form of writing as the disappearance of the name is asserted instead.  
In this new context, the subject is liberated from the supremacy of 
logocentrism, namely the powerful belief that the presence of some metaphysical 
signified or centre, an essence or beginning which precedes language and 
prevails over it, governs the structure of language. The concept of the Same as a 
transcendental signified beyond language that makes the latter subordinate and 
secondary is deconstructed. Instead, a different form of language and writing 
empowered to disturb the homogeneity of thought and touching on limits where 
things are reversed and heterogeneity becomes apparent, is brought forth.  
Différance is thus the deconstruction of the Same in its pure identity, 
functioning as the metaphysical signified by emphasizing its experience through 
the difference of co-existing fragmented elements in an open decentralized 
system. This deconstruction is accomplished through the deconstruction of the 
fundamental concepts by dividing them, posing in the difference from other 
concepts, depriving them of their meaning through syntactical play, simulacra, 
and mimicry.  
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3. 2. The Interplay of Infrastructures 
 
As has been stated in the previous section, the deconstructive approach aims to 
account for the heterogeneity, différance, dissension and fissures constitutive of 
the classical philosophical discourse. Rodolphe Gasché rightly considers the 
grounding of these contradictions in the philosophical quasiconcepts of 
infrastructures, as well as the discovery of the concept of infrastructure as the 
formal rule that each time regulates differently the play of the contradictions in 
question, an intrinsic part of Derrida’s contribution to philosophy.190 The 
necessity to apply the rule of infrastructures is linked with the insufficiency of 
the traditional concepts (eidos, totality, Gestalt, essence, form, etc.) and the 
unwillingness to use them any longer.191  
While focusing upon the deconstructive grounding of contradictions in 
infrastructures, it is, however, essential to bear in mind Gasché’s explanation of 
the deconstructive operation of grounding in terms of its repetition or miming.192 
The grounding operation is mimed or repeated in order to account 
for/explain/describe the difference between a ground and that which is grounded. 
If on this view infrastructures are said to ground origins, it must be added that 
they unground them at the same time. They are also more and less than an 
origin, in so far as they are situated within syntax without origin to represent the 
irreducible plurality in contrast with the origin they make both possible and 
impossible. In our attempt to reveal the infrastructures inherent in Derrida’s 
texts, we will deploy the aforementioned definition of infrastructures.    
The deconstruction of the philosophy of mimesis or representation in 
Dissemination is accomplished, for example, through the deconstruction of 
Plato’s Phaedrus by the semantic deconstruction of the words pharmakeia-
pharmakon-pharmakeus within the play of syntax. What is at stake is the 
deconstruction of the semantic meaning of the word pharmakon as a mixture of 
two heterogeneous terms, remedy and/or poison, and the task of tracing this 
duality as a guiding thread within the whole Platonic problematic of the mixture. 
The word pharmakon introduces itself into the body of Platonic discourse with 
all of its ambivalence, in the entirety of its connotations. It should be 
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acknowledged alternately or simultaneously in its indefiniteness as a substance 
and/or an antisubstance that resists any philosopheme, exceeding its bounds as 
non-identity, non-essence, and non-substance. 
The difficulty in translating the word pharmakon as remedy, recipe, 
poison, drug, philtre, etc., and in transferring a nonphilosopheme into a 
philosopheme enables Derrida to reflect upon the indefiniteness of Plato’s text 
and the resistance of language against the domination of a univocal 
interpretation.  
Derrida reduces the ontological semantics, the lexical richness of Plato’s 
text, its depth or breadth, the opposition between the contradictory layers of 
signification (continuity/discontinuity, inside/outside, identity/difference) to the 
infinite play of syntax, the syntactical praxis that composes and decomposes it. 
This syntactical operation is realized by the displacement of the words and the 
naming of fusion and separation. The words involved in this operation get a 
double, contradictory, and indefinite value not from the content, but deriving 
from the syntax that carries all the force of the operation. The displacement of 
Platonism and its heritage is thus realized through the very act of displacement 
as an effect of language or writing, and syntax. The classical acts of reading are 
displaced by a focus upon the plays of the signifier and by the erasure of any 
signified. The excess of syntax over semantics is an illustration of Derrida’s 
attempt at allowing syntax an independent form (this attempt is considered by 
Gasché as ‘the most radical attempt ever made’193).  
Among the syntactical operations are the focusing upon spacing through 
supplementary syntactical effects and the analysis of the articulation and blank 
spaces in Mallarmé’s texts, thereby pointing to the disorganization of any 
logocentric distinctions between the sensible and the intelligible, the ideal and 
the material. According to Derrida’s reading of Mallarmé’s texts, an excess of 
signifiers is observed: unhooked, dislodged, cut off from their historical contexts 
or disengaged from their historic polarization.194 The book then is a repetition of 
the process of spacing folded back upon itself, of a certain play propagating 
itself ‘through unequal displacements, abrupt slowdowns or bursts of speed, 
strategic effects of insistence or ellipsis’.195 
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Plato’s mimetic paradigm of the cave is deconstructed via the same 
syntactical ambiguities, a play of articulations, oppositions, and allusions. The 
syntactical displacement is based upon the homonymy between Plato’s antre 
(cave) and Mallarmé’s entre (between) and the introduction of the term hymen as 
the medium between opposites in its in-betweenness. The significance of the 
between lies precisely in its semantic void: signifying nothing but spacing and 
articulation, it marks the articulated opening of the opposition between 
semantics and syntax. As we have seen, in Derrida’s readings the syntactical 
operations are offered as a substitute for semantic ones. As David Wills remarks 
of Derrida’s analyses of writing, they often concentrate on the syntactic as ‘a 
troubling as well as a reinforcement of the semantic, the means by which the 
self-extensions of language as the graphic other of the scriptural come into play 
as both a cohesive and disruptive force’.196      
The medium of the hymen, according to Derrida, ‘outwits and undoes all 
ontologies, all philosophemes, all manners of dialectics’.197 It interposes itself 
between mimicry and mimēsis, ‘a copy of a copy, a simulacrum that simulates 
the Platonic simulacrum’.198 The double meanings and multiple functioning of 
the word hymen (membrane and marriage) and the syntagm ‘lit’ (bed and to 
read) are complicated to the point of admitting a multitude of subjects illustrate 
that the mime’s operation both preserves and erases the difference between the 
imitator and the imitated; the Mime is not an imitator, but mimes imitation. The 
Mime does not do anything, he is not an acting agent and aims toward no form 
of verisimilitude. Along with the play of syntax which is no longer subject to the 
meaning of words, Derrida introduces the issue of simulacrum which is no 
longer subject to truth.    
Another coexisting infrastructure deconstructs the whole of Western 
metaphysics in its conceptuality by deconstructing the permanence of the 
Platonic schema based upon the supremacy of the origin and power of logos as 
speech. Writing, proposed, presented, and asserted as a pharmakon is unfolded 
as intimately bound to the absence of the father. It is bound to death where the 
breathless sign substitutes for the living voice. 
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The focusing upon citational play, the anagram, the very textuality of the 
text, rooted in the relation between Plato and his language, individual discourse 
and language itself demonstrates the absolutely heterogeneous textuality 
constituted ‘by differences and by differences from differences’, and this is, as 
Derrida confesses, the single theme of this essay. 199 
The multiple senses of the word pharmakon open up access to other 
contexts, namely to the space of writing or space as writing supplementing 
memory placed in the subtle difference between mnēmē and hypomnēsis, 
knowledge as memory and nonknowledge as rememoration. Derrida generalizes 
the opposition between mnēmē and hypomnēsis presiding over the meaning of 
writing by viewing it within all the great structural oppositions within Platonism.  
Insofar as writing sows forgetfulness in the soul, it turns it toward death, 
toward the nontruth, inanimate and nonknowledge. It turns but does not 
confound it with death, nontruth, the inanimate and nonknowledge. It is at this 
point that Derrida brings forth the understanding of writing as having no essence 
or value, whether positive or negative, of its own, but functioning as 
simulacrum, as ‘the mime of memory, of knowledge, of truth’.200 In accordance 
with the more subtle excess of truth, namely the simulacrum, the metaphysical 
concepts of the philosophia and the ēpistēmē are displaced into a completely 
different field, philosophy asserts itself as an operation which mimes absolute 
knowledge (Bataille’s expression used by Derrida). 201   
Such a reading of Plato deconstructs not only the recognized models of 
commentary, but also the very genealogy or structural reconstitution of a system 
attempting to corroborate, refute, or comprehend it under a simple concept. It 
suggests a certain excess in the form of displacement or simulacra, a folding-
back [repli] or re-mark202 as an exit out of the series of the model of classical 
reading.  
It suggests différance as the process of writing that writes itself, as 
opposed to the metaphysical identity, referring back to a Same that is not the 
identical, but the medium of any possible dissociation. As Derrida himself notes: 
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‘Such a functional displacement, which concerns differences […] more than any 
conceptual identities signified, is a real and necessary challenge’. 203 
The pharmakon then reappears after its Derridean dismemberment, 
holding the opposites in its diacritical, differing, deferring reserve as ‘the 
movement, the locus, and the play: (the production of) difference’, as the 
‘différance of difference’.204 It reappears between the ambiguities of paternity 
and language, through Plato’s transgressing the law in order to make up for the 
father’s death (‘condemning writing as a lost or parricidal son, Plato behaves 
like a son writing this condemnation, at once repairing and confirming the death 
of Socrates’205).  
Writing thus emancipated from representation is compared with the lost 
trace, the dissemination of a nonviable seed scattered wastefully outside, ‘a force 
wandering outside the domain of life, incapable of engendering anything […], of 
regenerating itself’.206 The open space of dissemination as the simultaneous co-
existence of infrastructures substituting for that of representation in Derrida is, 
as Gasché describes, ‘the name by which the in-advance divided unity is 
affirmed’.207 It is manifested through the constant ellipsis of the verb to be and 
its complementariness to the practice of play in Mallarmé’s writing: ‘The casting 
aside [mise à l’écart] of being defines itself and literally (im)prints itself in 
dissemination, as dissemination’.208  
Dissemination then presents itself as writing without a book, enfolded in 
the blankness of the page and as an allusion to the limitlessness of literature 
voiding itself in the infinity of references. In this context, literature is deprived 
of essence or truth, whilst the question concerning the essence of literature is 
formulated merely as an attempt to find out the subject and reasons of what has 
been represented and determined under the name literature. 
Writing is located within the problematic of truth between the 
ambiguities of a writing of alētheia and the playful hypomnesic (between 
memory and forgetting) writing: ‘less between presence and the trace than 
between the dialectical trace and the nondialectical trace’.209 It is no longer the 
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representation of the Same, but a process of play, of differences, of simulacrum. 
Having no essence of its own, writing erases itself: 
 
Having no essence, introducing difference as the condition for the 
presence of essence, opening up the possibility of the double, the copy, 
the imitation, the simulacrum – the game and the graphē are constantly 
disappearing as they go along. They cannot, in classical affirmation, be 
affirmed without being negated.210  
 
The deconstructive infrastructures thus devalue a generalized writing as the 
signification of the Same, to assert the construction of a literary work, ‘outside 
and independent of its logocentric content’, in which the latter is among its 
inscribed functions and ‘can be read in its anagrammatical texture’.211 
Derrida brings to the fore the absolute indispensability of the scriptural 
reference at the point at which the principle of difference must be considered as 
the very condition of signification. He bases his argument on both Plato’s 
mathematical play of proportionalities based on a logos without voice or God’s 
calculation expressed in the silence of numbers and Saussure’s Course in 
General Linguistics. He presents writing as parricidal in its disruptive intrusion 
of otherness and nonbeing, illustrates it as a play of difference and places it at 
the brink of madness by directing it against the paternal figure of Parmenides 
with his thesis of the unity of being. 
The Platonic concept of the absent origin beyond beingness and presence 
gives rise to a structure of supplements in which every presence stands for the 
absent and all differences will be its irreducible effect. Différance as the 
disappearance of the originary presence becomes both the condition of 
possibility and the condition of impossibility of truth. The absent origin then 
appears in the presence of its identity as ‘the possibility of its own most proper 
non-truth, of its pseudo-truth reflected in the icon, the phantasm, or the 
simulacrum’.212 Hence, the graphics of supplementarity supplying another unit, 
which is half the same and half the other, for the lack of a full unity makes 
repetition possible.  
                                                          
210 Jacques Derrida, ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’, p. 155. 
211 Jacques Derrida, ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’, pp. 156-157. 
212 Jacques Derrida, ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’, p. 166. 
 197
It is at this point that Derrida brings forth the inseparability of the two 
types of repetition according to the graphics of supplementarity beyond the 
metaphysical binary oppositions: the dialectics of the repetition and the return of 
the Same and the repetition of the dispersed and multiplied presence via 
phantasms and simulacra in the form of writing designed as ‘Death rehearsal. 
Unreserved spending. The irreducible excess through the play of the 
supplement’.213 It is at this point and within this reversibility that the Same is 
deprived of identity, deconstructed, and operated as supplement in différance, in 
writing. 
 
 
3. 3. Mimicry of Totality 
  
 
The deconstruction of the metaphysical universal of the Same through 
infrastructures brings forth an entire reorganization of thought shifting from the 
mode of representation toward that of repetition. The point of departure is 
transposed from the transcendental signified into its deconstruction which 
accounts precisely for the heterogeneity inherent in the classical philosophical 
discourse. In so doing, it offers a different reading of the classical philosophical 
texts which have served as a ground for the manifestation of the unity and 
totality of the Same. What is at stake is no longer the thinking of the truth of 
Being, but the thinking of the thought which, as Derrida points out in Positions, 
exceeds meaning; the ‘thought-that-means-nothing’.214 This new thought which 
exceeds meaning is simultaneously the exceeding of the Same, its presence and 
truth by the play of infrastructures that reveals aporias, discrepancies, and 
fissures inherent in the classical discourse.     
Among the ways of deconstructing the ontological understanding of 
mimēsis rooted in the relationship between the signified and the signifier is its 
reduction to the very matrix of mimesis. Derrida elaborates upon a certain play 
between literature and truth conditioning the whole of history by juxtaposing 
Mallarmé’s Mimique and the Platonic texts. It is anchored in the finiteness of 
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language and, hence, in play as a field of infinite substitutions, deprived of any 
center that arrests and grounds the play of substitutions.215 
The interpretation of mimēsis as that of any other discourse about the 
relationship between literature and truth, according to Derrida, ‘bumps up 
against the enigmatic possibility of repetition’.216 To be more precise, it bumps 
up against the inseparability of the two types of repetition delineated according 
to the graphics of supplementarity: the classical repetition of the Same and the 
repetition of the multiplied presence via phantasms and simulacra. The 
displacement of the classical model of the repetition which makes the self-
identity of the transcendental signified of the Same manifest is possible by 
introducing the infrastructure of the iterability. The infrastructure of iterability 
is, as Gasché describes, the reunification of two incommensurable meanings: the 
possibility of iteration or repetition, and also the possibility of alteration.217 It 
becomes possible due to the lack of plenitude of the repeated which inscribes 
within itself the possibility of nonidentity, and, at the same time, as a means to 
fill this lack. In this way, the repeated is always already something other than 
what it purports to be. 
The experiencing of otherness becomes therefore possible through a 
variety of overlapping operations which can be characterized as mimicry of the 
totality. All of them stem from the common belief that ‘at first, there are sources, 
the source is other and plural’.218 The exceeding of mimēsis as an imitation of 
logos or the unveiling of the Same is accomplished by substituting a copy for it 
or through the double’s resemblance (homoiōsis). Here is how Derrida sketches 
the schema of these relations: 
 
Logos must indeed be shaped according to the model of the eidos; the 
book then reproduces the logos, and the whole is organized by this 
relation of repetition, resemblance (homoiōsis), doubling, duplication, 
this sort of specular process and play of reflections where things (onta), 
speech, and writing come to repeat and mirror each other.219 
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It is predominantly this classical order of truth, the precedence [pré-séance] of 
the imitated or the hierarchy of the metaphysical signified of the Same which 
governs the ‘philosophical or critical interpretation of literature, if not the 
operation of literary writing’220 that Derrida aims to exceed. This exceeding 
becomes possible by the introduction of new operations no longer belonging to 
the system of truth. Among them, the Mime from the Mallarmean text of 
Mimique is not subjected to the authority of any book, except for writing himself 
on the white page, inscribing himself as at once image and model or neither 
image nor model, ‘both passive and active, matter and form, the author, the 
means, and the raw material of his mimodrama’.221  
In this way, the space opened up by the exceeding of the Same becomes 
occupied by another reading, in which writing refers to itself as a determinate 
structure at once open and closed. The process of cross-referencing is both 
endless and useless in respect of Mallarmé’s text. This text then reverses the 
metaphysical concept of truth as the search for the arkhē, the eskhaton, and the 
telos that governs the relationship between the signified and the signifier into 
truth ‘as the present unveiling of the present: monstration, manifestation, 
production, alētheia’.222 It preserves the differential structure of mimēsis, 
phantasma (the simulacrum as the copy of a copy), but without its Platonic or 
metaphysical interpretation; the metaphysical name of the idea, but in order to 
mark non-being, the nonreal, the nonpresent. This interplay of overlapping 
infrastructures, in which there is no longer any model, and hence, no copy, is no 
longer being referred back to any ontology or dialectic, but becomes a 
dramatization which illustrates nothing which illustrates the nothing in the 
theatrum philosophicum.  
There is thus nothing but the staging of the stage, on which the difference 
between difference and nondifference, the future (desire) and the present 
(fulfilment), the past (remembrance) and the present (perpetration),’the gaping 
void of desire, and presence, the fullness of enjoyment’223 are abolished, leaving 
space solely for a series of temporal differences. In fact, we deal with mimicry 
imitating nothing, having no reference, but acting as a simulacrum, a 
simulacrum of Platonism or Hegelianism, separated from what it simulates only 
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by a barely perceptible veil, running unnoticed ‘between Platonism and itself, 
between Hegelianism and itself. Between Mallarmé’s text and itself’.224  
The mimed event is thus nothing other than the space of writing, mimicry 
without imitation or verisimilitude, the spacing as traces, a nothing, a blank as a 
yet unwritten page, a difference between two lines defined as ‘hymen, crime, 
suicide, spasm […] — in which nothing happens, in which the simulacrum is a 
transgression and the transgression a simulacrum’.225 
 
 
3. 4 The Other of Philosophy 
 
Within the boundaries of an understanding of the cluster of overlapping 
infrastructures which make us experience the Other, we can approach Derrida’s 
elaboration of the issues concerned with literature or literary criticism. It is 
essential to note here that literature is for Derrida, as J. Hillis Miller describes, 
‘the possibility of any utterance, writing, or mark to be iterated in innumerable 
contexts and to function in absence of identifiable […] context’.226 The 
deconstructive approach to literature will be viewed in the frame of a relation of 
philosophy to its Other which is located within philosophy as ‘the margin of 
infrastructural possibilities’.227 
What is at issue in the deconstructive approach to literature is its 
approach vis-à-vis metaphysics: it tends to deconstruct the metaphysical 
understanding of literature as a discipline deprived of its specificity and reduced 
to the function of merely the signifier of the metaphysical signified of the Same, 
its message or truth. To use Derrida’s words, what he tends to deconstruct is 
precisely the tendency predominating in the Western tradition of the history of 
texts concerned with the transcendentality of reading, in its search for the 
signified.228 
From another angle, Derrida takes interest in the power of literature 
(since Mallarmé) to resist its reduction to ‘the transcendental authority and 
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dominant category of the episteme: being’.229 This resistance presupposes ‘a 
break with what has tied the history of the literary arts to the history of 
metaphysics’.230 Moreover, he takes interest in the power of literature to achieve 
the exposition of the Other as an experience of the Same by virtue of an 
experience of pure language as repetition, outside the realm of representation. 
We will subsequently trace Derrida’s attitude to literature in terms of what 
Bernstein describes as ‘the very marking of otherness in terms of the textual 
operation of non-concepts’.231   
In light of the aforementioned perspectives, Derrida inquires into the 
capacity of literary criticism to face up to the crisis of literature and to de-limit 
it. He is concerned with the crisis of thematic criticism anchored in the 
ontological interpretation of mimesis or metaphysical mimetologism, namely its 
quest for the preexisting meaning or signified of literature. What he aims to 
demonstrate is the limit of this criticism which is focused upon content, 
meaning, or the signified and the impossibility of determining a meaning 
through a text, pronouncing a decision upon it and saying that a theme is posed 
as such. In so doing, Derrida critiques the thematic approach, in its 
phenomenological, hermeneutic, and dialectical projects with its application of 
overloaded terms and concepts which treats the text as a form of expression by 
reducing it to a signified theme, a nuclear unit of meaning located outside of its 
signifier. Thematicism as such thus ignores the play that dissects the word, 
cutting it up and putting its pieces to work according to new networks of 
differences. The poverty of thematic criticism, as Derrida describes it, is that one 
sees themes ‘in the very spot where the nontheme, that which cannot become a 
theme, the very thing that has no meaning, is ceaselessly re-marking itself — 
that is disappearing’.232  
This critique of thematic criticism conditions the subversion of the very 
possibility of the institution of literary criticism as such. It is a subversion which, 
in respect of Gasché’s argumentation, is not the annihilation of literary criticism, 
but the ‘decapitation […] of its pretensions, and thus an assignment of its 
locus’.233 A different kind of literary criticism, accounting for the ultimate 
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possibility of a text’s meaning, hinges on the deconstruction of thematic 
criticism. Derrida offers a different kind of criticism which is supposed to 
account for the specificity of the work of literature in the undecidability of the 
text cut off from any signified and in the non-sense or non-theme of its spacing.  
This kind of literary criticism would rather focus upon the operation of writing 
which is indistinguishable from and accounts for the graphics of the hymen as 
opposed to the ‘dialecticity that has remained profoundly inseparable from 
metaphysics, from Plato to Hegel’.234 According to a non-Hegelian identity, this 
new criticism implies interruption that suspends the equation between the mark 
and the meaning. It sees marks as opposed to seeing themes, sees the structurally 
necessary position of the surplus mark, the margin of meaning inserted in the 
text to the extent that it does not exist outside the text and has no transcendental 
privilege. In so doing, the new criticism concentrates upon phonic and graphic 
differences rather than on plenitudes or intuitive presences showing the 
displacement of the existing taxonomy that writing achieves. 
What Derrida aims at is, generally speaking, the replacement of the 
hermeneutic concept of polysemy by dissemination, the meaning of which is the 
impossible return to the rejoined, readjusted unity of meaning. This replacement 
is only possible if literary criticism destroys itself as commentary by exhuming 
the originary unity encompassing the differences between work and 
commentary, force and signification, literature and philosophy, etc.235 The aim 
of deconstructive reading is, then, as Bernstein defines it, ‘to traverse texts, […] 
by discovering a blind spot in a text that exceeds the author’s intentions yet 
governs the logic of the text’.236 
The reading of Philippe Sollers’s novel Numbers (as well as a number of 
other readings of literary works) demonstrates the operation of this different kind 
of literary criticism, accounting for the deconstructive infrastructures in the 
singularity of this given text and the actual transmutations of the operation of 
writing due to its transgression of the signifying paradigm by substituting 
graphicity for the extratext, pure signifiers beyond representation for the extra-
textual signified of the Same. Transgressing the paradigm of signification, 
writing no longer contents itself with the act of making or producing in the sense 
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of unveiling or manifesting and is no longer governed by the motif of truth. It is 
instead ‘just as rigorously accountable for nonproduction, for operations of 
nullification and deduction, and for the workings of a certain textual zero’.237 It 
‘modulates expropriation, repeats it, regularly displaces it, and tirelessly 
enumerates it’.238  
The infrastructure of iterability is introduced here through numbers 
which enumerate, write, and read themselves by suspending the voice and 
dislocating the living presence represented by speech. The death of the voice, of 
the representative function of speech designating the truth of a signified does not 
amount to silence but to a polyphonic inscription. The values of vocal spacing 
are then regulated by an operation within voice, not by the authority of the word 
or the signified, but in respect of the general rule of textuality. Within the frame 
of the textual difference, the text indefinitely refers to endless connections and to 
the indefinitely articulated regress of the beginning. Here, the distinction 
between reader/spectator/author is erased. The author is depersonalized and re-
inscribed within this program becoming both part of the spectacle and part of the 
audience. His I is identified with the full force of writing as simulacrum that 
ceaselessly dislocates any identity.  
Subject to the infrastructure of iterability, in respect of which all 
oppositions based on the distinction between the original and the derived, the 
first and the second, one and two, etc. lose their pertinence, the text reproduces 
‘the process of its own triggering’239 by accounting for the possibility of what 
comes to inscribe itself as a supernumerary that divides or displaces the 
numbers. The whole cluster of infrastructures of accidents, secondaries, and 
surplus is in operation: ‘Two is no more an accident of one than one is a 
secondary surplus of zero (or vice versa)’.240 Phonetic writing finds itself grafted 
(where the graft is the heterogeneity of writing) to nonphonetic types of writing, 
particularly via the scission or disarticulation of silent spacing (bars, hyphens, 
dashes, numerals, quotation marks, blanks, etc.). 
The deactivated oppositions are only reactivated as effects of the game, 
as the trace imprinting itself by referring to another trace and by letting itself be 
upstaged and forgotten. According to Derrida’s description, ‘its force of 
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production stands in necessary relation to the energy of its erasure’.241 The text 
is thus a network of traces endlessly referring to something other than 
themselves (yet never to an extra-text) and tied in with Otherness in an 
irreducible manner. This network is, however, not subjected to an ultimate 
totality; neither is its linkage oriented by oneness and totality. According to 
Gasché, if the general text is an interlacing at all, it is not because it 
interconnects homogeneous threads into one totality but because ‘in an almost 
nonsensible, nonaesthetic manner, it links heterogeneous forces, which 
constantly tend to annul the text’s precarious unity ’.242       
From this perspective of textuality, the paradigm of the four in the same 
novel Numbers presented by the word square [carré] refers endlessly to cross-
roads, squares, and other four-sided figures deconstructing the metaphysical 
binary oppositions and the tetragram, the ternary rhythm (Oedipus, Trinity, 
Dialectics) of the Trinitarian foundations of Western thought. The fourth surface 
not only encompasses the Platonic moment, but also dismantles the hierarchy of 
the order of presence leading up to the visibility of the eidos. Its hierarchy is 
replaced by a hierarchy of the mirror — included in the totality of all onta and 
their images —through which things become present. 
In respect of a deconstructive reading, however, the novel Numbers is by 
no means reduced to a signified content or absolute referent, but demonstrates 
the distorted reflection of writing on the fourth panel, a certain squaring of the 
text. This makes the difference between the reading of a text and the revealing of 
a theme analogous to the choice between the interminable motion of writing and 
the polythematicism or polysemy. This is difference itself: the difference between 
discursive polysemy and textual dissemination, between the semantic as ‘the 
reappropriation of the seed within presence’ and the seminal which 
‘disseminates itself without ever having been itself and without coming back to 
itself’.243 This is, in the final accounting, the disseminative exposure of 
dissemination that breaks the circuit of representation, inscribing itself via 
writing through some ungovernable excess or loss.            
The deconstructive interplay of infrastructures, beyond the chain of 
signification conditions likewise Derrida’s approach to poetic texts. Poetic texts, 
predominantly those of Stephane Mallarmé, Francis Ponge, Paul Celan, and 
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Edmond Jabès enact intensely the paradoxes which lie at the heart of Derrida’s 
theory of deconstruction. Despite the fact that Derrida reads them in the light of 
their absolute singularity, the point of his departure is the infrastructure of 
iterability, as clearly stated in his text Che cos’è la poesia? which was originally 
a general reply to the question of the Italian journal Poesia: ‘What is poetry?’. 
Poetry, the singularity of the poem can solely be retained through learning it by 
heart, i.e., in the poetic language, as pure repetition.244 
Derrida’s deconstructive approach toward the elimination of the 
dominating signified of the Same and, hence the signifying function of literature 
becomes apparent in his inquiry into poetic texts as an experience of the 
absolutely heterogeneous Other. In the reading of Francis Ponge’s poem Fable, 
it takes the form of a certain experience of the impossible, namely the experience 
of the other as the invention of the impossible or the only possible invention. 
Derrida distinguishes between the invention as a return to the Same that does not 
invent anything, but amounts to the Same, and the impossible invention of the 
other as the production of a new event, beyond the speech act that allows the 
other to come.245 Derrida tackles the enigma of invention by deconstructing this 
metaphysically overloaded term (from the Port Royal Logic to Descartes, 
Leibniz, and Schelling). What is deconstructed is primarily the notion of 
possibility, viewed as the becoming of an available set of rule-governed 
procedures, methods, and accessible approaches. This deconstruction breaks the 
convention by inserting a disorder into the ordering of things and inventing 
something on this subject. 
The reading of Mallarmé’s texts starts from the elusion of the categories 
of history, literary classification, criticism, and all kinds of philosophies and 
hermeneutics. What is at stake is the limit of thematic criticism expressed in the 
claim for the impossibility of judging the Mallarmean text as event or 
interpreting its meaning except by falling short of it. Derrida generalizes this 
tendency as a crisis of criticism which ‘will always use judgement to decide 
(krinein) on value and meaning […]. A crisis, equally, of rhetoric, which arms 
criticism with an entire hidden philosophy. A philosophy of meaning, of the 
word, of the name’.246 In this crisis, the writing of Mallarmé marks both a 
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rupture and a repetition, by revealing ‘the essence of past literature for what it 
is’.247 
Derrida instead introduces another kind of criticism where the meaning 
remains undecidable, and ‘the signifier no longer lets itself be traversed, it 
remains, resists, exists and draws attention to itself’.248 Mallarmé’s style is 
characterized by a resistance against the pull of language toward a determinable 
meaning. This undecidability ‘is no longer attached to a multiplicity of 
meanings, to a metaphorical richness, to a system of correspondences’,249 but 
rather directs the signifier toward itself.  
Derrida demonstrates Mallarmé’s tendency for tracking down any 
signification in favour of the presence of the pure sign in the text, referring to 
nothing but itself. The disappearance of the text, as well as the disappearance of 
the author substitute for any search for definite meaning.250 
Mallarmé’s dream book rests upon the radical separation of word and 
being, and, hence the release of language from its bondage to being. It is emptied 
from any external point of reference, aspiring to the void, the primal nothing 
which Mallarmé confesses to have found without any knowledge of Buddhism 
in the face of an overwhelming vision. 
What in Derrida’s description passes through or traverses Mallarmé is 
the emerging poetics of nothing or impersonality, the contemplation of this 
nothing, and the self-annihilation of the author in the text.251 It is anchored in the 
understanding of the pure poem, in which the poet’s voice must be stilled and 
the initiative taken by the words themselves. The collision of words is compared 
with the flaming out of the swathe of fire, substituting for the classical 
understanding of lyric as audible breathing which stands for the poet’s own 
personal and passionate control of verse. 
Derrida traces the deconstructive tendency of liberating the forbidden 
jouissance in Mallarmé’s decomposition of the word, described as 
disintegration, by which he ‘liberated its energy’.252 He also stresses the 
deconstructive tendency of replacing semantics by the free play of syntax in 
Mallarmé’s urge to seize relationships and the interval which marks the end of a 
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culture in which the exploitation of semantic richness has been a critically 
foregrounded feature of poetry. The fulcrum is transposed from the inexhaustible 
resources of the word to a certain play of syntax. It is worth recalling Derrida’s 
citation of Mallarmé’s comment on this account: ‘I am profoundly and 
scrupulously a syntaxer’.253  
The word thus liberated is fixed in an empty space, in the spatial and 
visual field of the blank page, marked by undecidable relations between multiple 
meanings, meaning and form, by different grammatical categories. The frequent 
application of the mark and/or254 also signs the position of the word as a 
structure of pure relations in Mallarmé’s texts. 
Derrida applies the deconstructive term writing to Mallarmé’s texts and 
generalizes them as a system of différance which transgresses the appearance of 
identity. Through the textual analyses of Mallarmé’s texts, he deconstructs the 
classical understanding of poetry which involved itself in mere representation, 
and replaces it by the one which grounds its intelligibility upon its own laws of 
development. The new understanding of poetry as writing implies not the 
representation of the totality and identity of the Same, but the repetition of 
manifold fragments, the disposition of parts and their heterogeneity. 
It is noteworthy to follow Derrida’s deconstructive reading of Mallarmé 
which instead of prescribing a definite meaning to his poetic texts, demonstrates 
its very nonmeaning. The erasure of meaning is realized, for example by the 
effacement of the semantic meaning of the referent gold [or]: through extraction 
and condensation, the mixture of grammatical categories (hesitating between the 
form of the possessive adjective and that of the noun; the value of the noun and 
that of the determinative adjective), the play of homonyms or synonyms, the 
etymology, and even through referring to its English homonym or homogram. 
As a result, the hypothetical signified Or, its natural substance, is deconstructed 
by the multiple forms of the monetary sign of the signifier Or in such a way that 
only the sparkle of gold is left: 
 
All Mallarmean sunsets are moments of crisis, whose gliding [dorure] is 
continually evoked in the text by a dust of golden gleams [une poussiere d’eclats 
d’or] (dehORs [‘outside’], fantasmagORiques [‘phantasmagorical’], tresOR 
[‘treasure’], hORizon [‘horizon’], majORe [‘increase’], hORs [‘outside’]) 
                                                          
253 Jacques Derrida, Acts of Literature, p. 114. 
254 Ibid, p. 115. 
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until the ‘effacement de l’or’ [‘disappearance of the gold’], which loses 
itself in the numerous o’s of this page, in the accumulated zeros which 
increase the value only to return to the void.255 
 
Does the deconstruction of the noun Or, [gold], its meaning and function, lead 
towards an initial identity, a rhythmic totality? Or does it bring language through 
a plethora of signifiers to the primal void, the nothingness of the yet-unnamed, 
the very silence, the zero? Is or, here, one word or several words? Does 
Mallarmé evoke the mythical unity of word and being or rather return to the 
original absence of the name? 
Derrida leaves the chain of these questions open, alluding to the alchemy 
of the verb empowered to embrace the Orphic and Hermetic powers of the word, 
making things ‘appear and disappear by the simple declaration of its name’.256 
He rereads Mallarmé on this account:  
 
I say: a flower! and beyond the oblivion to which my voice relegates any 
shape, insofar as it is something other than the calyx, there arises musically, 
as the suave idea itself, the one absent from every bouquet. (Crise de vers, 
368).257 
 
Derrida’s reading of Mallarmé predicates the language of his texts upon a 
condition of namelessness that embraces all names and is bereft of a dominance 
of meaning. The word thus liberated of things and meaning becomes the 
diaphanous momentum preceding speech, that which by virtue of its presence, 
conjures the non-presence of language. 
To sum up, a deconstructive reading treats all of Mallarmé’s texts as a 
quest for the primordial nothing through a materiality of language, erasing itself 
in the very process of its existence. This is accomplished by means of various 
syntactical, grammatical, and typographical devices, and a reduction of meaning 
to the letters of the alphabet.  
Derrida aims to illustrate how the Mallarmean conception of 
undecidability takes over ‘a multiplicity of meanings, [...] a metaphorical 
richness, [...] a system of correspondences’.258 In so doing, Derrida 
                                                          
255 Jacques Derrida, Acts of Literature, p. 122. 
256 Jacques Derrida, Acts of Literature, p. 116. 
257 Cited in Jacques Derrida, Acts of Literature, p. 116.   
258 Jacques Derrida, Acts of Literature, p. 115. 
 209
demonstrates, among other issues, how in his texts the spatial relationships 
among words are constructed through typography that creates the illusion of 
words forming the blank page. The free dance of words liberated from meaning 
becomes a visual experience, in which the main theme (Un coup de dès jamais 
n’abolira le hasard, A Dice Throw At Any Time Never Will Abolish Chance) 
distinguishes itself through 48-point print, surrounded by secondary themes 
printed in smaller types. The central stand, however, is the creation of a blank 
space through the sign blanc, [white] which ‘permeates Mallarmé’s entire text, 
as if by symbolic magnetization’.259 The essential point here is the reduction of 
the sign white from the vast reservoir of meanings to the spacing of reading. 
We can see how Derrida abstains from giving a totalizing meaning to the 
Dice Throw or from constructing any kind of philosophical discourse on the 
themes of the game of necessity and chance. He abstains from casting the dice to 
produce the fatal combination, and therefore from making an act of choice that 
would abolish chance. He instead mentions all the issues he should have spoken 
of in a thematic discourse in the parentheses: (of Stephane Mallarmé, his life, his 
work, his thought, of his unconscious and of his themes, of what he obstinately 
wanted to say, etc.). In so doing, he demonstrates the possibility of a different 
kind of criticism which opens up the overlapping of a variety of combinations, a 
multiplicity of co-existing infrastructures in a single dicethrow which, due to a 
number of combinations come to produce the essential transformation and 
affirmation of the Book. The dream Book is not the production of one author, 
but of none or many; it is not the Being of a single outburst, but the eternal 
Becoming grasped in the iridescences of multitudinous successive fragments. It 
is both, ‘unique and changing’, as the ‘number-constellation [ ...] or [...] the 
work of art as outcome and justification of the world’.260 
The Dream Book of Mallarmé is at the same time the ‘promise of a still 
unheard-of language’ or ‘a sole poem previously inaudible’,261 to which the texts 
by Derrida respond endlessly. The way to this language lies through risking the 
norms and the body of the given language and the stereotypes or cultural clichés 
which surround it, by leaving the road and giving himself the slip, as he himself 
                                                          
259 Jacques Derrida, Acts of Literature, p. 115. 
260 Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, pp. 30-31. 
261 Jacques Derrida, Monolingualism of the Other or the Prosthesis of Origin, trans. by Patrick 
Mensah (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 67. 
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confesses.262 It is to the inventing of the impossible path of this promise of 
language, of the ‘monolanguage of the other’263 that Derrida’s entire efforts are 
aimed.      
The reading of various texts by Derrida testifies to the forms of polemic 
that the philosophical method of deconstruction takes against the metaphysically 
overloaded philosopheme of the Same by de-sedimenting and deconstructing its 
dominance for the sake of making us experience sameness in otherness, in the 
iterability of the absolutely singular, in the différance of the overlapping 
infrastructures and the liberation of the forbidden jouissance in the endless 
process of free creativity.  
The next chapter will examine the transposition of the issue of sameness 
into the repetition of the poetic texts by Rainer Maria Rilke. 
 
                                                          
262 Jacques Derrida, Monolingualism of the Other or the Prosthesis of Origin, p. 66. 
263 Ibid, p. 68. 
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Part Five: The Transposition of Sameness from 
Philosophy into the  
Poetic Language of Repetition 
 
Art does not imitate, above all because it repeats … 
                                               Gilles Deleuze.1 
 
 
This part will examine the transposition of the issue of sameness from the domain 
of philosophy into that of the poetic language. The acknowledgement of the 
impuissance of the philosophical discourse to provide an adequate 
conceptualization of sameness and to recreate the issue of sameness through the 
mediation of language constitute the preconditions for this transposition. These 
acknowledgements condition the quest for the pure language empowered to 
express the experience of sameness that has been haunting philosophy since its 
inception in Greece, but with particular intensity from Hegel onward. In Hegel, 
this is still the language of representation, posed between the naming of the 
ineffable experience of the Same and an impossibility of naming. Yet, from 
Nietzsche on, with the postulation of pure difference, the language of sameness 
becomes liberated from the function of representation and transformed into the 
poetic language of repetition, no longer a repetition of the Same, but of itself as 
pure signifier, signifying nothing but itself. 
 As investigated in the previous Part of this study, the transposition of the 
issue of sameness from the philosophical into poetic language has been realized 
upon the philosophical ground of pure difference. The phenomenon of this 
transposition starts with Nietzsche’s establishment of the theatrum philosophicum 
and his sketching the contours of the pure poetic language as the language of 
freedom, of the unconscious and inner experience, transgressing the realm of 
representation toward the free manifestation of nothing but itself as repetition. It is 
                                                 
1 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. by Paul Patton (London: Continuum, 2008),  
   p. 365. 
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subsequently developed by Heidegger’s quest for the originary voice of Being, 
disclosing itself in the pure delight of the beckoning stillness of the pure poetic 
language as the shining forth of the openness or nothing. In Derrida, the pure 
language takes the form of the most abyssal repetition that crosses the path of the 
entirely Other through dissemination, the mimicry of totality, and the simulacrum. 
As a play of difference, it is transmuted into the disruptive intrusion of Otherness, 
nonbeing, and multiplied presence of the phantasms. This transmutation 
substantiates in Derrida’s outline of the poetic language as the monolingualism of 
the Other, anchored in the infrastructure of iterability that implies the repetition of 
the absolutely singular Other, retained by the learning by heart of the poem.              
 What is at stake in this Part, is, therefore, the inquiry into this space of pure 
repetition, grounded upon the rupture of the conceptual framework of the 
representation of the identity of the Same and the opening up of the philosophical 
thought of pure difference, in which everything rests upon the disparity, 
divergence and otherness of the singularity of the differential. The concept of 
repetition, we argue, is best manifested in the ideal organization of pure language 
in the bare repetition of the singular form of the poem. In this way, sameness 
appears as the recurrence of the absolutely singular Other in the modern(ist) 
understanding of poetic language as that of pure repetition. 
 The space of repetition will be investigated not only through the texts 
belonging to philosophical postmodernism (Gilles Deleuze, Jacques Derrida, 
Michel Foucault, Roland Barthes, Jean Baudrillard, and others), but also through 
the poetic texts by Rainer Maria Rilke, Die Sonette an Orpheus (Sonnets to 
Orpheus, 1922). It is essential to note that it is not within the scope of this study to 
provide an investigation of Rilke’s poetic legacy, or cover the field of secondary 
sources concerning Rilke. It is rather an attempt to demonstrate the transposition 
of the issue of sameness from philosophy into the pure poetic language of 
repetition, an attempt that conditions greatly the choice of certain sonnets from the 
entire cycle or the reason for granting unequal space and attention to their 
analyses. 
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1. Shifting from the Repetition of the Same into the 
Repetition of the Other 
     
The process of the eventual transposition of the issue of sameness from the 
philosophical discourse into the pure poetic language of repetition takes its start 
with the postulation of pure conceptual difference (from Nietzsche onwards). This 
is no longer the repetition of the metaphysical signified of the Same that infinitely 
represents and exposes nothing but the Same, but the dynamic repetition of the 
variable differentials as pure signifiers which repeat nothing but themselves. The 
difference between two kinds of repetition may be traced by Deleuze’s 
juxtaposition of a repetition ‘of asymmetry in the cause’, or a repetition ‘of 
selection and freedom’ and the classical ‘repetition of equality and symmetry in 
the effect’ or the ‘repetition of mechanism and precision’.2 
 This new space of repetition substituting for the repetition of the Same is the 
space of difference, transgression and chaos, formed by the dissemination of 
simultaneously correlating singular differentials and the resonance established 
between them. Forming part of Foucault’s theatrum philosophicum,3 it dramatizes 
ideas instead of representing concepts and illustrates solely the pure space of 
nothing (as opposed to the metaphysical nothingness), in which repetition is 
interwoven from the differences between differential points, from the play of 
masks as pure signifiers, from simulacra. The theatre of repetition, in which we 
experience the freedom of dance and the dynamics of pure movement, is opposed 
in kind to the theatre of representation, anchored in the identity in concepts or 
representations. It shifts from the representation of the absolute identity of the 
Same into the repetition of the free play of the multiple configurations, appearing 
in the immediacy of the once-and-for-allness. The dominance of the ontological 
oneness of the Same is overcome by the dispersion of multiple fragments, 
repeating nothing but their pure singularity and introducing disequilibrium and 
dissymmetry into the identity of the Same.  
                                                 
2 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 359. 
3 Michel Foucault, Aesthetics, Essential works of Foucault 1954-1984, ed. by James D. Faubion, 
trans. by Robert Hurley and others (London: Penguin Books, 2000), II, pp. 343 – 368. 
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 This reorganization of thought strives to re-invent sameness in its difference 
and otherness or, according to Foucault, to show how ‘the Other, the Distant, is 
also the Near and the Same’, by posing the issue of sameness as that, which is 
‘still to be conquered in its contradiction’.4 In so doing, the repetition of the other 
and the different; the appearance of the Double, the hiatus and ‘the distance 
creating a vacuum within the Same’5 liberate sameness from the sedimentations of 
ontological and dialectical thought and re-postulate it as the central issue of 
philosophy. Moreover, the shift from representation into repetition reasserts 
thought as moving not towards ‘the never-completed formation of Difference, but 
towards the ever-to-be-accomplished unveiling of the Same’.6 
 The thought of pure repetition, which is the ‘repetition of the signifier, 
repetition that is null or annulling, repetition of death’,7 realizes itself by virtue of 
writing as dissemination. In this context writing is no longer subjected to the 
authority of the Same, but is the mere inscription of itself or the effacement of 
itself on the blank page. The blank page, as the erasure of what has ever been 
written on it and all that is being written on it always but for the first time, is the 
disappearance of the speaking subject or the discourse and the appearance of 
language in its raw being endlessly repeating itself. This is a pure repetition 
beyond the realm of representation in so far as it does not reveal, represent or 
translate the transcendental signified of the Same or constitute a relationship of 
identity between writing and the Same. Instead, it illustrates nothing but the pure 
intensity of language as the manifold play of multiple differentials and fragments 
which gain more importance than the whole. In this reorganization of culture 
where the metaphysical signified of the Same loses its Platonic pertinence as the 
original, and, therefore, writing loses the pertinence of being its copy, the entire 
value of literature is reconsidered. From now on, it emerges as a theatre of 
thought, in which the invariant of the Same is deactivated and the trace becomes 
                                                 
4 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things, A translation of Les Mots et les chose (New York: 
Vintage Books, A Division of Random House, Inc., 1994), p. 339. 
5 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things, p. 340. 
6 Ibid, p. 340. 
7 Jacques Derrida, Dissemination, trans. and with an Introduction by Barbara Johnson (London: 
Continuum, 2004), pp. 136 – 137. 
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not the trace signifying the Same, but merely an imprint of itself, in its relatedness 
to other traces and in the constant erasure of itself. 
 Yet, the new writing of pure repetition does not cease to inquire into the 
enigma of sameness, but is itself an inquiry into its infinite power. It constantly 
dislocates and displaces the identity of the Same, by pushing it to its utmost limit 
in order to let sameness shine in its full splendour. Moreover, in this zone of 
transgression writing is, to use Foucault’s words, not only the ‘sole manner of 
discovering the sacred in its unmediated substance, but also a way of recomposing 
its empty form [...] through which it becomes all the more scintillating’.8     
 This pure repetition lies in the power of language and, according to Deleuze, 
‘it implies an always excessive Idea of poetry’.9 The ideal organization of 
language appears at its best in the form of repetition in the poem which produces 
bare repetition by combining nominal concepts and concepts of freedom. In the 
absolutely singular form of the poem (its measure, rhyme, elliptical form, absence 
of the constraint of the plot), ‘to the extent that it purports to say both itself and its 
sense, while appearing as always displaced and disguised nonsense’,10 sameness 
scintillates in its full unmediated splendour. Moreover, it is by virtue of the 
singular form of the poem that the enigma of sameness reappears in the full array 
of difference and otherness no longer as a dominant concept of identity, but as the 
infinite recurrence of the absolutely unique co-existing singularities. The 
otherness of the poetic form, by virtue of an otherness in rhythm, sound-pattern, 
grammar, semantics, structural disorganization and the rupture between 
sound/sense, deconstructs the homogeneity of representation to open up the 
hidden resources of language in its distance and proximity to the Same.11 Here is 
how Roland Barthes describes modern poetry, referring to the Word as to an 
expansion of the letter, standing for the poem:  
 
                                                 
8 Michel Foucault, Aesthetics, Essential works of Foucault 1954-1984, II, p. 70. 
9 See for a detailed account on poetry as repetition in Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 
pp. 363 – 365; this citation in p. 363. 
10 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, pp. 363 – 365; this citation in p. 363. 
11 See on this issue in Michel Foucault, Aesthetics, Essential works of Foucault 1954-1984, II, p. 
134. 
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Elle ne garde des rapports que leur movement, leur musique, non leur vérité. 
Le Mot éclaté au-dessus d’une ligne de rapports évidés, la grammaire est 
dépourvue de sa finalité, […] elle n’est plus qu’une inflexion qui dure pour 
présenter le Mot’.12 
 
Modern poetry emerges as an absolutely unique repetition, i.e. a form of writing 
of which the sum remains necessarily uncountable and the account impossible. 
The deconstruction of the metaphysical concept of poetry belonging to poiesis can 
be traced in Derrida who cuts all ties with genealogy, discursive and literary 
poetry of the sublime and the incorporeal to assert the singularity of the poem. 
The singularity of the poem — displaced outside poetry in general, before any 
poiesis, pure poetry, pure rhetoric, reine Sprache or the setting-forth-of-truth-in-
the-work’13 — can be retained solely through learning it by heart. What is at stake 
thus is solely the angelic poem as the singular mark, the signature that repeats its 
dispersion, the event whose singularity no longer separates the ideality from the 
body of the letter, but seals together the meaning and the letter, like a rhythm 
spacing out time, ‘rhythm but dissymmetry’.14 The origin of the poetic, in terms of 
the modern(ist) understanding of poetry as repetition lies in the very ‘desire of this 
absolute inseparation, the absolute non-absolute’,15 in which the Same is 
simultaneously itself and the Other.  
In summary, this is a period when sameness becomes transposed into the 
pure being of language as repetition, as an experience of death and absence, where 
the mirror and the simulacra enact their roles. In this period sameness as a 
language of repetition becomes of greatest urgency for philosophers, as well as for 
poets (with Nietzsche and Mallarmé onwards). The poets become greatly 
concerned with creating a zone of pure transgression, in which language is pushed 
to its limits to mirror nothing but itself, repeat nothing but its own singularity in 
the multiple configurations of words. The role of the poet is greatly stressed in 
                                                 
12 Roland Barthes, Le degré  zero de l’écriture (Éditions du Seuil, 1953 et 1972), p. 37. (It 
[the Modern poetry] retains only the movement, the music of relationship, not their 
reality. The Word explodes above a line of emptied relations, grammar is bereft of 
finality, … it becomes nothing but an inflexion which lasts to present the word). 
13 Jacques Derrida, ‘Che cos’è la poesia’, in Jon Cook, Poetry in Theory: An Anthology 1900 – 
2000 (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), p. 536. 
14 Derrida, Jacques ‘Che cos’è la poesia’, p. 536. 
15 Ibid, p. 534. 
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this period. For example, Alain Badiou has rightly suggested calling this lengthy 
period beginning with Hölderlin when ‘the poem rallied round same essential 
philosophical themes’, ‘the age of the poet’.16 Walter Strauss introduces the 
category of poet-thinkers (comprising all the major poets of the 19 – 20th centuries 
since Hölderlin, with Rilke and Ponge among them) who, in the absence of cogent 
philosophical and theological frameworks for thinking, have tried to propose a 
coherent vision of their world and have been compelled to assimilate their 
linguistic creation, their parole, to the exigencies of their thought.17 Erich Heller 
views the reconciliation of the poet and the philosopher, Dichter und Denker, 
Rilke and Nietzsche realizable via the return to Oneness by virtue of a return to 
the primordial word, or a transposition onto the ontological ground of speech, 
where the void is desperately filled with the unutterable word, the unnameable 
name. The poet and the philosopher are united then through speech and the 
impossibility of speech, through a dedication to ‘a belief in everything that has 
never been uttered before, and to the adventure of willing what nobody has ever 
dared to will’.18 
 For the abovementioned reasons, we will subsequently inquire into the 
repetition of the poetic language in the singular form of the poem as a 
transposition of the issue of sameness from philosophy into poetry. What the 
examination of the poetic texts will attempt to demonstrate, is the reassessment of 
the issue sameness through its liberation from representation in order to be 
manifest in the pure poetic language. In this period, poetry exhausts itself in the 
search of the nothing and, according to Badiou: ‘propagates the idea of an 
intuition of the nothing in which being would reside when there is not even the 
site for such intuition’.19  
 We are also concerned with investigating the establishment of the new mode 
of thought beyond representation (by the beginning of the twentieth century) that 
grapples with the issue of sameness in its otherness and difference, in the abyss of 
                                                 
16 Alain Badiou , Conditions, trans. by Steven Corcoran (London: Continuum, 2008), p. 39. 
17 Walter A. Strauss, Rilke and Ponge: ‘L’Objet c’est la Poétique’ in Rilke: the Alchemy of 
Alienation, ed. by Frank Baron, Ernst S. Dick, and Warren R. Maurer (Lawrence: Regents Press of 
Kansas, 1980), p. 90. 
18 Erich Heller, The Disinherited Mind (Cambridge: Bowes & Bowes, 1952), p. 103. 
19 Alain Badiou, Being and Event, trans. by Oliver Feltham (USA: Continuum, 2007), p. 54. 
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nothingness and the double, through the pure repetition of the poem. It is in this 
very period that philosophy and poetry are more than ever engaged with the same 
task and, to use Rainer Maria Rilke’s (1875 - 1926) words, become more closely 
linked than before through their search for truth and beauty.20 In other words, 
what we are particularly engaged with is the inquiry into Rilke’s coinage of a new 
poetic language of pure repetition as an experience of sameness in its otherness. 
We will also inquire into Rilke’s reflection upon the fundamental philosophical 
question of ‘Why is there something rather than nothing?’ in respect of a 
somethingness which is sometimes transformed into the mystical experience of 
nothingness.21 
 The movement toward this new mode of thought, by virtue of which the 
issue of sameness is manifested in the full array of its contradictions in poetic 
language, will be demonstrated through Rilke’s poetic texts from Die Sonette an 
Orpheus (Sonnets to Orpheus, 1922). The choice of these texts is primarily 
conditioned by the fact that Rilke poses his quest for the new poetic language both 
in respect of and in contrast to the Orphic dimension by offering a different 
understanding of poetic Orphism. As we will attempt to demonstrate through 
Rilke’s poetic texts, the unveiling of the issue of sameness in the poetic language 
is best accomplished through the precarious balance between identity and 
difference where the thought of the Same is already stripped of representation, but 
is not yet forgotten. We argue that it is solely in the precarious balance when 
difference is no longer subordinated to identity, but is not yet unlinked from 
sameness; when the Other is not dominated by the Same, but does not itself 
become a dominating idea bereft of the wisdom of sameness, that the issue of 
sameness reveals itself in its real plenitude: as the affirmation and positive 
recurrence of the absolutely unique differentials in their otherness.  
 This brings us to conclude that the new criteria for validating art are to be 
sought in the precarious balance between identity and difference. A balance which 
only becomes possible through the revelation of the plenitude of sameness which 
                                                 
20 Rainer Maria Rilke, ‘Essay on Maurice Maeterlinck’, in (KA IV, 217) cited in Paul Bishop, 
‘Rilke: Thought and Mysticism’, in The Cambridge Companion to Rilke, ed. by Karen Leeder and 
Robert Vilain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 159.  
21 See details of this view in: Paul Bishop, ‘Rilke: Thought and Mysticism’, p. 168. 
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means that the Same should be stripped not only of being represented as a 
totalizing, dominating concept of pure identity, but also of becoming annulled and 
forgotten. The latter tendency is characteristic of contemporary art which has 
either forgotten the enigma of sameness or is confused by its metaphysical 
dominance. This allows speaking of the duplicity of contemporary art which, to 
use Jean Baudrillard’s words, asserts ‘nullity, insignificance, meaninglessness’ 
and strives for ‘nullity, when already null and void’.22 Nullity or nothing, as the 
‘real insignificance, the victorious challenge to meaning’23 is, however, a rare 
quality of a few exceptional works, anchored rather in experiencing its plenitude 
in the precarious balance of identity and difference than the annulment of 
sameness. A quality which we believe is characteristic of Rilke’s poetic texts. The 
poetic singularity of Rilke’s text is manifested in the very unveiling of the 
plenitude of sameness by virtue of the vertiginous experience of void and nothing, 
in his reintegrating the voice of repetition into language to shape its own praising-
space. In this praising-space, the praising of the plenitude of sameness becomes 
the praising of what Baudrillard calls the ‘spirituality of language’, the praising of 
language itself, of ‘the energy and happiness of language’.24  
 We will subsequently inquire into Rilke’s poetic texts as a paradigm of 
poetic language liberated from the domain of representation. In this pure being of 
language as repetition, we will trace the ever more scintillating plenitude of the 
sameness, encompassing all the characteristic traits of transgression: the double, 
the other, the simulacra, the phantasm, and the nothing. In case the examination 
proceeds with the close-reading of the sonnet, the entire text of the sonnet with its 
English translation will be provided.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22 Jean Baudrillard, The Conspiracy of Art (Semiotext(e) (New York: Columbia University, 2005), 
p. 27. 
23 Jean Baudrillard, The Conspiracy of Art (Semiotext(e), p. 27. 
24 Jean Baudrillard, The Conspiracy of Art (Semiotext(e), p. 174. 
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2. Rilke’s Poetic Language of Repetition 
 
2. 1. The Poetic Space of Rilke 
 
The significance of Rilke’s authorship and oeuvres gives rise to a vast body of 
investigations which have engaged with his personality, legacy, and issues 
relating to the translations of his works. A number of them have linked Rilke’s 
life to his work, resulting in the emergence of biographical and psychoanalytic 
investigations of Rilke that expose the documented life of the poet to the public.25 
Others consider his correspondence, full of deep meditations on life and art, 
indispensable for gaining a full understanding of the poet, given the profundity of 
thought expressed.26  
 The present study, however, is not engaged with the aforementioned aspects 
of Rilke, but proceeds instead from an alternate reading of his poetic texts on 
Orpheus as a coinage of a new poetic language, or, to use Rüdiger Görner’s 
words, as Rilke’s ‘contribution to German culture in terms of its poetic 
language’.27 In so doing, it views the poetic language of Rilke within the 
framework of the recurring theory of the disappearance of the author. This theory 
stems from the argument that the task of criticism is not to bring out the work’s 
relationships with the author, or reconstruct through the text a thought or 
experience, but rather analyze the work through its structure, architecture, intrinsic 
form and the play of its internal relationships.28 Rilke’s texts are, therefore, read 
as a pure repetition of language, beyond the confines of the writing subject or 
within a space where the latter constantly disappears. They are read in terms of 
writing [écriture] which appears as a result of the disappearance of the subject 
                                                 
25 Among them: Donald Prater, A Ringing Glass (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986), Patricia Pollock 
Brodsky, Rainer Maria Rilke (Boston: Twayne, 1988), David Kleinbard, The Beginning of Terror 
(New York: New York University Press, 1993), Ralph Freedman, Life of a Poet: Rainer Maria 
Rilke (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1996), and others. 
26 See: Ulrich Baer, ‘The Status of the Correspondence in Rilke’s Work’, in The Cambridge 
Companion to Rilke, pp. 27 – 38. 
27 Rüdiger Görner, ‘Rilke: A Biographical Exploration’, in The Cambridge Companion to Rilke, p. 
20.   
28 See a detailed account of this view in Michel Foucault, ‘What Is an Author?’, in Aesthetics, 
Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984, II, pp. 205 – 222.  
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marking ‘the signature of an unceasing omission’ and pointing to its very 
absence.29 
 The preconditions for the manifestation of the pure language of repetition in 
Rilke’s Sonnets lie in the deconstruction of the tradition of myth, the discourse of 
history, and the classical genre of the sonnet. This deconstructive process in Rilke 
is remarked by Volker Durr who draws analogies between Nietzsche’s 
‘revaluation of all values’ and Orpheus’s ultimate message of overcoming 
established notions or enacting the reverse of all traditional assumptions.30 Rilke’s 
unique treatment of the Orphic myth provides primarily a reconsideration of the 
poetic figure of Orpheus and of the ontological understanding of poetry offered by 
it, in order to suggest a new poetic language beyond representation.31 Or, to use 
Erika Nelson’s words, we can speak of Rilke’s own ‘vision of the modern poet 
who recaptures, recreates, and revises the traditional power and scope of the 
Orphic vision in all its complexities for the modern world’.32 It is from the scope 
of Rilke’s coinage of a new poetic language in his overall ‘project to revolutionize 
poetry and the poetic tradition of the modern age’33 that his Sonnets will 
subsequently be analyzed.  
 The myth of Orpheus emerges as a central theme in modern French poetry, 
particularly in the later poetry of Mallarmé, whose influence on Rilke is referred 
to in secondary sources. Judith Ryan, for one, mentions Mallarmé’s ‘spare, 
hermetic poetry’ which influences Rilke,34 while according to Rilke’s letter, he 
himself considers Mallarmé to be ‘der sublimste, der dichteste Dichter unserer 
Zeit’.35 Yet, Rilke’s own attempt at liberating language from representation lies 
not in the removal of the voice (as in case of Mallarmé), but its re-inscription into 
                                                 
29 Jacques Derrida, Acts of Literature, ed. by Derek Attridge (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 113. 
30 Volker Durr, ‘Rainer Maria Rilke: The Poet’s Trajectory’, in Studies on Themes and Motifs in 
Literature, ed. by Horst S. Daemmrich (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc., 2006), pp. 132 – 
133. 
31 See: Dianna C. Niebylski, The Poem on the Edge of the Word: The Limits of Language and the 
Uses of Silence in the Poetry of Mallarmé, Rilke, and Vallejo (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 
Inc., 1993) on the crisis of language in Modern poetry, pp. 3- 10. 
32 Erika M. Nelson, ‘Reading Rilke’s Orphic Identity’, in Studies in Modern German Literature, 
vol. 101 (Bern: Peter Lang, 2005), p. 22. 
33 Erika M. Nelson, ‘Reading Rilke’s Orphic Identity’, p. 169. 
34 Judith Ryan, Rilke, Modernism and Poetic Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999), p. 156. 
35 Letter to Rudolf Bodländer, March 23, 1922, cited in Erika M Nelson, ‘Reading Rilke’s Orphic 
Identity’, p. 64. 
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the language of praising. This is the reason why Rilke’s reintroduction of the 
Orphic tradition should be regarded in terms of the coinage of a pure praising of 
language, or as Gaston Bachelard describes it, as ‘an exhaltation of joy, the 
outward expression of the joy of breathing’.36 
 This is realized through recomposing the traditional sonnet by the otherness 
of the poetic form, in which the intriguing play of identity and difference is 
demonstrated. Rilke preserves the formal architectonic organization of the sonnet, 
while transforming some of its characteristic features, such as rhyme patterns 
(abab in the first quatrain and cddc in the second one), metre (comprising stanzas 
of different length of lines; for example in sonnet 1,9), feet (the combination of 
dactyls, i.e. a stressed syllable followed by two unstressed ones; for example in 1, 
18 & 2, 18 or the implication of exclusively dactyls, which traditionally was a 
feature of the elegy; as in 1,7; 1,9 and 2, 20), and the overrunning of the divide 
between the quatrain and the tercet by an enjambment which links both parts of 
the sonnet.37 His modification of the rhyming scheme, particularly the changing of 
the length of the line of the traditional sonnet, characteristic also of Mallarmé (the 
sonnet Salut, preceding Rilke’s Sonnets) and Valéry (the sonnet Le Sylphe, 
published in 1921), affects the structure of the form to such an extent that, to use 
Belmore’s words, it becomes difficult to accept some of these poems as sonnets at 
all.38 His alteration of rhyming through the present participles used as nouns, 
acquires the significance of philosophical conceptions in their generalization, 
while the pairing of antithetical notions stresses the underlying differences 
concealed under apparent similarities. Belmore stresses the revolution 
accomplished by Rilke in rhyming, stating it may well be the first time that 
rhymes have been thus used and that a ‘subtler way of using them can hardly be 
imagined’.39    
 Upon the ground of this general outline of Rilke’s attempt to coin a language 
of pure repetition we will subsequently follow his deconstruction of the Same 
                                                 
36 Gaston Bachelard, Air and Dreams, trans. by Edith and Frederick Farrell (Dallas: Dallas Inst 
Humanities & Culture, 1988), p. 239. 
37 See an account of the changes inscribed into the classical form of the sonnet in Thomas 
Martinec, ‘The Sonnets to Orpheus’, in The Cambridge Companion to Rilke, pp. 103 – 105.    
38 Herbert William Belmore, Rilke’s Craftsmanship: An Analysis of his Poetic Style (Basil 
Blackwell: Oxford, 1954), pp. 12 – 13. 
39 Herbert William Belmore, Rilke’s Craftsmanship: An Analysis of his Poetic Style, p. 24. 
223 
 
myth of Orpheus, the decomposition of the Same sonnet-form and the 
dismemberment of any preconceived whole in order to liberate the hidden energy 
of language. We will trace the absolutely unique space of Rilke’s writing as a 
transposition of the plenitude of sameness into the poetic language of pure 
repetition where it scintillates in its full splendour.  
 Rilke’s quest for a new poetic language outside representation is expressed 
intensely from the very first sonnets which will be read as the key elements of the 
entire cycle. The close-reading of the first two sonnets will provide access to the 
remaining sonnets which will be discussed briefly in respect of the scope of our 
subject-matter (as it would be the task of a separate monograph to treat each of the 
sonnets at any length). Likewise, in our reading of the poems, we will emphasize 
the original German, relying on the English translations of J. B. Leishman40 and 
Howard A. Landman,41 but replacing them with our own literal translations, 
wherever the subtleties of language require it. So all translations, if not indicated 
otherwise, are our own literal translations. We will also provide the entire texts of 
the first three sonnets and the English translations by Landman, given that their 
analyses are based upon the close-reading of the texts. The texts of the remaining 
sonnets will merely be indicated by pointing to the number of the cycle (I or II), 
the sonnet, and the line, correspondingly.     
  
 
                                                 
40 Rainer Maria Rilke, Sonnets to Orpheus, trans. by J. B. Leishman (London: The Hogarth Press, 
1946). 
41 Rainer Maria Rilke, Sonnets to Orpheus, trans. by Howard A. Landman, from Howard A. 
Landman / howard@polyamory.org. 
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2. 2. Die Sonette an Orpheus: Inventing a Poetic Language of 
Repetition   
 
2.2.1 Reinventing Sameness through the Poetic Language of Recurrence   
 
The present reading of Die Sonette an Orpheus42 is an inquiry into Rilke’s 
invention of a new poetic language of repetition beyond the realm of 
representation. We will trace the displacement of the dominant metaphysical 
universal of the Same, corroborated by the Orphic myth as the world-building 
capacity of the logos by the poetic singularity of the other, manifested as the very 
advent of language. Rilke’s departure from the myth of Orpheus is reflected 
primarily in the withdrawal of Orpheus from the majority of the sonnets which 
have come to existence solely due to his absence and are marked by this absence. 
The departure from the Orphic myth is simultaneously a departure from the 
transcendental signified of the Same in order to reinvent it through the recurrence 
of the event of the word, extending itself in the silence and the voice, in its being 
and non-being, as the impossible shaping of nothing.43 This departure serves as a 
ground for Ryan’s original characterization of the Sonnets as a converting of 
Symbolist and classicising moments into ‘a sonnet sequence decisively modernist 
in character’.44 
 This chapter will examine the first Sonnet as the key to Rilke’s quest for 
coining a new poetic language of repetition beyond the realm of representation.45 
Given that the examination will be based upon the close-reading of the text, we 
are providing the entire text of the sonnet.   
 
                                                 
42 All references to Rilke’s poetry are from Rainer Maria Rilke, Werke: Kommentierte Ausgabe 
(KA), ed. by Manfred Engel and others, 4 vols (Frankfurt am Main and Leipzig: Beck, 1996). 
43 See: Rainer Maria Rilke und Marina Zwetajewa: Ein Gespräch in Briefen, Herausgegeben von 
Konstantin M. Asadowski, übersetzt von Angela Martini-Wonde (Frankfurt am Main und Leipzig: 
Suhrkamp, 1998) for Zwetajewa’s opinion of Rilke’s coinage of a pure poetic language, pp. 54 – 
57. 
44 Judith Ryan, Rilke, Modernism and Poetic Tradition, p. 171. 
45 See: Theodore Ziolkowski Die Welt im Gedicht. Rilkes Sonnette an Orpheus II,4 
(Würzburg:Königshausen & Neumann, 2010) for a recent example of singling out one of the 
sonnets from the entire cycle.   
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Sonnets to Orpheus I, 1 
by R. M. Rilke 
translated by H. Landman  
 
A tree ascended there. Oh pure 
transcendence! 
Oh Orpheus sings! Oh tall tree in the 
ear! 
And all grew hushed. But in that very 
silence 
a new beginning, sign and change 
appeared.  
Quiet creatures gathered from the 
clear 
unhurried forest, out of lair and nest; 
and so it must have been, their 
stealthiness 
was not born out of cunning or of fear, 
but just from hearing. Bellow, cry, and 
roar 
seemed tiny in their hearts. And where 
before 
there barely stood a hut to take this in, 
a hiding place of deepest darkest yens,
and with an entryway whose 
doorposts trembled - 
you built for them an auditory temple. 
Da stieg ein Baum. O reine 
Übersteigung! 
O Orpheus singt! O hoher Baum im Ohr!
Und alles schwieg. Doch selbst in der 
Verschweigung 
ging neuer Anfang, Wink und Wandlung 
vor.  
Tiere aus Stille drangen aus dem klaren 
gelösten Wald von Lager und Genist; 
und da ergab sich, daß sie nicht aus List 
und nicht aus Angst in sich so leise 
waren,  
sondern aus Hören. Brüllen, Schrei, 
Geröhr 
schien klein in ihren Herzen. Und wo 
eben 
kaum eine Hütte war, dies zu empfangen, 
ein Unterschlupf aus dunkelstem 
Verlangen 
mit einem Zugang, dessen Pfosten beben, 
- 
da schufst du ihnen Tempel im Gehör.  
 
     
 The first Sonnet to Orpheus as the opening sonnet to the entire cycle 
substantiates the quest for an impossible language beyond the realm of 
representation which is delineated through the limiting experiences of 
discursiveness, historicity, and culture. As the key sonnet, it intensifies and 
accumulates the major tendencies of the entire cycle, making clear that its 
dedication to Orpheus in the classical sonnet-form is not a return to myth but the 
very questioning of it; a quest for a different language, affirming itself as pure 
event, writing without literature, myth, or author.  
 The transposition of the philosophical question of sameness into the poetic 
language of pure repetition is unfolded through the intrusion of the otherness of 
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the key phrase ‘Orpheus singt’ (Orpheus sings, line 2; 1,1) into the otherwise 
coherent discourse of the poem. The singing of Orpheus as a pure signifier 
disperses the infinite discourse of representation through the displacement of the 
poetic language into the abyss, the void or, in Maurice Blanchot’s words, the 
‘space of dispersion’.46 This key phrase stands for the poetic language of 
repetition in its quest to overcome the alienation of sameness within the discourse 
of signification and return it to its original status of the ungraspable by virtue of 
the other, the void, or the absolute singularity of the differential.   
 Moreover, the entire structure of the sonnet is based upon the matrix of the 
divergence of the phrase ‘Orpheus singt’ from the coherent narrative stretching 
throughout the sonnet; the divergence of the poetic language as the pure sign, the 
very indication of itself from the discourse of signification. It is the confrontation 
of an Orpheussian singing with myth; the confrontation of the pure event of 
language with the discourse of representation unfolded by virtue of the subtleties 
of language. We will attempt to demonstrate how the entire sonnet is based upon 
the very tension between these two modes of arrangement.    
 The difference between these two modes becomes explicit by the opposition 
of the past and present tenses (the prevailing past tense of the sonnet as opposed to 
the present tense of the key phrase ‘O Orpheus singt’) and the application of the 
present tense (‘O Orpheus singt’) to the mythological narrative of Orpheus that 
should normally be in the Past Indefinite. The replacement of the past tense, 
usually typical for a mythological narrative, with the Present Indefinite stresses 
the event of Orpheus’s singing and testifies to the sonnet’s being not the least 
concerned with either the return to myth or the demythologization of Orpheus: the 
Orpheus of the sonnet is demythologized from the very start. 
 Besides, constituting the only present point, this key phrase diverges from 
the rest of the sonnet which is in the Past Indefinite, emphasizing the significance 
of the poetic singing. The otherness of the phrase emphasizes the presentness of 
singing as an infinite repetition of itself, intersecting the representation of the 
Same. Singing in the present is the detachment of the Same from the discourse of 
signification to pose it in the impossible experience of poetic language as the 
                                                 
46 Maurice Blanchot, ‘The Limit-Experience’, in The Infinite Conversation, trans. by Susan 
Hanson (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), p. 187. 
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experience of the unattainable which is present through the voice, but also the 
elimination of the voice. This dual function or rather exposition of the poetic 
voice and its relatedness to sameness has been among the central concerns of 
Rilke; according to Ben Hutchinson, Rilke maintains a striking conceptual 
consistency about the notion of silence which ‘regenerates language precisely 
through its suppression’.47 
 The present tense of the key sentence is opposed to the rest of the sonnet, in 
which the application of the Past Indefinite48 in combination with the third person 
creates what Emile Benveniste calls the objective situation of the domain of the 
third person.49 It stresses the impersonality of the narrative stretching coherently 
throughout the entire sonnet (from the first line up to the end, with the exception 
of the phrase ‘Orpheus singt’) and the disinterestedness of the sonnet with the 
discourse of representation, contrary to the poetic singing.  
 In one sense, the domain of the third person in combination with the past 
tense creates an atmosphere of dispassionateness and distance between narrator 
and narration, an indefinite space of writing beyond passion and mystification, 
beyond negation and affirmation, beyond dialectics. In another, it composes the 
interminable net of coherent discourses, of the discursivity of human language in 
service of history, myth, and literature under the domain of signification.  We will 
see through the textual analysis attempted below how relinquishing the ‘reign of 
circumspect consciousness’50 of the I and the intensity of the Present Indefinite, 
the application of the Past Indefinite tense in combination with the neutral third 
person creates a general discourse of representation, simultaneously 
demonstrating the sonnet’s disinterestedness with and detachment from the realm 
of representation. This disinterestedness is emphasized through the sudden 
experience of the presentness of the singt which emerges as an element of 
incoherence, fracturing the highly organized structure of the discourse, protected 
                                                 
47 Ben Hutchinson, Rilke’s Poetics of Becoming (London: Legenda, Modern Humanities Research 
Association and Maney Publishing, 2006), p. 160. 
48 See: Roland Barthes, L’écriture du Roman in Le Degré zero de l’écriture (Paris: Éditions du 
Seuil, 1972), pp. 25 – 32, for a detailed account of the meaning of the Past Indefinite. 
49 Emile Benveniste, Problems in General Linguistics, trans. by Mary Elizabeth Meek (Coral 
Gables, Fla: University of Miami Press, 1971), p. 221. 
50 Maurice Blanchot, ‘The Absence of the Book’, in The Infinite Conversation, p. 384.  
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by the indestructibility of its pastness. The past discourse is constantly viewed in 
relation to the present point of the singt, in its remoteness and relatedness to it.    
 The contrast of the tenses intensifies the opposition between the immanence 
of the poetic singing as a repetition of otherness and the discourse which 
represents nothing but the Same. Repetition is implied in the act of Orphic singing 
which is a singular event of language in the form of repetition — the singularity of 
which is stressed through the application of the proper noun of Orpheus — that 
has existed and is repeated an infinite number of times. 
 The divergence of the key phrase (‘O Orpheus singt’) — as a pure event of 
language — from the entire discourse of the poem becomes explicit from its 
juxtaposition to the opening phrase, ‘Da stieg ein Baum’ (A tree ascended 
there),where language exists merely as a discourse of signification, infinitely 
signifying things. The past tense in stieg, the third person of ein Baum, and 
especially the shifter da testify to a narrative governed by plot, usually 
characteristic of the neutral discourses of representation. The application of the 
pronoun da shifts this narrative toward the domain of representation, where 
language serves as a tool, forming the coherent discourse of signification. The 
sense of the universal, implied by the pronoun there, [da] which can be 
reformulated as a not-here and a not-now, and, hence a confrontation with the 
here and the now, brings about a confrontation of the discourse of signification 
with the immanence of language, having no attestable referent but itself.  
 The coherence of the discourse of signification is reserved not by the lines 
immediately following the first sentence, but starting only from the third line, Und 
alles schwieg, (And all grew silent, line 3) and expanding throughout the end of 
the poem. The linearity of the narrative from the first, straight to the third line and 
on — with an eclipse of the three intermediary sentences between the first and the 
third lines — is stressed through the logical succession in plot, a unified 
intonation (Da stieg ein Baum. […]. Und alles schwieg), and the application of the 
conjunction und. The implicit order of signification and causality indicated 
through the neutrality of the discourse is interrupted by means of a scission — 
intruded via three exclamatory sentences — that cancels the continuity of the 
discourse.  
229 
 
 The three exclamatory sentences, constructed in accordance with the ternary 
rhythm, ‘O reine Übersteigung! O Orpheus singt! O hoher Baum in Ohr!’! (O 
pure transcendence!, O Orpheus sings!, O tall tree in the ear, lines 1 & 2) and 
thrown upon the unity of the coherent discourse bring about an element of 
incoherence and heterogeneity by transgressing its circularity and suggesting an 
inexhaustible experience of poetic language outside the realm of representation. 
The exclamation marks which, according to Görner, ‘simultaneously interrupt and 
interconnect the parts of this sequence’,51 stand for intensity in language and 
explode the congruent narrative of the poem by attempting to reduce the language 
of representation to the primordial cry. Hence, Rilke’s urge for another language 
beyond representation as both naming and the cancellation of the name.  
 In these lines, the recurrence of the open vowels [O] in various 
configurations has different readings. Due to its circular form, the [O] brings 
about the notion of the neutralized circularity of the signifying discourse: an 
infinite, yet distanced singing which aspires to the pure transcendence (reine 
Übersteigung) embodied in the form of the dual symbol of the tree as that 
belonging to the earth and aspiring to heaven.  
 However, it also refers back to the pure primordial cry, withdrawn from the 
circularity of the discourse and transgressing its circularity in order to push 
language to its utmost limits. Yet, more than anything else, the accumulation of 
the O-s stands for Nothing, for the pure void that cancels all topological relations 
and remains unsaid in the said. The circularity of the discourse and the primordial 
cry dissolve into the nothing of the O. Rilke’s dedication of the sonnets to the 
demythologized Orpheus indicates his bewilderment in facing the task of uttering 
the void or filling it, and the impossibility of doing so. Any attempt to utter the 
void is doomed to failure. The void is lost in every single utterance, in every 
attempt to find it in the word; similar to Orpheus’s loss of Eurydice in every 
single attempt to embrace her. 
 The void, thus, only becomes tangible through loss, evasion, and allusion; 
through a singing outside signification as a manifestation of lost unity, death, and 
                                                 
51 Rüdiger Görner, ‘Dancing the Orange’ in Agenda: A Reconsideration of Rainer Maria Rilke, ed. 
by Patricia McCarthy (East Sussex: Agenda and Editions Charitable Trust, 2007), v. 42, nos. 3-4, 
p. 140. 
230 
 
sacrifice. In all three sentences the void, expressed through the recurrence of the 
O, is juxtaposed with singing in both its embodiment in the word and the 
impossibility of embodiment.  
 Yet, the phrase ‘O Orpheus singt!’ diverges not only from the homogeneous 
discourse of the poem, but also from the unity of the three phrases of similar 
constructions: ‘O reine Übersteigung! O Orpheus singt! O hoher Baum in Ohr!’. 
The first and last phrases of this trinity are in dual relation to the signifying 
discourse of the sonnet: despite their divergence from it and due to the differences 
in their structure discussed above, they are still linked to it via the application of 
the conceptualized nouns Übersteigung and Baum.  Sharing the same semantic 
root with the verb steigen, the noun Übersteigung refers back to the initial phrase, 
while the last exclamatory phrase of the unity is linked to it through the recurrence 
of the noun Baum. The intermediary sentence ‘O Orpheus singt!’, however, has 
no links with the central discourse of representation and stands outside it in its 
otherness as pure singing, devoid of any conceptuality, cut off even from the two 
analogously constructed exclamatory sentences.  
 The sentence ‘Und alles schwieg’ which follows the intermission of the 
three exclamatory sentences continues building a general discourse of 
signification as opposed to the immanence of the Orphic singing. The 
combination of the conjunction Und, the Past Indefinite of the verb schweigen, 
and the universal sense of the pronoun alles in the neutral third person account for 
its relatedness to the discourse of signification.  
 The subsequent discussion about the possibility of a new beginning, ‘neuer 
Anfang, Wink und Wandlung’ (a new beginning, sign and change, line 4) which 
would fill the void, the Verschweigung (the silence), equally refers back to the 
myth of Orpheus and the ontological discourse of signification. In accordance 
with both, speech is empowered to fill the void, grasp the ungraspable, and give 
birth to a new beginning.  
 What the sonnet questions, however, is the very fecundity of the word, its 
Orphic power. Rilke’s search for a ‘neuer Anfang’, a new beginning which, 
Görner finds consistent enough to be generalized as a ‘Rhetorik des Anfangs’, (‘A 
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rhetoric of beginning),52 leads him outside myth or discourse toward the ever new 
repetition of the poetic word. The poetic repetition, the recurrence of the singular 
event of the word cancels the concept of beginning, Anfang, overloaded by the 
meanings of symbol and change, Wink und Wandlung. Discussions about the 
origin of the word through ontological options of a beginning-of or beginning-in 
remain in the realm of representation, from which Rilke has departed. The theme 
of disinterestedness with these discussions becomes explicit through leading them 
in the impartial narrative of the Past Indefinite in combination with the neutral 
third person, contrary to the Present tense of the singt combined with the proper 
noun Orpheus.    
 What the sonnet opts for is a pure, absolute singing, detached from any 
discourse of representation;53 the Same, yet always the different, unidentified with 
it as the repetition of the singularity of the poetic language which is not an attempt 
to fill the void, but rather the very void itself. 
 The quest for another language is thus unfolded through the structural 
asymmetry of the sentence ‘O Orpheus singt!’ with regard to the symmetrical 
entity of the poem. The structural asymmetry is extended not only through the 
above asymmetry in tense, but also via the choice of grammatical categories, 
sentence types or the phonetic and semantic structure of the key sentence. 
 Amongst the significant factors distinguishing the phrase ‘O Orpheus singt!’ 
from the entire discourse of signification, constitutes the choice of the 
grammatical categories of verb/noun. The structurally simple sentence ‘O 
Orpheus singt!’, comprising an equilibrium of verb/noun, with a single proper 
noun (Orpheus) against a verb, is opposed to the entire first stanza which 
accumulates a vast number of  conceptually overloaded nouns. This opposition 
marks the difference between the poetic language as absence or void and the 
substantial presence of the discourse of signification. The dominance of the 
transcendental objective of the Same which is made explicit via the application of 
                                                 
52 See Rüdiger Görner, Rainer Maria Rilke: Im Herzwerk der Sprache (Vienna: Zsolnay, 2004), p. 
40.  
53 See: Ian Cooper, The Near and the Distant God (London: Legenda, Modern Humanities 
Research Association and Maney Publishing, 2008), pp. 121- 174, for a recent account of a 
controversial view, which considers Rilke’s poetry as an attempt to redeem the signified standing 
behind the poetic utterance and ‘to turn beyond poetry in order to redeem poetry’, p. 170.  
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the conceptual noun Übersteigung (‘reine Übersteigung’, pure transcendence), is 
eventually absorbed into the intensity of a poetic singing, expressed via the 
dynamics of the verb singt (sings).  
The dominance of meaning, name and sign, characteristic of the 
semantically overloaded discourse of representation, is made explicit via the vast 
number of conceptual nouns. The substantiality of nouns weighs down over the 
free floating process of singing as that of lightness and play. This opposition, as 
well as Rilke’s quest for a poetic language outside the domain of signification are 
demonstrated via the implication in the first stanza of an insignificant number of 
verbs (stieg, singt, schwieg, ging, ascended, sings, grew hushed, departed), 
contrary to the vast number of conceptually overloaded nouns (Baum (2), 
Übersteigung, Orpheus, Ohr, Verschweigung, Anfang, Wink, and Wandlung, tree, 
transcendence, Orpheus, ear, silence, beginning, sign, and change; 4/9). 
 Apparently, all these nouns assembled in the opening stanza constitute 
signifiers of philosophically overloaded concepts, which are being signified or 
represented by them. The dominance of the discourse of signification becomes 
explicit through the accumulation of nouns standing as static signs either with the 
omitted verb sein, (to be) in ‘O reine Übersteigung!’ and ‘O hoher Baum in Ohr’, 
or in combination with a substantiated verb sharing the same root with the noun. 
The recurrence of the same root as the carrier of meaning (seme) in the noun and 
the corresponding verb as in stieg — Übersteigung, schweig — Verschweigung, 
stresses the dominance of semantic meaning in the general discourse of 
representation. Here, again, the line ‘O Orpheus singt’ stands for an exemption, 
comprising the dynamical verb singt, devoid of any conceptuality. The lack of any 
corresponding noun which could share the same semantic root with the verb singt, 
contrary to the abovementioned examples, stresses the opposition of the 
dynamical immanence of singt to the static substantiality of noun-concepts in the 
signifying discourse. The opposition between the text overloaded with nouns and 
the one in which verbs dominate, lies at the basis of a distinction between a 
poetics of particles and a poetic of waves. Daniel Albright notes of the significant 
traits of the wave-poetics as that of the loss of the prestige of noun: ‘The sheer 
heft of the noun, the density of its gravitational field, makes it attractive to 
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particle-aesthetics; but wave-aesthetics prefers the verb’.54 It opposes the notion of 
the poetic language as a pure signifier to the discourse of representation. The 
divergence of this key phrase in relation to the remaining parts of the sonnet is 
stressed, along with the difference in tense (present/past), the prevailing category 
(verb/noun) and semantic dependency (relatedness or unrelatedness to a 
conceptual noun of the same seme), also through the difference in phonetics. Here 
again, the latent similarities come to stress the underlying differences. The verb 
singt, which due to its category forms a contingent part in the coherent continuity 
of the verbal chain, among stieg, singt, schweig, ging, also has typological 
affinities with them via the recurrence of the letter [s] in the verbs stieg, singt, 
schweig, and the letter [g] in these words and also in the verb ging. Yet, these 
affinities merely underline the otherness of singt, appearing this time in the form 
of an opposition between voice and inscription (an implicit opposition, which will 
become more explicit in the subsequent sonnets) expressed via the opening letter 
[s] and its pronunciation as sonorous [z] in contrast to the pronunciation of the 
same letter [s] as voiceless hushing sibilant [sch] in the other verbs starting with 
the letter [s]; and the sonority of the [g], followed by [t] as compared with the 
unstressed [g]-s in the other verbs. 
 The linearity of the homogeneous discourse which becomes tangible through 
the application of the Past Indefinite in the third person, is maintained in the 
second stanza. Here, the interesting, displayed through the intertwining of the 
mythological narrative with elements belonging to the history of evolution 
substitutes for the philosophical discourse of the first stanza. We will trace the 
alienation of language, not only in the philosophical and mythological discourses, 
but also within the interesting in plot.  
 The plot stretching throughout the sonnet designates the evolution of human 
culture in accordance with the famous dialectical scheme from negation toward 
affirmation, from the negation of cunning and fear (‘nicht aus List und nicht aus 
Angst’, lines 7 & 8) toward the assertion of an inner hearing (‘sondern aus 
Hören’, line 9), from lair and nest (‘von Lager und Genist’, line 6) to hut and 
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temple (‘Und wo eben kaum ein Hütte war’, ‘da schufst du ihnen Tempel’, lines 
11 & 14). 
 Yet, the same narrative which tells the story of evolution in a distanced way, 
contains elements that question the positive value of this evolution. Rilke applies 
the construction ‘und da ergab sich’ (‘and so it must have been’, line 7) as an 
intermediary sentence which not only strengthens the factor of the interesting, but 
also brings in an element of doubt and questions either the truth-value of the 
narrative, or the very process of evolution.  
 The enjambment, i.e. the transposition of the last fragment of the sentence, 
‘sondern aus Hören’ (but from hearing, line 9) which thematically belongs to the 
second quatrain into the first tercet, stresses the significance of Hören in Rilke’s 
phonocentric system, simultaneously underlining that it is the very principle of 
phonocentrism, posed as the governing principle of his poetics, that is being 
questioned. This underlined fragment should thus be viewed in its intermediary 
position vis-à-vis both the quatrain (thematically) and the tercet (phonetically) that 
separates and links the semantic and phonic dimensions of language. 
 The emphatic construction of the transposed fragment ‘sondern aus Hören’ 
that disperses the coherence of the interesting narrative of the second quatrain 
establishes a double correspondence on the one hand with the tercets and, on the 
other, with the first quatrain of the poem. By its sudden intrusion, emphatically 
starting with the conjunction sondern which adds a semantic layer to the structural 
divergence, the fragment disrupts the coherence of the discourse, by offering the 
appearance of the sonnet as a closed system. 
 The phonic and semantic correspondences of Hören to the noun Ohr of the 
first quatrain and the nouns Geröhr and Gehör of the first and second tercets 
disorganize the closed systems of the quatrains and tercets in order to expand 
them spatially and temporally into the infinite metamorphoses of language. The 
dispersion of these semantic and phonic units throughout the space and temporary 
rhythm of the poem reorganizes the quatrains and the tercets in chiasmus and 
dichotomy.        
 The relations of repulsion and attraction based upon the opposition between 
sound and sense can be traced in the following diagram: im 
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Ohr?Hören?Geröhr?Gehör. The poetic language, posed as a system of 
differences thus deconstructs the images of the ear (‘O hoher Baum im Ohr!’) and 
that of Orpheus, as the phonocentric Ear-god, constructed in the first stanza. The 
euphony of the assonances both stresses the phonic dimension of language or, 
what Paul de Man names ‘the perfect coalescence of the metaphorical dimension 
with the sound-pattern’,55 and destroys the dominance of phonocentrism. The 
sound-sense opposition underlying the aforementioned chain thus stands as the 
matrix of the Rilkean poetics, based in the liberation of poetic language not only 
from an entanglement in discourse, but equally from the dominance of 
phonocentrism. 
 The sonnet questions the very process of evolution from immanence to 
transcendence, from inside (expressed through the combinations ‘in ihren 
Herzen’, ‘zu empfangen’, ‘ein Unterschlupf aus dunkelstem Verlangen’, in their 
hearts, to take in, a hiding place of darkest desire, lines 10, 11, 12) to outside, to 
an Übersteigung or a Tempel im Gehör (Transcendence or an auditory temple, 
lines 1 & 14). The patently non-evolutionary character, the instability of such an 
ascendance and, as de Man calls it, ‘the dynamic axis’56 of this movement are 
substantiated through the metaphor of an ‘entryway whose doorposts trembled’, 
‘einem Zugang, dessen Pfosten beben’ (line 13), implied in the last stanza. What 
primarily is at stake here is the very questioning of such an evolution, as a result 
of which the primal language evolves into a discourse of signification that 
disregards the very advent of language as a pure signifier without any claim to an 
extra-textual signified.  
 The interplay of identities and differences in language, displayed through the 
opposition between sound and sense is magnified in the last pair of the 
abovementioned chain, Geröhr?Gehör. The similarity of sound-effect built via 
the technique of rhyming and assonances stresses the underlying identity 
concealed under the latently opposed semantic texture. The effect of phonic 
conversion in the pairing Geröhr and Gehör, the primal cry and the inner temple, 
attained through the change of location of the letter h, implies a semantic 
conversion which can be designated as Geröhr ? Gehör, in which the evolution 
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from Geröhr to Gehör is juxtaposed to the desiderata process of the return from 
Gehör to Geröhr.      
 The phonic and semantic similarities and differences observed between the 
pair Geröhr and Gehör allude to the equivocal character of the patently simple 
dialectical scheme of evolution from the primal cry, Geröhr, to an inner auditory 
temple, [Tempel im] Gehör. The dialectical scheme of evolution is reversed into 
the endless metamorphoses of language in the quest to liberate language from the 
dominance of discourse and the phonocentric system through returning it back to 
the primal cry. 
 In the final sentence, the subjectivity of the author that has been erased in 
the course of wanderings through the infinite labyrinths of language by the 
constant application of the neutral third person, re-emerges from its non-being via 
the personal pronoun du which substitutes for the proper noun Orpheus (‘da 
schufst du ihnen Tempel im Gehör’). The voyage, starting with the proper noun of 
Orpheus and extended throughout the alienated space of the poem unexpectedly 
ends up with the pronoun du, you, instead of its corresponding abbreviated 
substitute er, he. The intrusion of the du implies the reciprocal relation to the I, ich 
which, transcending the alienated discourse in the third person asserts the return of 
the consciousness and marks a sudden intrusion of subjectivity — of the voice of 
the author, reconstituting itself as a subject — into the objective domain of the 
third person. To reverse the analysis of Benveniste,57 based upon the I positing the 
you, we can trace the you, du of the poem, positing the concealed I as the one 
completely exterior to the you, and becoming the echo of the you when they 
reciprocally address to each other as you, du.  
 The polarity between the intruded du, you and the concealed ich, I 
encountered within language asserts, however, a relationship of reversibility and 
immanence between the subjectivity of the author and Orpheus, both having 
abandoned the Tempel im Gehör, the transcendental temple in the past, for the 
sake of a singing in the present as the very being of language. 
The conceptual affinity of the first sonnet to the second is exposed through 
the conjunction Und, initiating the second sonnet and testifying to its belonging to 
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the same net of coherent narratives prevailing in the first sonnet. Its unprecedented 
recurrence (5 times in the first quatrain and 3 times in the second) points to the 
still persisting discourse of signification which Rilke has attempted to liberate 
language from. 
 
 
2.2.2 The Impossible Invention of the Other  
 
Sonnets to Orpheus I, 2 
by R. M. Rilke 
translated by H. Landman  
 
 
She was a maid almost, emerging here
from this united joy of song and lyre 
and shone clear through her vernal 
veils like fire 
and made herself a bed inside my ear. 
And slept in me. And all was in her 
sleep. 
The trees, which I always admired, 
such 
palpable distance, the meadow felt so 
much 
and every wonder, that affected me.  
She slept the world. Oh singing god, 
how did 
you so complete her, that she did not 
care 
to wake up first? Look, she stood and 
dreamed.  
Where is her death? Will you invent 
this theme 
before your song consumes itself? To 
where 
sinks she away from me? ... Almost a 
maid ...  
Und fast ein Mädchen wars und ging 
hervor 
aus diesem einigen Glück von Sang und 
Leier 
und glänzte klar durch ihre 
Frühlingsschleier 
und machte sich ein Bett in meinem Ohr. 
Und schlief in mir. Und alles war ihr 
Schlaf. 
Die Bäume, die ich je bewundert, diese 
fühlbare Ferne, die gefühlte Wiese 
und jedes Staunen, das mich selbst 
betraf.  
Sie schlief die Welt. Singender Gott, wie 
hast 
du sie vollendet, daß sie nicht begehrte, 
erst wach zu sein? Sieh, sie erstand und 
schlief.  
Wo ist ihr Tod? O, wirst du dies Motiv 
erfinden noch, eh sich dein Lied 
verzehrte? - 
Wo sinkt sie hin aus mir? ... Ein 
Mädchen fast ... 
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 In the second Sonnet, the opposition between the classical discourse of 
metaphysics and the new poetic language of repetition introduced in the first one 
is demonstrated through the opposition between the quatrains and the tercets, 
where the quatrains stand for the classical discourse of representation while the 
tercets for the poetic language as pure signifier. The entire second sonnet is rooted 
in this opposition between the classical and the new, the metaphysical discourse of 
signification, representing nothing but the Same and the poetic language of 
repetition, signifying nothing but itself. The major features of the classical 
discourse of representation are exposed in the quatrains only for their subsequent 
deconstruction in the tercets.  
 The exposition of the classical discourse of signification by the quatrains 
through the poetic elucidation of its major tropes is transgressed by the gradual 
transposition and the final intensification of the thematic fulcrum of the sonnet in 
the tercets. The tercets are differentiated from the quatrains by difference in tense, 
sentence-types and the persistence of fragmental fractures substituting for the 
preceding coherent narrative. The difference between them is also manifested in 
the recurrence of the conjunction und as an element of narration only in the first 
part of the sonnet (in the quatrains) in the decreasing order from 5 to 3. The 
consistent application of the Past Indefinite Tense throughout the quatrains 
indicates their belonging to a unified coherent discourse of representation of 
nothing but the Same. The two quatrains are linked not only by the application of 
the Past Indefinite, but also by a characteristic reiteration: their initial sentences 
starting with the same conjunction und, (and), recurring throughout the two 
quatrains. 
 The quatrains stand for the exposition of all major tropes of the classical 
metaphysical discourse that will subsequently be deconstructed by the tercets. The 
first quatrain emerges as a representation of the ontology of the Same and vital 
tropes constituting the metaphysical discourse of signification, signifying nothing 
but the transcendental signified of the Same. The dominance of the metaphysical 
universal of the Same upon philosophy and art throughout the classical age and its 
reducing of poetry into a mere discourse of signification is illustrated by the 
application of the metaphor of ein Mädchen, a maid almost (‘Und fast ein 
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Mädchen’) in corresponding contexts. This metaphor alludes both to the 
mythological personage of Eurydice as the one who Orpheus sings of incessantly 
and to the ontology of the primal Word comprising its Orphic metamorphoses. 
The application of this metaphor aims at the exposition of two interrelated 
dominating themes of representation: the myth of Orpheus and the ontology of the 
primordial Word. The inverted syntax of the sentence ‘Und fast ein Mädchen’, 
and the fact of its being the opening sentence of the sonnet, builds a parallelism 
with the biblical saying about the primacy of the logos, which was in the 
beginning: ‘Am Anfang war das Wort’, ‘En arche én ho logos’. The allusion here 
is to the belief adopted by classical metaphysics of writing’s being a mere 
imitation of the logos. The quatrain exposes the primacy of the logos through the 
ontological evidence of its having emerged from a united joy of song and lyre 
(‘aus diesem einigen Glück von Sang und Leier’, line 2) and refers to the 
genealogy of the univocal word as a self-enclosed unity which, according to 
classical metaphysics, is signified through the particularity of each utterance. The 
representative discourse of signification is designated by the relationship between 
signified/signifier, in which the universality of the signified is incessantly 
manifested through the particularity of the signifier. It is exposed through the 
demonstrative pronoun diesem as an immediate presence of universality as 
particularity.  
 As we can see, the opening quartet demonstrates the fundamental features of 
representation: the existence of an extra-textual authority (the Same, the logos, the 
One, etc.) and its incessant signification through art by stressing the domination of 
phonocentrism and the ontological element in it. The characteristic features of the 
metaphysical paradigm are intensified through the lexical richness and semantic 
depth of the overloaded nouns Mädchen, Glück, Sang und Leier, 
Frühlingsschleier, Ohr (maid, joy, song and lyre, spring-veil, ear) and the 
corresponding forms of the verbs hervorgehen and glänzen (emerge and shine); 
the former belonging to the ontological context with the latter referring to the 
tropology of light. The primacy of the logos and its infinite representation by art is 
exposed through its identification with the pure light which disperses its unitary 
nature into multiple forms; a phenomenon, which was in the the constant focus of 
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attention from Plato to Hegel. The poeticized logos appearing under the 
metaphorical image of the Mädchen has maintained its capability to shine forth, 
(glänzte klar) which is stressed by the phonic element: throughout the two lines 
(2, 3), in which the ontology of the Mädchen and her shining power are described, 
we can observe an excessive number of [l]’s (appearing 6 times). The 
agglomeration of the gliding and flowing liquid with its glissando – adopting the 
definition of the letter [l] by Roman Jakobson58 — creates an imitation of the 
shining of the pure light.  
 Another significant point, upon which the paradigm of representation is 
based, is the exposition of truth through the phenomenon of shining which, if we 
adopt Heidegger’s analysis of Being, is posed as Aletheia, the unveiling-
disclosure of what lies concealed. Rilke exposes the metaphysical concept of truth 
as the unveiling of the concealed through the metaphor Frühlingsschleier, (spring-
veil, line 3), beneath which the Mädchen shines forth. In so doing, the first 
quatrain poetically alludes to the major dimensions of the Same, postulated as the 
prime transcendental objective of metaphysics. Poetry according to this 
postulation is nothing but the representation of the Same, the lifting of the veil 
from the thing itself, allowing it to shine forth through shaped matter, (Gestalt).  
 The recurrence of the noun Ohr, (ear) (which first appeared in line 2 of the 
first sonnet) in the last line of the first quatrain, underlines the persistence of 
phonocentrism, as the governing principle of the poetics of representation 
questioned in the first sonnet. The appearance of the personal pronoun meinem, 
(my) for the first time throughout the two sonnets (as applied in respect of the 
noun Ohr, (ear) in the same last line (4) of the first quatrain) testifies to the 
persistence of phonocentrism. Yet, the application of the Past Indefinite and the 
noun Bett, (bed) to the same line 4 creates an atmosphere of passivity, neutralizing 
the intensity implied by the pronoun meinem and testifying to the distance 
between the I in its quest for a writing beyond representation (in the present) and 
the I engaged with phonocentrism (in the past). The last line of the first quatrain 
also hints (by the noun Bett) at the central theme of sleep which unfolds the 
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transposition of poetry from objectivity into subjectivity and will be expounded at 
length throughout the second quatrain and the first tercet. 
 The theme of sleep is of central significance not only to the second quatrain 
and the first tercet, in which it is latently exposed, but to the entire sonnet. 
Through the exposition of the theme of sleep, in which from the very first line 
(‘Und schlief in mir’, line 5), it is linked to the subjectivity of the I (in mir), 
comprising the realm of the sub-conscious, the second quatrain unfolds 
subjectivity as another domain within which poetry has been trapped. Along with 
the objectivity of the metaphysical universal of the Same, the subjectivity of the I 
is viewed as an obstacle which should be surmounted for the coinage of a new 
poetic language outside representation.  
 The combination ‘ihr Schlaf’, (her sleep), to which the being of the universal 
all (alles) is reduced (line 5), and where the subjective and already personalized 
sleep substitutes for the conceptuality of sleep in its metaphysical beyond is 
already a lapse into subjectivity. The entire second quatrain unfolds the aesthetic 
understanding of poetry in terms of the subjective emotions of the poet, 
comprising all the possible shades of dream: desire, perception and memory. 
Subjectivity is expressed by the poetic remembrance of the perceived images to 
which they gave rise. It is intensified by the agglomeration of the corresponding 
forms of the verbs of sense perception: ‘bewundern, fühlen, betreffen’, (to admire, 
to feel, to be affected) and the noun Staunen, wonder (lines 6-8). The sentence 
‘Und alles war ihr Schlaf’, (And all was her sleep), (line 5), in which the pronoun 
alles, (all) encompasses the images of nature (Die Bäume, die Wiese, the trees, the 
meadow) and the feelings associated with them, testifies to the primacy of art as 
imitation of nature over nature itself.  Yet, the application of the past tense and the 
intermediary word-combination ‘diese fühlbare Ferne’, (such palpable distance) 
points to the distance that separates the new poetic language from the subjectivity 
of the period of philosophical-aesthetic digression. These issues point to the need 
of liberating language equally from representation and subjectivity for the coinage 
of the new poetic language.  
 The first tercet, with its combination of interrogative and exclamatory 
sentences (lines 9-11), brings about a fissure in the coherent narrative of 
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representation prevailing in the two preceding quatrains. It brings about Rilke’s 
quest for a different poetic language beyond signification. The simple structure of 
the first sentence of the tercet (Sie schlief die Welt, She slept the world), the 
recurrence of the theme of sleep (schlief, lines 5 & 9 and Schlaf, line 5) and the 
pronoun sie, standing for both the subject of this sentence and the omitted subject 
of the sentence Und schlief in mir (line 5) patently refer back to the first line of the 
second quatrain (line 5). Together, they create the/an illusion that the first 
sentence of the tercet is the logical development of the coherent narrative 
stretching forth throughout the quatrains. Yet, what lies hidden beneath the 
aforementioned identities is a conceptual difference, splitting up the signifying 
discourse prevailing in the quatrains and re-inscribing it within sequences which 
do not support the thematic unity of the discourse. The sentence Sie schlief die 
Welt, (line 9) thus in spite of apparent affinities with the quatrains, transgresses 
the theme of sleep conceptualized in the quatrains, demonstrating that in this 
different poetic language there should be no place for a thematic meaning, but 
only a textual system of identities and differences.  
 It similarly disrupts the ontological discourse concerning the creative power 
of the logos, its world-building capacity. The syntactical organization of the 
sentence, together with the prior identification of sie with ein Mädchen (despite 
the fact that the noun ‘das Mädchen’ is neuter, it is often used in the feminine) and 
with the logos, would assume an operation of building or creating the world (die 
Welt). Furthermore, this operation is also assumed by the myth about the Orphic 
power of creating the world through the word. Rilke, however, aims at the 
cancellation of the world-creating operation of the word by describing a state of 
sleep that remains untouched by worldliness, hence aiming to coin a different 
poetic language, creating but itself. He realizes this cancellation operation by the 
application of the verb schlafen instead of bilden which would be assumed by the 
context. Moreover, the a-grammatical application of the intransitive verb schlafen 
as a transitive verb in the combination schlief die Welt, substantiates its 
substitution for bilden, hence making the cancellation tangible. To recall Erich 
Heller’s words concerning the reverse process of using transitive verbs 
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intransitively, this substitution is ‘more than a matter of mere grammar: grammar, 
as often it does, mirrors here the grammar of consciousness itself’.59 
 The significance of this key sentence (line 9) which starts the process of 
disorganization of the coherent narrative of signification with an operation of 
cancellation, lies also in releasing the verb schlafen from any subjective meaning 
or detaching it from its customary relation to the subjectivity of the I. The 
subsequent sentence gives us a clue about the displacement of schlafen from the 
ordinary sequence of sleep/wake, stressing the uselessness of waking: ‘sie nicht 
begehrte, / erst wach zu sein ?’, (she did not care / to wake up first?, lines 10-11). 
The meaning of completeness, brought forth through the word vollendet and 
alluding to the metaphysical paradigm of the preconceived completeness of the 
transcendental objective of the Same, its sacrifice into the manifold and its final 
redemption through them is reversed here. The process whereby the word 
becomes complete through redemption, analogous to the metaphysical context of 
waking up, is reversed, negated (nicht begehrte). Whereas for the difference to 
take place, it is necessary, to recall Michel Foucault’s words, ‘to divide the same 
through contradiction, to limit its infinite identity through nonbeing, to transform 
its indeterminate positivity through the negative’.60 The completeness of the word 
is accordingly limited by introducing another meaning of completeness as a state 
of sleep that does not have the need to wake up first. Similarly, the Orphic legend 
is demythologized by introducing another singing through a sleeping word, 
substituting for the creating one. Here, the opposition of the sleeping, voiceless 
word and the logos, as the singing voice of Orpheus is substantiated through the 
phonic opposition of the voiceless [sch] in schlief and the voiced [s] in singender, 
(line 9). The intensity of the rhetorical question addressed to the singing god, 
(Singender Gott) testifies to Rilke’s quest for another language, a deactivated 
word as the complete void itself, freed from teleological or eschatological 
functions and from the urge of naming. The last sentence of the first tercet (‘Sieh, 
sie erstand und schlief’, Look, she stood and slept) finalizes the de-
contextualization of the theme of sleep, modifying it from a horizontal into a 
vertical position. The vertical but sleeping position of the logos alludes to the 
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sleep of the seed in its ability to emerge as a pure disseminated repetition. Writing 
therefore is no longer the representation of the Same or any unified truth that 
would be derived from it but an unfolding of the identities and differences of 
language. The impossible mixture of the Past Indefinite (erstand, schlief, stood, 
slept) with the present tense of Sieh, (Look) also points to writing as a timeless 
process of dissemination which results in the emergence of the multiple as pure, 
unique repetitions. 
 The last tercet is the transposition of the theme of sleep into that of death 
which is actually a reasserting of sleep by sketching the absence of death. Death, 
posed not as the metaphysical universal, comprising the phase of the beyond, the 
phase of resurrection, but her death, (ihr Tod), (line 12) at the extreme point of 
singularity. As Volker Durr puts it, the unique death (her or his own death) of 
every man, woman and child, as ‘the closure of every singular life’ is what 
concerns Rilke.61 The question ‘Wo ist […]?’, (Where is […]?) substituting for the 
metaphysical question ‘Was ist […]?’ (analogous to the question ‘wie hast du 
[…]?, in the first tercet) which would generally be assumed by the signifying 
discourse concerned with defining the essence of death, testifies to another 
attempt by Rilke to liberate language from signification.  
 The question ‘Wo ist ihr Tod?’, (Where is her death?) does not tackle the 
essence of death, but points to its displacement, its absence, and as such, should 
be viewed as a transposition of language from the field of semantics into that of 
syntax. The application of the Present Indefinite in respect of Eurydice’s death 
which is a mythological event of the past, demythologizes the Orphic narrative in 
order to state the absence of death or pose death as absence or void. Moreover, as 
the only phrase of the sonnet in which the Present Indefinite is used, it stresses the 
significance of the void or of the abyss, substantiated through poetic language.  
 The second interrogative sentence, (lines 12-13), clearly asserts the re-
positing of the poetic language beyond representation as a pure simulacrum. The 
application of the nouns Motiv and Lied, (motif and song) together with the verb 
erfinden (to invent) de-contextualizes the central discourse, transposing the text 
into a theatricality where nothing counts but the performance, and where the play 
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of masks, lacking any trace of representation, is but a simulacrum of the Orphic 
myth.  
 The negative form in ‘erfinden noch’ as the not inventing of this same motive 
(dies Motiv), displaces the traditional topos of invention, presupposing its application 
to the motive of the sameness into that of disposition, of the unique invention of the 
other, or of what Derrida defines as ‘the singular structure of an event that seems to 
produce itself […] by the fact of speaking of itself’.62 This disposition of relating of 
sameness to the Other frees the poetic language from the urge of representing nothing 
but the Same (the same motif of death in the Orphic myth) and re-poses it as the 
repetition of the uniqueness, the recurrence of the different.  
 The last question of the sonnet, ‘Wo sinkt sie hin aus mir?’ (Where does she 
sink away from me?), sketches the theme of erasure and disappearance or the 
ceaseless recurrence of the nontheme, as the remarking of itself of the ‘very thing 
that has no meaning’:63 whether it is the erasure of the I, the impuissance of the 
poetic word to give shape to the void and speak of nothing but itself, or maybe it 
is the designation of an impossible invention, of the impossibility of inventing the 
other, ‘which is never inventable and will never have awaited for […] 
invention’.64 ‘Ein Mädchen fast’: is it a meta-language already, pointing to 
nothing but itself or an impossible invention as a unique configuration which 
disposes and deconstructs the same motif so as to allow space for the other in the 
indefiniteness of the ellipsis. 
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2.2.3 The Poetic Language as Being 
  
Sonnets to Orpheus I, 3 
by R. M. Rilke 
translated by H. Landman  
 
A god can do it. How do you expect 
a man to squeeze on through the lyre 
and follow? 
His mind is torn. Where heartways 
intersect, 
you won't find any temple to Apollo.  
True singing, as you teach it, isn't 
wanting, 
not wooing anything that can be won;
no, Singing's Being. For the god, not 
daunting. 
But when are we? And when will he 
then turn  
into our being all the Earth and Stars?
It isn't that you love, child, even if 
the voice exploded from your mouth - 
begin  
forgetting, that you sang. That 
disappears. 
To sing in truth is quite a different 
breath. 
A breath of void. A gust in the god. A 
wind.  
Ein Gott vermags. Wie aber, sag mir, 
soll 
ein Mann ihm folgen durch die schmale 
Leier? 
Sein Sinn ist Zwiespalt. An der 
Kreuzung zweier 
Herzwege steht kein Tempel für Apoll.  
Gesang, wie du ihn lehrst, ist nicht 
Begehr, 
nicht Werbung um ein endlich noch 
Erreichtes; 
Gesang ist Dasein. Für den Gott ein 
Leichtes. 
Wann aber sind wir? Und wann wendet 
er  
an unser Sein die Erde und die Sterne? 
Dies ist nicht, Jüngling, daß du liebst, 
wenn auch 
die Stimme dann den Mund dir aufstößt, 
- lerne  
vergessen, daß du aufsangst. Das 
verrinnt. 
In Wahrheit singen, ist ein andrer Hauch.
Ein Hauch um nichts. Ein Wehn im Gott. 
Ein Wind. 
 
 The third Sonnet is primarily a manifestation of the new poetic language of 
repetition which has been coined in the two preceding Sonnets. Here, the destruction 
of the same myth aiming at the thinking of the pure event of language on the basis of 
its definite trace as a pure signifier without signified or signification is stressed. The 
Present Indefinite predominating throughout the sonnet as opposed to the Past 
Indefinite of the preceding sonnets indicates that the fulcrum is transposed from the 
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coinage into the manifestation of the new poetic language, for the sake of which the 
entire process of the deconstruction of the metaphysical universal of the Same, 
comprising the deconstruction of all the representational discourses — mythological, 
ontological, or subjective — is accomplished.  
 The structural organization of the sonnet is classical: starting with the 
poetic allusions to its central tropes with further development into their logical 
assemblage in the end. The central trope of the true poetic singing as deferral 
alluded to throughout the language of the entire sonnet, is distinctly condensed 
only at the end of the sonnet through the sentences:65‘Ein Hauch um nichts. Ein 
Wehn im Gott. Ein Wind’, (A breath of void. A gust in the god. A wind.). Here, 
the definition of the new poetic language in the form of a conclusion expressed 
through brief, clearly stated sentences and reinforced by their fragmentation via 
the falling intonation of a full stop, brings about a concord between content and 
form, usually typical of prose or philosophical discourse. This unprecedented 
concord is opposed to the rest of the sonnet rooted in the non-coincidence or even 
schism between sense and rhythm expressed through the enjambment, i.e. the 
detachment of the last sentence from the body which it logically belongs to. This is 
also the case when the sentence which is grammatically defined as a unity of sense 
and intonation is split into two parts, each belonging to a different body: Und wann 
wendet er, (line 8, second quatrain)/ an unser Sein die Erde und die Sterne?, (line 9, 
first tercet), (And when will he then/ turn into our being all the Earth and Stars?, 
Landman’s translation); lerne, (line 11, first tercet) /vergessen, dass du aufsangst (line 
12, second tercet), (begin/ forgetting, that you sang, Landman’s translation). In both 
cases, the enjambment brings about a tension between the last, rhyming word of the 
preceding line and the first one on the next line.  
To use Belmore’s words characterizing Rilke’s use of the technique of 
enjambment, contrary to its traditional use of knitting the lines of the verse without a 
break, here the ‘rhyming word is […] suspended for a moment before the reader dips 
down upon the next one, artificially separated from it by the beginning of the line’.66 
                                                 
65 See a detailed account of the end of the poem in: Giorgio Agamben, The End of the Poem: 
Studies in Poetics, trans. by Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), 
pp. 109-115. 
66 Herbert William Belmore, Rilke’s Craftsmanship: An Analysis of His Poetic Style, p. 75.  
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The enjambment creates the effect of major schism between sense and rhythm, alluding 
to the introduction of a new poetic language of fragmentation and difference 
intersecting the discourse of the Same. Its opposition to the concordance of the end of 
the poem also testifies to the transposition of the fulcrum of the sonnet from 
deconstruction into reconstruction, from the deconstruction of the Same discourse of 
representation into the reconstruction of the poetic language as pure repetition. The 
elliptical form and the final diminuendo (the decreasing number of words) in the final 
line 14 reinforce the minimalist approach applied in the reconstruction of the new 
poetic language.        
 Yet the third sonnet, with its abundance of central philosophical tropes of 
God’s creation and man’s invention, remains patently representational and 
testifies to Rilke’s quest for a different poetic language which he merely aspires 
to, but does not fully wield. The representational character of these tropes 
becomes apparent in the constant application of the verb sein, (to be), (lines 3, 5, 
7, 8, 10, 13), its ellipsis (line 14) and its corresponding noun Sein (Being) in line 
9. The distinctly didactic character of the sonnet, which attempts to give definition 
to the new poetic singing, has given rise to its purely philosophical interpretations. 
Manfred Engel has generalized this phenomenon as applicable to the entire 
Sonnets, ‘Appelle und Imperative geben ihnen streckenweise geradezu den 
Charakter einer Lehrdichtung’ (‘Appeals and imperatives give them here and 
there quite the character of a didactic poetry’) and has spoken about the absolute 
disastrousness (‘schlechterdings desaströs’) of interpreting the sentence ‘Gesang 
ist Dasein’, (Singing is being) in a merely philosophical way.67 
 The significance of the third sonnet thus lies mainly in reconstructing the 
new poetic language after having deconstructed the classical discourse of 
representation. Among the exposition of the central tropes, the one expounding 
upon God’s creation and man’s invention is of particular interest. The purely 
assertive propositions concerning God and the application of the Present 
Indefinite tense indicating the general truth stated through them (‘Ein Gott 
vermags’, [A God can do it]; ‘Für den Gott ein Leichtes’, [For the God — an easy 
matter]; ‘Ein Wehn im Gott’, [A gust in God] in lines 1, 7, 14) create the 
                                                 
67 Rilke Handbuch. Leben-Werk-Wirkung, ed. by Manfred Engel (Stuttgart: Metzler, 2004), p. 417.  
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impression of a return to the metaphysical discourse on the plenitude and 
perfection of the Same. Yet, this impression is totally deceitful, as what is at stake 
here is on the contrary — the deconstruction of the dominant discourse 
representing nothing but the plenitude of the Same.  
An analysis of the subtle elements rooted in the language of the sonnet will 
reveal how the patent opposition concerning God’s creation and man’s invention 
is reversed to praise man’s dynamics of creation rather than God’s creative stasis. 
The interrogative sentence, intensified through the negativity of aber, (but) and 
the first person of the pronoun mir (me) immediately following the initial 
sentence, which asserts the almightiness of god, actually questions the validity of 
a human invention imitating god’s creation, hence the validity of representation.  
 Human invention beyond representation is placed at a cross-road, 
substantiated through the nouns Zwiespalt and Kreuzung and the recurrence of the 
number two in the configurations Zwiespalt and zweier that allude to its 
opposition to the divine creation, signified as the One in the classical discourse of 
metaphysics. The cross-road which human invention faces is the discord between 
its being an expression of subjective perceptions, indicated through the noun Herz 
in Herzwege, and its being an erasure of subjectivity, the impossible shaping of 
the absence or nonplace, (kein Tempel), of pure nothing. 
The appearance of the noun Gott (God) as the initial word and its recurrence 
thrice in the sonnet (lines 1, 7, 14) indicate the significance of the trope of divine 
creation; however its application with the indefinite article ein (‘Ein Gott’, A God) or 
in inflectional forms (‘Für den Gott’ and ‘im Gott’) point to its absence rather than its 
plenitude, as different from classical metaphysics. In its last application (line 14), the 
position of the word Gott alludes to the word nichts of the preceding sentence, (Ein 
Hauch um nichts. Ein Wehn im Gott. Ein Wind.). The similar syntactical 
constructions and semantic functions of defining the true singing (‘In Wahrheit 
singen […] ist […]’) of the two elliptical sentences and the similar positions of the 
words Gott and nichts in them raise the thought that these words are interchangeable. 
What underlies the patently metaphysical discourse of the Same is thus rather the 
absence of God or its reduction to a nothing, which surpasses being, or, is equated to 
singing: ‘Gesang ist Dasein’, (Singing is being, line 7). Richard Cox has discussed 
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this saying in the context of the two preceding sonnets: ‘The implicit formula of the 
first two Sonnets is that existence is song. Reversing that eminently reversible 
formula, the third declares: ‘Gesang is Dasein’[…]’.68 
What the sonnet opts for is a poetic singing, the function of which is not 
the representation of the Same, but the pure singing as otherness (‘ein andrer 
Hauch’, [another breath], line 13), the impossible utterance of nothing alluded to 
through the negativity of nicht: ‘Dies ists nicht […]’ and ‘Ein Hauch um nichts’ 
(This is not […]; A breath of nothing, lines 10 and 14). The negation is primarily 
reinforced through the negative sentences: ‘Gesang […] ist nicht Begehr, / nicht 
Werbung […]’, (Singing […] is not desire,/ not wooing [...], lines 5 & 6), that aim 
to erase the subjectivity of the I. The negativity of the dialectical nicht is further 
transformed into a topography substantiated as a tangible nonplace, the absent 
place of the temple, the void pointing to its absence: ‘Herzwege steht kein Tempel 
für Apoll’, (Where heartways intersect, no temple for Apollo is found; line 4). In 
this context, Apollo stands for the shaping god, and his absence indicates the 
impossibility of shaping the void or nothing. 
 All these above mentioned oppositions between god’s creation and human 
over the stasis of the divine creation, defined as ‘ein Leichtes’, (easy; in line 7).  
As Katja Brunkhorst invention are thus designated to prioritize the dynamics of 
human invention, comprising all its characteristic sufferings, as the impossible 
invention of the other remarks, to Rilke, the poet as the perpetual creator is 
opposed to God who has stopped creating; the dynamics of creation is opposed to 
the perfect state of stagnation.69 
 Human invention is viewed in perpetual transformation, in its ability to surpass 
subjectivity or representation and transgress the opposition between transcendence 
and immanence in becoming a pure singing analogous to being. The interrogation 
concerns not the ability to surpass, but merely the quest for this invention: ‘Wann 
aber sind wir? Und wann wendet er/an unser Sein die Erde und die Sterne?’, (But 
when are we? And when will he then turn/ into our being the earth and the stars?; 
                                                 
68 Richard Cox, Figures of Transformation: Rilke and the Example of Valéry (London: Institute of  
    Germanic Studies, University of London, 1979), p. 152. 
69 See an account of this issue, unifying Rilke and Nietzsche in Katja Brunkhorst, Verwandt- 
    Verwandelt, Nietzsche’s Presence in Rilke (München: Iudicium Verlag GmbH, 2006),  
     pp. 137-139.  
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lines 8, 9) The prioritization of human invention is finalized at the end of the sonnet, 
in defining true singing through the dynamics of breath: ‘Ein Hauch […] Ein Wehn 
[…] Ein Wind’, (A gust[...], a breath [...], a wind [...], line 14).  
 The quest for a new poetic language as the impossible shaping of the void or 
nothing is transposed into the dimension of voice/name/silence, where singing is 
liberated from the Orphic understanding of naming the unnameable in the state of 
a fullness out of which there springs the Word as voice: ‘Dies ists nicht, Jüngling, 
daß du liebst, wenn auch/die Stimme dann den Mund dir aufstößt, - 
lerne/vergessen, daß du aufsangst. Das verrinnt.’, (It is not, young man, that you 
love, even if the voice exploded from your mouth — learn to forget, that you 
sang. That disappears; in lines 11-12). The application of the noun Jüngling and 
the intimate character of the pronoun du testify to the relatedness of Rilke as a 
young poet to the kind of singing, from which he attempts to liberate poetry. The 
verb lieben and the realistic description (die Stimme dann den Mund) of poetry as 
the expression of feeling create an atmosphere of subjectivity, which the new 
poetic singing has to leave behind, moving toward forgetting and disappearance. 
This new poetic language then deconstructs the same Orphic myth of the world-
building capacity of the word to assert the pure being of language as nothing and 
void, to attain the primal silence as the removal of the voice: ‘Ein Hauch um 
nichts. Ein Wehn im Gott. Ein Wind’.  
 To summarize: the three initial sonnets are significant for tracing the 
characteristic trait of the entire cycle which is the deconstruction of the classical 
metaphysical discourse as the representation of the Same and the coinage of a new 
poetic language of repetition as the impossible topology of the void or nothing, 
beyond signification. The close textual analyses of the three sonnets are an 
attempt to demonstrate how this tendency is realized and to delineate the main 
traits of the new poetic language. The subsequent sonnets, each in its unique form, 
are repetitions of the same quest for a new poetic language beyond representation. 
Despite the fact that each of them is a singular event of language and due to the 
limitations of space only a general approach will be provided toward the rest of 
the sonnets. We will stress merely those characteristic features of the sonnets 
which are essential from the scope of this study.  
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2.2.4 Disclosing the Nonbeing of Language in the Mode of Transgression 
 
  
The theme of space with its subtlest meanings of Hauch, Wehn, Wind (1,3) has 
been developed at length throughout the entire cycle of the sonnets and is replaced 
by new synonyms, such as Atem, Lüfte, Räume in the fourth Sonnet (1,4). In it, the 
disclosure of language through the topology of nonplace as pure nothing is 
juxtaposed to the weight and substance of the bodies and the gravitational force of 
the Earth.  
 What is at issue here is the rift, the pure tension between the heaviness of the 
ontology of the primordial word, overloaded with the metaphysical signified of 
the Same, alluded to through the nouns Seiligen, Heilen (blessed and whole; 1,4, 
line 5) or Anfang (beginning; 1,4, line 6), and the new poetic language as a mere 
signifier. The sonnet is based upon this very tension between a propagation of 
forms into formlessness (‘O ihr Zärtlichen, tretet zuweilen / in den Atem’, ‘O you 
tender ones, step now and then / into the breath; this and other lines from Sonnet 4 
are based upon Landman’s translation, 1,4, lines 1-2) and the substantiation of 
figures within their constraining contours (die Erde, die Berge, die Meere, die 
Bäume, the Earth, the mountains, the seas, the trees; 1,4, lines 10, 11, 12); the 
metaphysical One, which quivers, united again behind the figures (‘hinter euch 
zittert er, wieder vereint’ behind you it quivers, united again; 1,4, line 4) and its 
splitting in two (‘sich teilen’; 1,4, line 3). The poet is likewise placed in the 
tension between subjectivity (‘Bogen der Pfeile und Ziele von Pfeilen / ewiger 
glänzt euer Lächeln verweint’, ‘Bows for arrows and arrows’ goal, your smile is 
always stained with tears’, 1,4, lines 7 & 8) and memory (‘Selbst die als Kinder 
ihr pflanzet die Bäume’, ‘The trees that you planted as children’, 1,4, line 12). 
This tension is also represented through the dual figure of the tree, rooted in the 
earth, but aspiring to heaven, standing for the duality of a responsibility before the 
Earth of representing nothing but the Same and the quest for disclosing the 
nonplace of language as pure nothing.  
 The fissure in the classical discourse of representation is reinforced through 
the disjunction aber, appearing twice at the end of the sonnet and pointing toward 
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the nonbeing of language. In the end, the fulcrum of the tension is bent toward 
language as pure nothing, liberated from any responsibility before the Earth; the 
freedom of language as nonplace is juxtaposed with the freedom of an aspiring 
tree, rooted in the Earth. Language as pure freedom is represented in the 
diminuendo from Lüfte to Räume (from space to the air) and to the final 
indefiniteness of an ellipsis. 
 In the fifth sonnet the nonbeing of language is disclosed through the mode of 
transgression (‘er überschreitet’, ‘he transgresses’; 1,5, line 14), which is posed as 
the matrix of the thought anchored in the utmost limits of language. To indicate 
this new mode of thought of transgression, which will predominate throughout the 
20th century, Rilke accumulates a number of words beginning with the prefix 
über: übersteigen, überleben, überschreiten, and überstehen.  The mode of 
transgression arises from the absence of signification, the surmounting of 
subjectivity, and the dispersion of representation into the language of pure 
repetition which is placed in the void created by this absence. In the act of 
transgression, the questioning of the limit substitutes for the representation of the 
Same, and poetry is transposed into the place where it crosses these limits. 
 The sonnet begins with the rejection of monument (‘Errichtet keinen 
Denkstein’, ‘Erect no monument’; 1,5, line 1) as memory and signification in 
order to trace the line of transgression that causes the existence of difference to 
appear every year under the guises of blossoming roses (‘Laßt die Rose / nur jedes 
Jahr zu seinen Gunsten blühn’, ‘Just let the roses blossom / every year for his 
sake; 1,5, lines 1 & 2). To exempt writing from representation, from erecting 
monuments in memory of the Same, the sonnet effaces the irreducible singularity 
of the metaphysical universal of the Same and makes this singularity repeatable 
innumerable times through multiple guises. The Same signified as Orpheus 
divides and erases itself, annuls in itself the encrypted singularity, to become 
understandable through the unique otherness of the multiple: ‘O, wie er 
schwinden muß, daß ihrs begrifft!’, (‘O, in order for us to understand him, he has 
to pass’; 1,5, line 9).  
 In this zone of transgression, at the limit disclosing the insurmountable 
distance between eternity and finitude, being in its immediacy and event, 
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dissected into a jedes Jahr (every year; 1,5, line 2), an ein für alle Male , (once 
and for all; 1,5, line 5)  and an ein  paar Tage manchmal, (a few days longer than 
…; 1,5, line 8); between a coming and a going (‘Er kommt und geht’, ‘He comes 
and goes’; 1,5, line 6), the pure unmediated act of writing becomes manifest. An 
act of writing, disseminated from the dissipation of the Same and the forgetting of 
the Same, on the verge of the limitations of the lyre’s strings (‘Der Leier Gitter 
zwängt ihm nicht die Hände’, ‘The lyre’s strings do not constrain his hands’; 1,5, 
line 13) and writing’s pure immediacy. Writing in which transgression finds its 
space, then, emerges as the reforming of the empty form of sameness, from which 
the recurring multiplicity of repetition arises. 
 The sonnet is the quest for the inner core of the possibility of the language of 
writing, arising from the absence of the Same. It is the quest for a language of the 
limit, of the coincidence and difference between singing and being in the 
temporality of a wenn, (‘Ein für alle Male / ists Orpheus, wenn es singt’, ‘Once 
and for all, it’s Orpheus, when there is song’; 1,5, lines 5 & 6, recurring in lines 7, 
10) and the ellipsis of the verb ‘to be’ through the metamorphoses of this and that: 
‘Seine Metamorphose / in dem und dem’, ‘His metamorphoses in this and that’; 
1,5, lines 4-5). This language transgresses being and the naming of being (‘Wir 
sollen uns nicht mühn / um andre Namen’, ‘We should not go for other names’; 
1,5, lines 4-5) toward the impossible invention of the other through the scattering 
of sense and sound (‘Wir sollen uns nicht mühn / um andre Namen’: the first part 
of the sentence belonging to the first, the second to the second quartet) and 
through the dissecting of the unity of the word. 
 The fifth sonnet is the search for the new poetic language in the act of 
transgression — substantiated through the recurrence of the prefix ‘über’ in the 
words ‘überstehen’, ‘outlive’ in 1,5, line 8; ‘übertreffen’, ‘surpass’ in 1,5, line 11, 
and finally ‘überschreiten’, ‘transgress’ at the end of the sonnet, 1,5, line 14 — 
that crosses the limit, causing the Same to appear in ‘its unmediated substance’, in 
the very re-composition of its absence, through which, according to Foucault, ‘it 
[the sacred] becomes all the more scintillating’.70  
                                                 
70 Michel Foucault, Aesthetics, Essential works of Foucault 1954-1984, II, p. 70. 
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 The sixth Sonnet is significant for tracing the extension of the act of 
transgression upon the limits between the dual domains of here and there, the real 
and the invisible (‘das Unsichtbare’), life and death, initiating from the first lines: 
‘Ist er ein Hiesiger?’ Nein, aus beiden / Reichen erwuchs seine weite Natur’, (Is 
he from here? No, from both domains does his extended nature grew; 1,6, lines 
1&2) and ending up with combining in one sentence the apparently contradictory 
objects of Gräber (graves) and Zimmer (room; line 13).  
 The act of transgression is established as the basis for the new poetic singing 
presented through the formulation gütliges Bild (valid image; 1,6, line 12) which 
appears for the first time as the unfading (‘Nichts kann […] ihm verschlimmern’; 
1,6, line 12). The poetic language, then, as the creation of valid, unfading images 
is the pure act of transgression of the appearances of things and our multiple 
viewings of them: ‘Aber er […] mische […] | ihre Erscheinung in alles 
Geschaute’ (But he […] mingles […] their appearance in all viewings’; 1,6, lines 
7&9). As a result, the real things (Fingerring, Spange und Krug, ring, bracelet and 
pitcher) in their pure relatedness to each other (‘sei ihm so wahr wie der klarste 
Bezug’, ‘is as real to him as the clearest relatedness; 1,6, line 11) are 
substantiated. The phenomenon of the pure relatedness is expressed through the 
word Bezug (the poetic version of Beziehung), the frequent application of which in 
Rilke’s poetry, testifies to the fact that this phenomenon has been under his 
constant focus.71 The phenomenon of the pure relatedness between objects is 
remarked by Ryan, who argues that Rilke ‘came to conceive of artistic form or 
‘Figur’ (figure) as a way of retaining the object in a kind of structural 
metamorphosis’.72 
 
 
                                                 
71 See for the examples of this application in Herbert William Belmore, Rilke’s Craftsmanship: An 
Analysis of His Poetic Style, pp. 154 – 155.   
72 Judith Ryan, Rilke, Modernism and Poetic Tradition, p. 157. 
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2.2.5 The Invention of the Language of Praising  
 
 
The significance of the sixth sonnet is also essential in that it introduces the 
conception of the new poetic language, liberated from representation, in the pure act 
of praising (‘rühme er Fingerring, Spange und Krug’, ‘he praises ring, bracelet and 
pitcher’; 1,6, line 14).73 The act of praising is anchored in sameness as the wisdom of 
the Unnameable which is alluded to in the knowledge of the root: ‘wer die Wurzeln 
der Weiden erfuhr’ (‘who the knowledge of the roots has experienced’; 1,6, line 4). 
The knowledge of the root will be further propagated (in the subsequent sonnets), 
giving rise to the multiple figures of various kinds of fruit. 
 The search for the new poetic language of repetition traced throughout the 
preceding sonnets seems to end up with the invention of the poetic singing as 
praising in the seventh sonnet: ‘Rühmen, das ists!’ (‘To praise, that’s it!’; 1,7, line 
1). The poetics of praising seems to encompass the joy characteristic of a 
discovery preceded by a long and devastating seeking, full of hesitations, 
questioning and destruction.  
 The liberation of language from representation results not in its total erasure 
or its emergence as pure negativity, but in the assertion of the pure being of 
language as a unity of voice, graphé, and silence. Rilke conceives this unity in the 
form of a praising which rests no more on the removal of the voice, but in which 
the distant voice, polished and cleaned from dust, scintillates in a god-like 
manner: ‘Nie versagt ihm die Stimme am Staube, / wenn ihn das göttliche 
Beispiel ergreift’ (The voice from the dust does not fail It / when it seizes the god-
like example’; 1,7, lines 5 & 6). This new language of praising, indicating nothing 
but itself, aspires to the form of divine creation in its quest to encompass the fully 
given in a single act and to affirm the element of the divine once-and-for-allness 
(‘Ein für alle Male’; 1,5 line 5, 1,5) in its every single spatial act. 
                                                 
73 See: Dianna C. Niebylski, The Poem on the Edge of the Word: The Limits of Language and the 
Uses of Silence in the Poetry of Mallarmé, Rilke, and Vallejo (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 
Inc., 1993) on the poetic speech as the celebration of Being in Rilke’s Die Sonette, pp. 93-125.  
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 At this point, where language ceases to signify the Same, it is transposed 
into the dimension of pure repetition, where every single act — as the indication 
of its absolute uniqueness, the unfolding of otherness and nothingness — is at the 
same time the assertion of sameness not in the form of the transcendental 
signified, but in the ever more otherness of the singular event. The language of 
pure repetition is the dissolution and dispersing of the totality of the Same into the 
nothingness of silence, out of which the poetic praising as the praising of the very 
event of language emerges like ore: ‘Ein zum Rühmen Bestellter, / ging er hervor 
wie das Erz aus des Steins/Schweigen’ (‘One called to profess praise, he emerged 
like ore from the stone’s silence; 1,7, lines 1 - 3). The phenomenon of silence 
which is concealed within the stone and needs to be liberated in the form of 
praising, is stressed by enjambment, i.e. by the cutting of the noun Schweigen 
from the unity of the sentence and its transference into the next line 3.  The 
assertion of poetic singing in the form of the liberation of silence from stone 
brings forth the image of the poet who reveals the concealed speech or who is, 
using Görner’s definition, the ‘Bildhauer der Sprache, ein Graveur’.74  
 The image of ‘unendlichen Weins’ (‘endless wines’; 1,7, line 4) creates the 
association of the free floating language of praising, its overflowing without any 
barrier of signification or constraint of unspeakable experience. Neither is the 
freedom of praising limited by having any addressee, such as the glory of past 
kings or the pure divine light: ‘Nicht in den Grüften der Könige Moder / straft ihm 
die Rühmung Lügen, oder / daß von den Göttern ein Schatten fällt’ (The mould in 
the crypt of kings doesn’t expose the lie of his praising, neither that from gods a 
shadow falls; 1,7, lines 9-11). The new language of praising is beyond the realm 
of signification and consequently does not signify any signified, be it in the form 
of history or gods. As a pure act of speech located within the space of 
transgression, praising is not limited by any constraint of shape or the dialectics of 
contradictions of light/shadow.  
 So as to free the overloaded word praising (rühmen) from its connotations 
with human civilization and divine glorification (praising the crypts of dead gods 
and the absolute divine light), by which it has been weighed down for the long 
                                                 
74 Rüdiger Görner, Rainer Maria Rilke: Im Herzwerk der Sprache, p. 267.  
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period of the European Classicism, the first tercet of the sonnet unifies in its 
apparently homogeneous form the controversial words Grüften der Könige Moder 
(the mould in the crypt of kings), ein Schatten von den Göttern (a shadow from 
gods), and die Rühmung Lügen (the lie of his praising; 1,7, lines 9 - 12). The 
double negation of this discourse of signification is realized through the negative 
particles nicht (1,7, line 9) and oder (1,7, line 10) which divide the homogeneity 
of the discourse, to place in the fracture in-between the nicht and the oder, the 
otherness of the Rühmung Lügen.  
Signification is dispersed into the heterogeneity of the lie of praising 
which is not susceptible to exposure, as it is the very lie of praising – located 
within the space of transgression, in the abyss between history and religion, 
ontology and dialectics, the real and the hyperreal – that counts. It is from within 
this pure space of transgression that the new poetic language as the lie of praising 
emerges as pure simulacrum which, having stripped the representation of the real 
and the imaginary will subsequently be acknowledged by Baudrillard, as leaving 
space ‘only for the orbital recurrence of models and for the simulated generation 
of differences’.75 
 The recurrence of the different forms of the same word rühmen (praising) 
twice in the first line (1,7, line 1), once in combination with Lügen (Rühmung 
Lügen; 1,7, line 10) and once at the end of the sonnet as rühmlichen (rühmlichen 
Früchten, 1,7, line 14) reinforces the invention of the new poetic language of 
praising as a pure act of speech, the freedom of which is not weighed down by any 
constraints of signification; the language of praising as lie, as the pure space of 
simulacrum. The poet is then one of the remaining messengers who face death and 
in the experience of the void find the possibility of the pure act of speech: ‘Er ist 
einer der bleibenden Boten, / der noch weit in die Türen der Toten / Schalen mit 
rühmlichen Früchten hält’ (‘He’s the lone enduring messenger / who reaches deep 
into death’s door/offering glorious fruit in bowls’; Landman’s translation, 1,7, 
lines 12-14). According to Frank Wood, Orpheus, as the poet’s surrogate, is alone 
capable of crossing the threshold and, by virtue of his adherence to both realms, 
                                                 
75 Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, trans. by Sheila Faria Glaser (Ann Arbor: The 
University of Michigan Press, 1994), pp. 2-3. 
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praising the earth.76 Praising is then lodged in the possibility of death as the limit 
of language and its innermost potentiality which is unfolded in the singularity of 
repetition, redoubling, and simulacra. Speech as praising is disseminated through 
the absolute singularity of a multiple variety of praiseworthy fruit (rühmlichen 
Früchten); a phenomenon which constitutes a significant trait of some of the 
subsequent sonnets. 
 While defining the poet as one of the messengers (‘einer der […] Boten’, 
1,7, line 12), the seventh sonnet brings forth the notions of the double, of 
duplication and of writing which appear among other modes of transgressing the 
limit of death to open up the space of simulacra. In that pure space of praising, 
transformed into an already acknowledged and named Raum der Rühmung 
(praise-space; 1,8, line 1) in the eighth Sonnet, the unrehearsed, oblique, and 
unexpected Klage (Lamentation) passes freely: ‘plötzlich, schräg und ungeübt’ 
(‘But suddenly she, off-balance, unrehearsed’ Landman’s translation, 1,8, line 12). 
The recurrence of the umlauts in definitions of Lamentation stresses its 
destabilizing character and its belonging to the pure praise-space, in which those 
reopened mouths who already know silence’s name come to sing: ‘grüß ich, die 
wiedergeöffneten Munde, / die schon wußten, was schweigen heißt’ (‘I salute you, 
the reopened mouths / who already know silence’s name’, Landman’s translation, 
1,10, lines 10 – 11). If this is the infinite lament of Orpheus for the loss of 
Eurydice, then it is characterised by the fact that Orpheus has seen the face of 
Eurydice, and, in Foucault’s words, there shines ‘behind Orpheus’s laments […] 
the glory of having seen, however fleetingly the unattainable face at the very 
instant it turned away and returned to darkness’.77 In this space of transgression, 
our regained voices are no more constrained by the mediation of breath, but are 
held with their suspended breath in a constellation in the heavens: ‘hält sie doch 
ein Sternbild unsrer Stimme / in den Himmel, den ihr Hauch nicht trübt’ (‘holds 
up a constellation of our song / in the heavens, which her breath does not 
becloud’, Landman’s translation, 1,8, lines 13 – 14).  
                                                 
76 Frank Wood, Rainer Maria Rilke: the Ring of Forms (New York: Octagon Books, 1970), p. 
193. 
77 Michel Foucault, Aesthetics, Essential works of Foucault 1954-1984, II, p. 162. 
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Yet, this constellation, standing for the very idea of the totality of the 
Same is questioned as merely an illusion which is haunted and then subdued by us 
(‘gejagt und dann gebändigt’; ‘hunted and then subdued’, 1,11, line 5). The 
eleventh sonnet likewise questions the very idea of totality, the metaphysical truth 
of the One: ‘Und die zwei sind eins. / Aber sind sie’s? (‘And the two are one, but 
are they though?’; 1,11, lines 8 – 9). Here, the totality of the Same is dispersed 
into divergent multiplicities; the nameless is disseminated into the infinite 
repetition of names: ‘Namenlos schon trennt sie Tisch und Weide’ (‘The nameless 
is already divided into table and meadow’, 1,11, line 11). The sonnet reconsiders 
the paradigm of the One which: ‘Doch uns freue eine Weile nun, / der Figur zu 
glauben. Das genügt’(‘only delights us to believe the figure for a while’, 1,11, 
lines 13-14). What counts here, is not the constellation or the sum, but the infinite 
singularity of the stars which come to form not the same constellation, but the 
stars repeating themselves in the divided constellation of the Same. 
 The theme of the poet facing death to be able to find the possibility of the 
pure speech of praising, appearing in the seventh sonnet is intensified in the ninth 
to construct a double realm of transgression, in which the regained voices can 
flow eternally and mildly, without constraint: ‘Erst in dem Doppelbereich / 
werden die Stimmen / ewig und mild’ (‘Once in the dual land / the voices will be / 
eternal and mild’, 1,9, lines 12 – 14). The urge to face the void and transgress the 
limit of death in order to be capable of speech is substantiated through locating 
speech within the abyss between the oppositions of the praising lyre and the 
shades (1,9, lines 1 – 4). In this space of transgression language is made an image 
of itself through its reduplication in the mirror, the reflection of which, however, 
may often be blurred: ‘Mag auch die Spieglung im Teich / oft uns verschwimmen: 
/ Wisse das Bild’ (‘Though the reflection in the pond / may often waver: / Know it 
still’, Landman’s translation, 1,9, lines 9 – 11). What is at stake here, is not the 
original reflected in the pond, but the transgressing of the original and the copy in 
the reconstructing of the mirrored structure; not the Same, but the reverberation of 
its images in the praise-space: ‘wisse das Bild’ (1,9, line 11). 
 The twelfth sonnet transposes the issue of the totality of the Same, discussed 
in the eleventh sonnet, into the outer space of pure relatedness; an issue which was 
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first raised in the sixth sonnet (der klarste Bezug; line 11, 1,6). The poetic 
language is accordingly postulated not as the representation of the unifying power 
of the Same, but as an infinite repetition, exposed through the divided figures of 
the Same: ‘Heil dem Geist, der uns verbinden mag; / denn wir leben wahrhaft in 
Figuren’ (‘Hail the spirit able to unite! For we truly live in figures’, 1,12, lines 1-
2). The pivot is no longer the unifying presence of the Same, but the spreading 
forth of language as pure exteriority (‘die leere Ferne’, ‘empty distance’, 1,12, line 
8) and as absence in the nonplace of interrelatedness: ‘Ohne unsern wahren Platz 
zu kennen, / handeln wir aus wirklichem Bezug’ (Without knowing the place of 
our true location, / we deal with the real relatedness, 1,12 lines 5-6).  
 Only when language is brought to the edge of the abyss, in the space of 
transgression, can it face the nothingness of death: either in the silence of the 
suspended breath or the pure space of praising where words unravel unconstrained 
both of unspeakability and representation. It appears then as the pure experience 
of force (‘Musik der Kräfte’, ‘music of forces’, 1,12, line 9) in the fixed expanse 
or in the pure tension (‘Reine Spannung’, 1,12, line 9) between the univocal spirit 
(Geist, 1,12, line 1) and the retention of the multiple forms of figures. The birth of 
language is, therefore, not the result of transformation of seeds into summer, but 
of dissemination in the pure act of giving: ‘Selbst wenn sich der Bauer sorgt und 
handelt, / wo die Saat in Sommer sich verwandelt, / reicht er niemals hin. Die 
Erde schenkt (Even if the farmer cares and deals, / where the seeds change into 
summer, / he never reaches. The earth gives.) Language is dislocated from the 
universal flux of becoming by which the seeds are transformed into summer and 
relocated into the pure act of giving which splits the circle of becoming in order to 
assert the simultaneous recurrence of both summer and seeds in their infinite 
singularity without being confined by the constraints of causality. The language of 
praising is likewise located outside the subjectivity of the farmer, standing for that 
of the poet. The displacement of causality and subjectivity leaves space solely for 
the pure being of language which speaks only of itself in the pure act of 
dissemination. 
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2.2.6. The Theatre of Phantasms 
 
The newly coined praising-space of pure relatedness, or the zone of transgression is 
inhabited by the multiple variety of shapes, figures, colours, and tastes of different 
species of fruits described in the thirteenth sonnet: ‘Voller Apfel, Birne und Banane, / 
Stachelbeere’ (‘Plump apple, pear and banana, gooseberry’, 1,13, lines 1-2). The 
poetic descriptions of the perceptions associated with these fruits (1,13, lines 10-11) 
and their assemblage in nouns denoting perception: ‘O Erfahrung, Fühlung, Freude’ 
(‘O experience, feeling, joy’, 1,13, line 14), which appears at the end of the Sonnet, 
create an entourage of a phenomenology of perception. The fact that the sonnet is 
concerned not only with the unique mode of existence of the perceived things, but 
their expression in the thought of the subject, makes us think of a phenomenology of 
perception.78 Here is an account of this: ‘Lest es einem Kind vom Angesicht, / wenn 
es sie erschmeckt’ (‘Read it on the face of a child, who tastes them’, 1,13, lines 4-5). 
It seems as if the sonnet aims at restoring the encounter between the face of the child 
and the things which are reflected there, or at uniting the perceiving subject with the 
thing perceived through the senses which are termed perceptual fields by Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty.79  
 According to a phenomenology of perception, the sonnet should also be 
regarded as a rediscovering of the ways of sublimation, as a transformation of the 
perceived world into the spoken one: ‘Alles dieses spricht / Tod und Leben in den 
Mund’ (‘All these speak / Death and life in the mouth’, 1,13, lines 2 – 3). In this 
context, the spoken word becomes the possession of knowledge taking shape as a 
result of reconstituting the world through perception which links the body-
organism to the world. Yet, is the sonnet really engaged with a phenomenology of 
perception, i.e. the network of primal significations which, arising from the 
perception of things, link the body to the world? 
 The very next sentence following the aforementioned lines, questions the 
validity of any reference to the phenomenology of perception. Its brief form, 
                                                 
78 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. by Colin Smith (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965), p. xviii. 
79 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Prose of the World, ed. by Claude Lefort, trans by. John O’Neill 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), p. 123. 
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characteristic of a univocal statement in a single stroke sends this entire reference 
back to history: ‘Dies kommt von weit’ (‘This comes from far away’, 1,13, line 
5). What the sonnet is engaged with is instead, the singularity of the event which 
appears under the density of matter and breaks its engagement to name. The 
disenchantment from signification gives rise to the pure play of surfaces lacking 
names: ‘Wird euch langsam namenlos im Munde?’ (Do they grow slowly 
nameless in the mouth?, 1,13, line 6). The space now freed from word-signifiers 
(‘Wo sonst Worte waren’, ‘Where usually words were’, 1,13, line 7) and 
restrictions imposed upon them, is occupied by the simultaneous coexistence of 
the dispersed multiplicity of fruit-flesh in the immediate play of diversities. The 
disappearance of names opens up an empty space, a diaphanous opening which 
makes visible the very clearness and transparency of the clear and transparent fruit 
(‘klar zu werden, wach und transparent’, 1,13, line 12). The act of disappearance 
of mediation becomes an operation of allowing the openness to appear.  
 To open up space for the multiple, it was necessary to divide the Same, to 
limit its identity through otherness, differences and nonbeing; and coin a language 
of transgression which is not limited or confined by the constraints of signifying 
the Same, but allows for the recurrence of the different at the extreme point of its 
singularity. What does then emerge or flow like a discovery (‘fließen Funde’, 
1,13, line 7), astonishingly freed of fruit-flesh (‘aus dem Fruchtfleisch überrascht 
befreit’, 1,13, line 8,)? Does the emphasis of flesh (Fruchtfleisch) allude to the 
surface effects, interior phantoms of the Epicureans80 that are quickly reabsorbed 
into other depths by the taste, the mouth (through the words Mund recurring twice 
in 1,13, lines 3 & 5 and Schmecken in 1,13, line 11), or the membranes that are 
detached from the surfaces of objects to form colours or shapes of fleshes? If so, 
then freed from the fruit-flesh are the phantasms which ‘topologize’ the 
materiality of the flesh and function at the limit of bodies: ‘against bodies, 
because they stick to bodies and protrude from them, […] touch them, cut them, 
break them into sections, regionalize them, and multiply their surfaces’.81 Then, 
                                                 
80 See on the philosophy of phantasm in Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, trans. by Mark Lester 
with Charles Stivale (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990); pp. 266 - 279 on the analogies 
with the Epicureans. 
81 Michel Foucault, Aesthetics, Essential works of Foucault 1954-1984, II, p. 346 – 347. 
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what matters is solely the theatre of phantasms, of difference, of pure signifiers, 
masks without signification, of simulacra, of repetition; a theatre beyond 
representation that is ‘multiplied, polyscenic, simultaneous, […] where we 
encounter […] the dance of masks, the cries of bodies, and the gesturing of hands 
and fingers’.82 Is however the theatre of phantasms mute (namenlos, 1,13, line 6) 
or does the sonnet bring forth a new kind of mouth-centred praising-space as a 
result of a liberation from signification and phonocentrism? The mouth is rather 
the locus of the pure cry, the Geröhr (1,1, line 9), alluded to in the very first 
sonnet, where the genesis of the new praising-language as the repetition of the 
otherness of thought extends itself.  
 The sentence ‘Wagt zu sagen, was ihr Apfel nennt’ (‘Dare to say, what you 
call apple’, 1,13, line 9) and the following four lines (1,13, lines 10 - 14) which 
describe the taste of the apple passing through the mouth after the uttering of the 
word apple, remind of Zeno’s words: ‘If you say cart, a cart passes through your 
mouth’.83 The mouth is then the locus where the depths of phantasms are 
articulated and where nothing other than the simple succession of phonemes 
counts. The phonemes are detached from meaning in order to form the free-
floating space of praise, of the immediacy of flesh detached from signification. 
The mouth is then the place where the double-meaning (doppeldeutig) of the 
space of transgression opens itself up: at the limit between hiesig (here) and riesig 
(immense), (as an interplay of rhythmic identities and semantic differences, 1,13, 
lines 13&14). It is essential to recall Foucault’s words on this account, linking the 
locus of the mouth to the genesis of language: ‘Through this open mouth, through 
this alimentary voice, the genesis of language, the formation of meaning, and the 
flash of thought extend their divergent series’.84 
 In the fourteenth Sonnet the theatre of phantasms is extended to encompass 
not only the figures of fruit, but also the singular events of the flower and the 
vine-leaf (Blume, Weinblatt, 1,14, line 1) which no longer represent the seasons, 
but repeat their very singularity beyond signification. The totality of the notion of 
                                                 
82 Ibid, p. 348. 
83 See on this and more passages on the mouth in Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, pp. 183 – 
233 and Michel Foucault, Aesthetics, Essential works of Foucault 1954-1984, II p. 354.  
84 Michel Foucault, Aesthetics, Essential works of Foucault 1954-1984, II, p. 354. 
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season is dissipated by the singularity of each thing, the clear contours of which 
breach them from the totality of the season.  Each of them speaks of its own 
different voice which, entering into resonance with each other and the language of 
the seasons, does not dissolve into it, but sings of its own divergent otherness: ‘Sie 
sprechen nicht die Sprache nur des Jahres’ (‘They don’t just speak the speech of 
the seasons’, 1,14, line 2).  
 What is at stake here, is the role that these phantasm-events play in the 
theatre of phantasms (‘Was wissen wir von ihrem Teil an dem?; ‘What do we 
know about their part in it?’, 1,14, line 6). The question remains open: does 
thought invent these singular masks miming themselves and, hence the entire 
theatre, or is thought itself formed out of these phantasm-events it thinks through 
(this opposition is demonstrated through the equivocal roles of lord and slave in 
1,14, lines 10 – 14)? Sonnet fourteen reminds of the poetic genius which produces 
brute repetitions on the basis of a more secret repetition, by pointing to the thing 
halfway between brute force and kisses (‘dies Zwischending aus stummer Kraft 
und Küssen’, 1,14, line 14).85 
 The theatre of phantasms as the recurrence of the singularity of masks, 
liberated from representation and as the theatre of pure difference freed from the 
domination of identity is fully manifested through the dancing of the orange in the 
fifteenth Sonnet (‘Tanzt die Orange’, ‘Dance the orange’, 1,15, line 5). The 
dancing rhythm is built through the dissected fragments, the recurrence of 
elliptical, exclamatory marks, and repetitions that fill the space of the sonnet. 
Here, the new poetic language of praising emerges as a synaesthesia, 
encompassing the combination of taste, fragrance, colour, music, and dance 
within the contours of the thing.  
 What remains after the liberation from the name, is pure joy, the absurdity of 
combination emerging in the intense once-for-allness of the single chance. The poetic 
language which has realized the impossibility of pointing at a smell (‘Wer zeigt mit 
Fingern auf einen Geruch?’, ‘Who can point their finger at a smell?’, 1,16, line 5,), is 
no longer limited by the constraints of naming and pointing. It rather has to endure 
the decentring of the Same and accept the parts which are gaining more importance 
                                                 
85 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 364. 
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than the whole in the sixteenth Sonnet: ‘Sieh, nun heißt es zusammen ertragen/ 
Stückwerk und Teile, als sei es das Ganze’ (‘Look, now we together must endure / 
bits and parts, as if they are the whole’, 1,16, lines 9 – 10). 
 
 
2.2.7 The Dismemberment of the Same 
 
 
Since sonnets from 17 – 25 are not relevant to the purpose of our study, we will 
pass to the last (1, 26) Sonnet, which is not merely the end of the first cycle, but 
also the beginning of the second. Yet, in what follows we will merely present a 
general outline of the second cycle, given that the entire pattern of the second 
cycle is the unfolding of the new poetic language as repetition, designated 
throughout the first cycle. The second cycle will be viewed as a propagation of the 
multiple fragments constituting the poetic language of repetition outlined in the 
first cycle. 
The notion of the end which is also a beginning, delineated in the last 
sonnet of the first cycle, is paralleled with the end of Orpheus’s mundane 
existence when he was murdered by the maenads to give beginning to song. The 
entire development of the poetic language from cry, as a pure expression of 
emotions (‘ihr Geschrei’, 1,26, line 3), to its transposition into the musical 
sequence (‘hast […] übertönt mit Ordung’, line 3, 1,26); from the subsequent 
destruction of the musical sequence to its structuring as play (‘aus den 
Zerstörenden stieg dein erbaundes Spiel’, ‘from out the destroyers rose uplifting 
playing’, Landman’s translation, 1,26, line 4) is outlined in the first quatrain. The 
last sonnet stresses the notion of the poetic language of repetition, unfolded in the 
first sonnet and anchored in the liberation of sameness from representation in 
order to return it to its original status of the ungraspable. The last phrase of the 
first tercet ‘Dort singst du noch jetzt’ (‘Even now you still sing there’, 1,26, line 
11,), the otherness of which is stressed through its structure (constituting one of 
the two sentences into which the unity of line 11 is split) and tense (The Present 
Indefinite as opposed to the prevailing past tense) alludes to the key phrase 
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‘Orpheus singt’(1,1, line 2) of the opening sonnet. It realizes the same function as 
the abovementioned line of the first sonnet, i.e. the opposition of the poetic 
singing as a pure signifier to the discourse of representation. 
The last tercet is a prelude to the second cycle as the manifestation of the 
poetic language of repetition that comes into being only due to the 
dismemberment of the totality of the Same: ‘Nur weil dich reißend zuletzt die 
Feindschaft verteilte, / sind wir die Hörenden jetzt und ein Mund der Natur’ 
(‘Only because dismembering hatred dispersed you/are we hearers to-day and a 
mouth which else Nature would lack’, 1, 26, lines 13 – 14).86 The dismemberment 
of the whole amounts to a different poetic language as the manifestation of what 
Derrida nicknames as the ‘unnameable movement of difference-itself, […] trace, 
reserve, or différance’.87  
 The second cycle will be viewed as the trace of the absent God (‘Du 
unendliche Spur!’, ‘You infinite trace!’, 1,26, line 12) or as writing beyond the 
identity of the god. It will be traced as Weltraum (world-space, 2,1, line 3) or a 
renaming of the poetic space of transgression, as a coincidence of interior and 
exterior through the breath (‘Wie viele von diesen Stellen der Räume waren schon 
/ innen in mir’, ‘How many of these spots of spaces were inside me already’, 2,1, 
lines 9 & 10) or, to use Blanchot’s words, as Rilke’s notion of openness.88 The act 
of transgression destructs the ontology of the Sacred Word that was in the 
beginning (‘Du, einmal glatte Rinde, Rundung und Blatt’, ‘You, once smooth-
skinned roundness and leaf’, 2,1, lines 13 & 14), in order to assert the already 
personified weightlessness of the poetic word of Rilke (‘meiner Worte’, ‘my 
words’, 2,1, line 14), disseminated in the multiple reflections of the mirror-space. 
For Rilke this is the space of nothing, of silence, of speech devoid of speakers: 
‘Fische sind stumm […], […]| Aber ist nicht am Ende ein Ort, wo man das, was 
der Fische/Sprache ware, ohne sie spricht?’ (‘Fish are speechless […] | But isn’t 
there at last a place in which one speaks the fish's language, without fish?’, 
Landman’s translation, 2,20, lines 12 – 14).   
                                                 
86 Rainer Maria Rilke, Sonnets to Orpheus, trans. by Howard A. Landman, p. 84. 
87 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (London: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1997), p. 93. 
88 See on Rilke’s notion of openness expressed through the notion of Weltinnenraum  invoked in 
the ‘9th Elegy’, in Maurice Blanchot, L’Espace littéraire (Paris: Gallimard, 1968), p. 137. 
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 The new poetic word is formed by virtue via the operation of transgression, 
stressed through the preposition über (2,6, line 13). It is the transgression of name and 
memory toward the indefiniteness of guessing concealed in the ellipsis: ‘Dennoch, 
wir wissen ihn nicht zu nennen, wir raten’, (‘Still we don’t know what it is named, we 
guess’, 2,6, line 12). It is a transgression toward the Unsayable: am Unsäglichen 
(2,13, line 12).89 Transgression is, therefore, conceived as an operation of unsayable 
summation (‘den unsäglichen Summen’, 2,13, line 13), the account of which remains 
uncountable (‘zähle dich jubelnd hinzu und vernichte die Zahl’, ‘count yourself in 
joyously and cancel out the count’, 2,13, line 14). In the form of an overwintering 
(‘überwinternd’, 2,13, line 4), transgression encompasses the domains of death and 
ascendance (‘Sei immer tot in Eurydike —, singender steige’, ‘Be always dead in 
Eurydice — rise up singing’, 2, 13, line 5), being and non-being (‘Sei — und wisse 
zugleich des Nicht-Seins Bedingung’, ‘Be — but still know non-being’s conditions’, 
Landman’s translation, 2,13, line 9). The space of transgression is propagated through 
the innermost vibration of the poem, analogous to Mallarmé’s words which define the 
poem as ‘the enlarging of space by vibrations up to the infinite’.90 This idea is 
expressed in Sonnet 13 through the line ‘den unendlichen Grund deiner innigen 
Schwingung’ (‘the infinite foundation of your innermost vibration’, 2,13, line 10) and 
the image of the shattering of a ringing glass: ‘ein klingendes Glas, das sic him Klang 
schon zerschlung’ (‘a ringing glass, that in sounding swiftly shatters’, Landman’s 
translations, 2,13, line 8). 
 The issue of sameness manifested in the poetic language of repetition in 
various guises remains under the constant focus of Rilke throughout the second 
cycle. It appears now and then as the mouth which speaks inexhaustible Oneness 
and Pureness: ‘du Mund […] der unerschöpflich Eines, Reines’ (2,15, lines 1 & 
2), or as the place grown whole: ‘ist der Gott die Stelle, welche heilt’, 2,16, line 
2). This is, however, an already different conception of sameness which is 
displaced from the homogenous discourse of representation into the counter-
                                                 
89 See: Marielle Jane Sutherland, Images of Absence: Death and the Language of Concealment in 
the Poetry of Rainer Maria Rilke (Berlin: Weidler Buchverlag, 2006), p. 118 on the transformation 
of the language of death into the poetry of the unsayable. 
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balance, created through the rhythmical recurrence of the poetic word of repetition 
(Gegengewicht, / in dem ich mich rhythmisch ereigne’, ‘Counterbalance, / 
wherein I rhythmically recur’, 2,1, lines 3 & 4). Sameness is henceforth displaced 
from the totality of the whole into the singularity of the fragment: ‘Einzige Welle, 
deren | allmähliches Meer ich bin’, (‘A single wave, whose gradual sea I am’, 2,1, 
lines 5 & 6). The very metaphysical truth of the totality of the Same is being 
questioned: ‘Was war wirklich im All?’ (‘What was real in the All?’, 2,8, line 11): 
a questioning which amounts to the assertion of nothing: ‘Nichts’ (2,8, line 12), or 
to the recurrence of the throws: ‘Nur die Bälle’ (‘Only the balls’, 2,8, line 12). 
Rilke’s image of the throw of a ball into cosmic space is juxtaposed with 
Mallarmé’s throw of dice by Walter Strauss who stresses the difference of le 
hasard (the chance) in Mallarmé and the operation of transgression in Rilke.91  
 The Rilkean conception of poetry is accordingly anchored no longer in the 
representation of the Same by virtue of the other, but in the transgression of the 
opposition between them in the mirror-space. The mirror-space no longer points 
to the contradiction between the Same and the other, but is itself the showing of 
the reflection or the mirror in its own being: ‘Spiegel: noch nie hat man wissend 
beschrieben, / was ihr in euerem Wesen seid’ (‘Mirror: no man has known how to 
describe what your own being was’, 2,3, lines 1 & 2). The mirror thus marks the 
spacing of reflection (‘Ihr, wie mit lauter Löchern von Sieben / erfüllten 
Zwischenräume der Zeit’, ‘You, filled with nothing but holes of sieves like 
interstices of time’, Landman’s translation, 2,3, lines 3 & 4), or the poetic space of 
invention as the relation of the same to the other (the relation of Orpheus to 
Narcissus, 2,3, line 14). It marks the space of mirror effects, doubles, simulacra, 
and phantasms, substantiating through the shape of the animal that was not real, 
but grew pure because it was loved: ‘Zwar war es nicht. Doch weil sie’s liebten, 
ward / ein reines Tier.’ (‘Of course, it wasn't real. But it grew pure / 
because they loved it’, 2,4, Landman’s translation, lines 5 & 6).  
In the poetic space of invention, language divides and reproduces itself in 
the virtual space of the mirror. By ‘creating a vertical system of mirrors, self 
                                                 
91 Walter Strauss, A, Descent and Return (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971),  
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images, analogies’, it becomes its own mirror and transgresses ‘the limit of death 
through its reduplication in a mirror’,92 pierced by the sixteen-pointers of the 
chandelier (‘Und der Lüster geht wie ein Sachzehn-Ender / durch eure 
Unbetretbarkeit’, ‘But chandeliers / pierce you like sixteen-point antlers’, 
Landman’s translation, 2,3, lines 7 & 8). Language, liberated from representation, 
emerges in the second cycle as the transgression of the opposition between being 
and nonbeing, being and becoming, saying and speaking, or, to use Alan Keele’s 
words, as the ‘final, paradoxical chiasmus’ and the capturing of the ‘quintessence 
of the god Orpheus’.93 In this pure space of celebration, the past and future are 
contracted within the only present point of the pure event, which is the only 
justification of the singular, innocent being of language. Moreover, the entire 
creation is reduced to the pure being of the event of the language of celebration: 
‘zu der stillen Erde sag: Ich rinne. / Zu dem raschen Wasser sprich: Ich bin.’ (‘to 
the still earth say: I flow. / To the rushing water speak: I am’, 2,29, lines 13-14). 
In Georges Poulet’s words, ‘the entire creation has gone into seclusions so that in 
its stead and in its place the rose might be created’.94  
 In summary, Rilke’s Die Sonette an Orpheus should be viewed as an 
example of a transposition of sameness from the philosophical discourse into the 
poetic language. This transposition becomes possible by liberating language from 
representation and by the coinage of a new poetic language of repetition, located 
in the pure space of transgression. Starting with the dismemberment of the totality 
of the Same, this language of otherness and void becomes eventually transformed 
into the poetic language of celebration, in which sameness scintillates in its full 
splendour. In the course of this transformation, language is rendered light and 
transparent by a force, which is said to lift the words up and thus counteract ‘their 
associative heaviness’, resulting in a ‘happy serenity quite unknown to Rilke’s 
earlier productions’.95   
 
                                                 
92 Michel Foucault, Aesthetics, Essential works of Foucault 1954-1984, II, p. 100 & pp. 92 – 93. 
93 Alan Keele, ‘Rilke’s Sonette An Orpheus’, in A Companion to the works of Rainer Maria Rilke, 
ed. by Erika A. Metzger and Michael M. Metzger (Rochester, N.Y.: Camden House, 2001), p. 217. 
94 Georges Poulet, The Metamorphoses of the Circle, p. 340. 
95 Herbert William Belmore, Rilke’s Craftsmanship: An Analysis of his Poetic Style, p. 214.   
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Conclusion 
 
The inquiry into the incessant postulations of the issue of sameness 
throughout the history of Continental philosophy has demonstrated both its 
enduring significance and the impossibility of providing a definitive 
representation, formula or theory of the Same. These postulations have also 
displayed the relevance of the issue of sameness for the validation of art, 
particularly in the field of philosophical poetics, and in the poetic texts.  
The investigation of the fundamental stages of the history of sameness has 
made obvious that the issue of sameness should primarily be broached in respect 
of the precarious balance between identity and difference. As such, it 
encompasses both, the quest for the knowledge of the same world that all humans 
share and that is presupposed by the very notion of universality and the 
postulation of the absolutely singular differential vis-à-vis this same world. The 
human quest for the discovery that there is something that is identically the same 
for humanity or the assessment of the same world, the one in which we all live, is 
inextricably linked to the assessment of the factor of the different or the other 
within it. 
Yet, the insight into the essential traits of the philosophy of sameness has 
made clear that the entire philosophical discourse is greatly conditioned by the 
distortion of the precarious balance between identity and difference and the 
perpetual search for ways to overcome this distortion. In the period of its 
inception in Ancient Greek philosophy, the issue of sameness was posed in the 
sense of commencement, as the emergence of the thought of Being. It was first 
posed as a questioning about beings as phusis, i.e. beings as such and as a whole 
in the primal intactness of being and thinking, where thinking (apprehension, i.e. 
noein) and Being are the same (to auto). It is with the very oblivion of this 
intactness—an oblivion which makes Heidegger characterize Being more in its 
concealment in Lēthe than in its revelation in Alētheia—that the subsequent stages 
of the philosophy of sameness are distinguished.1  
                                                          
1 Martin Heidegger, Early Greek Thinking, transl. by D.E. Krell and D.A. Capuzzi (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1975), pp. 25 – 26. 
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From this aspect, the first stage in philosophical thought immediately 
following the oblivion of the intactness of sameness (from Plato to Kant) and the 
second stage of the return to sameness after the period of digression (German 
Idealism) are both greatly conditioned by the distortion of the balance of sameness 
in that they re-postulate it with regard to one dominating factor, that of identity. In 
so doing, they bring forth the fundamental distinction between the intelligible and 
the sensible, the original and its copies, according to which the function of the 
singular differential is reduced to the representation of nothing but the immutable 
oneness of the preconceived identity of the Same. Yet, while disparaging this 
period for the distortion of the balance of sameness by either disregarding the 
absolutely singular differential within sameness or by subordinating it to the 
dominating principle of identity (the German Idealism), we have also to credit it 
for representing the most complete knowledge of identity. The acknowledgement 
of the limits of this postulation should by no means overshadow its quest for an 
attempt to return to the primal intactness of sameness as an originary unity of 
being and thinking, phusis and logos. Moreover, the insight into the best 
manifestations of this period—the Monoeidetism of Plato, the Plotinian 
overabundant One, the rationally beautiful Cosmos of Leibniz, and the 
impenetrable depths of the Hegelian Geist, among others—reveals the 
significance of thinking of identity for a genuine understanding of the plenitude of 
the Same and the assessment of the responsibility for sharing the one world and 
the one culture identical for all humans. 
The third relevant stage in the history of sameness is the postulation of the 
absolutely singular differential and its intrinsic link to the identical Same or, in 
other words, the conceptualization of sameness as constituted by the recognition 
of the otherness of the differential. The thought of difference and otherness is, 
however, by no means dismissive of that of identity, but on the contrary, the right 
balance between identity and difference is the sole way to experience the 
plenitude of sameness. The stage of thinking of pure difference (with Nietzsche 
onward) has been thus broached within the philosophy of sameness in its 
relatedness to that of identity in a relationship of conjoining in distinction. 
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Despite the fact that, as Derrida has remarked, Greek thought had 
‘proffered the epekeina tes ousias, by welcoming alterity in general into the heart 
of the logos’,2 the long tradition of thinking of pure identity has been 
misinterpreting the role of singularity and difference within sameness by 
subordinating them to the dominating concept of identity. The period of thinking 
of pure difference may thus be defined as a quest to return to the plenitude of 
sameness not by denying the factor of identity, but by counterbalancing it with 
that of difference through pointing to the fact that difference has always already 
been inscribed within sameness.  
As has been displayed in the study, this period eventually gains pertinence 
starting with Nietzsche’s postulation of pure difference. Nietzsche overturns the 
history of sameness with its limitedness to thinking of pure identity by postulating 
the will to power as the differential element of force, upon the ground of which 
pluralism or difference finds its immediate corroboration.3 He denies the 
dominating idea of the identity of the Same in order to affirm the Eternal Return 
as the return of the different in the sense of repetition as displayed through the 
example of the dicethrow which affirms both: necessity and chance, chaos and 
circle, being and becoming, unity and multiplicity, cycle (circular movement) and 
chaos (mass of force) (Will to Power, II, 325). Yet, the affirmation of the different 
in Nietzsche is not the denial of sameness, but rather the affirmation of its unity in 
a correlation in which identity does not suppress or abolish difference, and, 
similarly, difference is not detached from the idea of sameness.  
Heidegger continues the tradition of postulating sameness with regard to 
the right balance between identity and difference. In so doing, he withdraws the 
issue of sameness from the metaphysical context of universality or abstraction and 
raises it by virtue of the question of Being. Here sameness is discussed according 
to the self-veiling essence of Being in the difference beween Being and beings and 
acquires a hold on the given via the finitude of Dasein in terms of its fundamental 
structures of thrownness, of being-with and being expropriated by the world in its 
difference. For Heidegger, thus, ‘the Same is truly the Same only in that which is 
                                                          
2 Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, p. 153. 
3 Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 7. 
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different’.4 As we can see, the other or the different in Heidegger is not detached 
from sameness, but is rather its utmost possibility and is acknowledged in its 
quintessential oppositional character, in ‘the genuine relationship [...] of a uniting 
that is not a confused mixing but a conjoining in distinction’.5 
Derrida summarizes the achievements of the stage of thinking of pure 
difference by pointing to the limits of classical metaphysics and the impossibility 
of thinking of sameness without considering the factor of the absolutely singular 
differential. He represents sameness as a potently meaningful matrix of différance 
that can be experienced in the jouissance, in the dynamical openness to new 
contexts. What Derrida primarily aims at is the showing up, the stressing of the 
factor of the different which has always already been inscribed within sameness 
by deconstructing the metaphysical signified of the Same and liberating the 
forbidden jouissance as an experience of freedom in an open de-centered system. 
To summarize, with the development that the thought of sameness has 
undergone by Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Derrida, it has undoubtedly reached its 
pinnacle: the assessment of sameness by virtue of the right balance between 
identity and difference. Here, the idea of sameness is not dismissive of difference 
and singularity, neither is the quest for identity a threat to particularity. Similarly, 
the postulation of the absolutely singular differential does not affect the validity 
and pertinence of sameness, but leads to a conception of sameness in which the 
same world that all humans share is the one which is equally open to the other and 
the different.  
The abovementioned assessment of sameness with respect to the right 
balance between identity and difference has been reached on the basis of the 
juxtaposition of the three relevant stages in the history of sameness. The present 
inquiry has also revealed that the significance of this balance is so determinant 
with Heidegger and Derrida, among others, that, admittedly, it is hard to see why 
we still need to stress its absolute indispensability. This need, we argue, is 
conditioned by the subsequent misinterpretation of the conception of difference as 
the denial of sameness in its genuine sense of a universal openness to the 
                                                          
4 Martin Heidegger, Hölderlin’s Hymn ‘The Ister’, transl. by W. McNeill and J. Davis 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), p. 123. 
5 Martin Heidegger, Hölderlin’s Hymn ‘The Ister’, p. 125. 
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challenges of the other and hence, the assertion of a radical otherness deprived of 
its intrinsinc link to universality. The misinterpretation of the conception of 
difference is one of the reasons for the frequent distortion of the balance of 
sameness in socio-political contexts and in artistic creations. In times, this 
distortion takes the form of the thought of pure difference completely detached 
from sameness, i.e. of the memory and consciousness of the identical world, 
values, and culture that all humans share. This brings about unsolvable conflicts, 
ethical issues, and a situation in which the alienated other becomes more 
important than the plenitude of sameness, thereby becoming discriminatory of 
universality and hence, of its very own singularity. It also conditions the 
degradation of aesthetics into transaesthetics (Baudrillardian metaphor) and the 
prevalence of insignificant art works devoid of the thought of the plenitude of 
sameness. Another reason for the disbalance of sameness is the misinterpretation 
of identity as dismissive of singularity and otherness and its domination over the 
different in a way as to homogenize or root it out as a threat to sameness. This 
kind of disbalance brings to what Baudrillard calls a police-state globalization, a 
total control, a terror based on ‘law-and-order measures’.6 It also puts real art 
works under the threat of losing their very own singularity, thereby once again 
becoming discriminatory of universality.  
As we can conclude, the assessment of sameness by virtue of the right 
balance between identity and difference is more than ever valid and pertinent. So, 
the inquiry into its various postulations aims to stress the absolute indispensability 
of the right balance, rather than the choice between either of the two essential 
factors, in a genuine corroboration of sameness. Moreover, it aims to emphasize 
that the question is how to meet both contradictory exigencies of universalization 
and differentiation at the same time in a genuine understanding of the conception 
of sameness. Solely by simultaneously facing these inexorable factors we can 
experience the true plenitude of sameness for the sake of building a free world not 
of consumption but of creation. 
 
 
                                                          
6 Jean Baudrillard, La violence du Mondial in Power Inferno (Paris: Galilee, 2002), pp. 63-83. 
276 
 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
— Abrams, Meyer H., The Mirror and the Lamp: Romantic Theory and the                                      
Critical Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971). 
— Agamben, Giorgio, Language and Death: The Place of Negativity, transl. by 
Karen E. Pinkus and Michael Hardt (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1991). 
— Agamben, Giorgio, The End of the Poem, transl. by Daniel Heller-Roazen 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999). 
— Agamben, Giorgio, The Man Without Content, transl. by Georgia Albert 
(Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 1999). 
— Albright, Daniel, Quantum Poetics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1997). 
— Alighieri, Dante, The Divine Comedy, Paradiso, Canto XXIX, transl. by Ch. 
S. Singleton (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982). 
— Anaximander, Fragments (transl. by John Burnet, 1908, 
<http://philoctetes.free.fr/anaximander.htm>, [accessed 20 August 2010]. 
— Aquinas, Thomas, Truth, transl. by Robert W. Mulligan (New York: 
Preserving Christian Publications, 1993), I. 
— Aristotle, Metaphysics in The Works of Aristotle transl. by W.D. Ross 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972). 
— Asadowski, Konstantin M., Rilke Rainer Maria und Zwetajewa Marina: Ein 
Gespräch in Briefen, übersetzt von Angela Martini-Wonde (Frankfurt am 
Main und Leipzig: Suhrkamp, 1998). 
— Auerbach, Erich, Mimesis. Dargestellte Wirklichkeit in der abendländischen 
Kultur (Tübingen: Francke 1946). 
— Bachelard, Gaston, Air and Dreams, transl. by Edith and Frederick Farrell (Dallas: 
Dallas Inst Humanities & Culture, 1988). 
— Badiou, Alain, Being and Event, transl. by Oliver Feltham (London: 
Continuum, 2007). 
— Badiou, Alain, Conditions, transl. by Steven Corcoran (London: Continuum, 
2008). 
277 
 
 
 
— Barthes, Roland, Le degré  zero de l’écriture (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1953, 
et 1972). 
— Bataille, Georges, On Nietzsche, transl. by Bruce Boone (London: 
Continuum, 2008). 
— Baudrillard, Jean, Simulacra and Simulation, transl. by Sheila Faria Glaser 
(Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1994). 
— Baudrillard, Jean, The Conspiracy of Art (New York: Semiotext(e), Columbia 
University, 2005). 
— Baumgarten, Alexander Gottlieb, Aesthetica (Hildesheim and New York: 
Olms, 1986). 
— Beiser, Frederick C., ed., The Early Political Writings of the German 
Romantics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), Cambridge 
Texts in the History of Political Thought. 
— Belmore, H.W., Rilke’s Craftsmanship (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1954). 
— Benjamin, Walter, Selected Writings, ed. by Marcus Bullock and Michael W. 
Jennings (Cambridge MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
1997), v. I. 
— Benveniste, Emile, Problems in General Linguistics, transl. by Mary 
Elizabeth Meek (Florida: University of Miami Press, 1971). 
— Bernasconi, Robert, The Question of Language in Heidegger’s History of 
Being (London: Macmillan Press, 1985). 
— Bernstein, Michael André, Five Portraits: Modernity and the Imagination in 
Twentieth-Century German Writing (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern 
University Press, 2000). 
— Bernstein, J. M., The Fate of Art: Aesthetic Alienation from Kant to Derrida 
and Adorno (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997). 
— Blanchot, Maurice, L’Espace littéraire (Paris: Gallimard, 1968). 
— Blanchot, Maurice, The Infinite Conversation, transl. by Susan Hanson 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997). 
— Blanchot, Maurice, The Work of Fire, transl. by Charlotte Mandell (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1995). 
278 
 
 
 
— Boeder, Heribert, Seditions: Heidegger and the Limit of Modernity, transl. by 
Marcus Brainart (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997). 
— Boileau, Nicolas, Art of Poetry and Lutrin, transl. by Sir William Soames and 
John Ozell (London: Oneworld Classics, 2008). 
— Bonaventure, St., De reductione artium ad theologiam, transl. by Sister 
Emma Therese Healey (New York: The Franciscan Institute, St. Bonaventure 
College, 1955). 
— Bowie, Andrew, Aesthetics and Subjectivity from Kant to Nietzsche 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990). 
— Bowie, Andrew, Schelling and Modern European Philosophy (London: 
Routledge, 1993). 
— Braunschvig, Marcel, L'Abbé  du Bos, rénovateur de la critique au XVIII 
siècle (Paris, 1904, reproduced by BiblioBazaar, 2010). 
— Brodsky, Patricia Pollock, Rainer Maria Rilke (Boston: Twayne, 1988). 
— Brunkhorst, Katja, Verwandt-Verwandelt, Nietzsche’s Presence in Rilke 
(München: Iudicium, 2006). 
— Bruno, Giordano, Five Dialogues by G. Bruno, Cause, Principle, and Unity, transl. 
by Jack Lindsay (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press Publishers, 1976). 
— Burke, Edmund, A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the 
Sublime and the Beautiful, ed. by Adam Phillips (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1990). 
— Burnet, John, editor, Early Greek Philosophy (London: A&C Black, 1920). 
— Cahn, Steven M. and Aaron Meskin, editors, Aesthetics: A Comprehensive 
Anthology (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2008). 
— Cheetham, Mark A., Kant, Art and Art History: Moments of Discipline 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
— Christoph, Jamme und Schneider Helmut, Mythologie der Vernunft: Hegels 
ältestes Systemprogramm des deutschen Idealismus (Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp, 1984). 
— Cohen Ted and Paul Guyer, editors, Essays in Kant’s Aesthetics (Chicago: 
Chicago University Press, 1982). 
279 
 
 
 
— Cohen, Tom, editor, Jacques Derrida and the Humanities: A Critical Reader 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
— Coleridge, Samuel Taylor, Biographia Literaria  (London: Dent, 1949). 
— Cook, Jon, Poetry in Theory, An Anthology 1900 – 2000 (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2004). 
— Cooper, Ian, The Near and the Distant God (Oxford: Legenda, Modern 
Humanities Research Association and Maney Publishing, 2008). 
— Corrigan, Kevin and Elena Glazov-Corrigan, Plato's Dialectic at Play: 
Argument, Structure, and Myth in the Symposium (Pennsylvania: The 
Pennsylvania State Press, University Park, 2004).  
— Cox, Richard, Figures of Transformation: Rilke and the Example of Valéry 
(Institute of Germanic Studies, University of London, 1979). 
— Cranz, Edward F., Nicholas of Cusa and the Renaissance, ed. Thomas M. 
Izbicki and Gerald Christianson (Aldershot, Brookfield USA: Ashgate 
Variorum, 2000). 
— Crawford Robert, The Modern Poet (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
— Cusanus, Nicholas, Nicholas of Cusa: Selected Writings, transl. by H. 
Lawrence Bond (New York: Paulist Press, 1997). 
— Cusanus, Nicholas, The Layman On Wisdom and the Mind, transl. by M.L. 
Fuhrer (Canada: Dovehouse Editions, 1989). 
— De Man, Paul, Allegories of Reading: Figural Language in 
Rousseau,Nietzsche, Rilke, and Proust (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1979). 
— De Man, Paul, Blindness and Insight (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1997). 
— De Man, Paul, Critical Writings 1953 – 1978, Theory and History of 
Literature (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), v. 66. 
— Deck, John N., Nature, Contemplation, and the One: A Study in the 
Philosophy of Plotinus (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967). 
— Deleuze Gilles, Difference and Repetition, transl. by Paul Patton (London: 
Continuum, 2008). 
280 
 
 
 
— Deleuze Gilles, Kant’s Critical Philosophy: The Doctrine of the Faculties, 
transl. by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (London: The Athlone 
Press, 1984). 
— Deleuze Gilles, Nietzsche and Philosophy, transl. by Hugh Tomlinson 
(London: Continuum, 2006). 
— Deleuze, Gilles, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, transl. by Martin 
Joughin (New York: Zone Books, 2005). 
— Deleuze, Gilles, The Logic of Sense, transl. by Mark Lester with Charles 
Stivale (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990). 
— Derrida, Jacques, Of Grammatology, transl. by G.Ch. Spivak (Baltimore; 
London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997). 
— Derrida, Jacques, Acts of Literature, ed. by Derek Attridge (London: 
Routledge, 1992). 
— Derrida, Jacques, Dissemination, transl. by Barbara Johnson (London: 
Continuum, 2004). 
— Derrida, Jacques, Heidegger and the Question, transl. by. Geoffrey Bennington 
and Rachel Bowl (London: The University of Chicago Press, 1989). 
— Derrida, Jacques, Margins of Philosophy, transl. by Alan Bass (Chicago: 
Chicago University Press, 1982). 
— Derrida, Jacques, Monolingualism of the Other or the Prosthesis of Origin, 
transl. by Patrick Mensah (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998). 
— Derrida, Jacques, Positions, transl. by Alan Bass, (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1981). 
— Derrida, Jacques, Spurs: Nietzsche’s Syles, transl. by Barbara Harlow 
(Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1979). 
— Derrida, Jacques, The Truth in Painting, transl. by Geoff Bennington and Ian 
McLeod (London: University of Chicago Press, 1987). 
— Derrida, Jacques, Writing and Difference, transl. by Alan Bass (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1978). 
— Desmond, William, Art and the Absolute: A Study of Hegel’s Aesthetics 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986). 
281 
 
 
 
— Durr, Volker, Rainer Maria Rilke: the poet’s trajectory (Oxford: Peter Lang, 
2006). 
— Eco, Umberto and Bredin Hugh, Art and Beauty in the Middle Ages, transl. by 
Hugh Bredin (London: Yale University Press, 2002). 
— Emilsson, Eyjólfur Kjavat, Plotinus on Intellect (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
2007). 
— Fine, Gail, Plato on Knowledge and Forms (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003) 
— Forster, Michael, ‘Johann Gottfried von Herder’, The Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), Zalta Edward N. (ed.), URL 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/herder/>. 
— Foucault, Michel, Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology, transl. by Robert 
Hurtley, (London: Penguin Books, 1998), II. 
— Foucault, Michel, The Order of Things (New York: Vintage Books, 1994).  
— Freedman, Ralph, Life of a Poet: Rainer Maria Rilke (New York: Farrar, 
Straus and Giroux, 1996). 
— Freydberg, Bernard, Provocative Form in Plato, Kant, Nietzsche (and others), 
ed. by Peter Haller (New York: Peter Lang, 2000), vol. 21. 
— Gasché, Rodolphe, The Idea of Form: Rethinking Kant’s Aesthetics (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 2003). 
— Gasché, Rodolphe, The Tain of the Mirror: Derrida and the Philosophy of 
Reflection (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997). 
— Genette, Gerard, The Architext: An Introduction, transl. by Jane E. Lewin 
(Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1992). 
— Gerson, Lloyd P., Plotinus (London: Routledge, 1994). 
— Görner, Rüdiger, Dancing the Orange in Agenda: A Reconsideration of 
Rainer Maria Rilke, ed. by Patricia McCarthy (East Sussex: Agenda and 
Editions Charitable Trust, 2007) v. 42, nos. 3-4.  
— Görner, Rüdiger, ‘From Liederkreis to the Eternal Recurrence of the Same’ in 
KulturPoetik (Journal for Cultural Poetics, Bd. 7, 2, 2007). 
— Görner, Rüdiger, Rainer Maria Rilke: Im Herzwerk der Sprache (Vienna: 
Zsolnay, 2004). 
282 
 
 
 
— Grabowski, Francis A., Plato, Metaphysics and the Forms, Studies in Ancient 
Philosophy (London: Continuum, 2008). 
— Guthrie, Kenneth Sylvan, The Pythagorean Sourcebook and Library (Grand 
Rapids: Phanes Press, 1987). 
— Guyer, Paul, ‘18th Century German Aesthetics’, in The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Fall 2008 Edition, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL 
= <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/aesthetics-18th-
german/>. 
— Guyer, Paul, Kant and the Claims of Taste (Cambridge MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1979) 
— Habermas, Jürgen, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, transl. by 
Frederick G. Lawrence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987). 
— Hadot, Pierre, Plotinus or The Simplicity of Vision, transl. by Michael Chase, 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993). 
— Hamilton, Paul, Coleridge and German Philosophy (London: Continuum, 
2007). 
— Hammermeister, Kai, The German Aesthetic Tradition (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
— Harte, Verity, Plato on Parts and Wholes: The Metaphysics of Structure 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002). 
— Harvey, Irene E., Derrida and the Economy of Différance (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1986). 
— Hegel Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, The Difference between Fichte’s and 
Schelling’s System of Philosophy, transl. by H.S. Harris and Walter Cerf 
(New York: State University of New York Press, 1977). 
— Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Faith and Knowledge, transl. by Walter 
Cerf and H. S. Harris (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1977). 
— Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics, ed. by 
Michael Inwood, transl. by Bernard Bosanquet (London: Penguin Books, 1993). 
— Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Phenomenology of Spirit, transl. by Arnold 
Vincent Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977). 
283 
 
 
 
— Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Science of Logic, transl. by Arnold Vincent 
Miller (New York: Humanities Press, 1969). 
— Heidegger, Martin, Basic Writings, ed. by David Farrell Krell, transl. by 
Alber Hofstadter (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978). 
— Heidegger, Martin, Being and Time, transl. by John Macquarrie and ed. by 
Basil Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962). 
— Heidegger, Martin, Existence and Being, intr. by Werner Brock (London: 
Vision Press, 1968). 
— Heidegger, Martin, Identity and Difference, transl. by Joan Stambaugh (New 
York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1969). 
— Heidegger, Martin, Introduction to Metaphysics, transl. by Gregory Fried and 
Richard Polt (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000). 
— Heidegger, Martin, On the Way to Language, transl. by Peter D. Hertz (USA: 
HarperSanFrancisco, 1982). 
— Heidegger, Martin, Poetry, Language, Thought (New York: Harper & Row, 1975). 
— Heidegger, Martin, The Essence of Truth, transl. by Ted Stadler (New York: 
Continuum Books, 2002). 
— Heller, Erich, In the Age of Prose (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1984). 
— Heller, Erich, The Disinherited Mind (Cambridge: Bowes & Bowes, 1952). 
— Henn, Martin J., Parmenides of Elea: A Verse Translation with Interpretative 
Essays and Commentary to the Text (London: Praeger Publishers, 2003). 
— Heraclitus, The Cosmic Fragments, ed. by Geoffrey Stephen Kirk 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1954). 
— Hölderlin, Friedrich, Essays and Letters on Theory, ed. and transl. by Thomas 
Pfau (Albany: State Uinersity of New York Press, 1988). 
— Hölderlin, Friedrich, Hyperion and Selected Poems, transl. by Williard R. 
Task, ed. by Eric L. Santner (New York: Continuum, 1990). 
— Horace, ‘Ars Poetica’, in Literary Criticism, Plato to Dryden, ed. by A. 
Gilbert (New York: American Book, 1940). 
— Hutchinson, Ben, Rilke’s Poetics of Becoming (Oxford: Legenda, Modern 
Humanities Research Association and Maney Publishing, 2006). 
284 
 
 
 
— Hyland, Drew A., Questioning Platonism: Continental Interpretations of 
Plato (Albany N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 2004). 
— Jakobson, Roman, Language in Literature, ed. by Krystyna Pomorska and 
Stephen Rudy (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1987). 
— Janaway, Christopher, Images of Excellence: Plato’s Critique of the Arts 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995). 
— Jones, Edmund P., editor, English Critical Essays (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1922). 
— Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Pure Reason, transl. by Kemp Smith (Garden 
City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1966). 
— Kant, Immanuel, Critique of the Power of Judgement, ed. by Paul Guyer, 
transl. by Paul Guyer & Eric Mathews (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000). 
— Kirk, Geoffrey Stephen, The Presocratic Philosophers (Cambridge  
University Press, 1962). 
— Kleinbard, David, The Beginning of Terror (New York University Press, 
1993). 
— Klossowski, Pierre, Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle, transl. by Daniel W. 
Smith (London: Athlone, 1997). 
— Kojève, Alexandre, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, ed. by Allan 
Bloom, transl. by James H. Nichols, Jr. (Ithaca and London: Cornell 
University Press, 1996). 
— Koterski, Joseph, An Introduction to Medieval Philosophy (Oxford: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2009). 
— Lacoue-Labarthe, Philippe, and Jean-Luc Nancy, The Literary Absolute (State 
University of New York Press, 1988). 
— Leeder, Karen, and Robert Vilain, The Cambridge Companion to Rilke  
(Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
— Leibniz, G.W., Monadology, transl. by Nicholas Rescher (London: 
Routledge, 2002). 
— Leishman, J. B., The translations of Rilke’s Sonnets to Orpheus (London: The 
Hogarth Press, 1946). 
285 
 
 
 
— Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim, Laocoon, Nathan the Wise, etc. ed. by William 
A. Steel (London: Aldine House, 1949). 
— Manfred, Engel, Rilke Handbuch. Leben-Werk-Wirkung (Stuttgart: Metzler, 
2004). 
— Mendelssohn, Moses, Philosophical Writings, ed. by Daniel O. Dahlstorm, 
Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy (Cambridge University Press, 
1997). 
— Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, Phenomenology of Perception transl. by Colin 
Smith (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965). 
— Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, The Prose of the World, transl. by J. O’Neill, ed. by 
Cl. Lefort (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973). 
— Metzger, M. M., A Companion to the works of R.M. Rilke, ed. by E. and 
M.M. Metzger (London: Camden House, 2001). 
— Meyer, Michel, editor, Questioning Derrida With his Replies on Philosophy 
(University of Brussels, 2001). 
— Moravcsik, Julius, Plato and Platonism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992). 
— Mulhall, Stephen, Heidegger and Being and Time  (London: Routledge, 
1996). 
— Nelson, Erika M., Reading Rilke’s Orphic Identity (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2005, 
Studies in Modern German Literature) vol. 101. 
— Nicholls, Angus, Goethe’s Concept of the Daemonic (Columbia S.C.: 
Camden House, 2006). 
— Niebylski, Dianna C., The Poem on the Edge of the Word: The Limits of 
Language and the Uses of Silence in the Poetry of Mallarmé, Rilke, and 
Vallejo (New York: Peter Lang, 1993). 
— Nietzsche, Friedrich, Human, All Too Human, Beyond Good and Evil, transl. 
by Helen Zimmern and Paul V. Cohn (London: Wordsworth Classics of 
World Literature, 2008). 
— Nietzsche, Friedrich, Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe, ed. by 
Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, 15 vols (Berlin/New York: Deutscher 
Taschenbuch-Verlag and Walter de Gruyter, 1988), XI. 
286 
 
 
 
— Nietzsche, Friedrich, The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings, ed. by 
Raymond Geuss and Ronald Spiers, transl. by Ronald Spiers (Cambridge 
University Press, 1999). 
— Nietzsche, Friedrich, The Gay Science, transl. by Walter Kaufman (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1974). 
— Nietzsche, Friedrich, The Will to Power, transl. by Anthony M. Ludovici 
(Wisconsin: Obscure Press, 2008). 
— Nietzsche, Friedrich, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, tr. Graham Parkes, Oxford 
World’s Classics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
— Nietzsche, Friedrich, Twilight of the Idols with the Antichrist and Ecce Homo, 
transl. by Antony M. Ludovici (London: Wordsworth Classics of World 
Literature, 2007). 
— Novalis, Philosophical Writings (New York: State University of New York 
Press, 1997). 
— O'Daly, Gerald J. P., Plotinus's Philosophy of the Self (Shannon: Irish 
University Press, 1974). 
— Pegis, Anton C., Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas, 2 vols (New York: 
Random House, 1945) 
— Plato in Twelve Volumes, transl. by Harold N. Fowler (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press).  
— Plato, The Complete Dialogues, ed. by John M. Cooper (Indianapolis, 
Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997). 
— Plato, The Republic, trans. by Desmond Lee, (New York: Penguin Books, 2003). 
— Plotinus, The Enneads, trans. by Stephen Mackenna (London: Faber & Faber, 
1962) 
— Poulet, Georges, The Metamorphoses of the Circle, transl. by Carley Dawson 
and Elliot Coleman in collaboration with the author (Baltimore, Maryland: 
The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966). 
— Prater, Donald, A Ringing Glass (Oxford, Clarendon, 1986). 
— Reginald, Allen E., Studies in Plato’s Metaphysics (London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1965)  
287 
 
 
 
— Rilke, Rainer Maria, Werke: Kommentierte Ausgabe (KA), ed. by Manfred 
Engel and others, 4 vols (Frankfurt am Main and Leipzig: Beck, 1996). 
— Ryan, Judith, Rilke, Modernism and Poetic Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999). 
— Sallis, John, Being and Logos: Reading the Platonic Dialogues 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996). 
— Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von, Bruno: or, On the Natural and 
Divine Principles of Things, transl. by Michael G. Vater (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1984). 
— Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von, System of Transcendental Idealism 
(1800), transl. by Peter Heath (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1978). 
— Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von, The Philosophy of Art, ed., tr. by 
Douglas W. Stot (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989). 
— Schiller, Friedrich, On the Aesthetic Education of Man: A Series of Letters, 
ed. by Elizabeth M. Wilkinson and L.A.Willoughby (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1985). 
— Schlegel, Friedrich, Kritische Schriften und Fragmente, ed. by Ernst Behler 
and Hans Eichner (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1988), v. 2.  
— Schuhl, Pierre-Maxime, Platon et L’Art de son temps (Paris: Alcan, 1933). 
— Shelley, Percy Bisshe, A Defense of Poetry, ed. by A. Cook (Boston: Ginn & 
Co, 1891). 
— Spinoza, Benedictus, The Chief Works, transl. by R.H.M. Elwes, (London: G. 
Bell and Sons, 1912). 
— Spinoza, Benedictus, Short Treatise On God, Man and His Well-being, transl. 
and ed. by A. Wolf (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1910). 
— St. Augustine’s De Musica, transl. by William Francis Jackson Knight 
(London: The Orthological Institute, 1949). 
— Starobinski, Jean, The Invention of Liberty, transl. by Bernard C. Swift (New 
York: Rizzoli International Publications, 1987). 
— Steiner, George, Grammars of Creation (London: Faber and Faber, 2001). 
— Stepelevich, Lawrence, Selected Essays on G.W.F. Hegel (Atlantic 
Highlands: Humanities Press, 1993). 
288 
 
 
 
— Strauss, Walter, A, Descent and Return (Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1971). 
— Strauss, Walter, A., Rilke and Ponge: ‘L’Objet c’est la Poétique’ in Rilke: the 
alchemy of alienation (Lawrence: The Regents Press of Kansas, 1980).  
— Sutherland, Marielle Jane, Images of Absence: Death and the Language of 
Concealment in the Poetry of Rainer Maria Rilke (Berlin: Weidler 
Buchverlag, 2006). 
— Taylor, Charles, Hegel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975). 
— Thales:Fragments, transl. by JohnBurnet, (1908) 
<http://philoctetes.free.fr/thaleseng.htm>, [accessed 20 August 2010]. 
— Tymieniecka, Anna Tereza, Leibniz’ Cosmological Synthesis (Assen: Royal 
VanGorcum, 1964).  
— Vlastos, Gregory, Plato: A Collection of Critical Essays: Metaphysics and 
Epistemology ([S.I.]: Doubleday and Company, 1971). 
— Warry, John Gibson, Greek Aesthetic Theory (London: Methuen & Co, 
1962).  
— Wegenast, Margarethe, Hölderlin’s Spinoza-Rezeption (Tübingen: Niemeyer 
Verlag, 1990). 
— Wills, David, Lemming in Jacques Derrida and the Humanities: A Critical 
Reader, ed. by Tom Cohen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
— Wood, Frank, Rainer Maria Rilke: the ring of forms (New York: Octagon 
Books, 1970). 
— Ziolkowski, Theodore, Die Welt im Gedicht. Rilkes Sonnette an Orpheus II, 4 
(Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2010). 
